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ABSTRACT 
Many African countries have been holding regular elections since the “Third Wave” of democratisation 
which reintroduced multi-party politics on the African continent, but few of these elections meet the 
democratic litmus test, due to, among other factors, the prevalence of election violence. The press has 
been justifiably or unjustifiably indicted for these imbroglios on account of alleged transgressions linked 
to its overt or covert incitement to violence. In the ensuing political contestations, citizens bear the burden 
of diminished prospects of credible information occasioned by a highly politicised press. In the Southern 
African region, there is no better case to illustrate the entanglement of the press in electoral contestations 
than Zimbabwe. This study is a qualitative exploration of press and citizen discourses on election violence 
during the presidential and parliamentary elections held in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2013. A 
Foucauldian discursive analytic approach was used to analyse the representation of election violence in 
two-state-owned and four privately-owned newspapers during presidential and parliamentary elections 
held over the specified period spanning thirteen years. The study also examined how these press 
discourses interrelate with citizen discourses. Empirical data were drawn from a corpus of archival textual 
data comprising hard news and feature articles published in The Herald, The Sunday Mail, The Zimbabwe 
Independent, The Financial Gazette, Newsday and the Daily News. In-depth interviews were conducted 
with purposively targeted journalists and editors from the selected newspapers. In addition, in-depth-
interviews were held with twenty-one (21) regular newspaper readers who were also politically engaged 
citizens. The main observation was that press representation of election violence was marked by 
antagonistic discursive practices reflective of the rivulets of political and ideological bifurcation. 
Consequently, competing and politically expedient journalistic philosophies emerged. The state-owned 
press used a model of ‘national interest’ journalism while the privately-owned press preferred the 
‘human-rights’ model which crystallized into an over-arching ‘activist journalism’. This ‘activist’ 
journalistic approach found expression through an array of anti-democratic press discursive practices 
epitomised by selectivity, silence and salience, the consequence of which was that citizens were starved 
of credible and impartial information. This thesis argues that the anti-democratic discursive practices 
deployed by the press camps blunted the citizenry’s critical engagement with the exact motivations, 
causes and manifestations of election violence. These anti-democratic discursive practices have a 
potential to engender a culture of political intolerance with long-term consequences that predispose 
society to political conflict rather than consensus building. 
KEY WORDS: Activist Journalism; Anti-democratic Practices; Citizens; Election Violence; Press; 
Discursive Construction; Human Rights; Political Culture; National Interest; Zimbabwe 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 1.1 Introduction 
This study uses the discursive analytic approach to examine press and citizen discourses on 
election violence during Zimbabwe’s presidential and parliamentary elections held between 2000 
and 2013. The period is significant in that the country went through immense socio-economic 
and political turmoil which attracted unprecedented domestic and international media attention. 
How the local press discursively constructed election violence and how citizens interacted with 
and interrogated these discursive constructions are questions that are germane to this thesis.  
The assumption behind this thesis is that, despite the considerable public attention 
accorded to election violence and the media in public discussions there is a dearth of academic 
attention on the topic (Wolfsfeld 1992, 1) be it in the media in general or the press in particular.  
This is troubling given the fact that electoral contests in Africa, particularly in “weak” and 
“fragile” states (Sisk 2008) are increasingly punctuated by election violence, vindicating those 
who are skeptical about the prospects of democratic consolidation on the African continent
1
.  
The 2007/2008 Kenyan post-election violence, the 2008 violent presidential run-off in 
Zimbabwe and the 2010/2011 Ivorian post-election crisis (the bloodiest electoral conflict in 
Africa to date) have given renewed impetus to the so-called “Rwandan Model”, (Onyebadi and 
Ojedeyi 2011) the belief that the media in Africa fuel conflicts, the consequence being that 
elections in Africa are increasingly being viewed as a “curse” (Motsamai, 2010, 2) rather than a 
mechanism for conflict resolution.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, for example notes that there has been preponderance of violent 
electoral conflict on the African continent, examples being Kenya in 2007/2008 , Zimbabwe (2008), Nigeria (2007),  
Lesotho (2007), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (2006), Togo (2005), Zanzibar (2005) and Guinea-Bissau 2008) 
and Ivory Coast in 2010.  
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The situation is more delicate in fragile societies bedeviled by deep-seated social, 
economic and political cleavages, and as Sisk (2008, 1) opines, elections present “palpable 
dilemmas” in that, while they provide the citizenry with avenues for democratic participation, 
they have become rarefied fields for violent conflicts. Biegon, (2009, 2) concurs, adding that: 
Africa seems to be under a constant curse of electoral violence that hangs precariously over the continent 
ready to strike at the slightest provocation. As such, it is often the case that elections in the continent are 
approached with much trepidation. As ironically put, ‘the fear of elections is the beginning of political 
wisdom’. In essence, elections are periods during which the stability and security of African states hang in 
the balance. They are events that lay bare the political fragility of a majority of African states, even those 
that have long been considered stable and touted as bastions of peace.   
Exactly what role the media play in election violence, and how, is a conundrum that 
remains unresolved as current empirical evidence is inconclusive. However, two competing 
narratives appear to have gained traction. On the one hand, there is the liberal democratic model 
of the press which accentuates the watchdog function of the press pivoted on positive 
instrumentalisation of the media’s monitoring or “burglar alarm” journalism (McQuail 2013, 
110), whereby the media are assumed to foster electoral accountability through protection of 
civil and political liberties and shining its spotlights into the dark alleys of powerful institutions 
(Norris 2000). On the other hand, there is the so-called ‘Rwanda Model’2 (Onyebadi and Ojedeyi 
2011) whereby the media in Africa face wholesale indictment for escalating conflicts on the 
continent. Findings in this thesis neither confirm the normative liberal function nor support the 
‘Rwanda Model’ in its totality.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The media in Rwanda have been accused of inciting hatred that led to the 1994 Rwanda/Burundi genocide 
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It is indisputable that the way in which the media represent electoral conflicts influences 
the electoral dynamics and outcomes of electoral conflicts. The exact role played by the media in 
these conflicts requires more unpacking. Vladisavljevic correctly observes that: 
By reporting on some conflicts but not others, and by representing conflicts they report on in 
particular ways, the media strongly influence the dynamics and outcomes of conflicts, and thus 
also shape the prospects of success of conflict parties. That is why participants in conflicts- 
including state officials, armed rebels and other warring sides, political parties, social movements, 
workers on strike and pro-democracy activists in authoritarian states- aim to exploit the media to 
foster their goals by adapting their activities to the logic of media operation (Vladisavljevic 
2015, 2).     
Much as this statement has some semblance of truth it is not clear what type of media 
does what, how and under what circumstances or context. How the press in fragile societies 
exercises its discretionary power of selecting, framing and interpreting election violence and how 
its discourses are interrogated lies at the core of this thesis. The thesis argues that by asserting 
their discursive power through privileging particular ways of social reality (Street 2001, 233), 
about election violence, the different press camps make particular meanings of election violence 
common cause.  
The discursive construction of election violence by state-owned and privately-owned 
press, therefore, constitutes distinct ways of seeing, or “regimes of truth” reflective of equally 
competing values and ideologies. However, these discourses are not immune to the counter-
hegemonic contestations of the citizens who also construct parallel discourses on election 
violence. This thesis elaborates how power is distributed and negotiated in the political 
communication process.  
Gurevitch and Blumler (1995) accuse previous studies on political communication of 
either underemphasizing or overemphasizing a single component of political communication, 
thereby obfuscating rather than illuminating the subtle interactions between the various elements 
of the political communication process.  
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Negrine (1996, 101) contends that the audience have been seriously marginalized in 
political communication studies, in spite of them being an integral element of the political 
communication process and always lurk in the background or simply have a “phantom 
existence”. Similarly, Pfetch and Esser (2012) observe that it is not only the political actors who 
are important in political communication, but also the public “to whom the messages are 
directed”.   
According to Gurevitch and Blumler (1995) we should not undermine or over-privilege 
any element of the political communication process. This thesis, therefore, brings press and 
citizen discourses on election violence into a dialogue so as to deepen the understanding of the 
political communication process. Examining press and citizen discourses on election violence is 
one way of ‘bringing back’ the audience into the political communication process so as to 
broaden the understanding the political communication process. 
1.2 Aim of Study 
The aim of this study was to critically examine press and citizen discourses on election 
violence during presidential and parliamentary elections held in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 
2013 with a view to broadening the insights on the role of the press in political conflicts in 
general and election violence in particular. A Foucauldian discursive analytical approach was 
adopted to capture the total ambience in which the press functions and to make sense of the 
meanings of election violence, and how those meanings are contested by the citizens. The 
investigation was driven by one over-arching research question and three sub-questions thus: 
 How did the press discursively construct election violence during Zimbabwe’s 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections held between 2000 and 2013? 
 How do citizens interact with press discursive constructions of election violence?  
 In what way do press discourses on election violence intersect with or differ from citizen 
discourses?  
 What are the potential implications of the press’s discursive constructions of election 
violence on democracy and citizenship? 
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The main question is addressed in two chapters, namely Chapter Five and Six, while the 
sub-questions are dealt with in Chapters Seven and Eight. In order to address the question, a 
corpus of textual data comprising hard news and feature articles from the selected newspapers 
(see below) and textual data from interviews with editors and journalists of these newspapers 
were used (see Chapter Three for a detailed methodological framework). The Foucauldian 
discursive analytic approach adopted in this study (see Chapter Two and Three), implied that the 
thesis was confined to mapping out patterns of discourse, and not the volume of the 
representations of election violence in the newspapers selected for this study during specified 
elections. 
1.3 Motivation 
There is growing concern in Africa that election violence is becoming a key component on 
the “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002, 36) and that the media are deeply implicated in 
this process. Such fears were amplified after the Kenyan 2007/ 2008 post-election violence and 
the Ivorian 2010/2011 and whose humanitarian consequences were too ghastly to contemplate. 
As a consequence, concerns have been raised about the efficacy of elections as a mechanism 
for political change in Africa (Biegon 2009, 2). Stremlau and Price (2009, 4) assert that 
election violence “challenges political transitions, aspects of nation-building and notions of 
democratization itself”. There are numerous reasons why the role of the press in election 
violence warrants a systematic investigation. Five of these reasons are discussed. 
1.3.1 Electoral Biasing Effects  
Democracy is premised on the ability of citizens to participate freely in electoral processes in 
which elections are a mechanism of circulating the nation’s political leadership in a peaceful 
manner. Sisk posits that: 
When successful, electoral processes offer a means of channeling social conflict into debate, persuasion 
and common rules for choosing authoritative representatives of the people who can serve in executive, 
legislative and other institutions; elections are in this sense a critical means of social conflict management 
through peaceful deliberations and decision-making processes, in which “winners” carry out promised 
platforms and “losers” are given the opportunity to either be represented as a loyal opposition in 
government or to try again in future competitions (Sisk 2008, 2). 
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However, when consensus breaks down and the rules of the game are trampled upon, the 
electoral field is tipped one way or the other. Election violence is one way of tipping the electoral 
field against the political opponent and has become one of the most effective strategies of 
“political biasing” (Reif 2011, 8). Whether covert or overt violence is used, the party that 
employs these electoral biasing strategies gains an unfair advantage which makes the process not 
to be credible as the outcome may not be representative of the will of the citizens.  
The assumption made in this thesis is that through its discursive practices, or through the 
manner in which it represents incidents of election violence, the press can either be an accessory 
to electoral biasing or part of the architecture necessary for the leveling of the political playing 
field.  It is, therefore, imperative that a systematic investigation of the press’ discursive practices 
in order to gain insights on the actual role played by the press in election violence. 
1.3.2 Humanitarian Implications 
Election violence is a destructive force with far-reaching humanitarian consequences. In 
its path is often a trail of dead bodies, injuries, scars, destruction of property including physical 
and social infrastructure. The 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya which left more than 
1200 people dead and about 350 000 displaced (Biegon 2009, 2). The humanitarian 
consequences of election violence are not confined to the domestic locality in which the violence 
takes place, but often have spill-over effects into neighbouring countries and far-flung regions 
when citizens flee to foreign lands where they become refugees. While the material humanitarian 
consequences are quantifiable, the breakdown of the social fabric, the trauma, and the subliminal 
effects of election violence suffered by citizens are unquantifiable and may take long to become 
manifest. Because humanitarian situations lend themselves to the newsworthiness logic of the 
media, they often attract phenomenal media attention, but the manner in which the media insert 
themselves in these struggles is fraught with controversy. 
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1.3. 3 Security Implications 
Election violence has been known to have an affinity with other types of political 
violence such as wars and prolonged armed conflicts, to the extent that there is a natural 
proclivity between election violence and prolonged conflicts. Some scholars argue that election 
violence exacerbates existing conflicts in a country and can lead to “chronic instability” as was 
the case with the 1992 Angolan elections (Fischer 2007, 7) and the Ivorian elections of 2010 
(Davis and Vigan 2013). Election violence can also trigger fresh conflicts, particularly in states 
that already suffer from social, economic and political fragility. Thus, electoral conflicts may 
degenerate into full-scale armed conflicts leading to a permanent democratic regression.  
In some situations, the aftermaths of election violence may result in perpetual mutual 
suspicion between social groups, or between citizens and the government.  Oucho suggests that 
the violence which broke out in Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 post-election violence 
“fell short of civil war”, to the extent that Kenyan citizens could no longer take each other for 
granted anymore as they continued “to recoil back to their ethnic cocoons after the most difficult 
time in their lives” (Oucho 2010, 491). This signifies that the country’s democratic edifice was 
shaken to the core and will most probably remain so in the foreseeable future. 
Mueller  (2011, 103) notes how diffused gang violence beginning in the 1997 and 2002 
elections in Kenya led to the state losing its legitimate monopoly of violence, thereby rendering 
the country vulnerable to the post-election violence which broke out in 2007/2008. This shows 
that election violence can set in motion permanent instability in a country by fracturing an 
already fractured state. 
1.3.4 Economic Implications 
Election violence can deal a serious blow upon the economy of an affected country. The 
uncertainty brought about by election violence often results in the massive withdrawal of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), thereby resulting in rapid economic decline followed by the 
concomitant impoverishment of citizens. The old adage which says “Capital is a coward, it 
doesn’t go to places where it feels threatened” holds true in situations where there is election 
violence.  
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Election violence impacts negatively on a country’s economic activities through delays in 
imports and exports. For example, the post-election violence in Cote d’IVoire in 2010/2011 in 
which 3000 people were killed and 150 raped (Davis and Vigani 2013) prevented the exportation 
of cocoa which is the country’s main foreign currency earner (Koko (2009, 78). Some sectors of 
the economy, such as tourism, are particularly vulnerable to election violence and a country can 
lose millions of dollars in a very short space of time thus, adversely affecting its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). In fragile societies, such disruptions of economic activities can worsen social 
and economic fragility thereby exacerbating social and political tensions. 
1.3.5 Legitimacy 
Given that elections have become the most widely recognized benchmark for affirming the 
legitimacy of a government’s democratic credentials, democracy has become synonymous with 
elections (Schedler 2002; Fischer 2002; Scott and Taylor 2007). Election violence constitutes an 
assault on the legitimacy of a government and erodes the credibility of institutions tasked with 
the responsibility of consolidating democracy (Koko 2009, 79). Koko (2009) asserts that election 
violence is evidence that democracy has not been adequately entrenched.  
Election violence undermines a government’s legitimacy, if the government is believed to be 
the perpetrator of the violence. In addition, election violence can be viewed as an indictment on 
the government’s failure to effectively stamp its authority (Koko, 199).  The use of election 
violence undermines the credibility of the winner if they are perceived to have used election 
violence. In such cases the electoral mandate of the winner may be fraught with a crisis of 
legitimacy which has a potential to trigger further instability.  
In this context the role of the media becomes complicated. Through their framing practices 
the media shape perceptions about the legitimacy (or the lack of legitimacy) of electoral 
processes and verdicts. This is the reason why political actors are keen to either control the 
media or to set the agenda for them. Given that election violence diminishes the integrity of 
elections; both the incumbent and the opposition may seek to influence the media so that they 
frame election violence in a manner that suits their political agendas.  As pointed out above, the 
exact role of the media in election violence remains a matter of conjecture and empirical 
investigations on the impact of different types of media on political conflict remain inconclusive. 
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In the context of Kenya in 2007/2008, much of the blame is heaped on the broadcast media, 
particularly those radio stations that broadcast to the people in Kenyan languages, and to some 
extent the new media (see Mbeke 2009; Ismail and Dean 2008 BBC World Service Trust 2008). 
Whether the press or any other media could be accused of exactly the same transgression is 
debatable, at least if the existing literature is anything to go by (see Chapter Two).  
 1.4 Significance of the Study 
This study seeks to make a contribution to an emerging body of literature on media and 
political conflict in fragile societies. As correctly observed by Vladisavljevic (2015, 1) much of 
the existing literature on the subject mainly focuses on media representation of domestic 
conflicts in developed counties of the West, while very few, (if any) studies focus on the 
experiences of non-western countries. As a consequence of that, there exists a lacuna in terms of 
knowledge about the role played by the news media in political conflicts. Vladisavljevic’s 
observation that “media coverage of political conflict can only be understood in a context” 
(2015, 1) is quite plausible in that, the way in which the press frame political conflict is shaped 
by a complex tapestry of factors, among them, political, economic, historical and social. To this 
extent, the concept of societal “fragility” used in this thesis (see Chapter Two) accentuates the 
uniqueness of the political circumstances in which the elections were conducted in Zimbabwe 
between 2000 and 2013. 
The assumption made in this thesis is that the political and economic context in which 
elections were held in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2013 were significant in many respects (see 
Chapter Four). Arguably, there is no African country outside a war zone, whose domestic 
politics has attracted more international attention than Zimbabwe, during the period in question. 
A detailed outline of this political context is discussed in Chapter Four. As pointed out above, 
empirical evidence on the role of the media in election violence is inconclusive. The reliance on 
Western liberal democratic models in explaining the role of the media in political conflict has not 
yielded much in terms of theoretical headway and superimposing them in non-Western and 
transitional contexts has been misleading (Vladisavljevic 2015,1).  
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It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to complement the existing body of knowledge 
on the role of the media in political conflicts by focusing on Zimbabwe, a non-Western country 
with considerable historical, economic and geo-political significance.  
The findings made in this thesis can contribute to building theory on the role of the media 
in political conflicts in general and in election violence in particular. One finds merit in the view 
of some scholars who disapprove of the wholesale application of the Anglo-American model of 
journalism, which is based on liberal-democratic precincts (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Burger 
2002; Shaw 2009). Berger’s call for developing “original theory based on African experiences to 
precisely explain these experiences more accurately-and act on them to advance the cause of 
democracy on the continent” (cited in Shaw 2009, 505) resonates with the broad thrust of this 
thesis.  
The discursive analytic approach adopted in this thesis is a marked departure from 
previous studies on media and elections (see Chapter Two) in terms of its shift in focus from the 
realm of journalistic practices and normative ideals to the meaning-construction domain. As a 
discursive formation, election violence becomes a terrain upon which meanings are constructed, 
deconstructed and contested. The assumption behind this assertion is that the press is an 
ideological agency which co-constructs meaning with the audience. An ancillary assertion holds 
that whatever meaning emerges out of this process is a ‘negotiated settlement’. Further, focusing 
on discursive practices made it possible to transcend the narrow lens of news framing and 
understand election violence as something intertwined with the everyday political cultural 
practices of society.  
The thesis opens new pathways for theorizing election violence and the media using 
different methodological and theoretical approaches. Rather than simply focusing on the efficacy 
of journalistic messages (Louw 2001, 205) during elections, the thesis executes a critical 
examination of the discursive practices of the press and how they intersect with citizen 
discourses.  Bringing press and citizen discourses on election violence into dialogue is one way 
of responding to Blumler and Gurevitch’s call not to “under, or over-emphasize any single 
element of the political communication” (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995, 4).  
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As privileged discursive actors the audiences (citizens) are not just passive consumers of 
press messages, but actively construct meanings about election violence and critique information 
that they get from the press. As demonstrated in this thesis, rather than being constructed by the 
press, citizens have agency and are able to construct new meanings about the reality of election 
violence. These meanings are counterpoints to the discursive constructions of the press. 
 
1.5 Why the Press? 
The aim of this study as previously indicated was to critically examine press and citizen 
discourses on election violence. The focus of analysis was purposively sampled hard news and 
feature articles published six weeks before and two weeks after each election and selected for the 
study (see Chapter Three). The press in Zimbabwe constitutes a formidable institution for 
shaping public opinion and perceptions about politics.  
The six newspapers selected for this study (see below) have over the years proven to be 
the key opinion leaders in Zimbabwe. They each have a wide national distribution network, and 
editorially, have distinct ideological positions that are representative of the diversity of 
Zimbabwe’s polity. These ideological differences were made apparent in the competing 
discourses on election violence. The newspapers have not only been consistent in terms of 
publication, but have maintained the same editorial policies over the period under study. The fact 
that the elections being studied span a period of thirteen years, each of them being held in a 
context marked by the progressive escalation of the political and economic crises, made it 
possible to tease out ideological nuances in the discursive constructions of election violence in 
the press. It was possible to make comparisons in relation to subtle shifts by the different 
newspapers over time. The rationale for focusing on the press was that, unlike the broadcasting 
sector (particularly television) which is monopolized by the state, there is diversity in the press in 
terms of ownership and views; hence it is easier to compare discourses on election violence. A 
significant fraction of the Zimbabwean population, particularly in the urban areas, has access to 
newspapers and the country’s high literacy rate (see the discussion in Chapter Three), means that 
newspapers are well-supported in terms of readership.  
 
12 
 
Although newspapers have fewer followers than radio, they are, nevertheless, read largely 
by an economically and politically significant elite class that commands considerable influence 
in shaping public opinion on political affairs. The opinion leadership position of this social class 
in Zimbabwean politics is significant.  
Apart from an active interest in political matters, regular newspaper readers influence 
public opinion through word of mouth. In this thesis it is these readers who are referred to as 
“citizens” on account of their being active participants in political issues through actively 
seeking information. The term is used in this thesis for analytical purposes to reflect their 
epistemic status of the citizens in news politics (see Chapter Three on the sampling procedure 
used). 
Government’s keenness to control the press in the context of mounting opposition testifies 
to the indisputable potency of the press in influencing public opinion in Zimbabwe. There is 
evidence to show that despite the threat posed by new media, the press still occupies a critical 
place in African societies as newspapers are read by a significant size of the population. 
Newspapers are shared by family members and friends and are also used to cement social 
relationships. In addition, many people still prefer to read the printed newspaper for news and 
information (Chari 2011). Below is a brief synopsis of the six newspapers selected for this study.  
 
 The Herald is a mass market daily newspaper owned by the Zimbabwe Newspapers 
Group (Zimpapers) (1980) Ltd, a publicly listed company owned by the Zimbabwean 
government through a trust company called the Zimbabwe Media Trust (IMPI Report 
2014). Having been founded in 1892 during the colonial era, it is the oldest 
newspaper in the country. Like all state-owned newspapers, The Herald is overtly pro 
the incumbent government. The Zimbabwe All Media Products Survey (ZAMPS) 
results for the first half of 2014 indicated that The Herald had the highest readership 
in the country at 26% followed by the Daily News at 15% (IMPI Report 2014). 
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 The Sunday Mail is a mass market weekly newspaper, also owned by Zimpapers and, 
like its sister paper; The Herald was founded during the colonial era. The ZAMPS 
2014 survey mentioned above put The Sunday Mail readership at 19% of the 
readership. Like The Herald, The Sunday Mail is overtly pro-government and 
espouses, in its editorial pages a ‘nationalist’ and “Pan Africanist’ ideology. 
 The Daily News is a mass market daily newspaper owned by the Associated 
Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ), a private company, and was founded on 31 March 
1999 by a consortium of local and foreign businessmen. The newspaper was shut 
down by the government in September 2003 after refusing to comply with the Access 
to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002) but was re-launched in on 18 
March 2011, after being re-registered by the newly-constituted, Zimbabwe Media 
Commission, during the Government of National Unity (GNU), formed by the ruling 
party, ZANU (PF) and two of the opposition MDC formations in February 2009. As 
was before its closure in 2003, the daily News is pro-capital, neo-liberal ideological 
leaning, highly critical of the ruling party and government and pro-opposition 
political parties especially the MDC.  
 The Zimbabwe Independent is a mass market weekly newspaper owned by Alpha 
Media Holdings (AMH), a private company owned by Trevor Ncube, a Zimbabwean 
businessman based in South Africa who is also the owner of the Mail and Guardian 
(SA). Ncube owns AMH through Vusumuzi Investments which holds 60% of the 
shareholding, while the other 39% is owned by the Media Development Investment 
Fund (MDIF) (IMPI Report, 2014, 61). Although The Zimbabwe Independent was 
originally founded as a “business” newspaper it generally leads with political news. 
The newspaper subscribes to a neo-liberal market ideology and like the Daily News is 
very critical of the ruling party and government and is pro-opposition. According to 
ZAMPS results (2014) it readership in the weekly mass marked was 2%.  
 The Financial Gazette is also a weekly mass market newspaper owned by The 
Financial Gazette (Private) Limited, a company wholly owned by Octadew 
Investments, a Zimbabwean company owned by former Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
governor, Gideon Gono.  
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Like the Zimbabwe Independent, The Financial Gazette positions itself as a 
“business” newspaper, but hardly leads with business stories as it usually leads with 
political stories and covers domestic politics voraciously. It is anti-government, and 
has been a leader in critiquing ruling party policies. In 2014 ZAMPS results put its 
readership at 3% of the weekly mass market share (IMPI Report 2014, 53). 
 NewsDay is a mass market daily newspaper owned by ALPHA Media Holdings 
owned by Tervor Ncube (see above) and was founded in June 2010, thus ending The 
Herald’s monopoly in the daily news market after the closure of the Daily News in 
2003. The newspaper was launched using funding provided by the Media 
Development Investment Fund (MDIF, n.d.). Like its sister papers (The Zimbabwe 
Independent and The Standard) the paper is also critical of the Zanu (PF) 
government, but is perceived to be more balanced than the other two, according to 
respondents who participated in this study. In 2014 ZAMPS rated it number 3 after 
The Herald and the Daily News, with a readership of 14% in the daily news market.  
The selection of newspapers was largely dictated by the need to cater for ideological 
diversity and representativity in the newspaper industry. The two state-owned newspapers 
selected for the study were published consistently throughout the period under 
consideration. However, only two of the weekly newspapers (The Zimbabwe Independent 
and The Financial Gazette) published consistently, after the closure of the Daily News in 
2003, while Newsday only appeared on the scene in 2010.  
The inclusion of more privately-owned newspapers was an attempt to make up for the 
lacuna in privately-owned daily newspaper coverage after the closure of the Daily News in 
2003 so as to ensure that there is enough material from privately-owned newspapers. The 
study did not include newspapers which did not exist at the time of the study such as The 
Sunday Mirror, Daily Mirror, The Weekend Tribune and The Daily Tribune (see Chapter 
Four). The excluded privately-owned newspapers, even during their existence did not 
command significant circulation figures and their influence was confined to the urban 
areas, meaning that they were on the periphery of public opinion formation. 
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1.6 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters and each one of them addresses a particular 
theme of the study. Chapter One, the introductory chapter, introduces the subject under 
investigation, that is, press and citizen discursive constructions of election violence during 
Zimbabwe’s presidential and parliamentary elections held between 2000 and 2013. The chapter 
discusses the aims and motivation of the study and foregrounds the key research questions which 
drive the study. An outline of the structure of this thesis is also given in this chapter.  It is this 
chapter which sets the research agenda of the thesis by foregrounding existing gaps in the 
literature on the role of the media in election violence. The main observation made in this 
chapter is that the discursive construction of election violence by the press and citizens 
constitutes an exercise in power and knowledge as well as a strategy for countering power. 
  Chapter Two reviews literature linked to the present investigation and situates the 
research questions about press and citizen discursive constructions of election violence in a 
proper context. The chapter also discusses the conceptual framework which underpins the thesis, 
namely, the Foucauldian concept of Discourse, the Mediation concept and the Social 
Construction Theory. The chapter also demonstrates how these concepts link up with the 
literature and the methodology used in this thesis. The main observation made in this chapter is 
that the bulk of existing literature focuses on wars, terrorism, protests and other types of political 
violence, particularly in western countries, while there is very little on the press and on election 
violence. Further, much of the existing violence is tilted towards an assessment of media 
performance; either extolling or lamenting the media’s coverage. There is very little scope for 
understanding election violence in different contexts such as fragile societies beset by social and 
political cleavages. The chapter concludes that election violence, as a unique type of political 
violence is different from other types of political violence in the sense that it takes place in a 
time- concentrated context and has far- reaching implications for democracy.  
Having outlined the theoretical debates around the role of the media in election violence 
and the theoretical concepts underpinning these debates, Chapter Three outlines the study’s 
research design and approach, methodology, data collection and analysis processes.  
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The chapter also discusses the researcher’s reflexivity and positionality, outlined ethical 
considerations and study limitations. Given the social constructionist epistemological approach 
adopted in this study, considerable emphasis was given to accounting for researcher constraints 
in explicating meanings during the research process.  
Chapter Four provides an outline of the broader social, political and economic context in 
which the thesis is situated. In very expansive strokes, the chapter maps out the socio-political, 
economic and historical background in which elections were conducted in order to provide a 
deeper understanding of the forces that shaped discourses on electoral violence in Zimbabwe. 
The rationale for this is that meanings about elections cannot be divorced from the larger socio-
economic context in which they are conducted. The chapter argues that the historical, social, 
economic and political events compounded by the fragility of the state shaped the meanings, 
framings, interpretations and articulations about elections and electoral violence during the 
period under study.  
The findings of the thesis are presented in three chapters, and begin in Chapter Five. 
Chapter Five discusses press discourses on election violence based on the corpus of archival data 
and interviews with journalists and editors. The Chapter discusses three themes in relation to 
election violence, namely discourses on levels of election violence, attribution of responsibility, 
and the Authority-Disorder discourse. The textual data principally addresses the HOW aspect of 
the research question, i.e., how the selected newspapers discursively constructed electoral 
violence, while the data from the interviews with journalists and editors are used to answer the 
WHY component of the research question which sheds light on the rationale for such 
construction. The chapter argues that state-owned and privately-owned newspapers produced 
competing discourses about electoral violence pitting a “national interest” discourse and a liberal 
human rights frame which found expression through a watchdog function of the press against 
each other. These discourses demonstrate the instrumental logic of electoral violence whereby 
the press becomes instruments for either retaining or capturing power. In addition, these 
discursive constructions of electoral violence mirror the contours chalked by the political 
bifurcation of the Zimbabwean society which became a hotbed for ‘activist journalism’.  
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Chapter Six, is an extension of Chapter Five and discusses additional themes gleaned from 
the textual data and interviews with media practitioners. The discussion focuses on three themes 
that relate to the way in which the press sought to either legitimise or de-legitimise elections 
through particular discursive tropes of election violence, namely memorialization, condemnation 
and peace advocacy discourses. The chapter argues that, while the state-owned press used these 
discursive strategies to legitimize electoral verdicts, the privately-owned press used the same to 
de-legitimise electoral outcomes, thus bringing to the fore the discretionary power of the press in 
shaping public opinion and perceptions about election violence.  
Chapter Seven discusses citizen discourses on election violence based on the data corpus 
from interviews with 21 purposively sampled citizens who are regular readers of newspapers. 
The analysis focused on three key questions relating to how citizens make sense of election 
violence, how they evaluate press reporting of election violence and the normative prescriptions 
than can guide the press in reporting elections. The chapter argues that citizen discourses on 
election violence reveal a complex conception of the causes, attributes, and manifestations of 
election violence that are circumscribed by Zimbabwe’s history, social, economic and political 
context of the country.  
Based on a synthesis of observations in Chapter Five, Six and Seven, Chapter Eight 
compares press and citizen discourses on election violence using three themes as a lens for 
gaining insights on the interaction between the press and citizens. The ultimate aim was to gain 
insights on the values, norms, beliefs and practices that underpin discursive constructions of 
election violence in fragile societies. It was noted that, although press and citizen discourses 
overlap, in some instances they show a significant disjuncture. The chapter argues that the 
interface between press and citizen discourses represents a zone in which a society’s authentic 
political culture is produced, contested and altered. 
Finally, Chapter Nine gives a summary of and a reflection on the main findings of the 
thesis and highlighting their implications for theory and journalism practice. The limitations of 
the study are also discussed in this chapter and areas for further investigation are identified and 
recommended. In conclusion, the chapter argues that the political instrumentalisation of the press 
manifested through the “activist” journalism model partly emanates from the lack of an 
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integrative and unifying, cultural and ethical ethos that could provide Zimbabwean journalists 
with a common identity and common value system.  
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter set out the research agenda behind this thesis by situating the study in a context 
and foregrounding the research questions that drive this study. It discussed the aim of the study, 
the motivation for the research, the nature of its contribution to the existing body of knowledge 
on the role of the media in election violence. The chapter also outlined the structure of the thesis 
and gave a summary of the key concerns in each of the nine chapters.  
A brief synopsis of the newspapers was also given highlighting their ownership, editorial and 
ideological positions as well as their market share position. Two major points emerged from the 
discussion in this chapter. Firstly, it was observed that elections are increasingly becoming a 
worrisome trend in Africa and are implicated in democratic reversals on the continent. Secondly, 
it was noted that as a discursive formation, election violence is a contested arena characterized 
by competing ideological interpretations. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  ELECTION VIOLENCE AND THE MEDIA: 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two main objectives. Firstly, it reviews literature linked to the present 
study in order to situate questions about press and citizen discursive constructions of election 
violence in societies beset by socio-political cleavages, unresolved national questions. Although 
the specific focus of this thesis is on press and citizen discourses on election violence, the 
literature reviewed in this chapter encompasses political violence in its broad conception as well 
as election violence as a specific sub-set of political violence. The rationale for this was that 
election violence is dictated by newsworthiness, the same logic that characterizes broader 
political violence; namely, the existence of the element of conflict, and lends itself to the logic of 
breaking news (Thussu 2009, 15) or as Meadow (2009, 232) puts it, the thinking that “if it bleeds 
it leads”.  
Examining literature on political violence helps to shed light on the distinction between 
political violence in its broader sense and violence which occurs in an electoral context. This is 
particularly imperative, because, in the Zimbabwean, and arguably in many African contexts, the 
terms ‘political violence’ and ‘election violence’ are used interchangeably in public discussions 
and in the media as evidenced by the excerpts from the citizens interviewed for this study (see 
Chapter Seven).  
The review focuses on three main aspects of political violence, namely, the causes of 
political violence, media and political violence in general, and press representation of election 
violence. The literature reviewed is mainly from a coterie of scholarly publications under the 
broad rubric of political violence, media and political violence, and media and election violence.   
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Important inclusions in this coterie of scholarly work are the following publications: the 
edited volume by Nossek, Sreberny, and Sonwalkar (2007), titled Media and Political Violence, 
Timothy Sisk’s article ‘Election Violence in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence’ 
(2008), Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor’s article, ‘Democratisation and Electoral Violence in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2007 (2009), Gadi Wolfsfeld’s paper ‘The Role of the News Media in 
Unequal Conflicts: From Intifada to the Gulf War and Back Again’ (1992) and Uche Onyebadi 
and Tayo Oyedeji’s article titled ‘Newspaper Coverage of Post-Election Violence in Africa: An 
Assessment of the Kenyan example (2011). Secondly, the chapter discusses the conceptual 
framework underpinning the thesis, namely, mediation, Michael Foucault’s concept of discourse, 
and his Social Construction Theory of the Media, clearly demonstrating how these concepts link 
up with the literature reviewed and the social constructionist epistemological approach 
contemplated in this thesis. As argued in Chapter Three, this epistemological approach rests 
upon the assumption that, rather than simply reflecting reality, the press shapes and constructs 
reality through its representation of election violence. This representation constitutes a particular 
body of knowledge or a regime of truth which legitimizes or de-legitimises particular actions. 
2.1 The Media and Election Violence Nexus: An Overview 
Although there is a continuous flow of literature on media coverage of political violence 
in its broad sense and in other political conflicts in both the developing and developed world 
(Alali and Eke 1991; Schlesinger 1991;  Miller 1992; Nossek et al 2002; Ryan 2004;  Jones 
2005; Bogkoff 2006; Ismail and Dean 2007; McCallum 2007;  Hobart 2007; Erjavec and Volcic 
2007; Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt 2007;  Papacharisi and Oliveira 2008; Stremlau and Price 
2009, Stremlau et al 2009; Hoerl et al 2009; Thussu 2009; Cissel 2012; Shaw 2012; Shaw 2013; 
Coesemans 2013) very little scholarly effort has been expended on understanding the 
representation of election violence from a meaning-construction theoretical perspective. These 
studies do not dwell on how election violence is implicated and implicates broader social-
cultural practices.  
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Elections are the most widely recognized benchmark for assessing a country’s democratic 
credentials to the extent that democracy has become synonymous with elections (Schedler 2002; 
Fischer 2002; Scott and Taylor 2007; Reif 2009). The media play a crucial role in shaping public 
opinion and perceptions about the legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of elections through their 
framing practices, the very reason why political actors are keen to either control the media or to 
set the agenda for them. Given that election violence diminishes the integrity of elections; both 
the incumbent government and the opposition may seek to influence the media to frame election 
violence in a manner that suits their political agenda.  Norris (2000, 1) argues that during election 
campaigns the media “have a responsibility to strengthen democracy through political coverage 
that should educate the public about the major issues, inform citizens about the contenders for 
office and mobilize people to turnout”. Garcia-Blanco (2011, 177) underscores the importance of 
the media in electoral campaigns thus: 
The importance of journalism in electoral campaigns is difficult to minimize. During these crucial moments 
in democratic politics, the media inform citizens about the different candidates, about the relevant debates, 
and about the issues at stake. 
Temin and Smith (2002, 586) posit that “there is a natural proclivity for a symbiotic 
relationship between the media and political parties” in that, on the one hand, “the media need 
the exciting political campaigns in order to market their products and on the other, the media 
provide the much needed publicity and relay the messages of the political parties to the voters. 
However, regular elections are no longer an adequate barometer of a country’s democratic 
credentials in the sense that legitimacy is requisite for elections to pass the democratic test. The 
peaceful coexistence of competitors and the ability of citizens to exercise their choice without 
coercion are indicators for electoral legitimacy (Lindberg 2006, 139).  
Through their watchdog function the media help to ensure electoral accountability, 
protect the civil and political rights of citizens and scrutinize the actions of the state and powerful 
institutions in society (Norris 2000, 4). Norris further notes that the more popular notions of the 
press’s watchdog role entail championing popular interests and challenging the government of 
the day (Norris 2000).  
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The more active role of the watchdog function involves reporting on issues critically, 
interpreting and evaluating political messages in order to help the readership understand issues in 
context (Norris, 2000, 5). However, there is a potential conflict between the press’s active 
watchdog role, particularly the interpretive aspect, and journalistic conventions such as factual, 
balanced and impartial reporting, particularly in the context of election reporting in the sense that 
the line between ‘reporting’ and  ‘interpretation’ becomes blurred. This conflict is further 
observed in relation to the press’s function as a civic forum or in Habermasian parlance, a 
‘public sphere’,  a forum which facilitates informed deliberation about topical issues and 
“mediating between citizens and the state” (Norris 2000, 2).  
The notion that the press is a conversational arena (Chae 2005) open to all and sundry to 
express their views freely (Habermas, 1989, Kean, 1991, Curran, 1991) is in contradistinction to 
one of the observations made in this thesis as discussed in Chapter Five, Six and Seven, that the 
press used a selective lens in its representation of election violence in Zimbabwe. The reliance on 
carefully selected and managed news sources by both state and privately-owned state press 
testifies that there is a need to rethink the concept of the public sphere, in particular, the political 
contexts.  
Optimistic accounts of the public sphere which ascribe educational and informational 
roles to the media as well as the roles of deepening democracy and good governance (Teshome, 
2008; Adriantosa et al, 2005) need to be modified and reconsidered, particularly against the 
backdrop of growing evidence that the press, particularly in conflict-ridden parts of Africa has 
been used less as a mechanism for exercising oversight over the state or exposing abuse of 
official authority (Uzodike and Whetho 2006, 38), or exposing electoral irregularities (Berger, 
2009) such as election violence. Rather, they have been used more as organs of public 
information than tools for managing consensus and promoting consumer culture (McCarthy 
1989, xii, Clarke et al, 2007). Thus functionalist accounts about the role of the media during 
elections in general, and election violence in particular, particularly in the context of Africa are 
aberrations of the actual practice on the ground, if the recent cases of elections in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe are anything to go by. Against this backdrop there is a need to bring about a new 
impetus on theoretical debates about the relationship between the media and election violence in 
order to expand existing knowledge on the role of the media in the democratisation process.  
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Willems’ call for an alternative “critical research agenda that considers the engagement 
between media institutions and political actors as a symbiotic relationship that ultimately seeks 
to legitimize certain election candidates and condone election rituals as democratic events par-
excellence” (Willems 2011, 91) is quite plausible. The functionalist approach embedded in neo-
liberal democratic normative assessments of the media treats concepts such as elections and 
democracy as unproblematic (Willems 2012).  
The theoretical discursive approach adopted in this thesis enables one to view election 
violence through the prism of socially constructed reality rather than an ‘objectivist’ normative 
perspective whereby the role of the media is viewed as unproblematic; simply entailing 
innocently reflecting what is happening in society. While the normative democratic model 
mentioned above assumes that the media are an arena in which public affairs are debated 
rationally and objectively, the social construction theory accentuates the meaning construction 
role of the media. Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt (2007, 68) are quite right when they argue that 
journalists give events meaning “by transforming them into words and images”. They are able to 
do this through a careful selection and presentation process and through their privilege and 
power to “decide what is important, making the complex reality understandable for their 
audiences.  
Much of the literature on media and political violence mainly focuses on news media 
framing of different political conflicts such as terrorism (Alexander and Latter 1990; Alexander 
and Oichard 1991; Alali and Eke 1991; Miller 1992: Ruigrok and Van Attenveldt 2007; Persson 
2004; Ryan 2004; Norris et al 2003;”.Hobart 2007; Erjavec and Volcic 2007; Papacharisi and 
Oliveira 2008; Strauss and Taylor 2009; Thussu 2009) ethnic violence (Myers et al 1996; 
Oberschall 2000; Alozie; 2007; Thompson 2007; McCallum 2007; Melvern 2007; Dowden 
2007; Wilkes et al 2010;  Chari 2010; Baisely, 2014) street demonstrations and protests (McPhail 
and Schweingruber 1991; McCarthy et al 1996; Smith et al 2001; Bogkoff 2006;  Cottle 2006; 
Cottle 2008; Cissel 2012; Lynch 2012;), and war (Hallin 1986; Wolfsfeld 1992; Goddard et al 
2001; Dimitrova and Stromback 2005; Aday 2005; Ruigrok et al 2005; Murray et al 2008). In 
spite of this vast literature on broad political violence, very little scholarly attention has been 
given to electoral violence as a special sub-category of political violence and this has had serious 
implications for democracy.  
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The consequence has been the fragmentation of theory (if any) around the relationship 
between media and election violence, and consequently fuzzy understanding of the actual role of 
the media in the democratization process. Some scholars have lamented the wholesale 
application of the Anglo-American liberal democratic model in non-western contexts arguing 
that its ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is problematic (Berger 2002; Hallin and Mancini 2004; 
Nyamnjoh 2005; Shaw 2009).  
Vladisavljevic 2015, 1) notes that some authors claim that the reliance on models 
developed for established western democracies in non-western settings may be misleading, hence 
the need to develop“ new theories that are more suitable for discerning the role that the media 
play in democratization”.  
Such calls are plausible, particularly given the fact that the normative democratic model 
has not been able to furnish sufficient theoretical insights to explain the role of the media in 
‘non-democratic’ and ‘democratizing’ states beset by socio-political cleavages. Nyamnjoh (2005, 
3) rightly observes that western inspired journalistic models are at odds with the dominant modes 
of personhood and agency and by extension notions of society, culture and democracy shared by 
African people because they assume “…that there is One-Best Way of being and doing to which 
Africans must aspire and to be converted in the name of modernity and civilization”.   
There are more compelling reasons for charting a research agenda around media and 
elections in weak and fragile societies, particularly those in Africa in the wake of the increasing 
prevalence of election-related violence in recent times, forcing some scholars to view elections 
as a “curse” (Motsamai 2010, 1). Notable cases of election violence include the 2010/2010 
Ivorian post-election violence in which over 3000 people were killed, the 2007/2008 election 
violence in Kenya, the election violence in Zimbabwe (2008), Guinea Bissau (2008) Lesotho, 
(2007), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006), Togo (2005) and Zanzibar (2005) (Motsamai 
2010) to mention but a few.  As demonstrated below, although these cases of election violence 
have received phenomenal attention in public discussions and the media, only the Kenya 
2007/2008 post-election violence has attracted significant academic attention (Anderson 2002; 
De Smedt 2009; Mbeke 2009; Khadiagala, 2009; Ogenga, 2009; Ojwang 2009; Dercon and 
Gutierez-Romero 2010; Koko, Merilainen 2012; 2013; Shilaho 2013).  
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However, because election violence has a close affinity with broader political violence 
such as war, terrorism, demonstrations and political protests, particularly in relation to the fact 
that conflict lends all types of political violence to the news agenda, a conceptual understanding 
of political violence in its broad sense is in order. 
 
2.2. Media and Political Violence: Global and Continental Perspectives 
A clear-cut definition of political violence is elusive forcing one scholar to argue that 
political violence is “a term that suffers from conceptual devaluation or semantic entropy” 
(Schlesinger (1991, 5). While violence can be conceived as physical harm against human and 
inanimate objects, a broader definition encompasses its symbolic manifestations such as the 
hegemonic activities of political actors (Schlesinger 1991).  
In its broad sense political violence encompasses a wide range of “deeply contested 
actions, events, and situations that have political aims and involve some degree of physical 
force” (Steinhoff and Zwermarn 2008, 213). Such actions include, among other things, 
politically motivated assassinations, civil wars, military putsches, demonstrations, protests, 
rebellions, terrorist attacks, guerilla wars, kidnappings, mob-violence, insurrections, national 
liberation and security policing just to mention a few (Schlesinger 1991; Steinhoff and Zwerman 
2008; Meadow 2009, UNDP, 2010).  
Moser and Clark (2001, 36) define political violence as the “commission of violent acts 
motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power” while the 
UNDP (2010, 2) defines it as “any organized violent or potentially violent activity or coordinated 
violent reaction to an organized activity to achieve political goals”. The latter definition is much 
broader and encompasses the potential of an action to turn violent is as a form of violence. 
De Los Rios (2004) identifies the main motivations of political violence as the desire to 
defeat a government,  the desire to control a particular region or land, religious beliefs, economic 
interests and the desire to retain or gain power. Many of these causes of violence are rooted in 
the powerful forces of capitalism and globalization which were accomplished through violent 
European colonial conquest, slavery, and looting of the resources of African countries. The 
divide and rule policies of the colonialists left indigenous communities deeply fractured along 
ethnic and tribal lines (Mamndani 2002).  
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After colonialism, the hegemonic policies of powerful countries such as the United States 
of America and Britain were blamed for the perpetuation of violence on developing countries. 
Where power and control were maintained through the gun during the colonial era, proxies who 
work in the knowledge industry can accomplish that easily in the ‘modern’ era through 
hegemonic apparatus.  In the same way that the relationship between the native and the 
colonialist was sustained through violence, colonialism was uprooted through violence by the 
former victims (Mamdani 2002) thereby seeding an ideology or “culture of violence” (Jenkins 
1998).  
The ultimate goal of political violence is the acquisition of power - a means to an end 
(Moser and Clark, 2001; De Los Rios 2004, Kirwin and Cho 2009) hence power and violence are 
intricately interwoven (De Los Rios 2004).  
The acquisition or retention of political power is the main justification for deploying 
violence and electoral contests are the arenas where contests for power are vividly amplified. 
Political violence in its broad sense has received substantial scholarly attention. Existing 
studies on political violence largely focus on war, particularly civil war and ethnic wars 
(Schlesinger 1991; Mamdani 2002; Oberschall 2000), violent protests or demonstrations such as 
those witnessed at the World Trade Organization conference in Seattle (Boykoff 2006) and the 
war on terror (Norris and Montague 2003; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008) and assassinations 
(Hoerl and Jarvis 2009). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the September 11, 2001 bombing 
of the twin towers also inspired a cottage industry of research on political violence (Steuter and 
Wills 2009; Dimitova and Stromback 2005; Ryan, 2004). Although the specific focus of this 
thesis is election violence as a special type of political violence which has serious implications 
on democratic consolidation, it is underpinned by the same rationale as all other forms of 
political violence, that is, by the retention or acquisition of political power.  
An examination of the discursive construction of electoral violence helps to shed insights 
into how election violence is intertwined in power contests, its links with other conflicts and its 
consequence in the broader society.  
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As mentioned in Chapter One, election violence does not only discredit electoral verdicts, 
it also impinges upon the general integrity of the electoral process. Where it takes a physical 
form, election violence destroys life and property, polarizes society, scares away investors, 
undermines peace and can lead to the dispersal of populations. In some situations, if not curbed, 
electoral violence has the potential to degenerate into full scale conflicts such as civil wars and 
genocide thereby destabilizing a whole country or region. From a constructionist, discursive 
perspective, this thesis views political violence as various acts and discursive practices through 
which power is enacted and challenged in private and public spaces. 
2.3. Triggers of Election Violence 
 
  Much of the literature which examines the causes of election violence falls under political 
science/international relations and related disciplines (Sisk 2012; Mueller 2011; Sachikonye 
2011; Motsamai 2010; Bekoe 2010; Koko 2009; Kirwin and Cho 2009; Reif 2009; Sisk 2008; 
Straus and Taylor 2007; Fischer 2002).  
In this literature, it is generally acknowledged that elections per se do not cause violence but the 
competitive environment in which they are held creates opportunities to exacerbate existing 
fault-lines in a particular society (Motsamai 2010; Rao 2014).  
 
The actual triggers of election violence are multifaceted and generally depend on the 
political context in which the elections are held. However, there is consensus among scholars 
that the causes of election violence are linked to social structural conditions, electoral system 
choice, the stakes of political competition, the neutrality and competence of the electoral 
administration system, and the nature and role of the security sector (Muller, 2011; Sisk 2008; 
Koko 2009; Motsamai 2010; Rao 2014).  
Koko (2009, 67-68) notes that the structural causes of election violence are located within 
the social fabric and are linked to those characteristics of a society which predispose it to 
particular political behavior. These include unequal representation and socio-economic 
development issues occasioned by a legacy of unequal representation.  
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Thus a long history of political and economic exclusion of a particular group may 
engender perceptions of victimhood forcing the excluded group to view elections not, as a 
mechanism for electing a government but a mechanism to “overcome their unfortunate 
predicament (Koko 2009, 68). This raises the stakes higher during elections and emotions can 
run high and degenerate into election violence if the situation is not managed properly.  
The structural causes of election violence may also be located in deep ethnic or sub-
ethnic differences particularly in communities with a history of intra or inter-community 
resentment and conflict over either political representation or the use of resources such as land. 
These conflicts are then reactivated or amplified during elections, and as Koko (2009, 68) rightly 
observes, such issues increase the probability of election violence, particularly where populist 
politicians vie for office and the media and civil society use these issues as a bait for political 
mobilization. Koko notes that:  
In such circumstances, elections cease to be merely a matter of dignified political competition, becoming 
instead a zero sum, game, an opportunity to settle long-held scores by all means available. The situation is 
aggravated when the electoral system is designed so the winner takes all, turning loss into an electoral 
defeat but more importantly into collective humiliation and the beginning of an era of marginalization 
(Koko 2009, 68). 
 
What is instructive to note from the quotation above is that the structural causes of 
election violence are intertwined with other factors such as the electoral system and identity 
issues, thus suggesting that the causes of election violence are hardly mutually exclusive. This 
shows that election violence is a complex phenomenon which requires careful examination. 
 
Apart from structural factors, election violence has also been attributed to the nature of a 
country’s electoral system. Electoral systems that are exclusionary increase the incentives for 
election violence. Sisk (2008, 11) notes that the electoral system under which an election is held 
is a very crucial factor in determining the likelihood of election violence because it can give an 
idea of who will be included or excluded after the election and in many ways shapes the way 
contestants craft their appeals and the overall context in which elections are held.  
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Thus countries with winner-take-all electoral or majoritarian systems are more prone to 
electoral violence because politics becomes a ‘zero-sum’ game in which losers are permanently 
excluded and in countries rocked by ethnic divisions the mere prospect of one ethnic group being 
perpetually excluded becomes an incentive to engage in election violence. Mueller (2011, 102) 
notes how the highly ethicized and non-programmatic nature of Kenyan politics “pre-disposed 
both leaders and followers to see politics as a do or die or zero-sum game” in the highly 
contested 2007 election.  
Sisk (2008) notes that when the stakes are too high in an election it creates opportunities 
for politicians to engage in corruption as they strive to win by any means possible. In addition, 
high expectations by political contestants can lead to election violence because they may imagine 
what they stand to lose or the perils and risks of losing a contest.  
Uncertainty about the outcome of an electoral contest may mean that an election becomes 
a question of life and death. Further, in conditions of high scarcity and underdevelopment where 
political positions are viewed as a means of livelihood rather than an opportunity to serve the 
public the incentive to engage in election violence becomes much higher because it may mean 
returning to a life of joblessness and penury.  
In societies characterized by networks of patronage certain electoral outcomes are likely 
to generate election violence more than others. Sisk (2008, 10) notes that when political parties 
are quite certain that they are going to lose an electoral contest or when they know that they will 
be permanently excluded from political power the incentive for election violence becomes 
higher. Thus the politics of patronage in countries like Kenya (Mueller, 2011) and Zimbabwe 
(Alexander and McGregor 2013) has been cited as one of the root causes of election violence.   
Apart from the competitiveness of electoral contests, election violence has also been 
caused by perceptions, real or imagined that the institutions tasked with the responsibility of 
running elections lack neutrality or integrity. For example, Mueller (2011) argues that the 
deliberate weakening of state institutions outside of the presidency, including the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK) (whose commissioners were appointed by the incumbent president 
just before the 2007 election and making his former lawyer the Vice-Chairman of the 
Commission) and the creation of new appointments in the judiciary was perceived to have 
undermined the integrity and legitimacy of these institutions.  
30 
 
The violence which followed after the elections is partly linked to perceptions of bias by 
these institutions and as Mueller argues, the disputes and the violence that ensued appear to have 
been “organized in anticipation of possible loss” (Mueller 2011, 104) and is partly linked to the 
violence that ensued in the post-election period. Koko (2009, 70) rightly observes that there is a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between the weakness of state institutions and election violence 
in the sense that the weaker state institutions become the less is their ability to deliver credible 
elections, and violence tends to erode their credibility further. 
 Apart from the triggers discussed above, other triggers of electoral violence that have 
been cited in the literature on election violence include the lack of a tolerant political culture, the 
protection of incumbency, disputes about the delimitation of constituencies, the role of the 
national security forces in the election process (Koko 2009). Sachikonye (2011) examines the 
causes, patterns and consequences of political violence in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008, a 
significant period which is covered by this study.  
Sachikonye sought to explore how political violence impacted on the country’s evolving 
political culture. He makes three pertinent observations that resonate with the findings on 
discursive constructions of election violence discussed in Chapter Seven. Firstly, he observes 
that violence has a historical dimension, having its roots in the country’s colonial and liberation 
war and is “embedded in a tradition and practice of violence that began more than half a century 
ago” (Sachikonye 2011 xvii). Secondly, he points out that political violence was not “random” 
but “organized” by different institutions and groups within the country. Thirdly, he concludes 
that political violence was not one-sided but involved many parties and provides evidence to 
show that, although they carried different proportions of culpability and level of involvement, 
state institutions, opposition parties and civil society organisations all engaged or participated in 
political violence; sentiments that are echoed in citizen discourses discussed in Chapter Seven. 
However, unlike the focus of this thesis, which is press and citizen discourses Sachikonye’s 
study is more of a historical account of the manifestations, causes and institutionalization of 
political violence. Its focus on political violence within and without the electoral context means 
that, unlike the present study, its scope is much wider than what is contemplated in this thesis.  
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However, it is worth noting that there is a general consensus among scholars that the 
factors discussed above are ‘triggers’ rather than the primary causes of election violence, 
although there is no agreement in relation to their level of influence with some scholars 
accentuating the weakness of state institutions and patronage (see Shilaho 2013; Alexander  and 
McGregor, 2013, Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero 2012; Frazer 2009) the competitiveness of 
elections (Sisk 2008; Mueller 2011),“the military-security complex” (Masunungure 2009; 
Makumbe 2009), underlying historical, social, economic and political factors (Bekoe, 2010, 
Oucho 2010; UNDP 2010), the democratization context linked with military dictatorships and 
the colonial struggle which bread a culture of political violence (Omotola 2008).  
Stefan Dercon and Roxana Gutierrez-Romero who conducted a survey on the Kenyan 
2007 post-election violence found out that the majority of the respondents (42%) attributed 
election violence to “election irregularities and a weak Electoral Commission”.  
 
Strauss and Taylor (2009) conclude that weak and corruptible electoral institutions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa encouraged politicians to compete for access to vital resources such as land, 
resulting in lawlessness, while the UNDP (2010, 8) states that election violence in Africa is 
caused by “deep rooted socio-economic and political issues which are brought to the electoral 
process”. Similarly, Bekoe (2010) posits that electoral violence in Africa is a sign of the currency 
of systematic bottled grievances over resources such as land, employment and ethnic 
marginalization. This suggests that the salience of these factors is determined by the social, 
political and economic context in which elections are held. While one set of factors may be 
salient in one country another set of factors will be dominant in another context. As alluded to 
above, these triggers are not mutually exclusive, an indication that it may be difficult to clinically 
disaggregate the causal factors of election violence. This shows that the issue of the causes of 
election violence is very complex. 
The literature is, however, silent on the role of international observers in election 
violence. This is troubling, particularly against the background of emerging evidence that 
election monitors sometimes endorse flawed elections in order to protect the interests of their 
member states or their donors so as to “accommodate their compelling but tangential 
organizational norms” (Kelley 2009, 766).  
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Laakso (2002) has examined the politics of international election observation, noting how 
before the 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe some international election observers made 
certain demands before the elections and threatened to impose sanctions if the Zimbabwean 
government did not accede to their demands. It would be unreasonable to conclude that the 
activities of international observers in themselves may cause election violence; however, that 
bias by election monitors, through endorsement of fraudulent elections (see Kelly 2009) or 
conspiracy of silence on transgressions has an effect on election violence. 
It is also instructive to note that with the exception of a few scholars (e.g. Koko 2009) the 
literature on election violence, (mainly by political science scholars) hardly mentions let alone 
foregrounds the media as triggers of election violence. This is surprising given that the media has 
been implicated in African political conflicts such as the Rwanda genocide. Even when the 
media are mentioned, as in the case of Koko (2009, 75) the actual role played by the media in the 
violence is fuzzy as it is simply stated as “negative” and nothing beyond that. Further, the 
relationship between the media and the culture of political violence in socially, politically and 
economically fragile societies remains unexplored and the potential implications of such 
discursive practices on election violence remains a matter of conjecture.  
 
2.4. Mediation of Political Violence 
 
It must be admitted, of course, that violence makes good copy. A good machine gun attack on a bank makes 
exciting reading, and in a free press journalists report and editors will always print what they believe to be 
exciting for their readers (Chalfont et al 1980, 80).  
 
The above quotation is a succinct summation of how violence of any nature lends itself to the 
news-making process-one of the key recurring themes in the literature discussed in this section. 
There is an outpouring of literature examining the mediation of political violence in its broad 
sense i.e. wars, terrorism, protests, demonstrations etc., (Cissel 2012; Thussu 2009; Papacharissi 
and Oliveira 2008; Nossek, Sreberny, and Sonwalkar 2007; Hobart 2007; McCallum 2007; 
Wolfsfed, 1993; Schlesinger 1991; Chalfont et al. 1980; Clutterbuck 1981).  
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This strand of literature has some relevance to the present study in so far as it demonstrates 
the dynamics and logics attendant to the mass mediation of election violence, although, unlike 
the present study its focus is not on election violence per se, but political violence in its broader 
sense, including demonstrations, wars, and terrorism, to mention only a few. A further distinction 
on this strand of literature can be made on account of the specific focus of mediation and three 
categories emerge.  
The literature which focuses on ‘media coverage’ (Chalfont et al 1980; Wolfsfeld 1993; 
Jones 2005; McCallum 2007; Hobart 2007; Thussu 2009; Cissel 2012; ‘media frames’ (Boyd 
2000; Volcic 2007; Robinson 2008; Autesserre 2009) and ‘discourse’ (Ryan 2004; Van Gorp 
2005; Christie 2006; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). However, the unifying factor in this 
literature is that all studies focus on the competing interpretations of political violence and the 
divergent objectives of different actors in the communication of political violence, thus 
underscoring the fact that political violence is a site for ideological contestation.  
 
Literature on the mediation of political violence mainly focuses on how the media 
reported on different incidents of political violence, ranging from terrorism, war, demonstrations, 
protests and crises of different kinds. Two key texts in this category are Phillip Schlesinger’s 
Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities (1981) and an edited 
volume by Hillel Nossek, Annabelle Sreberny and Prasun Son Walker, Media and Political 
Violence (2007).   
Using British case studies of political violence involving industrial disputes, mass 
demonstrations and terrorist incidents, Schlesinger (1981) examines the theoretical debates 
around the interpretation of political violence, its relationship with the state and the media. He 
tackles enduring themes around the media and political violence nexus and rejects the 
assumption that the media should be on the side of the state when reporting political violence. In 
relation to industrial disputes Schlesinger argues that the media gave salience to the views of the 
public which dislikes strikes, noting that any bias against strikers would have invoked a sense of 
injustice.  
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Schlesinger views the mediation of political violence as characterized by competing 
interpretations of events by different actors that seek to either legitimise or de-legitimise political 
violence. Thus political violence is viewed as a “contested category in political discourse” 
(Schlesinger 1981, 2) with one school of thought viewing the state and media as being 
collaborative in covering political violence while another school views the media as an 
independent fourth estate and not an appendage of the state. However, Schlesinger argues that 
this dichotomy is simplistic as the reality is more complex and argues that the scope of media 
reporting of political violence is conditioned “by the contradictory communicative strategies of 
the state and its armed enemies” (Schlesinger 1981, 4). Thus Schlesinger dismisses arguments by 
some scholars who take a moralistic stance and accuse the media of being sympathetic, if not 
supportive of perpetrators of political violence, adding that the success of terrorism depends on 
the amount of publicity given by the media (Chalfont 1980).   
 
Chalfont (1980) contends that the media have been obliging tools of terrorist 
organizations through a combination of subtle manipulation, subtle collusion, unwitting 
collaboration, rationalization, explaining away terrorism and obsession with the seductive news 
worthiness of political violence resulting in terrorist organizations and the acolytes getting 
undeserved publicity in the media. Chalfont dismisses any attempts to sanitize terrorist 
organizations by comparing them with democratically elected governments who have a 
legitimate monopoly of violence, describing such attempts as ‘bogus intellectual objectivity’ and 
‘fallacious moral symmetry’ (Chalfont 1980, 81). Chalfont posit that: 
 
The first point to be grasped is that terrorism would be impotent without publicity. It depends for its effect 
upon dramatic impact in order to compel and hold public attention. Terrorists have occasionally shown 
great sophistication in manipulating the media. Some of the results of all this have been striking and 
disturbing. The FLN in Algeria discovered that if you killed ten Frenchmen in the desert, no one noticed; 
but kill one in the casbah and it would be front page news the next day in every Paris newspaper 
(Chalfont 1980, 79). 
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 This statement echoes Papacharissi and Oliveira’s observation that terrorism has the 
propensity to attract the sympathy of the news media because it has elements of drama that 
media savvy terrorists exploit the media to legitimize their cause (Papacharissi and Oliveira 
2008). 
Thussu (2009, 17) notes how the Indian government, after the Mumbai terrorist bombings in 
November 2010 became a “non-stop, news generated soap opera that you could plug into 
whenever you wished…A platform for  hyperventilating for outraged citizens, mostly of a class 
pursued by advertisers. A pillorying point for politicians. And a site for war mongering, no less” 
(Thussu 2009, 15) paving way for the Indian government to craft new measures regulating the 
Cable News sector. One of the regulations was that, should such events occur in the future there 
should be “delayed carriage of live feed” (Thussu 2009, 18) in order to curb the 
“Bollywoodization” of terrorism (Thussu 2009, 18).  
These descriptions invoke debates about the normative role of the media in political 
violence, ethical issues like objectivity, impartiality and balance and policy issues like press 
freedom and media regulation.  
Thus, scholars who do not subscribe to the objectivist school blame the media’s 
adversarial relationship with governments as an abdication of the public interest (Chalfont 2007, 
Thussu 2009). Schlesinger disagrees with this view when he says that: 
 
…we should not see broadcasting either as a simple instrument of the state or as the terrorist’s friend; nor 
should we buy the argument that it is a fearless part of the mythic Fourth Estate. The reality is actually 
more complex, and …the scope for reporting at any given time is in many respects conditioned by the 
contradictory communicative strategies of the state and its armed enemies.   
 
The theoretical debates raised by Schlesinger (1981) and other scholars are taken up and 
elaborated through practical case studies in an edited volume by Nossek, Sreberny and 
Sonwalkar (2007). The volume examines various theoretical perspectives for understanding the 
nexus between the mass media and political violence in historical and contemporary case studies 
in different parts of the world.  
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It examines mass mediation of different types of political violence such as the Hiroshima 
bombing (Allan 2007) the Bosnian war (La Porte 2007; Bloch-Elkon and Lehman- Wilzig 2007) 
the September 11 bombings and the war in Iraq (Berkowitz 2007), terrorist attacks in Indonesia 
(Hobart 2007), the Bali Bombings in Indonesia (2007), the war on terror (Lewis 2007 and other 
recent political conflict around the globe.  
The running thread in these studies is how the element of conflict lends political violence 
to newsworthiness and how media from different ideological standpoints may deploy different 
discursive practices on the same event thereby generating competing versions of reality. For 
instance, Hobart (2007) compares and contrasts Indonesian and British media coverage of the 
September 11, 2001 bombing of the twin towers in the United States of America and the Bali 
bombings in Indonesia.  
On the one hand, the Indonesian media reported the September 11 as a low key event, 
avoided naming the perpetrators (a discursive strategy known as ‘exnomination’, meaning 
avoiding naming something) and tried to balance their own perspectives with their own 
hegemonic Euro-American narratives. On the other hand, the British media named the alleged 
perpetrators of the Bali bombing (nomination) and engaged in mythologizing, silencing and 
stereotypical assumptions that made the causes, perpetrators and victims of the violence appear 
common cause.  
Hobart argues that the British media’s representation of the Bali bombings reflected a 
‘distinctly Christian dystopia’ which was at odds with the Hindu values of the Indonesian 
society, thereby preventing a critical inquiry on the manifestations of political violence  and the 
act of representing became a form of political violence against the Indonesian society itself 
(Hobart, 2007, 11).  
The difference in the representation of the same event by the Indonesian and the British 
reflects the contention between two conflicting journalistic cultures (Hantzc et al, 2011) and 
news production values.   
Schlesinger (1991) who views violence as essentially “contested” term in political 
discourse and advises that terms such as “terrorism”  should be “understood within the context of 
competing propaganda strategies by the state and its enemies” (Schlesinger 1991, vii).  
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The implications are that violence becomes a “strategically, consciously employed 
resource” (Riches cited in Schlesinger 1991, 1) and its mediation must be viewed as a struggle 
over meaning the mediation of political violence should be viewed as a struggle over meaning 
rather than in moralistic terms. Hence, political violence is subject to various and sometimes 
competing interpretations by the media through their rhetorical, semantic and framing activities. 
Thus, Cissel (2012) who employed content analysis and the framing theory to investigate 
mainstream and alternative media coverage of the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the 
United States of America in 2011 found out that alternative and mainstream media used different 
frames to represent the demonstrators. Further, the differences in framing were not just 
attributable to media ownership, but to a host of relationships and networks cemented by 
friendships, investments, advertising and other commercial relationships and the motives which 
informed of the divergent political agendas of the mainstream and alternative media. This shows 
that the media are deeply implicated in political violence.  
However, what role they should play in political violence and how they should execute 
that role remains debatable and the flurry of studies discussed above are inconclusive. It is, 
however; instructive to note that the underlying assumptions informing the literature on the 
relationship between the media and political violence in the broad sense are the uniqueness of 
political violence and the accompanying dramatic and conflictual elements that make it 
newsworthy. Such assumptions are premised on the basis that most current studies focus only on 
serious, large scale conflicts such as those associated with terrorism, war, the holding of hostages 
and other such similarly dramatic crises or what Thussu refers to as “Bollywoodisation” (Thussu 
2009).   
Wolfsfeld (1993) examined the role of the news media in the intifada and the Gulf Wars 
using what he describes as the “transactional model” to explain the role of the news media in 
lopsided conflicts, demonstrating how media get implicated in situations characterized by power 
symmetries (Wolfsfeld 1993). He discusses the role of the news media in “unequal political 
conflicts” (public confrontations pitting a party that controls a significant amount of coercive 
resources, such as the state or government, against at least one other antagonist with 
comparatively less resources.  
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Wolfsfeld posits that in unequal conflicts the weaker side uses the media to gain the 
sympathy of third parties in order to “create a more balanced power” (Wolfsfeld, 1993, 1). The 
ability of the antagonist to bring third parties to its side depends on the extent to which the media 
appropriate the frames of the antagonist and propagate them within a wider constituency. He 
contends that the inclusion or subtraction of players in a conflict can alter power relations in a 
conflict and that weaker parties have more to gain by expanding the scope of the conflict and the 
media play an important role in this process. The more powerful party in a conflict also deploys 
the media to fit its strategic interests and possibly neutralize the media by keeping the conflict 
away from the public agenda. The party also ensures that the official voice drowns all other 
voices until the voice of the weaker party is completely obliterated (Wolfsfeld 1993).  
 
While this model could be helpful in explaining how the media are instrumentalised in 
political conflicts and how media framing may be geared to balance the power equation by 
appealing to external partners/players, it does not clearly explain what happens in political 
contexts where the media are polarized along political lines and each media camp is a pliant 
instrument for political mobiliziation.  
The model also falls short in terms of which media (international or national) gets 
conscripted  in the conflict to balance the power relations, since in some situations the bulk of the 
media might be in the hands of the more powerful party (the state or government) as is the case 
in Zimbabwe. In electoral contests, it is not clear how bringing in third parties to the conflict 
affects relations between the protagonists.   
 
Although the specific focus of this thesis is election violence, a special type of violence 
subsumed by political violence (Sisk 2008) this study takes the stance that in so far as election 
violence relates to the electoral context, important theoretical insights can be drawn from the 
mediation of other types of political violence, particularly on how the media are implicated in 
power struggles. When that happens, the different media structure mutually antagonistic 
narratives about incidences of political violence in different ways. It is, however, important to 
keep in mind the uniqueness of election violence, particularly in so far as it takes place in the 
context of electoral campaigns. 
39 
 
 
2.5 Media and Election Violence  
As mentioned above, there is paucity of literature which focuses on election violence as a 
sub-set of political violence. There is even fewer literature that focuses on press and citizen 
discourses of election violence (if any). Election violence is a special type of political violence 
and differs from other types of political violence in the sense that its motive is to change the 
outcome of an election.  
 
In this framework Reif (2011, 5-6) views election violence as “any spontaneous or 
organized actions by candidates, party supporters, election supporters, election authorities, 
voters, or other political actors that employ physical harm, intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, 
violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or other forms of coercion (or threat 
thereof) aimed at disrupting, determining, hastening, delaying, reversing, otherwise influencing 
an election and its outcome”.  
Meadow conceives election violence as “acts that are used to harm, intimidate, exploit, 
disrupt, determine, hasten, delay or reverse electoral process or outcomes and acts that occur 
between the registration of a voter and the inauguration of a political regime” (Meadow 2009, 
234). Sisk (2008, 5) sees election violence as “…Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or 
physical harm to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of an electoral 
competition. Straus and Scott (2007, 8) assert that electoral violence is the “physical violence 
and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced 
electoral result.”  
These definitions are wide and encompass a lot of elements, meaning that like the broad 
term “political violence”, election violence also suffers from “conceptual devaluation or 
semantic entropy” (Schlesinger 1991, 5). Meadow’s definition is more suited to the objectives of 
this thesis and its sampling procedure in so far as it covers violence perpetrated during a full 
election cycle; namely, the pre-election period, during voting and the post-election period (see 
Chapter Three). Election violence, in this thesis includes any violent acts or threats of violence 
reported in the media six weeks before and two weeks after an election.  
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Although there is a significant amount of literature focusing on African elections (Temin 
and Smith, 2002; Waldahl 2004; Adriantosa et al, 2005; Waldahl 2005; Uzodike and Whetho, 
2006; Lindberg 2006; Teshome, 2008; Chuma, 2008; Selinyane 2008; Ogola, 2009 Frere 2011a; 
Frere 2011b) none of these really focus on election violence per se (although Waldahl (2004) 
briefly discusses ‘political violence’ in the context of an election that was not his major focus, 
while Frere (2011a) and (2011b) focuses on the role of the media in post-conflict elections. It 
suffices to acknowledge the existence of this literature but will not be subjected to any further 
scrutiny since it does not have a direct link with this thesis.  
The snippets of literature by some Non-Governmental Organisations such as the Media 
Monitoring Project (see MMPZ 2000a; 2000b; 2001; 2002; 2006; 2009; 2011) is also 
acknowledged but because it does not exclusively focus on mediated election violence it will not 
be discussed further than this acknowledgement. At both the global and continental level 
literature on election violence and the media is scant.  
One is inclined to agree with Meadow (2009) who attributes the lack of attention to 
election violence to the fact that, unlike other types of political violence  election violence is 
“time concentrated” and has comparatively fewer death tallies than wars and rebellions which 
take place over a long period of time resulting in huge death tolls (Meadow 2009, 232). Meadow 
(2009) notes that with the exception of Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence where more than 
1000 people died, 3500 injured and 350, 000 displaced, (and in Ivory Coast where 3000 people 
died in the 2010/2011 post-election violence) election violence has far more fewer deaths and 
casualties.  
As a result, election violence and the media as a subject has not been given adequate 
academic scrutiny. This demonstrates that although other types of political violence have 
received considerable academic attention, election violence, particularly its nexus with the media 
and citizens has remained in the backburner of the academic enterprise. There are snippets of 
literature on election violence and the media worth considering, although this literature does not 
directly address the concerns of this thesis.  
One theoretical expose on the role of the media in election violence deserves some 
attention in this regard. This is an article by Robert G Meadow who develops a general typology 
of election violence based on whether it is proactive or reactive (Meadow 2009, 234).  
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Meadow defines proactive election violence as entailing; turnout suppression, boycott 
enforcement, justice seeking, retaliatory and outcome grieving. Meadow notes that the structure 
of media organisations and the nature of elections make it rather difficult to gauge the actual role 
of the media in election violence (Meadow 2009). This is particularly the case if the nature of the 
violence is covert. Unlike other types of political violence, election violence is very difficult to 
detect because elections take place at many and different venues and yet the media, due to 
resource constraints cannot be everywhere to detect election violence all the time.  
Using examples from the United States of America, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Iran and Sri 
Lanka, India and Macedonia, Meadow argues that the media play two crucial roles in election 
violence.  
Firstly, they can legitimize or delegitimize elections by providing external evidence 
thereof, and through its interpretative frames the press can create the impression that an election 
was free and fair or was rigged through coercive acts. 
 Secondly, the media are able to alert people about the risks and dangers of partaking in 
elections by showing people bearing the brunt of electoral violence, thereby invoking the 
‘burglar alarm’ role of the press whereby, the press acts as a sentry to alert citizens about 
impending danger or crisis (McQuail 2013, 112). 
 Meadow notes that, courtesy of the new technological enhancements occasioned by the 
digital media, images of election violence can now be disseminated to a global audience, thereby 
creating an opportunity for more people to witness election violence. However, whether the 
enhanced ability to see violence can help explain its underlying causes remains unclear (Meadow 
2009, 239). Meadow contends that the “presentation of these images does nothing to address the 
path to resolution of the conflicts that underlie the violence. Despite plenty of literature on 
election violence, there is limited empirical and comparative evidence of the causes and 
trajectories of election violence (Meadow 2009, 239).  
This conclusion leads him to raise close a dozen questions about election violence, of 
which question number 5, 6, 8 and 9 are worth reiterating on account of their resonance with 
some of the literature reviewed in this chapter and the central concerns of this thesis and are 
stated thus: 
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(5)Whether election violence is greater when there are existing cleavages within 
society not rooted in ideology, but in ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic, 
economic, or geographic differences; 
(6) Whether election violence is greater at political transition points when the 
stakes are highest, such as the first democratic election, the end of dictatorship, 
upon independence, and so forth; 
(8)With respect to the media, what are the dominant images of election violence? 
(9) What are the narratives used to portray election violence? (Meadow 2009, 
239-240). 
These questions are pertinent because they speak to the context in which election 
violence occurs (whether there are cleavages or not) the time in history in which election 
violence takes place (transition or consolidation, end of an era) the images selected by the media 
(selections, silence/suppression/ salience) and discursive constructions (narratives).  
It is for these reasons that this thesis sought to background the socio-socio-economic and 
political context, (characterized by fragility in the context of this), periodization and discursive 
constructions of election violence. Although there are important insights gleaned from Meadow’s 
article, it does not focus on election violence on any specific political context nor does it directly 
focus on the press, which is the focus of this thesis. Like most of the studies reviewed in this 
chapter its media centric approach implies a one-sided political communication process in which 
other elements such as the audience are not anticipated in the social construction of reality. By 
focusing on both the press and citizen discourses this thesis departs from this approach. 
 
Two reports on media and election violence by Stremlau and Price (2009) and Stremlau 
et al (2009) are worth noting. The former is based on a workshop which sought to explore the 
election experiences of Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Somaliland, Tanzania and Sudan. It came up 
with an analytical framework for understanding the role of the media in the post-election context. 
It argues that the media, particularly the new media can play three roles in the post-election 
context, namely, as a mirror, an amplifier and enabler (Stremlau and Price, 2009).   
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The ‘mirror’ metaphor connotes that the media should reflect on the state and nation-
building processes, providing insights into the levels of national dialogue within communities. 
‘As amplifiers’ the media make it easier for people to disseminate messages geared towards 
mobilizing others to take certain actions. In the case of the Kenyan 2007 post-election violence, 
the amplifier role was witnessed when new media gadgets such as mobile phones and vernacular 
radios were used to propagate hate messages.  
 
As ‘enablers’, the media can prioritize nation-building through the celebration of common 
identities, negotiation of political power as well as acting as outlets for divergent opinions 
(Stremlu and Price 2009). A point underlined by the report is that the media do not necessarily 
cause violence, but are among a number of factors that have a bearing on election violence. 
Stremlu and Price’s (2009), observation that the media play different, if not dynamic roles during 
elections is plausible. The level of state legitimacy, political polarization, the degree of media 
partisanship, and to some extent, media commercialization are some of the factors that influence 
the media’s function during an election. The second report, Stremalau et al., (2009) explores 
issues of media policy in relation to election violence, using the experiences of Kenya’s 2007 
post-election violence to “distill  lessons” for an impending election in Somaliland.  
The report identifies six factors that the government, journalists and politicians should be 
aware of namely, the monitoring and regulation of radio, reporting of public opinion polls, 
reporting of election results, live news coverage of violence, the accelerating effect of new 
technology and partisan media and public broadcasting (Stremlau 2009, 8).   
In addition, the report discusses potential triggers of election violence. Among these are 
government monopolization of state media and “concerns about the private press exacerbating a 
tense situation” through the use of “provocative words directed at the government” (Stremlau 
2009, 15). A key point underlined in this report is that the Kenyan media did not cause the 
violence in 2007, but “together with government policies and interventions exacerbated a volatile 
situation” (Stremlau 2009, 17).  
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While these reports are valuable for their insights on the functions of the media during 
electoral violence they are more policy oriented interventions and their findings are not based on 
empirical research but brainstorming sessions during a workshop. This is however, does not 
minimise their contribution to the body of literature on media and election violence, which they 
acknowledge is very little (Stremlau et al 2009).  
However, the fact that these reports do not necessarily focus on any particular media type 
is problematic in that the media is very diverse and cannot possibly play the same role at any one 
time. It is highly inconceivable that broadcasting media or social media which are visual media 
and disseminate their messages can play exactly the same role as the press, notwithstanding the 
impact of media convergence occasioned by new technological developments. 
 
2.6 The Press and Election Violence 
 
There is a miniscule amount of literature that directly addresses the role of the press in 
election violence in the African context. Almost all of this literature focuses on the role of the 
press in the Kenyan post- election violence of 2007/2008, while very little scholarly literature 
exists on the bloodiest electoral conflict on the African continent, the 2010/2011 Ivorian 
elections. Notable studies on the Kenyan conflict includes Onyepadi and Oyedeji (2011)’s 
content analytic examination of how the country’s main newspapers, the Daily Nation and The 
Standard covered the post-election violence. Onyepadi and Oyedeji argue that the way in which 
the two newspapers reported on the post-election crisis in Kenya advanced peace rather than 
promoting conflict, thereby debunking the “stereotypical characterization of African media as 
sectarian advocates of mayhem or institutions that hardly play any constructive role during crises 
(Onyebadi and Oyedeji 2011, 224).  
The study observes that during the pre-election period the two newspapers used thematic 
frames to address the restoration of peace story, thus demonstrating, that even in the context of 
‘worst case’ scenarios such as the Kenyan post-election violence of 2007 the media’s role is not 
wholly negative.  
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Although the dominant view is that the media in Kenya, particularly the local language 
radio stations were responsible for fanning violence (Ismail and Dean, 2008, Ogola, 2009) 
Onyebadi and Oyedeji’s study shows that the mainstream press in that country generally played a 
positive role by fostering peace-building (Onyebadi and Oyedeji 2012), thus debunking the 
wholesale indictment of the media in the Kenyan 2007 post-election violence. 
 Although Onyebadi and Oyedeji’s study is based on two newspapers with similar 
ownership the fact that the study deviates from conventional wisdom about the role of the media 
in electoral conflicts in Africa supplies the impetus for further empirical studies to validate or 
invalidate previous findings about the role of the press in political conflicts in fragile societies. 
In any event, this was a small study which did not cover a full electoral cycle and the 
analysis is limited to only two newspapers.  
 
Although their analysis brings refreshing findings pertaining to the possible roles of the 
press in election violence, the content analysis approach used tends to limit analysis to thematic 
issues, meaning that it does not cater for discourses per se. Similarly, Coesmans (2013) studied 
discursive constructions of Kenya’s post 2007 election violence in hard news report from a 
linguistic-pragmatic approach.  
His methodology encompassed ‘quantitative content analysis’, ‘qualitative discourse 
analysis’ and ethnographic fieldwork’ comparing the thematic analysis of news reports from 
local newspapers (Daily Nation and The Standard) and foreign newspapers (The Independent 
(UK), The Times, The New York Times and The Washington Post). He concluded that news 
representation in British and American newspapers accentuated ethnicity while that of the 
national newspapers tended to politicize the post-election violence.  
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He argues that the difference in language use is attributed to “contextual (political, social 
and pragmatic) factors” (Coesmans 2013, 179). Thus,  
 
The Kenyan newspapers contained few references to ethnicity because of policy, political context and 
because the news workers believed they would inflame tensions in the assumption that they had to protect 
their multi-ethnic readership and restore harmony in the country. Foreign correspondents made frequent use 
of ethnic language, because they deemed it relevant for their audiences abroad and acknowledged the 
explanatory force of such terms both from a journalistic and reader perspective, although they often only 
saw what was happening at the surface (Coesemans 2013, 197). 
Significantly the tension between the local and foreign invokes Schlesinger (1991)’s 
argument that violence is an ideological interpretation and Huntington’s notion of the “clash of 
civilizations” discussed above. This demonstrates the complexity of the mediation of election 
violence. 
Although these studies have illuminating insights on the press and election violence they 
did not examine citizen discourses, meaning that they do limit understanding of the political 
communication process (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995). Incorporating the audience (citizens) 
opens up pathways for understanding election violence as a site for struggle over meaning.   
It is one way of taking up the challenge by Esser and Pfetch (2004) who rightly observe 
that because the media effects debate is nearing a dead end there is need to turn attention to how 
audiences engage with political messages in order to broaden understanding of the political 
communication process.  
This thesis seeks to contribute to this research agenda by shifting attention from the 
efficacy of journalistic messaging to meaning production (Louw 2001, 2005), bearing in mind 
that the media are ideological agencies which co-construct meaning with “multiple players 
embedded in ever shifting contextual arrangements within which there are simultaneous 
pressures for ‘opening’ and ‘closing’ reading (and coding) possibilities” (Louw 2001, 208).  
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The acknowledgement that meanings are co-constructed in the political communication 
process resonates with this thesis’s ambition to engage press and citizen discourses in a dialogue. 
Further, a discursive analysis of how these key elements of the political communication process 
interact during electoral episodes thereby opening up open debates on the press-election violence 
nexus to a more inquisitive exploration of African elections as discursive formations, and 
representation of election violence as an alternative way of ‘seeing’ (Schlesinger 1991). 
   
Having outlined these theoretical debates it is imperative to return to the research 
questions driving this thesis: How did the press and citizens in Zimbabwe construct election 
violence during Zimbabwe’s Presidential and Parliamentary elections during 2000 and 2013? 
What meanings do the press and citizens generate about electoral violence? Why do they 
construct such meanings? How do press discourses on election violence differ from citizen 
discourses? What are the implications of these discursive constructions to democracy? In order 
to address these questions a discursive analytic approach was adopted in order to glean insights 
on the way in which the press and citizens interface during electoral violence. The next section 
discusses the theoretical framework which underpins this thesis.  
2.7 Theorizing Media Representation of Reality: Mediation, Discourse and Power 
 
A key assumption made in this thesis is that media texts are not reality but versions of 
reality which is subject to a variety of interpretations. In order to theoretically contextualize 
questions about press and citizen discourses on election violence this section focuses on the 
various perspectives on how the media shape and construct reality through representation. One 
key concept that resonates with the constructionist approach outlined in this thesis (see Chapter 
Three) also central to this debate is mediation, a term which suggests that the media become 
more influential in the production and circulation of knowledge in contemporary society. 
McQuail (1994, 64) notes that “the information, images and ideas made available by the media 
may, for most people be the main source of awareness of a shared past (history) and present 
social location”, and that the media are a store of social memories and a map of where and who 
we are (“identity”).  
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There is no consensus regarding the precise meaning of mediation and descriptions of the 
term range from connotations about its passive role, through a neutral role to an active role. 
McQuail (1994, 65) observes that “mediation can mean different things ranging from neutrality 
to informing, through negotiation, to attempts at manipulation and control”. 
 An array of terms connoting the different versions of the mediation process such as 
“mirror”, “window”, “signpost”, “filter”, “screen”, “barrier”, and “forum” (McQuail, 1994:65) 
demonstrate the ambivalence of mediation as a process. Silverstone alludes to this ambivalence 
when he defines mediation as “the fundamentally, but evenly, dialectical process in which 
institutionalized media of communication (the press, broadcast radio and television and 
increasingly the world wide web) are involved in the general circulation of symbols in social 
life” (Silverstone, 2002:3 ).  
Debate on mediation is polarized between positive and negative accounts of the mediation 
role of the media (Thompson, 1995; Silverstone, 2002, Couldry, 2006, Silverstone, 2006; 
Chouriaraki, 2011). Positive formulations of mediation position the media as innocently relaying 
“second-hand versions of events and conditions which we cannot directly observe for 
ourselves”(McQuail, 1994,65).Thus conceived, mediation harks back on technological 
determinism, whereby the media close the distance between us and them, thereby enhancing 
understanding between geographically distanced people (Chouliaraki, 2006: Silverstone, 2002; 
Chouliaraki and Orgad, 2011).  
The positive articulations of mediation overlook the fact that media texts are products of 
specific historical, socio-political and economic contexts and as such they shape and are shaped 
by those particular contexts. This evokes the dialectical nature of mediation and as Couldry 
(2006,3) asserts “media work, and must work, not by transmitting discrete textual units for 
discrete moments of reception, but through a process of environmental transformation which in 
turn transforms the conditions under which any future media can be produced and understood”. 
McQuail (1994, 229) asserts that media production decisions are shaped by a combination of 
economic, technological and media cultural logics which impacts on the media products.  
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The view that technology ‘annihilates’ distance  by bringing the spectator closer to the 
represented, what Giddens refers to as the “sequestration of experience” (cited in Silverstone 
2002,14) should be taken with some skepticism because it overlooks inherent differences 
between the  spectator and the represented. The implication for this is that mediation can increase 
rather than breach the gap between the spectator and the ‘Other’ who is represented in the media 
text.  Silverstone succinctly illustrates that the illusion of closeness is implied in this conception 
of mediation concept thus:  
 
The illusion of connection is grounded in the refusal of otherness. It is based on the private masquerading 
as the public, the separate masquerading as the shared, the different masquerading as the same, the distant 
masquerading as the close at hand, the unequal masquerading as the equal (Silverstone 2002, 10). 
 
This statement suggests that mediation is a contradictory process which brings possibilities 
of bridging the distance between the spectator and the represented while at the same time 
undermining possibilities of sameness, shared values and understanding between the 
communicator and the represented. It is these contradictory tendencies that have contributed to 
the fuzziness of mediation, a point that will be revisited in subsequent sections. 
Unlike the positive view which celebrates technology’s ability to connect geographically 
disconnected people the pessimistic view of mediation mainly foregrounds the ideological and 
sinister “efforts of other actors and institutions in society to contact us for their own purposes or 
our own supposed good” (McQuail, 1994:65).  
Conceived this way, mediation bears the imprints of agenda-setting (Cohen 1963; Mcombs 
and Shaw 1972, Severin and Tankard 1992) and framing (Entman 1993; Parenti 1993; Melkote 
2009; D’Angelo 2002) which has been broadly understood as “principles of organization which 
govern events” (Goffman 1974, 10) or “principles of selection, emphasis and presentation” 
(Gitlin 1980, 6). Like framing, mediation connotes a process whereby the media meaningfully 
“structure the social world” (Reese 2010, 17).  
The implications for this are that, mediation cannot be viewed simply as an innocent 
reflection of reality as most journalists seem to imply (Schudson 1989, 263) but rather, a 
conscious process that entails, sifting, selecting, organizing, giving interpretative frameworks for 
understanding reality, what Herman and Chomsky refer to as ‘manufacturing of consent’ 
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(Herman and Chomsky 1988). In the same vein, Thompson (1995, 17) sees the media as invested 
with symbolic power that enables them to “intervene in the course of events, to influence the 
actions of others, and indeed, to create events by means of the production and transmission of 
symbolic forms”. To the extent that mediated communication aims to define one reality as 
opposed to another through inclusion and exclusion (Silverstone 2005, 192) mediation can be 
viewed as essentially a political process.  
The argument advanced in this thesis is that, rather than enhancing understanding of the 
production and reception of meaning in media texts, the polarized perspectives of mediation 
obfuscate what is otherwise a dynamic process. Couldry succinctly illustrates this dynamism 
when he states that “the wider space of symbolic action” characterized by “flows of production, 
flows of circulation, flows of interpretation, and flows of recirculation where interpretations flow 
back into production or flow outwards into general social and cultural life” (2006,4) (emphasis 
original). Even this critical view of mediation  falls short in accounting for the unequal power 
dynamics embedded in the process of mediation in the sense that it implies that the flows are 
seamless, and unaided, if not equal. Viewing mediation through a power dynamics lens enables 
one to visualize how meaning is negotiated between the communicator, the reader and the 
represented. It is an acknowledgement of the fact that power is not evenly distributed between 
the journalist, the audience and the represented.  
 In the specific case of this thesis the questions that arise are: Are journalistic discourses 
more privileged than citizen discourses in terms of meaning construction; and to what degree do 
readers (citizens) influence meaning at the level of production? To what extent are journalistic 
interpretations reflected in ordinary citizens’ discursive constructions of election violence? To 
what extent do citizen or ‘popular discourses’ on election violence flow back into the domain of 
production? In order to shed light on these questions it is worthy turning to the multiple 
dimensions of mediation in order to have a broader understanding of how meaning is constructed 
through speech and text. 
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2.7.1 Mediation as Sense Making  
 
Whether one is looking at mediation from an optimistic or pessimistic perspective, that 
the media define and shape reality is incontrovertible. As such, mediation is a meaning 
inscription or a transformative process through which the meaningfulness of things is decided 
(Silverstone, 2002, 2). Events owe their meaningfulness and value to mediation because all 
communication involves mediation of some sort. Silverstone alludes to this point when he argues 
that everyday life would be meaningless without communication (Silverstone, 2002, 2). 
Mediation is crucial in the production of meaning in the sense that it provides the framework and 
symbolic resources for understanding complex events.  
Since mediation involves three elements, namely, the communicator, the audience and 
the represented it is crucial not only to understand the mechanics of meaning production, but also 
how and where meanings are produced. Meaning production is hardly the sole privilege of the 
mass media, but also a terrain of the audiences, although, as Silverstone rightly observes, the 
power to interrogate the dominant meanings is not evenly distributed across societies (2002, 3). 
In his encoding-decoding model, Stuart Hall proposes a four phase  model in which the 
communication process is produced and sustained  through articulations of what he terms 
“distinctive moments”(Hall 1993, 508). These pre-determinate moments of meaning production 
represent four related, but not identical sites in which meanings are generated through framing 
techniques (Hall 1980), namely the production, circulation/distribution, use and reproduction 
(During 1993).   
Hall argues that each of these four stages of meaning production has its own limits and 
possibilities and the production of a message impacts on its reception, although this does not take 
place in a manner that is transparent. There is a way in which the encoding of messages 
anticipates the reception of the particular message in that messages are packaged with certain 
audiences implying that media consumption is in a way also a process of content production, 
although it might not be predominant. 
 Hall gives the example of television discourse whereby its discursive aspects are framed 
by meanings, ideas, knowledge, definitions and assumptions about the audience (Hall 1980). 
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Louw (2001, 206) concurs noting that the receiver of a message is as much part of the encoding 
of the message. This shows that mediation is a reciprocal process and meanings are not 
predetermined by the communicator, but collectively produced through a mutual exchange 
process. However, the precise way in which this exchange of meaning takes place remains a 
matter of conjecture. In spite of the acknowledgement by the minimal effects paradigm research, 
that media audiences are active they are still complicit and collusive (Silverstone 2002, 18) to a 
one way communication in the sense that the media define, determine and set the rules of 
engagement. As argued below, the media regulate and set limits on what can be discussed, how it 
can be discussed and why it should be discussed. Although readers have the leverage to choose 
what they read and the meanings they make from media texts (an indication that they are active) 
the parameters and terms with which they engage with these texts are prescribed by the logic of 
the medium. Silverstone argues that: 
…the weaknesses of our media, which are both structural and circumstantial, do not just impinge 
on everyday life, imposed on our daily values and practices as if by men or women from Mars. 
They emerge and are accepted as components of a shared culture. Without challenge, without 
interrogation, and above all without our willingness to take responsibility for them, they both fail 
us, and crucially, we them. The notion of the active audience (Silverstone, 1994) is limited in so 
far as it does not move beyond the immediate experience of the individual, and insofar as it does 
not move beyond the reception of the content…Without such informed interrogation audiences 
become complicit with the media’s representational strategies (Silverstone 2002, 18-19). 
 
Silverstone’s argument that audiences are complicit and collude with the media in 
the representation of events and the ‘other’ is plausible, but the nature of this complicity 
and collusion depends on the context in which the mediation takes place and the object of 
representation. In examining mediation at the reception level, this thesis seeks to broaden 
understanding on how ideologically opposed press mobilize resources to generate 
regimes of meaning that enforce different kinds of complicity and collusion among their 
audiences, and in turn how the ideological preferences of the audience dictate the 
meaning construction at the production level.  
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Complicity and collusion in meaning-production between producers and their 
audience are contingent upon the objects of representation, memory, experience and the 
conditions in which the representation takes place.  
Focusing attention on mediation as a strategy for the production of regimes of 
truth enables one to broaden questions about how media texts, particularly the news 
genre, construct, reconstruct and deconstruct reality. Chouliaraki’s ‘analytics of 
mediation’ (2006, 156) is a sound framework for interrogating how media texts produce 
meaning through the integration of ‘multi-modality’ with a critical analysis of discourse. 
Specifically, the analytics of mediation focuses on how various genres across media 
make sense of the world through an examination of the “bounded field of possible 
meaning relations that obey a certain regularity in the ways in which they combine and 
circulate and as a consequence, in the forms of knowledge and identity they constitute in 
the medium where they appear” (Chouliraki 2006, 157-158). In the specific context of 
Chouriaraki’s study of television mediation of suffering, she speaks of ‘regimes of pity’ 
referring to the multiple semiotic practices that construct suffering as ‘a meaningful 
spectacle with its own proposals of relating to the spectator” (Chouliraki 2006, 158).  
Underlying the notion of ‘regime of meaning’ and by extension ‘regime of pity’ 
are not only assumptions about meaning being a construction, but also its contingency of 
space and time, thus making meaning production a continuous process, what Chouliaraki 
(2006, 159) calls ‘unfinished businesses’. The true value of the analytics of mediation is 
that it focuses attention on how meaning is constructed through systematic patterns of co-
appearance and combinations that organize reality so that news becomes meaningful to 
the reader or viewer. One element of news responsible for the construction of regimes of 
meaning which is relevant to this thesis is the mode of representation, which refers to the 
locations from which the news story is told and the medium used to tell the story 
(Chouliaraki 2006, 160).  
In this thesis, modes of representation include the reporter who writes the story, the form 
of narration used, the sources used (whether anonymous or named, whether institutional or non-
institutional, lay or expert, whether moral witnesses or participants).  
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The mode of news presentation is critical in so far as it determines how the audiences 
evaluate the events being represented and the actions they are likely to take as a result of the 
news.  
Different types of narratives may yield distinct “regimes of truth” depending on the 
perceptions of realism. News is an open-ended genre with the capacity to generate multiple (and 
sometimes conflicting meanings) about an issue. To that extent election violence is bound to 
generate different meanings with different people depending on their ideological point of view 
and experiences. In order to enhance the believability of their stories and to secure the complicity 
and collusion of their readers in the desired regimes of meaning, news employs a coterie of 
classificatory techniques such as exclusion, inclusion, foregrounding, backgrounding, 
justification and legitimating devices in order to separate victims from perpetrators of violence. 
Chouliaraki (2006, 162) identifies three narrative functions of the news that are responsible for 
this classificatory work namely; descriptions (hard facts about what we see) narrations or story-
telling proper (chronological report) and expositions (verbal narratives that incorporates points of 
view within the news). 
As a sense-making enterprise mediation reflects power inequalities embedded within the 
communication process as well as the broader society. Focusing on media texts as discursive 
constructs endowed with their own internal logic and specific approaches to truth claims enables 
one to understand how this power is unevenly distributed and exercised. The next section turns to 
a discussion on power and discourse. It argues that media texts as discursive constructs produce 
particular ‘regimes of truths’ that are open to contestation. 
2.7.2 Discourse, Power and Knowledge: A Foucauldian Perspective 
 
The dominant perspective of mediation connotes a process that entails the passive 
construction of reality or simply a situation whereby the media closes the distance between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ or as Silverstone posits, “the movement of meaning from one text to another, from 
one discourse to another, from one event to another” (Silverstone 1999, 13).  
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Many of the metaphors of mediation discussed above as much accentuate this view. For 
instance, the ‘mirror’ metaphor implies that “there is nothing much that can be done about the 
reflections in a mirror” (Potter, 1996, 98) as if to suggest that reality is pre-ordained and not 
other people’s versions of the world, what Foucault refers to as “regimes of truth” (Foucault 
1972, 201).  
One key concept that spotlights meaning production as embedded in power relations is 
discourse. The concept discourse is very broad and multi-dimensional (Pitsoe and Letseka 2013, 
24) as a result scholars hardly agree on a precise definition, with some giving catch-all 
definitions of the term,  while others define it narrowly (Hobbs, 2008). Many scholars are 
however in agreement that the term discourse owes its origins to the works of French scholar and 
post-structuralist, Michael Foucault (Fairclough, 1989; Fairclough, 1995; Potter, 1996; 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Hobbs 2008; Whisnat 2012).  Foucault defines discourse as: 
‘…a group of statements which provide a language for talking about - a way of representing the knowledge 
about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment…Discourse is about the production of 
knowledge through language. But…since all social practices entail meaning, and meanings shape and 
influence what we do- our conduct- all practices have a discursive aspect (Foucault, cited in Hall 1992, 
291). 
This definition is broad enough to encompass language, social practices and ways of 
thinking about particular subjects. Chouliraki and Fairclough subscribe to Foucault’s definition 
of discourse but extend it to include the “economic, social and cultural changes of late 
modernity” as discourses as well (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999 4). Conceived this way 
discourse encompasses both material and extra-discursive facets of social reality such as money, 
power, relations, material practices, institutions beliefs, values and modes of social relations 
(Chouliraki and Fairclough, 1999, 6). Such a definition is elastic enough to incorporate all the 
elements of the Foucauldian discursive approach which underpins this study.  
Whisnat (2012 4-5) defines discourse as the “very specific patterns of language that tell 
us something about the person speaking the language, the culture that the person is part of, the 
network of social institutions that the person is caught up in, and even frequently the most basic 
assumptions that the person holds”.  
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This definition situates discourse in relations of power but is limited in that it suggests 
that discourses are trapped in language ignoring the fact that language is a social practice.   
Fairclough (1989, 20) locates discourse in different sites, i.e. conversational, textual, as 
well as in production, reception and interpretation and shares many aspects of Foucault’s 
definition. He conceives discourse as “the whole process of social interaction…” in addition to 
the text, the process of production and interpretation for which the text is a resource (Fairclough 
1989, 20). Viewing discourse as social practice implies that when analysing discourse it is 
imperative to pay attention to the social conditions in which discourses are produced, consumed 
and interpreted because discourse is constitutive, meaning it is shaped and shapes the conditions 
in which it is produced. Seeing discourse as a social practice means that we should be committed 
to scrutinizing not just the process of production and interpretation, but also the relationship 
between texts, processes and their immediate and remote conditions of institutional and social 
structures (Fairclough 1989, 20). This shows that discourse is embedded in relations of power. 
Viewing discourse this way is useful in the sense that it does not limit discourse to language but 
incorporates ways of talking, thinking, morality, meaning and about who can speak and when. In 
other words discourse is intricately interwoven with power and knowledge. 
In the specific context of this thesis concerns about power emanate from the fact that 
discourse, particularly media discourses, shape the work of journalists through framing practices 
that affect perceptions of (Hobbs, 2008). The Foucauldian definition is preferred in this thesis 
because it foregrounds meaning production as particular “regimes of truth” (Foucault 1972; 
Hobbs 2008, 13) distributed through text and talk and incorporates Fairclough’s idea of discourse 
as a social practice (Fairclough, 1989, Potter, 1996). 
 Discourse is thus conceived as representations or versions of reality about the world 
produced through text and talk and social practice in a context of unequal power relationships. 
Such a conception of discourse suggests that meanings are not intrinsic but are ascribed by 
people and enables one to address critical questions about how the press and citizens make 
claims to truth through symbolic structuring of the meaning of events such as electoral violence.  
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An understanding of the discursive production of power and dominance starts with asking 
questions like, who has access to the press to talk about election violence; what are they saying 
about election violence; the descriptions they use when talking about election violence; when 
and in what context do they speak about election violence? Knowing who has access to discourse 
is important because it is the first step towards understanding the distribution of power. 
 Van Dijk (1996, 86) argues that the more access one has to discourse the more social 
power they wield. Access to discourse takes various dimensions such as the planning of a 
communicative event, the control of the setting of the discourse, the power to control various 
dimensions, of talk and text such as the decision regarding the language to be used and the scope 
and control one has over the audience (Van Dijk 1996, 87-88). 
To the extent that journalists have the privilege to ‘impart certain social truths’ (Hobbs, 
2008, 11) to citizens they have the prerogative to influence their knowledge and attitudes. Pitsoe 
and Letseka (2013, 24) correctly assert that “as a social construct, discourse is created and 
perpetuated by those who have access to the means of communication”.  
The power of the press lies in its privilege to decide what to put on the public agenda 
(agenda setting) what interpretative frameworks to ascribe to particular issues (framing) and how 
much importance to attach to those topics (salience).  
Thus discursive power entails the exercise of control over the discourse itself.  
Journalists, as “symbolic elites”, (Van-Dijk (1999, 28) do not only control the material 
production of discourse, but also its packaging and circulation.  
To a certain degree, they determine the topics or stories to be covered, the amount of 
space devoted to the stories, placement in the newspaper, the genre to be used, the style, and 
rhetorical, and lexical devices to be used in a particular story and the sources to be used in those 
stories. This acts as an exercise of power as well as a form of legitimating power.  
Through its representations the press shapes the social cognitions of others while giving 
other people (news sources) to voice their opinions is a way of legitimating the views of those 
people given access to articulate their points of view. This shows that discourse is constituted by 
inclusions and exclusions (Pitsoe and Letseka 2013, 25).  
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Journalistic discourses thrive on selectivity as a mechanism for enacting power and 
control in that what qualifies as news is based on ideological and professional values that give 
media access to elites and institutional voices (van Dijk 1999, 43). However, it would be 
misleading to create the impression that the less powerful in society are totally absent in the 
media. Many newspapers have letters to the editor-columns where readers voice their opinions.  
New communication technologies such as the Internet have further leveraged the citizens 
through generation of their own content online (User Generated Content) thereby, signaling a 
form of participatory communication. This argument, however, needs to be tempered because 
access to the Internet is also a function of economic power particularly in the developing world 
where very few people have access to the Internet is a function of economic power, and very few 
people have access to the internet, let alone to the computer (Nyamnjoh 1996). In addition, 
audience-controlled discursive platforms such as the letters to the editor are subjected to 
selection and editing, depending on ideological, professional and other considerations. This 
shows how power is manifested through the control of access to journalistic discourse. Denying 
access to other points of view as a strategy of exercising power in discourse means the audience 
is denied an opportunity to access other claims to truths and as argued below, this demonstrates 
the link between knowledge and power.  
Discursive power is never confined to content, but also exists in structures of discourse. 
Thus when  scrutinizing media texts it is vital to pay attention to who is saying what, to whom, in 
what context and how, in order to have a broader understanding of the various dimensions 
through which power is exercised discursively.  
At the content level discursive power manifests itself in a subtle way. Power in discourse 
is manifested indirectly as “representation in the form of an expression, description or 
legitimation of powerful actors or their actions and ideologies” (Van Dijk 1999, 49). Without 
discourse, power cannot easily be gained, exercised or legitimated because it is through 
discourse that social cognitions are constituted. Van Dijk (1999, 45) notes that knowledge 
acquisition and opinion formation about most world events is mainly based on news discourse 
and there is no discourse type that is as pervasive and globally shared as the news.  
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Foucault (1972b) equates discourse with knowledge and knowledge with power. He 
argues that reality is socially constructed and because of that discourse joins power and 
knowledge.  
Pitsoe and Letseka (2013,25) conceive discourse as a way of constituting knowledge as 
well as a vehicle for transmitting power, adding that power and knowledge are two sides of the 
same coin. While knowledge does not reflect power relations it is “imminent in power relations”. 
Power manifests itself as hegemony whereby the dominated class may unconsciously collaborate 
with the dominant class. Media discourses are hegemonic in that they depict reality in a taken-for 
granted, commonsensical way. They constitute knowledge in that they project a particular 
worldview. Media discourses embody meaning and social relationships in a subtle way.  
 Foucault (1972, 49) argues that discourses are not about objects, neither do they identify 
objects, but they constitute them and in the process masking their own intentions the same way 
social practices spread beliefs in a commonsensical way. In the news media, some news sources 
are given access and the latitude to propound their points of view thereby generating meanings 
that legitimate and reproduce existing power relations in society. Thus unequal access to media 
discourses perpetuates power inequalities in society, because the dominating class speaks for and 
in its interests. This does not mean that power is a totalizing magic bullet. Foucault (1972) 
acknowledges this as much when he points out that power is never absolute and dominated 
classes always try to challenge the dominant class in various ways.  
The constitutive nature of discourse implies that discourse is both an effect and an 
instrument of power. As much as reality is a social construct it can be deconstructed or 
reconstructed. Thus, Foucault sees discourse as both a form of gaining power as well as a 
“starting point for an opposing strategy” (1978, 101).    
2.8 Social Construction Theory of the Media 
As mentioned above, Foucault’s discourse theory has implications for the media which 
stem from its contention that discourse “produces the meaning of objects” (Hobbs 2008, 8). The 
Social Construction Theory explains how meaning and reality are created by the media and how 
this reality creating enterprise of the media shapes public opinion and perceptions. 
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 Inspired by the Constructionist Epistemology, (discussed in Chapter 3), the Social 
Construction Theory of the media, an offshoot from Berger and Luckman’s (1966) seminal 
work, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, (also 
discussed in Chapter 3) resonates with the discourse theory’s rejection of an objectivist ontology, 
whereby reality simply exists “out there”.  
The crux of Berger and Luckman’s argument is that “reality is socially constructed” by 
human beings (Berger and Luckman 1966, 13). This means that society is a human product 
which has no “other being except that which is bestowed upon it by human activity and 
consciousness”. There can be no social reality from man” (Berger and Luckman cited in Gordon 
1983, 49-50).  One more very pertinent point made by Berger and Luckman is that; man is a 
product of society and individuals are born into an already existing social world, and as Gordon 
(1983, 50) contends, man “achieves and maintains his identity” in the pre-existing world. 
Similarly, in a media saturated society where people are daily bombarded with media generated 
images and symbols, the media have become the principal constructor of reality.   
Gamson et al (1992, 374) assert that: 
We walk around with media generated images of the world using them to construct meaning about political 
and social issues. The lens through which we receive these images is not neutral, but evinces the power and 
point of view of the political and economic elites who operate and focus it. And the special genius of all 
this is to make the whole process seem so normal and natural that the very art of social construction is 
invisible (Gamson et al 1992374). 
The pervasiveness of media reality is succinctly captured by Bal and De Vries (2000, 3) 
who assert that “Whatever we know about society, or indeed about the world in which we live, 
we know through the mass media”. Hall adds that the mass media define reality through their 
“active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping; not merely the transmitting 
of an already – existing meaning, but the more active labour of making things mean” (cited in 
Dispensa and Brulle (2003 79).  
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Luen-Wun Siu (2006, 4) identifies four basic assumptions behind the social construction 
theory, namely “reality does not present itself objectively” but is understood through human 
experience,  social interactions determine categories of language, the construction of reality is 
determined by particular conventions of communication and communication behavior constitutes 
the construction of reality.  
As much as meaning requires discourse for it to be meaningful, reality construction also 
needs language for it to be meaningful, (Hall cited in Luen-Wun Siu 2006, 4) hence the media 
are invested with power to make things meaningful. This brings the spotlight to the centrality of 
language in the social construction of reality; the same way language has been identified to be 
vital in discourse.  
The meaning fixing mechanics of the media entail a whole range of techniques of choice-
making, selection, descriptions, inclusion and exclusion, salience/suppression, naming and 
framing.  The discretionary power of the press is demonstrated through the use of certain 
metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, lexical choices, source selection, graphics, stereotypes, 
dramatic characters (Van Gorp 2008) and the entire package of “emphasis and presentation” 
(Gitlin 1980, 6).  
In the specific context of this thesis the press decided what incidents of violence to publish 
and what not to publish, whether to give those incidents prominence or how to frame them. As 
argued in the analysis sections, the reality about election violence was a media reality. Such 
reality was constructed through selection, salience, silence, and framing and the press discourses 
discussed in Chapter Five and Six are a product of this social construction process.  
  Entman (1993, 52) defines framing as  
…to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in communicating text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described (emphasis original).  
 
Through framing the press can either define election violence narrowly or broadly depending 
on their agenda.  Since frames are located in various places in the communication process key 
elements of violence, namely (i) tactics of violence (ii) perpetrators of violence (iii) participants 
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in violence (iv) the venues of violence (v) timing of violence and (vi) victims of violence 
(Meadow, 2009) become active fields for framing. Through framing the press could either 
legitimize or de-legitimise certain political actors. News framing implies that political, economic 
and social events and issues are presented to citizens as alternative characterizations of a course 
of action  
The way in which the media frame violence can cause people to think in a certain way 
about the perpetrators or victims of violence. It can also cause people to think about the causes of 
the violence, the seriousness of the violence and the solution to the problem of violence. Because 
framing enables one to identify the press’s operational frameworks - what is said, how it is said, 
what is omitted, what is emphasized or downplayed, one gains insights on the manner in which 
the press relates to the citizens as the imagined audience. People can extract nuanced meanings 
of election violence in both the press and citizen discourses. However, as the analysis reveals, the 
reality constructed by the media is not uncontested, nor do they create one reality. Carey argues 
that “what persons create is not merely one reality, but multiple realities. Realities cannot be 
exhausted by any one symbolic forms, be it scientific, religious, or aesthetic” (cited in Luen-Wun 
Siu 2006, 3).  
The existence of multiple realities implies that even the constructed reality is dynamic, 
not static. It implies that meanings about phenomena shift, are fluid, are assigned and contested. 
The latter is of particular significance in this thesis and shall be revisited below. Gamson and 
Modigliani contend that:  
Media discourse can be conceived of as a set of interpretive packages that give meaning to be an issue. A 
package has an initial structure. At its core is a central organizing idea, or frame, for making sense of 
relevant events, suggesting what is at issue… This frame typically implies a range of positions, rather than 
a single one, allowing for a degree of controversy among those who share a common frame (cited in 
Luen-Wun Siu (2006, 7).   
The existence of multiple realities does not only bring to the fore the malleability of 
mediated reality, but also validates the argument advanced in this thesis that representation of 
election violence by the press constitutes versions of reality that can be contested.  
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The fact that meanings cannot be fixed emboldens the view that media messages open 
texts which can be read preferentially or oppositionally (Gamson et al 1992, 373), implying that 
readers or the audience (citizens in this thesis) are able to go beyond the pre-determined 
meanings supplied by the press (Gamson et al 1992, 373), a point that is canvassed in this thesis 
as illustrated by citizen discourses in Chapter Seven.  However, it is worth noting that in spite of 
its “powerful effects” inflection, the social construction theory is for understanding how the 
media construct reality. Its openness enables understanding on how citizens contest the reality of 
the press by constructing versions of reality about election violence that counter that of the press. 
This shows that as much as press reality is a social construct, it can also be de-constructed. More 
importantly, the social construction theory enables one to gain insights on the ambivalent role of 
the press in election violence, particularly the observation made in this thesis that the press can 
engender contradictory behaviours among the citizens. 
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2.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter reviewed literature on political violence and the media and election violence 
and the media. It was observed that the role of the media in general and the press in particular is 
an understudied area. A distinction was made between political violence, which encompasses 
various types of violent conflict and election violence, which takes place before, during and after 
an election. The causes of election violence were also discussed, highlighting both structural and 
non-structural factors.  
It was observed that the bulk of existing literature focuses on broader political violence 
(wars, terrorism, demonstrations etc.) and its interface with the media while there are very few 
studies focusing on the media and election violence, let alone press and citizen discursive 
constructions of election violence. The existing literature mainly focuses on the experiences of 
the Western or developed world and very little of is based on the experiences of the developing 
world, particularly Africa.  
The role of the media in political violence, particularly in violent conflicts such as 
terrorism is a contested arena, with some scholars (mainly, Chalfont 1980) adopting a moralistic 
stance, arguing that the media should not be instruments of terrorism but should be on the side of 
the state, while others like Schlesinger (1991) take a more nuanced approach asserting that the 
media should   be independent (and not embedded) in any institution.  
This makes the role of the media in political violence an ambivalent one. Thus, the 
representation of violence is viewed as interpretation of reality because various media are 
inspired by different ideological standpoints and agendas rather than the search for the ‘truth’. 
Thus media representation of election violence is a contested arena and the discursive approach 
adopted in this thesis is well suited to exposing these contestations. 
 It was observed in this chapter that, election violence, like all other types of political 
violence lends itself to the logic of media newsworthiness because of the element of conflicts 
and drama inherent in it. However, election violence, as a unique type of political violence is 
different from other types of political violence in the sense that it takes place in a time 
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concentrated context and has far reaching implications for democratic practice. Since the bulk of 
literature on media and political violence is tilted towards an assessment of media performance, 
either extolling or lamenting the media’s coverage of political violence, there is very little scope 
for understanding election violence in different contests such as fragile societies.  
The chapter also discussed the conceptual framework underpinning this thesis, namely 
mediation, power and discourse and the social construction theory of the media, highlighting the 
complex social nature of the production, interpretation and consumption of media texts. It 
demonstrated how discursive constructions of electoral violence by the press constitute an 
exercise of power and knowledge as well as a strategy for countering power. 
The next chapter discusses the thesis’s research, design, methodology, data collection and 
analysis methods. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 The Research Problem 
 
This study is a qualitative exploration of press and citizen discourses on election violence 
during Zimbabwe’s presidential and parliamentary elections held between 2000 and 2013, in 
order to gain insights on the role of the press in election violence. Previous studies on political 
communication have tended to place too much emphasis on media frames while neglecting the 
way in which the press and citizens construct their lives through talk. Such disarticulation of the 
political communication process may hinder a broader understanding of how meanings are co-
constructed between citizens and political actors.  
There is a need for studies that spotlight the political communication process in a more 
complex way, because the production of political meaning goes beyond the unidirectional 
conveyance of messages from the media to the audience and entails the exchange of meaning 
and value between the media, political actors and citizens. Although the press plays a vital role 
of providing citizens with information for them to make informed choices, this relationship is 
never unidirectional as citizens are not passive actors devoid of experience or knowledge.  
Discourses that uncritically endorse the efficacy of the press as sources of information for 
democratic development mask the complex relationship between the press and citizens and how 
this interaction structures political meanings. This study aims at pushing the boundaries of 
knowledge in political communication by linking press production of political meaning to citizen 
interpretation of political reality (Van Gorp, 2007).  
The study is a departure from approaches that accentuate causal relationships between 
political communication messages and public opinion and perceptions. Paying attention to how 
institutionalized discourses coalesce with citizen discourses during electoral contests brings the 
political communication process in its complexity under the spotlight.  
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The approach contemplated in this study follows Gamson’s argument (cited by Negrine 
1996, 128) that we need to think about the media, not as a set of stimuli to which individuals 
respond, but a site upon which a complex symbolic contest over the interpretation of messages 
takes place. Juxtaposing citizen and press discourses on election violence may broaden 
understanding of the meaning of election violence and the role of the press in political conflict. 
How the press and citizens frame reality about election violence and the values underpinning that 
framing are issues that are germane to this study.  
3.2 The Social Constructionist Epistemology 
 
Research of any kind ought to be underpinned by some philosophical assumptions in 
relation to what is authentic knowledge and what is not; who is a legitimate producer of 
knowledge and who is not, or under what conditions (context) is authentic knowledge generated. 
The fact that the study is mainly concerned with discursive constructions of election violence, 
which essentially entails systematic disclosure of textual meanings and the accessing of feelings, 
beliefs, “perspectives”, and lived experiences of participants locates it within the realm of the 
social constructionist epistemology. Galbin (2014, 82) defines social constructionism as “a 
perspective which believes that a great deal of human life exists as it does due to social and 
interpersonal influences”.   
As a philosophy of knowledge, social constructionism has become one of the dominant 
perspectives in the human and social sciences. Although it is closely related to, and sometimes 
interchangeably used with social constructivism, the two are different in that, while social 
constructivism focuses on the way in which individuals construct meaning or interpret the world 
around them, social constructionism focuses on the social; the way in which meaning is 
constructed through social interactions (McNamee 2004; Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009; 
Andrews 2012; Castello 2013). Gergen (1995) argues that the central concern of social 
constructionism is to explain the processes through which people describe or interpret events in 
the world and how they understand themselves.  
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As a movement, social constructionism has its roots in the late 1960s and is mainly 
associated with Berger and Luckman, who, in their seminal book, The Social Construction of 
Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (1966, 2) stated that they sought to “clarify the 
foundations of knowledge in everyday life”, implying that world events are predefined, allusion 
to Marx, Nietzsche, Scheler, Mannheim and other pioneers in the social constructionism 
movement’s skepticism on the “existence of objective knowledge”  and their contention that 
“knowledge arises from processes more related to ideology, interests or power” (Alvesson and 
Skoldberg 2009, 25).  
Berger and Luckman asserted that: 
Common-sense ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘ideas’ must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge, it 
is precisely this ‘knowledge’ that constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could exist. 
The sociology of knowledge, therefore, must concern itself with the social construction of reality (cited in 
Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, 25).     
The overarching concern of social constructionism, therefore, is meaning and power, 
concepts that link up with the Foucauldian discursive approach discussed in Chapter 2. Although 
social constructionism comes in different guises (Lock and Strong 2010), the common thread 
connecting these various versions is their preoccupation with “meaning and understanding”. 
White (2004, 7) argues that people construct meanings according to their life experiences and 
contexts. Unearthing these meanings is the forte of the discourse analyst.  The dilemma is that, 
the discourse analyst is differently located, and also constructs meanings through his or her 
interpretation of reality. These meanings may be at odds with other versions of meanings 
constructed, thereby raising the problematic of positionality and the need for the researcher to 
reflect on how their own assumptions impact on the research process -  an issue that will be 
revisited later in this chapter. The meaning-making enterprise is embedded in everyday social-
cultural practices and particular events mean different things in different times and places (Lock 
and Strong 2010), thus bringing to focus the multi-faceted perspectives of social constructionism.  
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 Social constructionism rejects the positivist view that data already exists, positing that 
data must be uncovered. That social constructionists believe that reality is socially constructed 
rather than “merely there” (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, 23) meaning that data has to be 
disclosed by pricking holes in texts. As demonstrated in this thesis, the discourse analytic 
approach deployed lends itself to the task of “pricking holes” in the text as it is premised on the 
assumption that there are different regimes of truth in relation to particular event. The approach 
resonates with Durkheim’s contention that “social facts should be viewed as “things” (cited in 
Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009, 25) which means that social facts need to be unpacked.  
It is instructive to note that because reality is constructed through social interactions and 
language (generally referred to as discourse in this thesis) discovering the various regimes of 
truth about a phenomenon (election violence in this thesis) entails scrutinizing both manifest and 
latent meanings in texts and how those meanings are implicated in power relations.  
The centrality of language in social constructionism is clearly demonstrated in Berger and 
Luckman’s assertion that the language which is used in everyday life objectifies and provides the 
order with which human beings make sense of everyday life (Berger and Luckman 1966, 22). 
Language provides “coordinates” of life in the sense that it designates places, defines human 
relationships, and gives legitimacy to institutions (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009). Thus Cojocaru 
et al. (2012, 32) assert that the language that people use to describe the world is a “social 
artifact” and “the product of historical exchanges between people”.  
The import of this statement is that language is implicated in power relations, and the 
way people use language reflects their social location, gender and culture. Cojocaru et al. (2012, 
32) elaborate this point thus: 
Language, communication, and discourse are considered means of interaction between individuals who 
construct multiple realities. Social constructionism considers that realities are created by people who 
communicate through language, each of them, influencing and limiting the responses of the other 
(Cojocaru et al. 2012, 32) 
This means that social constructionism views reality as co-constructed through social 
interactions, thus evoking the idea of hybridity, and of multiple perspectives in meanings as 
opposed to the idea of a singular ‘truth’. Thus, social constructionism has resonance with Michel 
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Foucault’s idea of “regimes of truth” which alludes to the possibility of different versions of 
reality of an event or issue.  The view that knowledge is constructed through the individual’s 
interaction with subjects in specific social contexts is what motivated this researcher to adopt the 
research design selected for this study. 
3.3 The Research Design 
Previous studies on political communication have predominantly adopted the quantitative 
research design because they sought to demonstrate a causal relationship between the media and 
political behavior (Lazarsfeld et al 1948; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; McCombs and Shaw 1972; 
Goffman, 1994; Hughes and Guerrero 2009; Groeling 2013). Following the assertion by Priest 
(1996) that the choice of method is largely dictated by the nature of the problem at hand, this 
study adopted a qualitative research design. Henning et al (2004, 36) concur with this view, 
pointing out that “a design type is a reflection of the methodological requirements of the research 
question and therefore the type of data that will be elicited and of how the data will be 
processed”. The selection of a research design is, therefore, a direct response to epistemological 
as well as practical considerations. The fact that this thesis seeks to explore meanings that are 
embedded in texts and talk makes a qualitative research design suitable. The fact that the study 
maps out shifting discourses across time, between the state-owned and the privately-owned press 
as well as between citizens thus locates it in the realm of a longitudinal study. Such a comparison 
was crucial in the sense that a key element of discourse, at least from a Foucaldian perspective is 
that discourse is conditioned and shaped by context.  
 Through qualitative research, researchers seek to immerse themselves in naturally 
occurring data so that they have a first-hand experience of the phenomenon under investigation 
(Silverstone 1993, 20). Social constructionist epistemology falls under the interpretivist 
paradigm (Goldkhul 2012) and acknowledges the fact that “facts and values cannot be separated” 
as the researcher brings their own biases and interpretations to bear on the research process, 
(Vine 2009). This necessitates the researcher having to suspend his/her values and assumptions 
when they conduct the research (Vine 2009).  
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The interpretivism embedded in social constructionism enables the researcher to 
understand “subjective meanings…to acknowledge their existence, to reconstruct them, to 
understand them, to avoid distorting them, to use them as building blocks in theorizing” 
(Goldkuhl 2012, 5). Citing Lein and Meyers, Rowlands asserts that: 
…the foundation assumption for interpretive research is that knowledge is gained, or at least filtered, 
through social constructions such as language, consciousness, and shared meanings in addition to the 
emphasis on the socially constructed nature of the reality, interpretive research, acknowledges the intimate 
relationship between the researcher and what is being explored, and the situational constraints shaping this 
process (Rowlands (2005, 81). 
 Bryman characterizes qualitative research using six point criteria, namely ‘Seeing 
through the eyes of …’ or taking the subject’s perspective, ‘describing the mundane detail of 
everyday settings’, ‘understanding actions and meanings in their social context’, ‘emphasizing 
time and process’, ‘favouring open and relatively unstructured research designs’, and ‘avoiding 
concepts and theories at an early stage’ (Bryman, cited in Silverstone 1993, 24). Although this 
characterisation of qualitative research appears too broad to risk generalization, it captures the 
essence of qualitative research; namely, its preoccupation with explication of “the subject’s 
interpretation of social reality” (Silverstone 1993, 24).  
Adopting a qualitative research design enabled the researcher to use flexible data 
collection methods such as the semi-structured interview, thereby allowing him to interact with 
subjects in their natural setting.  Gray (2009, 166) acknowledges the flexibility of the qualitative 
research design when he notes that the qualitative research design enables the researcher to go 
beyond giving “a mere snapshot or cross-section of events and can show how and why things 
happen-also incorporating people’s own motivation, emotion, prejudices and incidents of 
interpersonal cooperation and conflict”.  
As demonstrated in the data analysis sections, interviews with journalists/editors and with 
‘citizens’, did not only enable the researcher to elicit data on how the press and citizens 
discursively construct election violence, but also to gather data on the rationale of such 
discursive constructions.  
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Intense and intimate contact with participants enabled the researcher to formulate 
opinions on the basis of observations in the field of study and to gain insights on “tacit 
knowledge” (discussed later in this chapter) through observation of their emotions, feelings, 
prejudices and motivations (Gray 2009), meaning that the researcher could incorporate the 
voices of the participants verbatim, as demonstrated in Chapter Five, Six and Seven. 
However, because social constructionism is so broad that it encompasses a “mosaic” 
(Gubrium and Holstein 2008, 3) of approaches, the researcher was able to focus on discourses 
embedded in press texts as well as his epistemic position and that of his subjects by zeroing in on 
“face-to-face interactions through semi-structured interviews” (Gubrium and Holstein 2008).  
Flick (cited by Gray 2009, 67) argues that the fact that qualitative designs enable the researcher 
to incorporate his interpretations and those of the participants. It is imperative that the researcher 
reflects on their own actions and observations and such reflections become part of the data. To 
this extent, this researcher found it prudent to give a more elaborate reflection on his 
positionality as demonstrated later in this chapter. Similarly, Merkl-Davis et al., (2014, 1) concur 
with the need for reflexivity by the researcher in their assertion that “in discourse analysis, 
researcher biases need to be acknowledged to reflect the view of the constructed nature of 
knowledge”.      
3.4. Data Collection 
3.4.1 Sampling Procedure  
The sampling procedure used in this study is purposive sampling. Purposive sampling, a 
type of non-probability type of sampling which enables the researcher to obtain insights into 
“particular practices that exist within a specific location, context and time” (Gray 2009, 180) was 
used to identify newspaper articles that would give the richest data on election violence during 
the five elections held between 2000 and 2013. As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the electoral 
field in Zimbabwe during the period under study was heavily polarized and conflict-ridden. 
These conflicts manifested themselves in verbal animosity and election violence.  
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Elections in Zimbabwe have historically been marred by violence since independence in 
1980. However, election violence reached unprecedented levels after the watershed referendum 
of 2000. While the specific reasons for this are debatable and outside the purview of this thesis, 
popular opinion attributes this to the emergence of a credible and ‘popular’ opposition party. 
Unlike previous elections which had been characterized by apathy and the dominance of the 
ruling party, ZANU (PF), the emergence of a strong opposition party and the crises afflicting the 
country at the time spurred citizens to partake in political action.   
The enormous amount of textual data on election violence, the large number of 
newspapers involved, coupled with the length of the study period made purposive sampling a 
more suitable procedure for the study as it enabled the researcher to identify information-rich 
newspaper articles which could be used to explore the issue at hand (Patton, cited in Gray 2009, 
180). As discussed in Chapter One, six newspapers selected for this study were considered to be 
the main sources of news and information on political issues in the country as demonstrated in 
surveys by the Zimbabwe All Media Products Survey (ZAMPS). A ZAMPS survey released in 
revealed that the The Herald had a readership of 799 950, The Sunday Mail, had 658 166 readers, 
and The Daily News (the second highest in the daily news market) was read by 571 581 people. 
The Financial Gazette and the Zimbabwe Independent were read by 92 215 and 72 833 
respectively.   
As already noted in Chapter One, the Daily News was closed in September 2003 (re-
registered in March 2011), after failing to comply with the Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act (AIPPA), meaning that the newspaper only covered three elections, the 2000 
parliamentary elections, the 2002 presidential elections and the 2013 harmonised elections. Its 
inclusion was therefore strategic in the sense that before its closure it had torpedoed the state-
owned daily, The Herald with its print run shooting from 60 000 to 120 000 (compared to The 
Herald’s 90 000) (Moyo 2005 113), hence the Daily News  was a key player in the media 
industry during the period under study.   
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3.4.2 Fieldwork 
 
Field work for this study was done in three phases, namely, the textual data collection 
phase, interviews with citizens and interviews with journalists and editors. The collection of 
archival newspaper articles, took place between 1 January 2012 and 31 January 2014. This 
process took much longer than anticipated because the researcher travelled from South Africa 
where he is a full-time employee.  
Each visit to the National Archives of Zimbabwe lasted approximately two weeks when 
the researcher was either granted special leave by the employer or during the university semester 
breaks. The interludes in the data collection process did not just mean a loss of momentum in the 
research process, but also deferment of the interview process which was scheduled to begin after 
the textual data collection process had been concluded. The rationale for conducting the 
interviews after finishing collecting the textual data was that it would be possible to relate the 
interview data to the textual data. 
 Given that the textual data primarily addressed how the press represented election 
violence, interview data, from journalists and editors mainly spoke to the WHY component of 
the research question. Hence, during the interviews with the journalists and editors the researcher 
carried with him some samples of newspaper cuttings and asked the interviewees to explain why 
their newspaper represented election violence in the manner reflected in specific newspaper.  
As the analysis in Chapter Five and Six indicates, data from interviews with journalists 
and editors of newspapers complemented the textual data in that, the interview data enabled the 
researcher to gain deeper insights on why the press reported election violence in the manner they 
did. These insights could not be obtained by merely analysing the textual data. In this respect, the 
textual data took precedence over the textual data. 
Although the researcher could have used a research assistant to help with the collection of 
textual data at the National Archives of Zimbabwe and with coding it, doing it himself turned out 
to be more beneficial in terms of gaining a foothold on the insights emerging from the data.  
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Being directly involved in the collection of the textual data enabled the researcher to 
figure out the key themes emerging from the textual data, resulting in more clarity on the 
findings of the study. It also enabled the researcher to focus the attention of the respondents on 
questions that directly addressed the key objectives of the study, based on the representational 
patterns observed in the newspaper archival material. Inevitably the data analysis process started 
as early as the data collection process and continued up to the writing of the thesis.  
The second phase of data collection entailed conducting interviews with purposively 
selected members of the public, hereafter, referred to as ‘citizens’ who are regular readers of the 
newspapers selected for the study. Interviews with citizens took place between the 8
th
 and 19
th
 of 
July 2013, in the capital city of Zimbabwe, Harare (see Appendix 2.1). Although the timing of 
the first segment of the interviews was mainly determined by the exigencies of work 
commitments and availability of time referred to earlier, it was nevertheless significant in the 
sense that this coincided with the election campaign period for the 31 July 2013 harmonised 
elections. There were many challenges attendant on embarking on a research of this nature 
during a campaign period in a political context such as that of Zimbabwe, where a climate of fear 
is pervasive. What was more significant was that the 2013 harmonised elections came after the 
2008 presidential election run-off election which is generally perceived by both the public and 
the media to be the bloodiest election in Zimbabwe’s electoral history, a sentiment which 
recurred in the interviews with ‘citizens’ as well as the textual data (see the discussion on 
‘memorialisation’ in Chapter Six).  
As demonstrated later in this chapter, the sensitivity of the issue of election violence 
meant conducting this research constituted a risk for the researcher and the respondents. The 
pervasive climate of fear, particularly during the time the study was conducted could mean that 
the results could be skewed by what previous studies on public opinion polling have referred to 
as “the margin of terror”, meaning, the biasing or distortion of opinions or perceptions on politics 
which result from “conditions of widespread political violence” (Bratton and Masunungure 2012, 
1).  
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The need to guard against this risk partly necessitated the use of the purposive sampling 
strategy adopted for the study, whereby the researcher deliberately looked for respondents who 
were not just knowledgeable about the issues at hand, but also were willing to express 
themselves as freely as possible about the topic at hand, an issue that will be revisited in greater 
detail below. The timing of the interviews could, however, be said to be an advantage in the 
sense that it afforded the researcher an opportunity to have the “authentic” experience of election 
violence, thereby gaining insights on nuances that could have been lost had the interviews been 
conducted outside the context of an election.  
A looming election enabled the respondents to speak in a particular way and to mobilize 
a repertoire of discourses that reflected their ‘authentic’ (unmediated by third parties or the 
media) experiences about elections in Zimbabwe. Since the 2013 election triggered memories of 
the previous elections (see discussion in Chapter Six) respondents became more articulate when 
talking about press representation of election violence, thus enabling the researcher to obtain 
enough data to reach saturation. There is, however, an obvious limitation in the selection of 
respondents in this category which relates to the class position and geography of the respondents 
in this category. This point will be revisited later in this chapter. 
The third and last phase of the field work involved interviewing selected journalists and 
editors of the newspapers included in the study and had two segments. The first segment of 
interviews took place between the 2
nd
 and the 7
th
 of September 2013, also in Harare, which was 
about one month after the 2013 harmonised elections. The second segment entailed follow-ups 
with respondents who had been interviewed in the first segment, as well as the recruitment of 
more respondents to fill information gaps which were apparent after the first round of interviews 
with journalists and editors.  
The selection of participants in this category was largely dictated by their experience in 
reporting elections between 2000 and 2013 and their ability to relate, in an articulate manner 
(including the ability to recall events and trends dating back to 2000), their experiences in 
reporting election violence, and in particular, why they (or the newspapers they worked for) 
represented election violence in the manner they did.  
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The follow-up interviews targeted journalists and editors who had been previously 
interviewed and those that the researcher had not managed to get hold of during the first round of 
the interviews and were conducted between 11 and 15 May 2015. Significant to note is that, only 
one of the journalists was female, perhaps a reflection of the fact that political journalism and the 
editorship of newspapers in Zimbabwe is dominated by men. 
In some cases the second round of interviews (three respondents were interviewed twice) 
became a ‘gap-filling’ and data validation exercise in the sense that the respondents had been 
interviewed in the first round of interviews undertaken in 2013, but there had not been enough 
time for the interviews. Others were being interviewed for the first time because the researcher 
had not been able to get hold of them. Details of the interviewees are shown in Table 3.3 below. 
The field work experience was a mixture of rewards and challenges owing to contextual 
factors and the sensitivity of the topic under investigation. Getting respondents who were willing 
to express themselves about the subject was a daunting task. At the same time being able to 
recruit respondents who were willing to openly share their experiences about this sensitive topic 
was gratifying.   
3.4.3 Archival Search 
As pointed out earlier, textual data was obtained from the six newspapers targeted for the 
study. The textual material was obtained from the National Archives of Zimbabwe were archival 
material for all publications is kept. Relevant articles were identified, retrieved and photocopied 
This process was guided by the principle that in qualitative research, samples sizes should, 
neither be too large to be able to extract rich data, nor should they be too small to hinder the 
researcher  from achieving data saturation (Onwuegbuzie and Leech cited in Gary 2009,182).  
Thus, the first two days at the National Archives of Zimbabwe were spent trying to determine the 
quantity of news articles on election violence during the period under study before coming up 
with cut-off dates.  
After scanning the first few editions of two of the weekly newspapers the decision to use 
a random sampling procedure was dropped because this would yield too small a number of news 
articles to enable any meaningful analysis.  
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The initial decision to include only front page stories and commentaries was also 
abandoned after realizing that there were some articles with rich information in other pages 
which could help advance the objectives of the study.  
“Letters to the editor” which had been originally included were also excluded because 
including them would broaden the scope of the study beyond what was desired by the researcher. 
Ultimately, the researcher decided to include all cases which had the potential to yield “rich” 
data on election violence. This included hard news, editorials, feature and opinion articles on any 
page of the selected newspapers published six weeks before and two weeks after an election.  
The researcher checked every newspaper published within the eight-week period, 
selecting only those articles that were more than three hundred words
3
 long and dwelt on 
“election violence” to a considerable degree. Since the study combined newspapers with varying 
publication frequency (i.e. daily and weekly newspapers), surveying every edition was found to 
be more useful in addressing the objectives of the study as well as ensuring that there was 
sufficient and ‘rich’ textual data from every newspaper selected to enable the researcher to 
establish distinct thematic frames on election violence. This also ensured that the number of 
articles selected was kept within manageable limits so as to guard against unmanageable 
volumes of data. Selecting newspaper articles in this way ensured the selection of rich cases and 
also enabled the researcher to establish distinct themes that were principally derived from the 
research questions of the study. This sampling procedure also ensured that textual material 
covered the full electoral cycle, namely, the pre-election period, the voting period and the post-
election period, which covered the proclamation of results. 
 It is however, worth noting that the post-election period of the 29 March harmonized 
elections overlapped into a campaign period of the presidential run-off which was held on June 
27, 2008. Because the results of this particular election were delayed, campaigning for the run-
off election started immediately after the release of the release of the harmonized elections. This 
means that only two weeks of textual data were left out (see table 3.2 below).  
                                                          
3
 Three hundred words is ordinarily considered the standard hard news article. 
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Given the purposive nature of the study, the researcher did not believe that these two 
weeks could have skewed the findings in any significant way. 
Overall, a total of 766 newspaper articles were identified and analysed. Table 3.1 below 
displays the number of news articles from the different newspapers.  
Table 3.1: Distribution of newspaper articles according to newspaper title 
Newspaper  Number of Articles 
              The Herald 308 
The Sunday Mail 71 
Daily News 207 
Financial Gazette 82 
Zimbabwe Independent  75 
Newsday 23 
TOTAL 766 
 
As shown in Table 3.1 above 308 were from The Herald 71 from The Sunday Mail 207 
the Daily News 75 from The Zimbabwe Independent, 82 from the Financial Gazette and 23 from 
News Day. Table 3.2 below shows the elections selected for this study and the sampling dates for 
the elections.  
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Table 3.2: Election dates and sampling dates 
Election and Date Held Sampling Dates 
 General Election June 24-25, 2000 7 May-9 July, 2000 
Presidential Election, March 9-11, 2002 23 January-25 March 2002 
Parliamentary and Senatorial Election, 31 
March, 2005 
1 February-14 April, 2005 
Harmonised Elections, 29 March, 2008 29 January-12 April, 2008 
Presidential Run-off Election, 27 June, 
2008 
27 April-4 July 2008 
Harmonised Elections, 31 July 2013 14 June- 14 August 2013  
 
3.4.4 Semi-structured Interviews 
 
Interviews enable participants…to discuss their interpretations of the world in which they live, and to 
express how they regard situations from their own point of view. In these senses the interview is simply 
concerned with collecting data about life: it is part of life itself, its human embeddedness is inescapable 
(Cohen et al. 2001:267). 
The above quotation is an apt summation of the philosophy which underpins interviews 
in general and semi-structured interviews in particular. The nature of the research problem and 
research questions in this study necessitated the deployment of an approach that views human 
subjects as best qualified to report their own experiences about particular events.  
Darlington and Scott (2002, 369) argue that the best data collection research approach is 
one that yields data that address the purpose of the study and answer the research questions.  
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Thus, in order to complement textual data from the archives, and also generate additional 
data on the way in which citizens talk about election violence, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with purposively selected journalists and editors from all the newspapers selected for 
the study. Arksey and Knight (cited in Gray 2009, 370) argue that “interviewing is a powerful 
way of helping people to make explicit things that have hitherto been implicit- to articulate their 
tacit perceptions, feelings and understandings”.  
Semi-structured interviews were, therefore, more suited to gleaning insights on the 
discursive construction of election violence in the sense that the social constructionist 
epistemology which guides this study foregrounds the idea that “language is more than a mere 
mirror of the world and the phenomenon ‘out-there’, and the conviction that discourse is of 
central importance in constructing the ideas, social processes and the phenomena that make up 
our social world” (Nikader 2008, 413). Thus, interviews are more useful when exploring 
“subjective meanings that respondents ascribe to concepts or events” (Gray 2009, 373).  
The initial target was to interview at least one editor and one political reporter per 
newspaper, but realizing, that because of the time lapse some editors and journalists who could 
have provided rich data had either left the employ of certain newspapers or emigrated into the 
Diaspora
4
, the selection of respondents became more dictated by accessibility, while at the same 
time ensuring that every newspaper was adequately represented. The rationale for involving 
editors was that they are considered the custodians of the editorial policy of their newspapers and 
have authority to articulate the newspaper’s editorial stance on key issues. Because the 
researcher knows the names of all the editors (although he had not previously met three of them) 
he contacted them telephonically in order to schedule an appointment.  However, accessing 
editors and journalists proved to be difficult (including those he knew already) because of tight 
newsroom production deadlines, especially those working for daily newspapers, and also due to 
the climate of fear and suspicion already mentioned above (particularly in the case of those he 
did not know or had not met before).  
                                                          
4
 As mentioned in chapter 4, the country experienced a huge out-migration of journalists at the turn of the 
century. 
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In order to get around this problem the researcher relied on referrals by acquaintances and 
contacts in the media industry to reach participants, in a ‘snowball-like’ sampling strategy. 
However, even after such referrals it was not possible to interview everybody who had been 
targeted. In one case the researcher had to cancel an interview with an editor after spending 
seven hours waiting for a potential participant in a car park in the capital city, Harare. The 
potential participant had promised to “call back in 30 minutes” but the call never came. Any 
attempts to call him at intervals of one hour, reminding him that the researcher was still waiting 
for his call would be received with the promise that “I will call you now, I am still busy”. In 
order to make-up for this interview, the researcher had to look for a retired editor who once 
worked for the same paper in early 2000 and beyond to tap on his views in relation to why the 
newspaper reported on election violence in the way it did.  
Whereas the timing of the interviews was an obstacle to accessing participants who were 
willing to talk, it enabled the researcher to appreciate the people’s perceptions, attitudes, and 
behaviour in vis-à-vis election violence as a subject and its corrosive effects on the political and 
electoral environment. It is inevitable that these and other subjective experiences during the 
interviewing process might have coloured the researcher’s outlook and assumptions during the 
data interpretation process. It is worth noting that while the pervasiveness of fear is 
acknowledged in so far as it made the recruitment of participants an onerous task, it did not 
necessarily affect the results as most of the respondents who agreed to participate in the study 
spoke freely.  
All the editors interviewed consented to their names being revealed in the study. One 
editor of a privately-owned newspaper actually stated that he was not afraid at all to have his 
name mentioned in the study because he was “speaking the truth”. One realises that, being 
journalists, their views are already in the public domain and there was possibly no bigger 
political risk than the real fact of practising journalism in Zimbabwe, where the media laws are 
restrictive. Overall, a total of eight (8) political journalists and eleven (11) editors participated in 
the research. Table 3.3 below shows the distribution of the respondents according to newspaper 
organization and occupation. 
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Table 3.3 : Distribution of respondents according to organization and occupation 
Newspaper Number of Editors Number of political reporters Total 
The Herald 3 2 5 
The Sunday Mail 2 1 3 
Newsday 2 1 3 
Daily News 1 - 1 
The Zimbabwe 
Independent 
2 3 5 
The Financial Gazette 1 1 2 
Total 11 8 19 
 
As shown in Table 3.3 above, a total of 19 media practitioners participated in the study, 
of which eight (8) were from the state-owned press and eleven (11) from the privately-owned 
press. Due to the fact that the study period spans a period of thirteen (13) years (2000-2013) and 
the high turn-over in the newsrooms, particularly editorships, a conscious effort was made to 
ensure that participants who had institutional memory of the different newspapers were included.  
The high number of editors thus includes those who once edited the newspapers but had 
left the organization. The idea was to get a holistic picture of how the various newspapers were 
reporting on election violence during the entire period of the study. Equally significant is the fact 
that all the editors (except three) included in the study had at one time occupied the position of 
political reporter or had reported on political issues in their organization before their elevation to 
editorship. With regards to the journalists, the idea was to target political reporters, who are in 
most cases are senior journalists in the newsroom, and have had considerable experience in 
reporting elections.  
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This meant that the participants in the study had a wealth of experience in political issues 
in Zimbabwe and could speak authoritatively on matters of election violence.  The interviews 
lasted between twenty-five (25) minutes and thirty (30) minutes and all of them (except one) 
were conducted in the newsroom, the natural habitat of media practitioners.  
Conducting interviews in the ‘natural habitat’ of the journalists was beneficial in the 
sense that it enabled the researcher to have an appreciation of the dynamics of news production 
and to observe his participants in an appropriate setting, and to better appreciate how that setting 
shaped news products. For instance, while interviewing an editor of a privately-owned 
newspaper the telephone rang and he answered it. 
 On the other end of the line could be heard a male voice. It turned out that the person 
was an official from the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services, who upon an 
instruction from the deputy minister was disputing a story that had been published by the 
newspaper on that day. The editor called the reporter concerned and asked him about the story, 
telling him that the minister was contradicting his story. Fortunately for the reporter, he had tape-
recorded his conversation with the deputy minister. The editor later used the incident to illustrate 
some points in our conversation and to validate some of his points in relation to why they hold 
certain views about election violence and why they do not trust politicians who call for peace 
during the day, while instigating election violence during the night.  
Respondents in the category of journalists and editors were mainly asked questions about 
their experiences on reporting election violence beginning the year 2000 up to 2013, how their 
newspapers reported elections violence, the constrains they faced and most importantly WHY 
they reported election violence in the manner they did. In order to ensure consistency in the 
interviewing process, an interview guide was used and the same questions were used.  
Respondents were also shown cuttings of newspaper articles and asked to explain why 
their newspaper reported the story in the way it did, or why the story had the kind of headline it 
had, or the kind of language used. As mentioned earlier the idea was to gain deeper insights on 
the rationale for the representation of election violence by the different newspapers. 
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 Such data was crucial in solidifying observations made during the archival data 
collection process. All the interviews were conducted in English. 
While the data generated from the interviews with media practitioners were primarily 
meant to complement archival data, the data from interviews with citizens were meant to address 
the question on citizen discursive constructions of election violence and their evaluation of press 
performance in reporting election violence. As argued in Chapter Seven the idea is to foreground 
citizens as agents rather than subjects so as to bring into dialogue their constructed reality with 
that of the press on the issue of election violence, as discussed in the analysis section (Chapter 
Seven). Accordingly, empirical data on citizen discursive construction of election violence was 
generated from interviews with twenty-one (21) purposively sampled Harare- Zimbabwean 
citizens who are regular readers of the newspapers selected for this study. Although the pre-
requisite for inclusion in the study was regular readership of at least two of the newspapers, it 
turned out that almost all the respondents claimed that they read all the newspapers regularly. 
Given the socio-economic conditions in the country, it is impossible that a person could read all 
the newspapers published in the country, but the researcher discerned that respondents who made 
this claim wanted to show that they were exposed to views from both sides of the political 
divide. The idea was to include people who had the competence to talk about the way 
newspapers report on election violence, giving their perspectives, in a manner that would enable 
the researcher to reach data saturation. The referral method ensured easy identification of 
participants who were considered by their peers to be knowledgeable on political issues. Thus, 
regular readership of newspapers and interest in public affairs was used as a yard stick for 
determining the participants’ knowledge. 
 In a sense, this meant that the data collection process using the semi-structured interview 
method entailed some kind of data analysis as well. Polokinghorne (cited in Darlington and Scott 
2002, 52) advises that in qualitative research participants should have “the capacity to provide 
full and sensitive descriptions of the experience under investigation”, what Darlington and Scott 
refer to as “articulateness”, which arises out of experience with the topic under consideration 
(2002, 51).  
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However, the limitation of this sampling strategy was that targeting only those who 
articulate issues, meant that only those with a certain level of literacy would be included, thus 
opening the sampling strategy to the charge of elitism, since unlike radio, newspaper 
consumption requires literacy competence that is slightly above the functional literacy level, that 
is the ability to access newspaper content in the English language.   
In 2013 the country was ranked by The African Economist Magazine as having the 
highest literacy rate on the African continent at 90.7% (The African Economist Magazine 2013). 
In any event, qualitative studies are not censuses and the idea in this thesis was never to strive at 
a generalisability of findings, but rather, to glean insights on meanings constructed around 
election violence and the possible impact of such constructions. This is the overriding objective 
which dictated the identification and selection of respondents in the category of ‘citizens’. It is 
also worth pointing out that the classification ‘citizen’ should be viewed more as an operational 
term signifying newspaper reading as a civic duty, than a segregatory label. It connotes people 
who actively follow political events through the press and are able to interrogate the views 
contained therein. 
As mentioned above, the identification and selection of respondents in this category 
followed a snowball-like sampling strategy. The process was ‘snowball-like’ in the sense that the 
researcher was referred to people by other people, but the snowball chain did not always meet 
the conditions of a conventional snowball sample in the sense that, due to the sensitivity of the 
topic and the difficulty in securing subjects, sometimes the snowball chain would break, but the 
researcher would not start afresh. If the person referred to by the last person refused to 
participate in the study, the researcher looked for another contact person who then linked him up 
with another person and the process continued until there were no new views coming out of the 
interviewees.  
While targeting only respondents in Harare could be viewed as a limitation, this 
drawback was ameliorated by the fact that, as the capital city, Harare is the most cosmopolitan 
city and is home to all ethnic and racial groups. This means that the charge of ethnic or 
geographic bias would not arise. The initial encounter with the first ‘link’ person was rather 
fortuitous. 
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 As the researcher was travelling to Zimbabwe from South Africa by bus, he sat next to a 
middle-aged man, a Zimbabwean national who was also going to Harare. A conversation started 
and they talked about a lot of things, politics included. Although the man had left Zimbabwe a 
long time ago his knowledge of Zimbabwean politics was compelling. The researcher later 
explained to him that he was going to do a research on the press and election violence in 
Zimbabwe and he was looking for people living in Zimbabwe to participate in his research. The 
man said he knew one such person and would link the researcher up with the person when they 
got to Harare. It turned out that the person in question was the one who was waiting for him at 
Roadport, the main international road transport station in Zimbabwe. He became the first 
interviewee and later linked the researcher up with others, but as mentioned above, the researcher 
had to look for other contacts to link him up with other participants so as to elicit diverse views.  
In the polarized and dichotomised context of Zimbabwean politics where people are 
perceived to be either Zanu (PF) or opposition (MDC), securing diversity meant having views 
that lean on both sides. Harare, being an opposition stronghold, this was a daunting task. In a 
study where political affiliation is not a qualification for participation the process becomes a 
delicate balancing act.  
The approach was to get respondents who expressed totally different views as much as 
possible in order to avoid getting similar views, which is one of the disadvantages of snowball 
sampling. Hence, there was also a deliberate need to break the snowball chain if the researcher 
realized any two consecutive respondents had similar views. To get around the problem of 
homogeneity of views the researcher looked for people who were known to hold ‘extreme’ 
political views from either side of the political divide. In most cases such respondents declared 
their affiliation during the course of the interviews. For example, someone could just say “Of 
course myself I am Zanu (PF)” or “Me I don’t want to lie, I don’t like this government”. Hence, 
both theoretical and practical considerations guided the identification and selection of 
respondents in the sense that because of resource and time constraints the researcher could not 
visit many parts of the county and was conscious of the need to avoid the homogeneity of views 
by keeping an eye on the diversity of views in order to fill certain information gaps. Thus, the 
selection of respondents was guided by Strauss and Corbin’s view that “case analysis” does not 
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necessarily negate our research questions or statements”, but rather adds variation and depth of 
understanding (cited in Darlington and Scott 2002, 53). After the five interviews, the selection of 
participants was more guided by the imperative to broaden perspectives on the issue under 
investigation.   
Darlington and Scott add that: 
Where there are many possible experiences of a phenomenon it will be important to talk to people 
representing a wide range of views and situations to build up a broad understanding of the topic. Even so, 
in situations where there is relative homogeneity, it would be wise to obtain the maximum number of 
participants possible in order to document the extent of the views or situations identified and avoid the 
charge of choosing only the few cases that fitted the researcher’s own perspective Darlington and Scott 
(Darlington and Scott 2002, 52-53) 
The most challenging part was balancing the gender representation of the respondents. It 
was more difficult to get female participants than male participants. Although, structural factors 
linked with the patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean society, resulting in more men being 
empowered through education, the fear factor appears to have contributed to the low number of 
female participants. More female respondents turned down the request to participate in the study 
than men. One female respondent terminated the interview after twenty-five (25) minutes, 
claiming that her boss wanted her to finish some task. Given that historically, women (and 
children) have been more vulnerable from election violence as they are at the receiving end most 
of the time, women’s apprehension to participate in a study of this nature was quite 
understandable. Against this background the gender representation in the study was four (4) 
women and seventeen (17) men.  
 In terms of education all the respondents had a minimum of Ordinary Level education, 
with the highest level of education being a Master’s Degree. Among the respondents were an 
airtime vendor
5
, a university lecturer, a teacher, a priest, a business woman, a medical student, 
and a laboratory technician.  
                                                          
5
 A person who sells mobile phone airtime recharge cards. 
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As indicated in the analysis (Chapter seven) the majority of my participants read almost 
all the printed newspapers published in Zimbabwe at the time of the study. A few of them read 
the online versions of the mainstream Zimbabwean newspapers and other online news sources 
that focus on Zimbabwe. The interviews were held in different places depending on the wishes of 
the interviewee. Some were held in the researcher’s car in the central business district of the 
capital, Harare, while others were held in the offices of the interviewees. All the respondents 
were assigned pseudonyms in order to protect their identity.  
3.4.5 The Interview Process 
Using an interview guide consisting of a list of questions and a tape-recorder, journalists 
and editors were asked questions relating to their experiences in reporting election violence in 
Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2013 and the rationale for their newspapers representing election 
violence in a particular way.  
Citizens were mainly requested to share their experiences about press representation of 
election violence in Zimbabwe during the same period and to evaluate the performance of the 
press in relation to its reportage of election violence. They were able to give their views on their 
understanding of election violence, the causes of election violence and they also gave a critique 
of the press’s coverage of election violence in Zimbabwe. They were also asked to give their 
views on the ideal role of the press in election violence. While the interview guide helped to 
provide an “overall framework” (Rubin and Rubin 1995, 145) of the conversation, there was 
sufficient flexibility, allowing the researcher to ask probing questions particularly in instances 
where detail was lacking or if there was ambiguity. In order to show respondents that what they 
were saying was important and interesting, and also to build rapport with them, the researcher 
took notes during the interviews even though the interviews were tape-recorded.  
Throughout the interviews efforts were made to ensure that the questions directed at the 
respondents remained focused on the research questions. It was also imperative to adopt a self-
reflexive stance, in order to ensure that the responses of the respondents were accurately 
captured and interpreted.  
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Respondents were requested to confirm their views throughout the interview process. As 
demonstrated below, self-reflexivity, bracketing and intuiting (Streubert and Carpenter 1999) 
were used to ensure that the interpretation of data obtained from respondents was not coloured 
by the researcher’s academic background and previous experience and interactions with media in 
Zimbabwe. The use of an interview schedule to guide the interview process made it possible to 
incorporate interesting themes emerging from the interviews. Bryman (1989,149) credits 
interviews of this nature for giving respondents considerable latitude and for being more 
responsive to the lines of answering that would have been initiated by the respondents 
themselves. The flexibility of the semi-structured interview method made it possible for 
respondents to tell their stories in a natural way, thus enabling the researcher to access some of 
the most concrete views about the way in which the press and citizens frame election violence 
during electoral contests.  
Borrowing from Rubin and Rubin (1995)’s advice, and through the self-examination 
process, the researcher sought to check whether the concepts and themes that should be explored 
were coming out, whether there was enough depth and examples, whether the right questions 
were being asked, whether his description of the topic was not too broad or too narrow as well as 
reconsidering his relationship with the interviewee (Rubin and Rubin 1995, 154). However, a 
constraint associated with the interview method was the fact that respondents were required to 
reconstruct past events about past elections which had been held between 2000 and 2013. This 
proved difficult and some of the narratives were either partial or disconnected. Given the 
changed political and economic circumstances of the country, occasioned by the formation of the 
Government of National Unity in 2009, it is quite possible that people’s perceptions of election 
violence might have been moderated by the peaceful political context of the Government of 
National Unity, during which the interviews were conducted, thereby presenting partial 
narratives, vaguely remembering or skipping some important incidents of election violence. This 
necessitated the use of follow-up questions to enable respondents to elaborate on incomplete 
narratives. The researcher was however, mindful of the fact that such follow-ups could subject 
the respondents to stressful moments, given the time lag. 
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3.5 Data Analysis and Research Instruments 
 
3.5.1 Discourse Analysis 
Since the objective of this study was to examine the discursive construction of election 
violence by the press and citizens, the preferred method of data analysis was the Foucauldian 
discourse analytic approach. 
 Essentially, this necessitates both the examination of discourses through texts, talk and 
the context in which discourses are constructed. The Foucauldian notion of discourses is of 
particular relevance in this study because it adheres to the social constructionist premise which 
views knowledge as a social construction rather than something that is fixed or is simply out 
there (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 13). The view taken in this thesis is that citizen and press 
constructions of election violence is not necessarily a reflection of the reality of election 
violence, but rather, constitutes different regimes of knowledge about election violence in 
Zimbabwe. The different ideologically located press and citizens construct different versions of 
reality and their constructions have consequences. Their privilege to construct reality about 
election violence means that they have power and agency.  
As argued in subsequent chapters this power is neither a monopoly of the press nor the 
citizens, but is “spread across different social practices” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 13). In 
this sense, power does not necessarily have to be conceived as oppressive, but “constitutes 
knowledge, bodies and subjectivities” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 13). Foucault states that: 
What  makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us 
as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, 
produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social 
body, much more than a negative instance whose function is repression (Foucault 1980, 119). 
This statement foregrounds power as ideology rather than as coercion and alludes to the 
intertwinedness of power with knowledge, an issue that is extensively discussed in Chapter Two. 
As demonstrated in this thesis power is enacted through the privilege to construct (and promote) 
particular versions of reality about a phenomenon, thus making election violence a site for the 
ideological contestation.  
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Potter and Hepburn (2008, 275) contend that “discourse is the most fundamental medium 
of action”, implying that it is through discourse that the various and competing versions of social 
reality are constructed, thus making discourse the central foci of study.  
The Foucauldian discursive approach adopted in this thesis necessitates broadening the 
conception of discourse beyond text and talk, to include what Parker describes as “delimited 
tissues of meaning reproduced in any form that can be given an interpretive gloss” (Parker, cited 
in Hergaden 2013, 9). Foucault defines discourse as “a group of statements that belong to a 
single system of formation” (Foucault 1972, 121), thus bringing discourse into the realm of 
“historical problematisation” (Hergaden 2013, 9) whereby history is not essentialised or viewed 
in totalizing terms, whereby things are dichotomized into right or wrong, but making a conscious 
effort to account for differences, transformations, continuities, and discontinuities and to 
scrutinize the deployment of power. Admittedly, such an approach makes the delimitation of the 
discourses to be studied an onerous task, the approach enabled the researcher to pay attention to 
contextual issues as well as knowledge which was not brought to the public domain, be it in the 
textual analysis or the interviews. The discursive analysis of both the textual and interview data 
entailed explicating key themes and topics on election violence (thematic analysis) and deep 
theorizing which entailed engagement with the themes from a theoretical perspective.  
3.5.2 Data Preparation  
Data preparation entailed transcribing data from tape-recorders and converting field notes 
into written documents that could be read logically. The researcher preferred doing it himself 
because it helped him to become more familiar with the data. Apart from transcribing the data 
the first stage involved the identification of the units of analysis – the “single undivided unit 
upon which you direct your analysis and express the qualities you perceive in that element” 
(Chenail 2012, 266). This requires that the researcher clearly identifies “who” or “what” is being 
studied (Crossman, n.d).  
The determination of the units of analysis was influenced by the research questions and the 
interpretative approach adopted for analyzing the data, whereby the important themes had to be 
explicated from the data in order to provide descriptions of the ways in which the press and 
citizens construct reality about election violence.  
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Different units of analysis conceived at different levels were identified in this study. For the 
archival textual data, the unity of analysis was the entire hard news article, editorials 
(commentary) and opinion columns, sentences, phrases and words. Observations made from 
studying these newspaper articles enabled the researcher to make generalizations about the press 
and citizen discursive construction. For interview data with journalists, editors and citizens, the 
unity of analysis was the entire script, sentences/paragraphs, phrases and words. The views of the 
individual journalists and members of the public were aggregated in order to map out the 
different perspectives on election violence.  
3.5.3 Data Coding and Organization 
This process entailed identifying, summarizing, explicating and structuring emerging themes 
or patterns that speak to the research questions using coding sheets, one for the textual data and 
another for the interview data. Following Gray’s recommendation that coding should start very 
early during the data collection process for the researcher to familiarize himself with the main 
issues emerging from the data (Gray 2009, 49), the coding process started during the data 
collection process and continued during the analysis stage. The code sheets were constructed by 
folliwng a series of steps suggested by Schneider (2013) thus: 
(1) Identifying a set of predetermined set of key themes on election violence based on the 
research questions and inspired by a thorough reading of the related literature. 
(2)  Identifying themes emerging from the textual and interview data which the researcher 
felt could be related to the predetermined themes. Any thematic categories that were 
found to be too broad were merged. 
(3) Revision of the list of categories to reflect the identified categories 
(4)  Repeating the process with different documents until a final list of coding was 
established what Marying (cited in Schneider 2013) refers to as evolutionary coding. 
(5) Highlighting some sections of the text (archival and interview data) using different 
colours. This process also entailed marking key words or phrases. 
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(6) An examination of the structure of the text, checking whether there were any overlaps in 
discourses, how arguments were structured and examining the context of discourses. 
(7) Collecting statements assigned with specific codes and examining their meanings. This 
collection of statements allowed the researcher to ‘map out’ the regime of truths 
established on each major topic (Schneider 2013). 
(8) Identifying cultural inferences and how the context of the discourses informed the 
argument. 
(9) Identifying linguistic and rhetorical devices used in the text and how various statements 
functioned. 
(10) Identifying any ‘evidentialities’ or statements/phrases that appeared to make any 
statements appear ‘common cause’ or self-evident. 
(11) Interpretation of data, which entailed weaving findings together by explaining 
what the discourse is all about and how it works. 
In order to get a general feel of the main themes emerging from the data the researcher read 
through the transcribed interview scripts line-by- line, noting down, interesting and significant 
issues and circling key words and underlining key phrases linked to the research questions. The 
same process was done for all the newspaper cuttings from the archives. This was followed by 
more focused reading of both the transcribed data and the newspaper cuttings. The researcher 
tried to make sense of the data, delineating different discursive patterns, paying particular 
attention to who was saying what, where, when, and why they were saying what they were 
saying. This is in line with Elo and Kygnas’s advice that researchers should try to “immerse 
themselves” in the data if meaningful insights are to be gained from the data (2007:109).   
In delineating discourses in texts, Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 145-146) advise that one 
should focus on the following: 
 the  aspects of the world to which the discourses ascribe meaning; 
 the particular ways in which each of the discourses ascribes meaning; 
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 the points on which there is open struggle between different representations; and 
 any understandings naturalized in all the discourses as commonsense (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002, 145). 
 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) recommend that within this framework of analysis, emphasis 
should be on how discourse changes (or does not change) over time. The fact that this study 
spans a thirteen-year period means that it lends itself to a mapping out of subtle temporal shifts  
in discursive constructions of election violence between 2000 and 2013, as is illustrated in the 
example of ‘Chamisa and Madzore case’ discussed in Chapter Six. 
 3.5.4 Drawing Conclusions 
This entailed looking for connections between conceptual categories emerging from the data, 
by carefully examining if any of the concepts relate to the literature section. In order to draw 
meaningful conclusions from the data the author made inferences and reconstructed meanings 
from the data by exploring the attributes of the different data sets. Relationships between data 
categories were also drawn. Quotations that were considered key to addressing the research 
questions were incorporated in the analysis but the researcher was mindful of Patton’s advice 
that one should “strive for balance between description and interpretation” (cited in Zhang and 
Wildemuth, n.d).  
3.5.5 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) stands out from the ordinary type of discourses 
analysis in that its primary focus is to uncover group relations of power (Van Dijk 1995b). It 
could be argued that unlike discourse analysis which is politically uncommitted, critical 
discourse analysis is a special approach of discourse analysis inspired by the need to discursively 
expose dominance, inequality and the ways in which these are produced in various discourses, 
and how such dominance is resisted by dominated groups. Thus, critical discourse analysis 
exposes “underlying ideologies, that play a role in the reproduction of resistance against 
dominance or inequality” (Van Dijk 1995b, 18).  
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 While Critical Discourse Analysis shares similar concerns with the Foucauldian 
discursive analysis in so far as the two are concerned with examining power relations and how 
these relations are expressed through language, they differ in that the Foucauldian discourse 
analysis places emphasis on discourse and its intersection with power and knowledge, 
particularly, how society is shaped by discourse, while Critical Discourse Analysis is imbued 
with elements of political activism which finds expression in the denunciation of discursive 
dominance and corporation with dominated groups with a view to empower them.   
In this study, the quest to gain knowledge on the way in which the press and citizens 
construct their social reality necessitated the deployment of a method of data analysis that 
focuses on discourses in a social context. In order to complement qualitative content analysis 
critical discourse analysis was used to gain insights on how respondents construct their version 
of events through discourse in a particular context.  
Gray (2009, 515) notes that, unlike content analysis, critical discourse analysis rejects the 
view that language is a “transparent medium which merely reflects ‘reality’. Instead, the starting 
point of discourses analysis is that reality cannot be accessed outside of discourse, hence it is 
discourse that should be the object of analysis (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 21).  
The discourse analyst has to focus on “what has been actually said or written exploring 
patterns in and across the statements and identifying the social consequences of different 
discursive representations of reality” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 21). 
Critical discourse analysis concerns itself with understanding the relations of power and 
inequality in society (Van Dijk 1993; Van Dijk 1995; Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000; Blommaert, 
2001). Thus, language is intricately embedded in societal power relations, and through 
discourses analysis, structures, strategies or properties of texts that are crucial in the production 
of unequal power relations and dominance are understood.  
Critical discourse analysis was found more suited to the study because of its 
constructivist approach-the stance that reality is a social construct, and the fact that through its 
use one can go beyond the observational, descriptive and explanatory.  
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Using critical discourse analysis enabled the researcher to treat texts and talk as being 
implicated in the construction of relations of power.  
The method provided the necessary linkage with the theoretical framework, which rests 
on the Michael Foucault Discourse Theory and the social construction theory of reality theory. 
The approach facilitated the interpretation of texts by focusing on discursive practices, individual 
words, themes, ideas, and views embedded in texts with the ultimate aim of identifying 
commonly shared patterns about the dynamic relationship between press and citizen discourses 
on election violence. This is in keeping with Blommaert’s assertion that critical discourse 
analysis enables one to demonstrate the “minute ways” in which discourse, as a symbolic power 
resource works to generate or articulate power and inequality, (2001,14).  
To this extent a three –dimensional approach to conceiving and analyzing discourse was 
adopted (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2001). Discourse was thus conceived thus: 
(i) Discourse as a text: This entailed noting down linguistic features, choice of 
words, patterns in vocabulary, choice of words, paying attention to concrete 
textual features in both the semi-structured interview data and textual data from 
the archives. 
(ii) Discourse as a discursive practice: This approach entailed viewing discourse as 
something that is produced, circulated and consumed in society (Blommaert and 
Bulcaen, 2001:448). Viewing discourse in this way meant that one had to make 
inferences about the conditions in which various discourses were produced, 
distributed and circulated. It also attempts to forge links between different texts, 
i.e. those texts that directly draw upon other texts and those that do so indirectly. 
(iii) Discourse as a social practice: This process entailed looking out for ideological 
and hegemonic uses of texts that are meant to re-order discourse and power 
relations in society.  
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(iv) Blommaert and Bulcaen (2001: 449) note that: 
… hegemonies change, and this can be witnessed in discursive change, when the latter is viewed 
from the angle of inter-textuality. The way in which discourse is being represented, re-spoken, or 
re-written sheds light on the emergence on the orders of new discourse, struggles over normality, 
attempts at control, and resistance against regimes of power. 
Viewing discourse as a social practice, thus meant making attempts to uncover ways in 
which social relations impinge on patterns of discourse and social relations, and also treating 
these relations as problematic rather than given. The observations made from discourse analysis 
where then integrated with those from critical discourse analysis and subjected to interpretive 
analysis. However, the constructed nature of knowledge in discourse and critical discourse 
analysis bring to bear questions about the researcher’s influence on the process, necessitating the 
need for one to reflect on the way in which their values, beliefs and philosophical assumptions 
may impact on the findings. This is the focus of the next section. 
3.6 Reflexivity and Positionality  
 
The qualitative nature of this study implies that the researcher is, as Henning et al., (2004, 
7) rightly observes, “…the main instrument of research”, meaning that the researcher constructs 
meaning from their engagement and interpretation of the data. The implications are that the 
researcher has to reflect on the possible impact of their personal values, beliefs, experiences, 
their social and political identities, class position, gender, or academic background to ensure that 
they are able to “present “thick descriptions” with ample empirical evidence” (Henning at al 
2004, 7).  
Lambert et al (2010, 321) rightly point out that “in qualitative research the researcher 
aims to situate themselves in the participant’s world and to understand the subjective (persona) 
experiences of their research participants. In doing so, the researcher can turn these subjective 
experiences into representations that allow interpretation and real insights that apply more 
generally beyond those individuals studied”.   
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Having adopted a qualitative methodology, the researcher was aware that through this 
research he was making knowledge claims which are of necessity circumscribed by a particular 
epistemology, experiences, philosophical assumptions, social, political and economic 
background and position. It was therefore imperative for him to reflect on how his experiences, 
assumptions, values, beliefs and background could possibly influence this research right from the 
conception of the topic, through the literature review and data collection, up to the data 
interpretation stages of the research (Lambert et al 2010, 321).  
 Through this thesis the researcher endeavoured to make a contribution to the body of 
knowledge on media and political conflict in general and the press and election violence in 
particular, and as Lambert et al (2010, 321) assert, all knowledge is based on theory  and 
inevitably, there are different ways of “understanding and attaining knowledge”. 
 To this extent, the researcher found it vital to situate himself within the experiences of 
his respondents, primarily because part of the knowledge generated in this study was based on 
his interpretation of their narratives, and reflecting on his own positionality enabled him to gain 
deeper insights on the power dynamics between him and his respondents since knowledge claims 
are always socially situated (Harding, cited in Garatidye 2014, 30). Sultana contends that: 
Knowledges produced thus are within the context of our inter-subjectivities and the places we occupy at the 
moment (physically and spatially, as well as socially, politically, and institutionally). Knowledge is always 
partial and representations of knowledges produced through field research embody power relations that the 
researcher must be aware of in undertaking ethical research (Sultana 2007, 382). 
The researcher’s professional academic background as an academic studying for a 
Doctorate at one of South Africa’s premier institutions of learning clearly locates him in a class 
of the privileged. Having emigrated from Zimbabwe to South Africa takes him out (both 
geographically and class wise) from the world of his participants who bear witness to the 
economic problems back home in Zimbabwe and are possible targets of, read about or witness 
election violence during electoral contests. In spite of this geographical displacement from the 
motherland, the researcher has family members who live in Zimbabwe and frequently visits 
relatives in rural and urban parts of the country who have varied experiences of election 
violence.  
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The researcher hails from a district in Mashonaland province which has been one of the 
worst affected by political violence. It is however important to point out that none of his 
immediate family members have been seriously affected by election violence, although, as noted 
above they have various forms of vicarious experiences of election violence. 
The researcher was introduced to Marxism, Critical Theory, Critical Political Economy 
and Social Constructionism as well as Post-Structuralism in the very early stages of his 
undergraduate studies at the University of Zimbabwe, where he later became a media studies 
lecturer for close to a decade.  In undergraduate studies, he was exposed to the writings of Frantz 
Fanon, Ngugi Wa Thiongo, Ibekwe Chinweizu, Walter Rodney, Paulo Freire and Antonio 
Gramsci.  
Ngugi’s Decolonising the Mind, Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 
and Basil Davidson’s The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State, Frantz 
Fanon’s The Black Skin White Masks and the Wretched of The Earth, and David Korten’s When 
Corporations Rule the World were made mandatory preliminary readings for the post-Graduate 
Media Studies Programme. Among his instructors were a sprinkle of “nationalists”, 
“traditionalists”, “anti-colonialists” and neo-Marxist Gramscian scholars.  
The researcher later developed interest in Noam Chomsky, and Michael Foucault’s works 
and admired Francis Nyamnjoh, Francis Kasoma and Issa Shiviji’s critical approaches to 
concepts such as democracy and human rights. 
As the researcher embarked on this research journey he became acutely aware of the fact 
his personal experiences and academic background constituted the composite labyrinth of values 
and beliefs which underpinned his choice of a research topic, the research process, and the 
choice of literature reviewed, data collection methods and the interpretation of data. In addition, 
his brief stint with The Sunday Mirror, a left-leaning newspaper practising an ‘independent 
nationalist’ model of journalism, transcending the political polarisation in the country and 
“arguably the most analytical and dispassionate source of electoral news” (Chuma 2007, 68), 
owned by an academic and publisher would also have an influence on his interaction with his 
respondents, particularly journalists and editors.   
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Being conscious of these realities required that the researcher needed to be sensitive to 
his own behaviour and assumptions and the assumptions of his respondents would influence the 
quality of data, the enquiry process and the way in which knowledge was generated from the 
interviews. 
 Many scholars are in agreement that, although it is impossible to completely purge one’s 
personal values and beliefs in a research study, it is critical to be aware of issues such as those 
articulated above because they shape the research in a significant way, and one has to devise 
ways of “dealing with their consequences” (Watt 2007, 85). To this extent, throughout the 
research process the researcher used a reflexive memo to continuously identify and record his 
own assumptions about the topic under investigation so as to ensure that he did not “impose 
meanings on the data” (Fischer 2009, 584) and to ensure that all possible meanings present in the 
data were considered, taking Fischer’s advice that in qualitative research, researchers must 
continuously identify and record their assumptions or hold them in abeyance- a process called 
bracketing and also continuously question one is earlier understanding of data (Fisher 2009).  
According to Fisher (2009, 584), bracketing entails “mindfulness that one brings to bear 
regularly, asking about assumptions that have gone into how one has “languaged” what was 
apprehended”. Fischer adds that, “It is not possible to view without viewing from somewhere. 
We do our best to become aware of what that somewhere is, questioning it, owning it in our 
reports”.  For Chenail (2012, 2) bracketing entails putting one’s “repertoire of knowledge, 
beliefs, values, and experiences in order to accurately describe participants’ life experiences” and 
a means to demonstrate “the validity of the data collection and analysis process”.  In the context 
of this thesis, bracketing entailed a continuous engagement with the data to ensure that prior 
assumptions about the press’s representation of election violence were recorded and shelved, 
being self-aware and re-examining insights emerging in the data. It also entailed “looking back 
and inward in a self-aware manner” (Fischer 2009, 583) in order to maintain awareness about his 
reflexivity so as to position his research and writing (St Louis and Calabrese Barton, 2002).  
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Continuous engagement,  also meant being self-conscious to the language used in 
reporting the findings as well as developing creative and intuitive strategies to negotiate the 
various tensions and obstacles in order to minimise “errors of deficiency” ( saying less than what 
the data shows) and “errors of exuberance” (saying more than what the data shows) (Chenail 
2012, 2). In order to accomplish this, Chenail (2012, 2) advises that “…we should keep looping 
back and forth in an iterative or circular manner between the qualitative notation you have 
assigned to the data (e.g., the category or theme) and the data itself.  
In order to guard against errors of deficiency and exuberance, the researcher took St 
Louis and Calabrese Barton’s advice that in reporting findings, there is a need to “foreground the 
experiences of the people we work with over “theoretical commentary”, because “foregrounding 
the voice of participants makes a statement about what constitutes valid knowledge” (St Louis 
and Calabrese Barton 2002, 15). 
 In the specific context of this thesis, privileging the voice of the participants entailed 
presenting the reality of electoral violence as perceived and experienced by the respondents as 
demonstrated by a significant amount of direct quotations used in Chapters Five, Six,  and Seven. 
This way the researcher tried to minimise his own interpretations by presenting the data as is. It 
must however, be pointed out that as the researcher employed this strategy he also relied on his 
own “intuitive and creative inclinations” (Mabweazara 2010, 660) in negotiating the dynamic 
tensions between what the participants told him (public knowledge) and what they actually knew 
(tacit knowledge), (Chenail 2012, 2).  
Scholars, (see Bussey 2015; Miller 2015; Lin 2013; Markely 2012)  acknowledge the 
power of intuition in accessing the most subtle forms of meanings about human experiences, 
what, Lin (2013, 471) refers to as the “essence of things”.  Polanyi (cited in Chenail 2012, 2) 
asserts that researchers work from the assumption that their research participants “always know 
more than what they say or make “public knowledge” through our interviews with them or via 
our data generation activities”, thus necessitating the deployment of intuitive capabilities, 
observation of participants, looking out for cues, probing and asking follow-up questions so that 
tacit knowledge is brought into the public realm.   
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Apart from negotiating the various tensions occasioned by his epistemological position 
and his class position as an academic and doctoral student at a prestigious university, the 
researcher’s other focus of reflexivity was his ambivalent location vis-a vis  that of his 
respondents. He was both an “insider” and an “outsider”. He was acutely aware that there could 
be perceptions about the existence of hierarchies occasioned by the different geographical and 
class location of his participants and him.  
As mentioned earlier, almost all of the respondents in the category of journalists and 
editors knew the researcher when he was still a faculty member at the University of Zimbabwe, 
the oldest university in the country, and in its heydays a reputable institution of higher learning 
on the continent. The researcher had also worked with some of the journalists as an intern at a 
privately-owned newspaper, and most were familiar with his opinion column at The Sunday 
Mirror which ran between 2002 and 2007.  At the same time the researcher was an outsider in 
the sense that he was not a journalist and had emigrated to the ‘Diaspora’, meaning that he was 
perceived as the ‘Other’. 
The use of a ‘snow-ball like’ sampling strategy in identifying participants for the 
“Citizen” category (whom the researcher did not know)  meant that he was often introduced to 
them by his contacts as “a PhD student from Wits University, in South Africa”, thus clearly 
demarcating the researcher and his respondents’ different locations,  thereby amplifying the 
researcher’s  “outsider” status.  
On the one hand, the researcher was an insider on account of his previous association 
with the media as mentioned earlier. He was also an outsider because he was an academic (and a 
PhD student) and not a practising journalist, meaning that he had “limited knowledge” of the 
inner intricacies of the media in Zimbabwe. In addition, he was also an outsider, because he was 
now based outside the country and supposedly not “on pulse” (if not out of touch) with the 
political developments in the country, and therefore, worth educating. Hence, some of the 
participants in the category of journalists saw this as an opportunity to “educate” the researcher 
about the topic because they regarded themselves as the experts as was evidenced by their 
keenness to talk endlessly on any one issue.  
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While the outsider status of the researcher caused discomfort and suspicion, resulting, in 
partial responses, cancellation of scheduled appointments and the rejections mentioned above, it 
also worked in his favour in the sense that it motivated his respondents to be over-elaborative as 
they strived to “educate” him on the topic.  
Although the researcher listened attentively, he would ask follow-up questions or 
rephrase the question until he got the desired response. However, for some respondents, because 
of the suspicion and the climate of fear mentioned earlier, some respondents became too brief in 
their responses, or talked slowly with calculated and measured responses, making sure that they 
said the “right” thing. 
Before the interview started, one respondent told the researcher that he had been 
interviewed so many times by people who purported to be researching for academic purposes but 
he had never seen the final product of the research. The researcher interpreted this to mean that 
the respondent doubted the authenticity of the researcher’s academic research. The respondent 
took more time scrutinising the researcher’s introductory letter, his ethics clearance letter and his 
student identity card before the interview commenced. As a result, the researcher became too 
cautious in the manner in which he asked questions, trying to convince the respondent that his 
research was an authentic academic study. The situation was compounded by the fact that the 
researcher had brought some archival press cuttings from the newspaper the respondent 
previously edited. Although the motive of bringing the press cuttings was to facilitate dialogue 
about how the newspaper had previously reported on election violence, it appeared as if the 
respondent was being ambushed or being put on the spotlight. 
The fact that the focus of the research inquiry was the WHY (as discussed in Chapter 
Five and Six) did not help matters either, because the respondent felt as if he was being put on 
the defensive. The researcher had to quickly adjust the style of his questioning having sensed the 
researcher’s discomfort. The researcher became more careful in his questioning and choice of 
words, and instead of saying “Why did you use such a headline?” he would say “So what was the 
rationale for having such a news headline in your newspaper?” or “What was the justification for 
using such words or phrases?” This style of asking questions made a big difference. 
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How this respondent (a former editor who is well known both locally and internationally) 
was able to negotiate for a more balanced control of the interview process was significant. 
Respondents in the category of citizens could not make a similar bargain because of the unequal 
power relations occasioned by the different social and economic locations between the researcher 
and his respondents. Suffice to note that the researcher’s interaction with this respondent did not 
just make the researcher develop a more nuanced understanding of the topic he was researching 
on, but also challenged his own assumptions about what he knew about journalists’ self-
identification and their perceptions of one another, such as the view expressed by some of the 
journalists that some of their colleagues had become “activists” instead of professionals, and 
labelled each other “ZANU (PF) supporter” or “MDC supporter” (see Chapter Five).   
The interaction also made the researcher realise how, in a qualitative research study such 
as the present one, power relations between the researcher and the research participant are 
always in a state of flux. 
 The researcher realised how, in an interview process, power is a negotiated outcome 
between the researcher and the research participant, and consequently bound to shift back and 
forth depending on the class position of the researcher and the researched and the setting. In 
addition, the researcher learnt that the identity of the researcher and the researched are never 
unitary at any one time (Day 2012).  Thus, the researcher’s experiences in interviewing 
journalists and editors (a group that wields power by virtue of their professional status and 
privileges) were different from his interactions with “ordinary” members of the public, who 
themselves rely on the press for information.  
Unlike the journalists and editors who knew the researcher, none of the respondents in 
the category of ‘citizens’ knew him, thus making the climate of fear mentioned above a more 
salient issue. This challenge manifested itself at various levels. Firstly, the recruitment of 
participants became more onerous and rejections were high. In a few instances, respondents who 
had verbally agreed to be interviewed turned down the interview the moment the researcher 
requested them to sign participation and consent forms.  
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Another participant agreed to sign the participant and consent forms but did not want to 
be audio-recorded. As a result the interview did not take place as it would be difficult to capture 
his views. It was instructive to note that instruments that were meant to facilitate transparency 
and accountability in the research process became obstacles to the research process. This 
however, could be a subject for a separate study.  
Given the fact elections were looming and the fact that the previous election (the 2008 
presidential run-off) was characterised by violence fear and the perception of risk were palpable. 
For instance, during an interview one respondent kept on imploring the researcher to keep the 
information she was giving confidential and her plea for protection became louder as the 
interview progressed and she complained that “the questions were getting more and more 
political”. This was in spite of the fact that, before the interview, the researcher had taken time to 
explain the objectives of the study and signing consent forms and participation forms 
guaranteeing confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents.These cases clearly bring to the 
spotlight, how certain research contexts bring to bear different dilemmas into the research 
process whereby the researcher ends up juggling conflicting roles in an attempt to manage the 
emotions of the participants as well as his own, a scenario which Day (2012, 69) refers to as 
“emotional labour”. While the use of the interview method was motivated by the researcher’s 
own epistemological view and the belief that authentic knowledge is that which is generated by 
closely interacting with the researched in their own natural settings, this did not necessarily erase 
the barriers between him as a researcher and his participants.  
The researcher became aware that his attempts to narrow the distance between him and 
his research participants (by going to interview them, thus privileging them as “knowers”, 
thereby relinquishing some of the researcher’s  power to speak on their behalf) did not 
necessarily guarantee that he had unlimited access to the information he wanted. The fact that 
respondents were giving information to the researcher - an outsider (and from their perspective 
they were not absolutely sure what the researcher would do with the information) might possibly 
have limited the amount of information that the researcher obtained from them, thus highlighting 
the fluidity of power relations in the research process, and in the process debunking the view that 
power is a “a possession that can be attained and used by social actors” (Day 2012, 66).  
107 
 
Foucault asserts that power relations are “circulatory” and “something that is intrinsically 
held by persons; it is the effect of discursive struggles over the realm of meaning and production 
of knowledge. Nor is power simply imposed from above or held by a singular source; it’s 
distributed throughout social relationships” (cited in Day 2012, 67). That power is perceived as 
ever shifting, does not however, imply that it is equally distributed between the researcher and 
the participants in a research process. However, these reflections on the researcher’s  
positionality and his engagement with various dilemmas and obstacles  encountered during the 
research process cannot by itself suggest that the researcher was able to address all the 
challenges related to power differentials, his values, beliefs and presuppositions, nor does he 
wish his reflexivity to be viewed as a mere “confessional tale” (Pillow cited in Day 2012, 68) but 
rather an attempt to insert himself in the research process, the ultimate objective being to account 
for the epistemological basis upon which his interpretations are founded.   
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
Cognizant of the fact that any research process that involves human subjects has the 
potential to create tension between the objectives of the research and the rights of participants, 
due ethical considerations were taken throughout the research process in order to ensure that no 
harm was caused to participants. The research was guided by five main ethical principles, 
namely: 
 To ensure that participants clearly understood the objectives of the study and what was 
expected of them; 
 The need to avoid harm to participants; 
 To ensure the informed consent of the participants; 
 To ensure that the privacy and confidentiality of participants was respected. 
 To ensure that the researcher is truthful and honest in the presentation and analysis of 
findings and that data is not manipulated. 
Ethical clearance was sought and granted by the University of Witwatersrand Ethics 
Committee.  
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The purpose and objectives of the research study, and data collection methods were 
clearly spelt out to the participants before the interviews started. It was also explained to 
them, that they had a right to withdraw from the interview at any stage of the interview if 
they wished to do so.  
Before each interview began, participants were given an Informed Consent form and a 
Participant Information Sheet. The Participant Information Sheet outlined the purpose and 
objectives of the research, the approximate duration of the interview, what the participants 
were expected of, their right to withdraw from the interview at any stage if they so wished, 
and the promise to guarantee confidentiality and anonymity (if the latter was desired). 
 Participants who agreed to be interviewed were given both the Participant Information 
Sheet and the Informed Consent and Audio-Recording Consent form to sign. Gaining 
informed consent from the participants was beneficial in a way that was beyond simply 
fulfilling ethical requirements in the sense that participants began to show more confidence 
in the study and responded to the questions frankly and enthusiastically. This boosted the 
prospects for obtaining rich data. 
 Guaranteeing anonymity to participants during the data collection and reporting process 
boosted the confidence of the participants thereby improving the prospects for obtaining rich 
data. Participants were requested to choose where the interviews would be conducted, thus 
making sure that participants were interviewed in a place where they were more comfortable. 
Appropriate measures were taken to ensure that raw data would not be accessible to any 
other person other than the author and his supervisor. Transcripts were kept under lock and 
key and their electronic versions were encrypted.  
In respect to the category of participants classified as ‘citizens’, all identifying features, 
such as names of respondents were removed and in order to weaken the link between raw 
data and processed data fictitious names were used to replace the real names of respondents 
who preferred anonymity.  
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This was done to ensure that respondents did not suffer any physical or psychological 
harm. However, respondents in the category of editors did not mind their names published, 
and as indicated in Chapters, Five, Six, and Seven their names are appended to their 
statements. 
In order to ensure that the responses of participants were accurately represented in the 
analysis and interpretation, and to ensure that the results were not slanted, the researcher 
continuously cross-checked and verified what the respondents had actually said and their 
narratives were represented as they were. Continuously reflecting on his positionality (as 
discussed above) ensured that, throughout the study process, the researcher  remained 
conscious of the possible impact of his social location, values, beliefs, perceptions, and made 
an effort  to have these bracketed during the study process, thereby, ameliorating errors of 
deficiency and exuberance. 
 
3.8 Limitations of the Study 
One limitation of this study was that the very limited sample of citizens which was 
confined to the capital city, Harare, and the fact that participants were required to be regular 
readers of newspapers, thereby excluding those who were not literate enough to read 
newspapers, but might have had rich experiences of media reporting of election violence (such as 
radio and television).  
The purposive sample used to select respondents and textual data meant the researcher 
used his discretion to select ‘information rich cases’, resulting in the sample being skewed 
towards one particular group of people, residing in a particular locality and were of a certain 
gender. In addition, the use of interviews to collect people’s views about past experiences and 
events also presented a number of challenges in the sense that some respondents found it difficult 
to remember past events relating to specific elections. 
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Some events are better analyzed when they are still happening rather than after they have 
happened, and elections are no exception. The problem of asking people about events that 
happened in the past is that their context is usually lost in the narrative and the views of the 
respondents are likely to be influenced by current events.  
As observed earlier, it was a huge challenge for participants to reconstruct events which 
had transpired more than a decade ago due to the time lag. The other limitation was that the 
study focused only on newspapers and did not include the broadcasting in the analysis, meaning 
that it is impossible to have a much broader insights on the discursive construction of election 
violence in Zimbabwe. Further, the Foucauldian discourse analysis approach applied in this 
thesis has been criticised for giving “too much power to the concept of discourse”, thereby 
stripping the subject and the journalist of their agency (Hobbs 2008, 13). The Foucauldian 
perspective has also been accused of placing too much emphasis on the notion of discourse, to 
the point of being reductionist or deterministic. Such reductionism finds expression in the 
misplaced conception of people as “not free to think and act” on their own free will since their 
ideas are produced and determined by social, political and cultural contexts (discursive practices) 
in which they exist.  Hobbs (2008) argues that Foucault’s idea of discourse ignores “the material, 
economic and other structural factors involved in the distribution of knowledge/power, while 
exposing his argument of discursive “regimes of truth” to the charge of relativism” (Hall, cited in 
Hobbs 2008, 14). Be that as it may, the Foucauldian discursive approach remains a powerful and 
insightful theory for understanding meaning production in text and talk. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
 
  This chapter discussed the epistemological position of the thesis, the research design 
adopted in this thesis, the sampling procedures, data collection and data analysis, demonstrating 
their linkage with the epistemological position of the thesis. It was demonstrated in this chapter, 
how social constructionism, which is the epistemological position which underpins this thesis 
necessitated the deployment of a qualitative design and qualitative research methods which 
enabled the researcher to interact with his participants and to consider the voices of these 
participants as legitimate forms of knowledge on the phenomenon under investigation.  
It was noted that the choice of research design, sampling procedures, data collection and 
analysis methods adopted in this study was principally dictated by the purpose of the study 
which raises questions about how individuals make sense of the world. The chapter also 
discussed the fieldwork process, highlighting the opportunities presented by the selected data 
collection methods as well as the challenges encountered during the research process.  
The ethical issues and dilemmas attendant upon the study and the way in which they were 
dealt with was also highlighted. A reflexive account highlighting the researcher’s interaction 
with his participants and assumptions occasioned by his class position, experiences, and identity 
and how these assumptions, presuppositions and experiences were dealt with was given. The 
chapter also discussed the study’s limitations, highlighting how certain methodological choices 
were a drawback to the research study.  
The next chapter sketches the background of this thesis, illuminating the political and 
economic context which shaped the press and citizen discourses on election violence that is the 
focus of this thesis.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: NATION STATE FORMATION, ELECTIONS AND 
THE PRESS IN ZIMBABWE, 1980-2013: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Elections do not occur in a social vacuum. They take place within specific and historical contexts. 
Unfolding historical and political developments directly and indirectly influence the electoral process of 
the country. In fact, they constitute the macro environmental contexts within which elections are conducted. 
Political and historical contexts define the playfield, determine the rules and play of the game as well as 
the policy issues that inform and underpin election campaigns. Electoral processes and practices at a given 
time, mirror political scenarios aground where the political climate is tense, agitated, and polarized, 
election campaigns have generally been marred with violence. Understanding of the politics and history of 
the country is therefore critical in unraveling the political behavior of election contenders (ZESN 2008, 
14). 
This chapter provides the broader context in which this thesis is situated.  In very expansive 
strokes, the chapter maps out the socio-political, economic and historical background which 
informs this thesis in order to give the reader a deeper understanding of the forces that have 
shaped discourses on electoral violence in Zimbabwe. The assumption which is informed by the 
above quotation is that, meanings about elections are framed through the prism of the larger 
context in which elections are conducted. The chapter illuminates the historical processes and 
events underpinning discourses about electoral violence, beginning in 1980 when the country 
attained independence from Britain and demonstrates how those events are implicated in current 
struggles over the state.  
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section one is an overview of the country’s 
colonial legacy, the struggle to liberate it and how these remain the albatross around the neck of 
the post-colony. Section two discusses the reconciliation policy, the socialist project and the civil 
war in Matabeleland. It also draws the common strands linking these events and their relevance 
in contemporary Zimbabwean politics. Section three examines the debate on the one-party 
system, the neo-liberal policies introduced in the late 1990s and how they became catalysts to the 
multi-layered crises at the turn of the millennium. 
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 Section four examines the fast-track-land reform and the emergence of a viable 
opposition and how they relate to the crises. Section five gives an outline of the press system 
from the colonial era to the present, teasing out salient aspects of the press and its interface with 
politics and society. Section six recapitulates the key observations made in the chapter and maps 
out the nodal points linking the different sections. The chapter argues that the discursive 
construction of election violence discussed in the analytical chapters cannot be fully 
comprehended outside the historical antecedents and the larger socio-political and economic 
context in which electoral contests were performed in Zimbabwe.   
4.2 Zimbabwe’s Colonial Legacy: ‘An Unfinishable Business’? 
 
Zimbabwe became an independent Republic on 18 April 1980 after a protracted and 
bloody liberation war, known as Chimurengas or Zvimurenga (war of liberation) (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2011, 11). The first Chimurenga pitted the indigenous people of Zimbabwe led by 
famous spirit mediums, Ambuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi against the white colonialists 
between 1896 and 1897 and claimed 8000 lives (Chitiyo 2000, 3). The colonialists quashed the 
first Chimurenga by using asymmetrical force, brutality and torture of war prisoners and 
civilians (Zimbabwean Embassy in Sweden, 2009). This was followed by the second 
Chimurenga, between 1966
6
 and 1979, which pitted pro-colonialist Ian Smith Rhodesian forces 
against anti-colonial Zimbabwean liberation guerilla forces.  
The second Chimurenga ended in December 1979 after excruciating negotiations at the 
Lancaster House Constitutional Conference in Britain culminating in the April 1980 general 
elections which brought the country’s independence.  
                                                          
6
Although the Chinhoyi Battle of April 1966 marked the formal onset of the Second Chimurenga the revolution 
started in the early 1960s and took various forms of resistance such as protests, demonstrations and passive forms 
of resistance.  
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This Chimurenga was bloodier than the first and it is estimated that 50 000
7
 people, 
mainly Africans from the rural areas died while thousands others were maimed (Chitiyo, 2000, 
10).  
One contentious issue that threatened to scuttle the Lancaster House negotiations was the 
moratorium on the land which proscribed the new government from expropriating white-owned 
land until after ten years. In addition, constitutional amendments during the ten year period 
required 100 percent majority, which was unfeasible because the same constitution reserved 20 
seats for the white minority for the subsequent seven years preceding independence.  
The Patriotic Front, comprising the two liberation movements, ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU 
had strenuously opposed the moratorium on land acquisition arguing that the land issue was the 
epicenter of the liberation struggle and any compromise was a flagrant negation of the essence of 
the liberation struggle. They, however, reluctantly accepted the deal after being persuaded by 
some of their Front Line States compatriots and benefactors, some of whom, nevertheless 
acknowledged the duplicity of the arrangement. For instance, the then president of Tanzania, 
Julius Nyerere commented that it would be impossible to: 
…tax Zimbabweans in order to compensate people who took it away from them through the gun. Really the 
British cannot have it both ways. They made this an issue and are now making vague remarks mixing rural 
development with the question of land compensation. The two are separate…The British paid money to 
Kenya. That the future government of Zimbabwe must pay compensation is a British demand and the 
British must promise in London to make money available (Utete, 2003, 14). 
Pledges by Britain, the United States of America and other donor countries to assist in 
funding land reform helped to allay the fears of the Patriotic Front leaders that they would not be 
able to make good their promises of delivering land to their legion of land hungry masses after 
independence. However, Britain, the United States of America and many of the donors reneged 
on their promises.  
 
                                                          
7
Statistics on the number of lives lost during the Second Chimurenga however vary from author to author. Paul 
Moorcraft (1990) puts the figure at “over 30 000” while Sue Onslow says the war took between 30 000 and 80 000 
lives. The 50 000 figure stands closer to official accounts of the Second Chimurenga. 
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When the Labour Government under Tony Blair came to power in Britain in 1997 its 
Secretary for International Development, Claire Short delivered the message which broke the 
camel’s back precipitating the irrevocable collapse of diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe 
and Britain. Short wrote to Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister declaring that: 
I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land 
purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former 
colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonized and not colonizers (cited 
in Utete 2003, 15). 
Most studies on the Zimbabwean multi-faceted crisis which started at the turn of the new 
millennium locate the country’s multi-layered crisis to its colonial legacy (external factor) and 
the ineptitude of its political leadership (internal factors) with differing degrees of emphasis on 
the apportionment of blame (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011, Bond and Manyanya, 2002, Mlambo and 
Raftopoulus, 2010). Gastheni-Ndlovu (2011, 64) posits that the ruling party, Zanu (PF) inherited 
an ‘intransigent colonial settler state’ whereby violence was the modus operandi.  
The ZANU-ZAPU split in 1963 was so acrimonious that both parties learnt to embrace 
militaristic methods and violence as legitimate tools for gaining and retaining power. Makumbe 
(cited by Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011, 64) contends that the liberation parties tasked with ushering a 
democratic dispensation were forced by circumstances of the day to adopt militant and 
militaristic strategies epitomized by ‘commandist’ and regimental attitudes that did not brook any form 
of dissent, and the celebration of violence as a legitimate tool for achieving political control. As 
demonstrated in this chapter these commandist strategies would be invoked and revoked depending on the 
political exigencies of a power contest after even independence. 
Although some scholars concede that the compromises made at the Lancaster House negotiations, 
the consequence of which was a ‘residual economical and political power in white hands’ (Bond and 
Manayanya 2002, 8) and several kinds of debt inherited from the colonial regime as having contributed to 
the crisis, they tend to apportion more blame on “exhausted nationalism”, (Bond and Manyanya 2002).  
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011, 7) argues that the Lancaster House agreement compromised Zimbabwe’s 
‘revolutionary transition’ that could have dealt with finality with the racially skewed land tenure system 
and unequal distribution of economic resources in a post-colonial Zimbabwe.  
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The incomplete transformation or the “half-way house” (Bond and Manyanya, 2002) nature of 
the Zimbabwean revolution returned to haunt the country at the turn of the millennium. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2011, 15) argues that: 
…the crisis that engulfed Zimbabwe at the beginning of the third millennium has its deep roots in the 
legacies of settler colonialism and inherent limits of African nationalism. This reality has far reaching 
implications for the shape of Zimbabwe’s nation-state project. In the first place, control over and access to 
land has continued to shape and influence political contestations and imaginations of freedom because 
‘control over land and production on itself became a crucial aim of the Southern Rhodesia administration 
and government’. 
At independence, Zanu (PF) inherited a structurally weak state without control of a key 
economic resource, buffeted by economic sanctions and saddled with various types of 
international and domestic debt, amounting to about US$697.1 million (Bond and Manyanya, 
2002). The euphoria of independence masked the reality of the new state’s capacity to deal with 
its colonial legacy and sooner rather than later the tell-tale signs of a bifurcated state began to 
show. The ideological and moral debt of colonialism to the people of Zimbabwe was such that 
Zimbabwean tax-payers would pay double for colonial oppression through payments of loans 
taken to oppress them during the colonial era and repayments of the same after independence and 
the rise of neo-liberalism (Bond and Manyanya 2002, 9). The imposition of neo-liberalism after 
independence also meant that the colonialists remained in control and the revolution suffocated. 
4.3 Reconciliation without Justice, the Socialist Experiment and Gukurahundi 
In the preceding section it was pointed out how compromises made at the Lancaster 
House negotiations postponed the resolution of the national question. These compromises were 
further underpinned by Robert Mugabe, a famed Marxist who became the executive Prime-
Minister in the coalition government reconciliation policy. There would be neither retribution 
nor radical policies that would shake the edifice of the colonial structure. 
 Announcing the reconciliation policy Mugabe said: 
If yesterday I fought you as an enemy today you have become a friend and ally with the same national 
interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love 
that binds you to me and me to you. The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten 
(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003, 34). 
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Although Mugabe’s magnanimity earned him international accolades as a mature states-
man (Ingham-Thorpe, 1997, 187) and Zimbabwe was hailed as a beacon of reconciliation 
politics the moods of bitterness among some sections of the society were palpable. Despite Zanu 
(PF)’s socialist rhetoric the economy remained in the hands of the white minority enjoying 
government protection through “legitimized private accumulation” as opposed to government 
intervention (Raftopoulos 2004, 4). The country received substantial donor support from 
Western countries as recognition of its racial tolerance (Scarnecchia n.d., 90) and was feted as a 
model of transition in a region where global capitalist interests were ingrained. 
 Some scholars argue that Zimbabwe’s reconciliation policy was flawed in that it placed 
too much emphasis on reconciliation between blacks and whites at the expense of reconciliation 
between blacks and blacks, given that the two liberation movements, ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU 
had a history of mutual-suspicion (Institute for Electoral Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
2003, 34) epitomized by rancorous cleavages and “erratic attempts to forge alliances and 
umbrella organisations” (Sylvester, 1990, 378).   
The two main ethnic groups from which these two political parties drew their support, i.e. 
Shona and Ndebele also had a history of implacable conflicts dating back to the colonial period, 
through the liberation struggle in the 1960s and most recently during the Gukurahundi
8
 period in 
the 1980s (Chitiyo 2000). Others have criticized the reconciliation policy for accentuating 
forgiveness and forgetting at the expense of justice, “truth telling, confession, repentance” 
(Fisher 2010, 50). Fisher (2010) argues that with the reconciliation policy, whites did not have to 
do anything in reciprocation.  
In the absence of any form of apology, confession or “expression of any genuine regret” 
(Fisher 2010, 49) the conditions necessary for genuine and lasting reconciliation did not exist. 
The so-called “new order” was viewed by others as change without change.  
                                                          
8
 Gukurahundi was a violent state sponsored military operation in the mainly Ndebele speaking provinces of 
Midlands and Matabeleland which was primarily targeting dissidents and civilians who supported the then major 
opposition party, ZAPU. The violent nature of the operation resulted in widespread resentment of the ruling ZANU 
(PF) party.  
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Sylvester (1990, 381)  argues that Zanu (PF), like Ian Smith and Muzorewa had imbibed 
the myth that  whites were “indispensable to the economy” and deserved more protection in 
order to safeguard “standards”, thereby fostering a “false sense of economic security” among the 
white community (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2003, 37).   
There was no explicit acknowledgement and acceptance of past wrongs by anybody. The 
persistence of economic inequalities between the blacks and whites in the midst of increasing 
destitution and penury among those who bore the brunt of the liberation war such as the war 
veterans engendered destructive social relations and the failure by the socialist policy to deliver a 
nirvana produced a crisis of expectations. 
The government’s ferocious military operation to crush the dissidents in the 
Matabeleland and Midlands provinces, (see Appendix 2) which happened to be PF-Zapu 
strongholds and mainly populated by Ndebele-speaking people beginning 1981, has been cited as 
an example of the shortcomings of the reconciliation policy.  Dubbed Gukurahundi, (the rain that 
washes away the chaff before the spring rains (Deller 2009, 1) the operation resulted in the death 
of about 20 000
4
 civilians (CCJP cited in Vambe 2012, 76) and the maiming and disappearance 
of thousands others. However, much of what happened during this era did not receive much local 
and international media attention, hence the silence around Gukurahundi.  
The deployment of the 5
th
 Brigade to quell the dissident menace did not decrease the 
people of the region’s support for ZAPU. If anything it increased their resentment of the ZANU 
(PF) government because they saw Gukurahundi not as a “war against dissidents, but against the 
Ndebele and ZAPU” (CCJP 1999, 13). The failure to implement a genuine “truth recovery and 
truth disclosure” process (News Day, 2010) and national healing meant these wounds have 
remained unhealed.  Eppel (2004, 43) argues that Zimbabweans have avoided facing the truth by 
side-stepping the wrongs of the past.  
                                                          
4
The number of civilians killed during the Gukurahundi military campaign however, differs from writer to writer.  
For example, Chitiyo (2000, 6) puts the estimate at 6000, Rukuni (2007, 1) says nearly 30000 civilians were killed. 
Deller, 2009, 1) put the estimate of civilians killed during the Gukurahundi at between 5000-7000). Most recently 
an MDC high ranking official, Eddie Cross claimed that about 80 000 people were killed during the Gukurahundi 
(see NewZimbabwe.com2014). The figure that is widely quoted by the popular press is 20 000 (see also Vambe, 
2012, Newsday 2010). 
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Participants at a workshop to discuss a report by the Human Rights NGO Forum on the 
Gukurahundi massacres in 2010 urged truthful disclosure and a categorical apology to the people 
of Matabeleland as a prerequisite for genuine reconciliation.  
There is no other way to reconcile the region of Matabeleland with the rest of the country if the truth of 
what happened during Gukurahundi is not known. Even for an apology to be accepted it must be clear what 
is being apologized for (News Day, 2010). 
This clearly shows the extent to which the events around Gukurahundi sowed the seeds 
of bitterness, suspicion, and mistrust regarding the Zanu (PF) government. ZANU (PF)’s dismal 
electoral performance in the Matabeleland region is testament to this mistrust. 
Scholars who critique Zimbabwe’s reconciliation policy, however, tend to be selective in 
their analysis (Ingham-Thorpe 1997; Eppel 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012) in that, while 
acknowledging the flaws of the reconciliation policy they accentuate such flaws in relation to the 
most recent events such as Gukurahundi while glossing over the need for the same in relation to 
colonial injustices, as if to encourage the truncation and decapitation of history or to sanctify the 
colonial regime.  
The case for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission modeled along the lines of the one 
instituted in South Africa in the early 1990s could be more convincing if it were made in relation 
to both the wrongs of colonialism and any other human rights violations, be they historical or 
contemporary. These scholars also evade questions as to whether reconciliation was genuinely 
embraced or spurned by its beneficiaries and what evidence there was to demonstrate acceptance 
or disdain of the policy.  
4.4 The One-Party State Debate, ESAP and the Economic Downturn 
Negotiations between ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU culminated in the signing of a unity 
deal, the Unity Accord on December 22 1987 and the two parties merged into one party still 
called ZANU (PF). The civil war in Matabeleland ceased and PF ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo 
became the second vice-President of the country. ZANU (PF)’s dream of a one-party state 
almost became a reality (Shaw 1986).  
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The one-party state idea was reaffirmed in the party’s 1985 election manifesto thereby 
spelling the end of the “mock pluralism” (Sylvester, 1986, 375) which had characterized the first 
years of independence.  
When the 20 seats reserved for the whites were abolished through a constitutional 
amendment in 1987, the rest of the political parties became more like pretenders to the throne. 
Zanu (PF) mounted its arguments for the one party-state on several planks. They argued that the 
one party state system resonated with African customary practices whereby there is one chief and 
decisions are arrived at by consensus rather than by decree (Shaw, 1986, 378). The ruling party 
also justified the need for a one party system arguing that the majority of Zimbabweans had 
voted for it. Moreover, it was argued that the multiparty system was divisive and undermined the 
imperative for unity and nation-building, and accusations leveled against most opposition parties 
in Africa that they are fronts for Western imperialist interests were used to bolster this view 
(Shaw 1986, 379).  
A sudden turn of events dealt a heavy blow to Zanu (PF)’s one-party state project when 
Edgar Tekere, the party’s firebrand former Secretary General and Chairman of the party’s 
Manicaland province who had been expelled from the party formed a break-away political party, 
the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in April 1989. Earlier, the report of a scandal involving 
government ministers who illegally bought and sold motor vehicles from the sole car 
manufacturing plant, Willowvale Mazda Motor Industry caused an uproar (Raftopoulos, 1992, 
Mukasa, 2003), prompting President Mugabe to set up the a commission to investigate the 
scandal.  
Geoff Nyarota, the editor of state-owned daily newspaper, The Chronicle who had 
unearthed the scandal, commonly known as the “Willowgate scandal” was however, moved to a 
redundant position “upstairs” (Mukasa, 2003), an indication that the government was not fully 
committed to fighting corruption.  
The Willowgate scandal was preceded by demonstrations by University of Zimbabwe 
students who were protesting against what they perceived as growing corruption in the 
government and the ruling party.  
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The students took to the streets again in 1989 after members of their Students 
Representative Council (SRC) were detained by the police. The then Secretary General of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU), which had been a strong ally of government, Morgan Tsvangirai  was detained 
by the police for issuing a solidarity message with the students and criticizing the police’s 
highhandedness in handling the student demonstration (Raftopoulos,  1992).  
Between April and June 1990 a battery of national strikes by public service workers was 
the clearest indication that things were falling apart and the centre could no longer hold. ZUM 
sought to capitalise on this groundswell of disenchantment among the urban working class in the 
context of a growing social gap between the working class and the ruling elite (Sachikonye, 
1989, 119). Feeding on disillusionment, ZUM pivoted its campaign manifesto on an “anti-
corruption” and “anti-one party-state” platform in the 1990 elections.  
Although ZUM dismally lost the 1990 elections, winning only two seats, translating to  
18% of the popular vote in an election where  the First-Past The-Post (FPTP)
9
 electoral system 
was used (Sithole and Makumbe 1997, 128) it broke the myths about  ZANU (PF) and Mugabe’s 
invincibility, forcing the party to shelve its one-party state project (Sithole 1993, 38). ZUM gave 
hope to the multitude of urban working class people reeling from (ESAP) which the government 
had introduced in 1991 at the behest of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank.   
Faced with a ballooning budget deficit and a growing Balance of Payments (BOP) deficit 
emanating from the poor performance of exports, Zanu (PF) faced the dilemma of remaining 
wedded to its socialist policies or embracing neo-liberalism. It chose the latter path, but the 
consequences were disastrous. The official spin was that ESAP was the panacea for the country’s 
economic malaise, but just like an efficient pill it would be bitter to swallow but in the end heal 
the economy.  
                                                          
9
 This is a winner-take all system whereby political parties field candidates in every constituency and the 
candidates who gets the highest votes wins as opposed to proportional representation system where seats are 
allocated according to the total number of votes garnered by candidates. 
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Although the government urged the poor to tighten their belts, the opulence among the 
ruling elite spoke volumes about its hypocrisy. The Willowgate scandal was just but one prelude 
to the acquisitive propensity of the nouveau-riche. The austerity measures called for under 
ESAP; the retrenchments, the removal of subsidies and a host of cost-cutting measures in the 
social services sector resulted in the working class sinking deeper into abject poverty. 
  When Zimbabwe’s government forged an unholy alliance with the business sector, the 
workers became alienated, resulting in the labour body ZCTU breaking ranks with the 
government. The drought of 1992 could not have come at a worse time. The result was acute 
food shortages and inflation, sparking wild-cat food riots in 1993. As the economic hardships 
intensified the grievances and demands of the workers’ transcended the realm of bread and butter 
issues as they began to demand “accountability”, good “governance” and “democracy” from the 
ruling elite. The result was the formation, in 1998, of the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA), a coalition of civic bodies, labour, intellectuals, churches and students calling for 
constitutional reforms to replace the Lancaster House constitution (Bratton and Masunungure, 
2011).  
The NCA was chaired by Morgan Tsvangirai, who was still the Secretary General of the 
ZCTU, later becoming the President of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 
Government responded to the demands for constitutional reforms by setting up its own 
constitutional body, the Constitutional Commission (CC) in order to undercut the NCA.  
Meanwhile, war veterans of the 1970s liberation war, who all along had been neglected 
by the government confronted the government in 1997 protesting against the abuse of the War 
Victims Compensation Fund (WVCF) which had been set up in the late 1990s to cater for the 
welfare of war veterans injured during the war. Subsequent demonstrations by the Zimbabwe 
National War Veterans Association (ZNWVA) headed by the Polish-trained medical doctor 
Chenjerai “Hitler” Hunzvi became riotous and in 1997 President Mugabe was heckled while 
delivering a speech at the National Heroes Acre.  
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Due to pressure, the government acquiesced to the demands of the war veterans and 
agreed to pay each of the 50 000 members of the ZNWVA a one-off payment of Z$50 000
5
  and 
a monthly pension of Z$2000
6
, the total of which amounted to an unbudgeted Z$4.5 billion 
(Bratton and Masunungure 2011). The Zimbabwean dollar crushed to an all-time low on 20 
November 1997, popularly commonly referred to as “Black Friday”. This triggered a series of 
convulsions in the economy resulting in a pattern of violent politics in a grueling “battle for the 
state” (Onslow 2011, 2) symptomatic of the crisis of nation-state project” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2011, 7).  
Most scholars on the Zimbabwean crisis place undue emphasis on the unbudgeted cash 
payouts and the military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DCR) for 
precipitating the then crisis in Zimbabwe while downplaying the machinations of external forces 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Bond and Manyanya, 2011; Bratton and Masunugure 2011;Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2011 Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). Moyo and Yeros (2007) disagree with this view, pointing 
out that, although the Zimbabwean state had always been in a delicate position overt signs of 
distress started showing in 1997 after government suspended ESAP and went on to list 1471 
white owned commercial farms for expropriation.  
The IMF and the World Bank delayed and later withdrew funding and some bilateral and 
multilateral funding arrangements collapsed and the local currency took a battering (Moyo and 
Yeros, 2007). Gowans (2008, 3) reasons that Mugabe’s government’s pursuit of black nationalist 
interests rattled the interests of Western banks, corporations and white settlers who are of 
European origin, prompting the IMF, the World Bank and Western donor countries to cut 
development aid and impose sanctions. The US specifically passed a law, the Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 2001 to block the country’s access to 
international credit. Stone (2007, 3) concurs, arguing that the Zimbabwean crisis has its roots in 
the geo-political conflict “spurred on by non-conformity of Zimbabwe’s government with 
existing U.S., U.K. and IMF dictates”.  
                                                          
5
Equivalent to USD 8000 at the time 
6
Equivalent to USD200 
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He adds that the “considerable interference in Zimbabwe’s internal politics to a large 
degree explains the measures undertaken by the government” (Stone 2007, 3).  
The erosion of ZANU (PF)’s hegemony and its adoption of predatory tactics, what Moyo 
and Yeros (2007) refer to as “radicalization” became more poignant after the adoption of 
neoliberal policies. Although ESAP had been abandoned in 1997 the public acknowledgement of 
its adverse effects came much later. Addressing a gathering at the National Heroes Acre on 15 
October 2001 President Mugabe pronounced ESAP dead and buried. He said “Engough is 
Engough… ESAP is no more. We can bury it here” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 2002). Earlier, 
Mugabe had told delegates of the Special National Congress in December that: 
The hardships we endure today arise from the programme of adjustment to which we acquiesced at the 
beginning of this decade, which have had the terrible effect of simply wiping off the phenomenal social 
gains we had made during the first decade of our independence. Presently, many children are out of school; 
support for our health institutions can no longer serve our people; our social safety nets are largely 
dismantled and the laws that used to protect our workers against arbitrary retrenchments are, by and large 
repealed. Our people suffer and blame the Party and Government for it (Mugabe 2001, 117). 
Scholars who argue that the erosion of ZANU (PF) hegemony deepened after the 
government lost the crucial referendum vote in February 2000 are quite correct but they fall short 
in accounting for the causes of the ruling party’s popularity, preferring to blame everything on 
ZANU (PF)’s allergy to good governance and inherent deficit in human rights. Mugabe blames 
ESAP for his party’s dwindling political fortunes stating that 
We adjusted the economy for external interests, which is why our people have nothing to show, ten years 
into the adjustment; which is why this economy has been declaring monthly dividends to foreigners year in 
year out, indeed why local white companies have been notching profits at the expense of their workforce. 
The way forward is to adjust the economy for real ownership and control by indigenous Zimbabweans. 
Some of ZANU (PF)’s fiercest critics concede that:  
Whatever the many other flaws of Robert Mugabe and Zanu (PF), the first post-independence government 
was driven into a cul-de-sac by the forces of neo-liberalism, both local and global. Political degeneration 
was the next logical process, once it became evident around 1997 that ESAP was incapable of lifting 
Zimbabwe from the chronic dependency and had indeed greatly exacerbated underdevelopment (Bond 
and Manyanya (2011, 48) 
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This shows that there are competing narratives about Zimbabwe’s quagmire.  The truth, 
however, lies somewhere in-between these competing narratives.  
4.5 The Third Chimurenga, Opposition Politics and Manifestations of Crises  
 
It is perhaps trite to state that Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform has become 
synonymous with the Zimbabwean crisis and vice-versa (Chari 2010) the real basis for the 
assumption that the crisis began in 2000. Lush and Kupe (2005, 5) argue that the words “crisis” 
and “Zimbabwe” are rarely found apart these days with Zimbabwe becoming the ‘poster boy’ of 
anarchy and crisis. Chuma (2005, 2) argues that there is a “crisis of perspective regarding 
Zimbabwe’s crisis and the terrain of debate about the Zimbabwean crisis is bifurcated”.  
It could be argued that the crisis predates the referendum, but the referendum was the rod 
that torched the powder keg. After the government formed its Constitutional Commission the 
NCA cried foul arguing that it preferred a “people driven” constitutional reform process and not 
one championed by the government.  
The NCA therefore, campaigned for a NO vote. ZANU (PF) suffered its first electoral 
defeat since independence in a referendum held in February 2000. A few months back the MDC 
had been formed and drew the core members of its leadership from the ZCTU and the NCA and 
was led by Morgan Tsvangirai, who by the time of the referendum wore three hats, as President 
of the MDC, Secretary General of the NCA and Secretary General of the ZCTU.  
The electoral humiliation suffered by the government was followed by a raft of measures 
which have been described by some critics as acts of vengeance and vindictiveness. One of these 
was the retrieval from the rejected constitutional draft, of a clause empowering the government 
to compulsorily acquire land without compensation and incorporating it into the Lancaster House 
constitution (Amendment Number 16, Act/5/2000) thus, signaling the beginning of a fast-track 
land reform programme which became popularly known as The Third Chimurenga or Jambanja.  
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Official discourse lavishes the amendment and The Third Chimurenga as the final phase 
of liberation, which is economic liberation. The state-daily newspaper, The Herald portrayed the 
event thus:  
Zimbabwe yesterday took a giant leap towards correcting the historical imbalances in land 
ownership when Parliament passed a Bill which gives government the power to compulsorily 
acquire land for resettlement without compensation. The MPs (who voted in favour of the law) 
who included vice-Presidents  Muzenda and Msika, immediately broke into the liberation war 
song “Zimbabwe Ndeyeropa (Zimbabwe was born of the blood shed during the liberation war) 
soon after the bill was passed as British High Commission officials trooped out of the Speaker’s 
Gallery. Some MPs could not contain their joy and swayed to the rhythm of the song, while others 
clapped and banged benches in ecstasy (cited in Willems 2004, 167). 
The joyous mood in parliament sharply contrasted the sorrowful mood and bitterness 
which enveloped the white commercial farming community. The country had opened a new 
political chapter epitomized by polarisation and a political culture of intolerance. The months to 
follow witnessed widespread and uncoordinated occupations of white commercial farms 
characterized by violence and mayhem.  
As the June 2000 elections approached, the farm occupations became more violent, 
resulting in deaths and political talk became more virulent. ZANU (PF) upped the tempo on its 
rhetoric about Hondo Yeminda (war over land) and ran its election campaign with the slogan 
“Land is the Economy; The Economy is Land”. Whites who had previously shown little 
enthusiasm in political activities prior to the referendum came out in large numbers to vote for 
the MDC and were at one point filmed by CNN before the 2000 signing cheques for the 
opposition leader, Tsvangirai.  
The land reform programme gathered momentum after the elections, which Zanu (PF) 
won narrowly (winning 62 of the contested seats while MDC won 57 seats). The elections were, 
however, marred by violence. As the farm occupations spread throughout the country diplomatic 
relations between Zimbabwe and Western countries, principally the United Kingdom and the 
USA plummeted to historic lows prompting the EU and the USA to impose travel bans on the 
Zanu (PF) leadership.  
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Disruptions in the farming sector resulted in acute food shortages and unprecedented 
inflation. The farm occupations became the terrain for contending discourses. While the 
opposition branded the farm occupations “chaotic” acts of “barbarism” ZANU (PF) described 
them as “peaceful demonstrations”.  
 Although the ZANU (PF) line was drowned by widespread local and international 
condemnation, there are some who feel violence was inevitable, arguing that “the violation of 
property rights” was “by all objective considerations” to address the problem given the failure of 
the willing buyer-willing seller and some credit schemes for over decades (Bond and Manyanya 
2002, 73).  
On the one hand, critics of land reform ignore the necessity to redress historical 
imbalances and the negative impact of sanctions on the economy (Ahmed 2002, 5). On the other 
hand, sympathizers of the land reform are blind to the plethora of the programme’s 
shortcomings, some of which are documented by government appointed commissions such as the 
Utete Commission (2003). These include lack of productivity on some of the farms, multiple 
farm ownerships, violence and the haphazard manner in which land was allocated. It cannot be 
denied that an economy pivoted on the agricultural sector such as Zimbabwe’s would suffer from 
the deleterious effects of farm occupations, the ripple effects of which were far reaching 
(Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010, 3). However, the impact of other factors like the sanctions 
imposed by Western countries cannot be discounted. Government’s controversial clean-up 
operation, after winning the 31 March 2005 election targeting “illegal activities, criminals, touts, 
unlicensed business and other undesirable elements” made worse an already untenable political 
and economic situation. Code named Operation Murambatsvina (Operation drive out Filth) also 
known as “Operation Restore Order” or “Operation Tsunami” on account of the speed with 
which the operation was executed resulted in the displacement of about 700 000 and a further 2.4 
million were affected in various ways (Tibaijuka 2005, 7).  
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The humanitarian consequences of the operation were telling as it was indiscriminate and 
haphazard (Tibaijuka 2005). Critics of the clean-up operation argue it was meant to punish urban 
dwellers for overwhelmingly voting the MDC in the 2005 elections (Moore 2007; Mlambo and 
Raftopoulos, 2010). Others assert that it was meant to forestall a looming “Orange Revolution” 
subsequent to the election (Mhiripiri 2005, 151). 
 Mahoso (2005, 157) argues that the clean-up operation was just a routine event which 
should not have been turned into the global spectacle that it became (Mahoso 2005, 157). 
Mahoso argues that the moral condemnation of Operation Murambatsvina should be viewed 
within the context of discourses of globalization, whereby powerful nations such as the United 
States and Britain seek to impose their values on economically weak countries like Zimbabwe by 
mobilizing ‘international community’ for military intervention (Mahoso 2005).  
Discourses around Operation Murambatsvina illustrate how toxic politics played host to 
moods of mistrust, intolerance and acrimony. That its successor, “Operation Garikai/Operation 
Hlalani Kuhle), a programme for building houses for people who had been affected by Operation 
Murambatsvina was received with much skepticism, if not cynicism by the general public is 
instructive of the level of mistrust and ill-feeling towards the state at the time. 
As the economy took a tailspin social services such as education and health collapsed 
forcing thousands to emigrate in search of greener pastures in neighbouring countries, Europe, 
Australia and the United States of America (Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010, 4). By 2007 
inflation was in percentages of hundreds of millions while the national currency had become 
worthless. Per-capita GDP fell to $200 from about $900 in 1990 and about 80% of the 
population was reported to be living on less than $2 a day (Mlambo & Raftopoulos 2010, 4). 
As the harmonized elections of March 2008 loomed, there were several media reports of 
a government clampdown on university students who were demanding “better service delivery” 
and for failing to deal with the socio-economic problems ravaging the country (Moore and 
Raftopoulos 2012, 252).  
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Before that, an unauthorised “prayer meeting” by civil society organizations in March 
2007 had been violently quashed by the police, resulting in the death of an MDC activist and the 
injury of several others, including Morgan Tsvangirai, who suffered a deep cut on his head. The 
incident attracted unprecedented global media attention and Western countries led by Britain and 
the United States of America, tried to mobilize the international community to support military 
intervention against Zimbabwe.  
Although there was relative calm before the March 29 harmonised elections the 
semblance of peace evaporated after the elections. Zanu (PF) lost its parliamentary majority to 
the MDC for the first time and the incumbent, President Robert Mugabe was defeated by MDC’s 
Morgan Tsvangirai, who garnered 48% of the popular vote against Mugabe’s 42% but the 
presidential results were embargoed for five weeks (Makumbe 2008).  
Although Tsvangirai won the race he fell short of the 50% plus 1 vote prescribed by a 
constitutional amendment effected shortly before the March 2008 harmonised elections thereby 
necessitating a presidential run-off within 90 days. The presidential run-off was eventually held 
on 27 June after three months of bloody campaigns in which hundreds of opposition supporters 
(and a handful of ruling party supporters as well) died, homes burnt and thousands displaced.  
Mugabe won the presidential run-off after Tsvangirai had pulled out a few days before 
the election citing violence against his supporters. Election observers were unanimous in their 
pronouncement of the election as neither free nor fair. There is unanimity among scholars that 
the 27 June presidential run-off was the most violent election in the history of Zimbabwe 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Chitando 2010; Masunugure 2009, Moyse 2009; Makumbe 2009).  As 
a result, Zanu (PF) faced a legitimacy crisis forcing the party to negotiate with the opposition 
under a SADC mediated deal in order to secure a lasting solution to the festering economic and 
political situation.  
After months of bickering and haggling a government of national Unity (GNU) 
comprising Zanu (PF), the MDC faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai and the smaller faction led by 
Arthur Mutambara was formed in September 2008. However, due to disagreements over 
ministerial portfolios the GNU could not be implemented until February 2009.  
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A raft of economic reforms were introduced by the coalition government, one of which 
was the formal abolition of the Zimbabwean dollar and replacing it with a multi-currency regime 
resulting in inflation dropping to a single digit. On the political front political violence dropped 
significantly but the mutual suspicion between the coalition partners remained.  
Some outstanding issues relating to the key appointments continued to dog the GNU until 
its tenure expired after which elections were held on 31 July 2013. ZANU (PF) won the elections 
garnering a two thirds majority and Mugabe whitewashed Tsvangirai after obtaining 73% of the 
popular vote. Although the 2013 hramonised elections were given a clean bill by African 
election observers, the MDC cried foul alleging that the elections had been rigged. Western 
countries, notably Britain, the European Union, and the USA pronounced the elections neither 
free nor fair. 
4.6 Elections in Zimbabwe: A Source of Conflict or Dispute Resolution?  
 
Zimbabwe has regularly and consistently held elections since independence in 1980 but 
these elections have been a source of apprehension, tensions and moods of bitterness (Mlambo 
2005, Mlambo 2006) rather than a mechanism for dispute resolution (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). 
The transitional elections which ushered the country into independence were supervised by the 
former colonial power, Britain, using the Lancaster House Constitution. They were the first and 
last elections to be run under the Proportional Representation (PR) system (Sithole and 
Makumbe 1997; Gregory 1980; Kriger 2005; Sachikonye 2004). All subsequent elections were 
held using the Single Member District (SMD) or the First-Past-the Post (FPTP) system. Nine 
political parties took part in the 1980 elections but only three won seats; namely Zanu (PF) (57 
seats), PF-Zapu (20 seats) and UANC (3 seats). A 5% threshold was used to allocate seats in the 
country’s eight provinces.  
Zanu (PF)’s emphatic victory helped engender the myth that it was invincible and the 
only “authentic liberation movement” (Sylvester, 1986, 246). Zanu (PF)’s triumphalist posture 
played host to exclusivist discourses which justified violence against opponents and opposition 
supporters were likened to weeds which needed to be uprooted from the Zanu (PF) field 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012, 8).  
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The then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe is also alleged to have urged his supporters to 
“strike the bushes in the field with your clubs” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012, 8) a message which was 
interpreted to mean that opposition supporters should be attacked. Pre-and post-election violence 
left society more polarized.  
Five political parties participated in the 1990 elections in which a new kid on the block; 
ZUM was the main opposition amid speculation that the country would become a one-party state 
after the elections (Sithole and Makumbe 1997, 128). The presidential race was a “bitterly 
contested struggle” (Sachikonye 1990, 92) between the Robert Mugabe and Edgar Tekere. Zanu 
(PF) won 117 of the 120 contested seats, constituting 81% of the popular vote. ZUM only won 
two seats, representing 18% of the vote, a percentage which would have translated to 20 seats 
had the Proportional Representation (PR) system been used (Sithole and Makumbe 1997, 128). 
Mugabe also garnered 83% of the total valid votes compared to Tekere’s tally of 18% of the 
votes (Sithole and Makumbe 199,129). Election issues revolved around the future of democracy, 
the land question, the state of the economy and the issue of unemployment, housing and 
transport (Sachikonye 1990, 93).  
While Zanu (PF) espoused a socialist ideology based on a one-party system ZUM, 
rejected Marxism-Leninism in favour of a mixed economy in which the private sector and the 
state co-existed. It was, however, on the one-party state issue that the two sharply differed. Like 
previous elections, ethnicity manifested itself in that, Zanu (PF) and PF Zapu agreed not to field 
Shona candidates in Ndebele speaking constituencies and vice-versa (Sithole and Makumbe, 
1997, 128) and ZUM’s two seats were won in Tekere’s home province, Manicaland. Ndabaningi 
Sithole‘s solitary seat again came from Chipinge, Sithole’s home district. As a result of 
disillusionment about unfulfilled expectations in the post-independence period voter turnout 
dropped from 84% in the 1990 elections to 54% in the 1985 elections.  
In the wake of the Unity Accord with PF Zapu, Zanu (PF) was preaching unity their 
election campaign message sought to portray Zanu (PF) and PF Zapu as equal partners unified 
by a common history of the liberation struggle (Sylvester 1990, 387). Beneath this veneer of 
unity, the election campaign itself spoke volumes of political cleavages particularly in relation to 
the opposition ZUM which was portrayed as an enemy.  
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Such enemies were either disgruntled elements of the ruling party who had lost positions 
in which they totally failed to perform, lumpen proletariat elements, or diehard Rhodesians. 
ZUM, which had formed an alliance with the dying Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ) 
was described as a “front of white settler interests” (Ndlovu-Gatstheni 2012, 8) suggesting that it 
was a party of sellouts.  
Voting for ZUM was equated with death through AIDS or a car accident (Sylvester 1990, 
394) thereby prompting some critics to describe the 1990 elections as “dirty”, “trashy” and 
pregnant with threats and promises, accusations and inflammatory messages, innuendos, 
mudslinging and crude language which was intimidatory (Sylvester 1990, 394). Verbal and 
textual violence morphed into physical violence the climax of which was the shooting and 
wounding of ZUM candidate for Gweru and prominent businessman, Patrick Kombayi who 
dared to challenge the then Vice-President, Simon Muzenda (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012 8).  
The 1995 election was the first election to be boycotted by some political parties claiming 
that the political terrain was skewed in favour of the ruling party, particularly in relation to 
access to the media, access to funding and excessive presidential powers (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012, 
8). The only opposition parties to participate in the election were Forum Party of Zimbabwe led 
by former Chief Justice Enock Dumbutshena and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole’s Zanu Ndonga.  
  The number of independent candidates increased from twelve in 1990 to twenty-nine in 
the 1995 election. One of these, Margret Dongo, a war veteran of the 1970s liberation struggle, 
and a former Zanu (PF) Member of Parliament, won against her former party in the high density 
suburb of Sunningdale, in the capital city, Harare (see Appendix 2.1). Sithole and Makumbe 
(1997) argue that the phenomenon of independent candidates was an indication of the gradual 
decline of elite cohesion within Zanu (PF), suggesting that a viable opposition was likely to 
emerge from a splinter group within the ruling party. Such an opposition never materialized 
though and as mentioned earlier the most formidable opposition to emerge since independence, 
the MDC led by Morgan Tsvangirai was a coalescence of civil society groups, labour, 
intellectuals, students, industrialists and white commercial farmers, whose grievances converged 
around the poor performance of the economy and misgivings about the electoral system 
(Sachikonye2003).  
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Against this backdrop, the 1996 presidential election was a fait accompli as most opposition 
parties boycotted the plebiscite raising the same issues relating to the uneven electoral field 
(Sithole and Makumbe 1997).    
Some scholars have attributed Zanu (PF)’s continued dominance to among other factors, 
the use and abuse of state institutions to clampdown on the opposition and inherent weaknesses 
in the opposition (Sylvester 1990). Through its Gukurahundi policy, which was an “undisguised, 
intolerant, commandist and deliberately violent policy” aimed at annihilating its opponents 
(Sithole and Makumbe 1997, 133) Zanu (PF) was able to render the opposition impotent. In 
addition, Zanu (PF) was able to construct a Pan-African and anti-colonial narrative that resonates 
with the common man on the ground. In this vein, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011, 3) notes that Zanu 
(PF) has been able to project itself as a “messiah” party or the vanguard party that liberated the 
masses from the clutches of colonialism. As Onslow (2011, 5) puts it, the dominant narrative has 
been that Zanu (PF) was the sole champion of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe- the reason 
why it has been under sustained attack from imperialist forces.  
The ruling party has effectively used the European Union (EU) sanctions imposed on the 
country after the 2002 presidential elections to explain away the country’s economic hardships 
experienced in the country contrary to the party’s detractors, who attribute this to the ruling 
party’s ‘inept’ economic policies (Onslow, 2011). Furthermore, the MDC’s cozy relationship and 
with Western donors and its ‘unholy alliance’ with white commercial farmers and capitalists has 
significantly alienated some sections of the Zimbabwean population who view the party as a 
‘Trojan Horse” of neo-colonialists (Gowans, 2008). As a consequence the view that the MDC is 
a “sellout” party has gained traction among some sections of the electorate courtesy, of the state 
media which often repeats the refrain with reckless abandon. However, some scholars attribute 
Zanu (PF)’s continued dominance in Zimbabwean electoral politics more to the use of violence 
than on perceived shortfalls and weaknesses of the opposition. 
 Kriger (2005, 1) argues that Zanu (PF) would rely on more or less the same strategies to 
win elections held after 2000, although the context, the issues at hand and the nature of the 
opposition might have differed remarkably.  
134 
 
Most studies on elections in Zimbabwe suggest that election violence has been the 
exclusive monopoly of Zanu (PF) or at least attribute disproportionate blame to the dominant 
party (Ndlovu-Gatsheni; 2012, Kriger 2005, Smiles 2003; Sithole 1993, Sachikonye 1990). This 
view has been challenged by some scholars, not least because it portrays the ruling party as a 
monster and opposition parties as saints. In the case of Zimbabwe, there is evidence to suggest 
that minor parties are not always innocent victims. This is true in relation to the 1990 elections as 
is with subsequent elections. Gregory  (1980, 12) argues that the culpability of other parties such 
as the Rhodesian forces in acts of violence was often overlooked during the 1980 elections 
resulting in the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), the main election observer group in the 
election to point out that the one sided picture portrayed  by the authorities was misleading and 
“must be corrected”  
 In 1990 ZUM mounted a vigorous campaign in urban centres spraying graffiti on postal 
boxes and bus stops, some of them with provocative aggressive messages such as “Down with 
Zim Dictatorship”(Sylvester 1990, 394). ZUM had threatened that “if Zanu (PF) rigged the 
elections Mugabe would go ahead and form the next government, but Zanu (PF) would be out 
after 12 months, so it was up to Zanu (PF) either to get out freely or get out the painful way” 
(Sylvester 1990, 395). This threat bears resemblance to one made by the opposition MDC 
president Morgan Tsvangirai a few months after the 2000 parliamentary elections when he 
addressed a gathering at the first anniversary held at Rufaro stadium. Tsvangirai is reported to 
have threatened President Mugabe saying:   
What we would like to tell Mugabe today is that please go peacefully. If you don’t want to go peacefully 
we will remove you violently. The country cannot wait a day longer than necessary (BBC News, 30 
September 2000). 
While Tekere’s statements were interpreted as hinting at a coup, Tsvangirai’s statements 
were taken to mean an unconstitutional removal of an elected government. Although the 
opposition may not have the wherewithal to engage in the level of violence as the state, it is 
certainly not immune to the language of violence. 
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4.7 The Press Situation Since 1980 
Zimbabwe’s press owes its history to the country’s colonial era beginning with the 
establishment of The Herald in 1892 and the Bulawayo Chronicle in 1894 by the South African 
based Argus Printing and Publishing Company. Before that William Fairbridge, a South African 
born columnist of the Cape Argus had kept the settler community in Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) informed through a cyclostyled pamphlet called The Mashonaland and Zambezia 
Times which became The Herald in 1892 (Mararike 1998, 213). Its aim was “to advance to the 
fullest” the agricultural interests of the owners of the newspapers (Gale cited in Mararike 1998, 
213).  The Chronicle just like The Herald, sought to “promote…the rule and the success of the 
wonderful organisation born of Mr Cecil Rhodes…” (Gale 1962, 25). The two newspapers, 
therefore, championed the interests of their owners and they were not apologetic about it. At 
independence in 1980, the Argus Group, the owners of The Herald and The Chronicle were 
acquired by the Zanu (PF) government using a grant provided by the Nigerian government and 
the Rhodesian Printing Company which had been formed in 1927 was renamed Zimpapers Pvt. 
Limited in 1980. The Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT), a trustee company was set up in 
1980 to provide a buffer between the government and the newspapers. The ZMMT offered some 
protection to the newspapers against direct government control and ensured that there was a 
degree of editorial independence (Article 19/MISA Zimbabwe 2004, 13).  
The ZMMT was, however, dissolved  in 2000 when Professor Jonathan Moyo became 
the Minister of Information and Publicity, and Zimpapers, the Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News 
Agency (now New ZIANA) and the Community Newspapers Group (CNG) came under the 
direct control of boards appointed by the minister (Article 19/MISA Zimbabwe 2004, 13). 
Although government through the ZMMT was the dominant player in the press market, the press 
was at that time fairly diversified, comprising of a blossoming privately-owned press and state-
owned newspapers. The economy and the press remained in the hands of the white minority 
despite the party’s socialist rhetoric, thus mirroring Zanu (PF)’s ambiguous political character 
(Saunders 1991, 24).  
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During the first decade government did not have a codified media policy but the press 
policy was contained in “statements of intention” such as “The Democratization of the Media” 
document which was essentially broad references to the government’s intention to indigenise the 
media (Saunders 1991, 48). Due to the vagueness of the press policy and lack of direct 
interference the press of the country flourished reaching its peak during the second decade of 
independence, commonly referred to as “the golden decade” of the press in Zimbabwe.  
Buoyed by the relatively tolerant political climate of the 1990s and a liberalised economy 
during the ESAP period, a coterie of privately-owned newspapers was established (Saunders 
1991; Ronning and Kupe 2000). These include The Daily Gazette (1991) The Sunday Gazette 
(1992) The Zimbabwe Independent (1996), The Standard (1997), and The Zimbabwe Mirror 
(1997). The first two were owned by Elias Rusike, a former Chief Executive Officer of 
Zimpapers and owner of the financial weekly, The Financial Gazette.  
The Daily Gazette was the first privately-owned newspaper in the country but did not last 
due to lack of financial sustainability, partly attributable to its schizophrenic editorial policy 
(Ronning and Kupe 2000, 168). Apart from newspapers, there were also a number of magazines. 
These include Horizon (1991), a hard hitting and investigative magazine started by journalists 
using donor funds. Like the Daily Gazette, Horizon had a precarious existence due to financial 
difficulties but soldiered on until the beginning of the new millennium.  
Ronning and Kupe (2000, 167) note that the SIDA grant which started Horizon angered 
some ruling party members and the issue was debated in parliament. Capitalising on the upsurge 
of disillusionment associated with the economic downturn, the press funnelled and amplified the 
grievances of the urban populace, thereby helping to counterbalance the views of the state-owned 
press. By the beginning of the millennium, Zimbabwe had enjoyed the “taste of a free press” 
(Ronning and Kupe 2000, 170) capable of undercutting state propaganda by providing an outlet 
to oppositional voices.  
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However, it was the establishment of the Daily News in 1999, which radically altered the 
face of Zimbabwe’s mediascape (Chari 2010). The Daily News was a brainchild of the 
Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) Pvt Ltd, a consortium of Zimbabwean institutional 
and corporate private investors “backed by companies and individuals with publishing interests 
in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and South Africa” and a chain of provincial newspapers in 
Zimbabwe (Ronning and Kupe 2000, 171). However all the ANZ provincial newspapers folded 
due to financial difficulties but the Daily News and its sister paper; The Daily News on Sunday 
overcame these adversities and became the bestselling newspapers in the country until their 
closure in 2003. At its peak the paper sold about 100 000 copies compared to its competitor, the 
state-owned The Herald which sold about 90 000 (Waldahl 2004, 37). 
 Some of the key personalities behind the ANZ include a former editor of The Chronicle 
who shot to prominence after exposing the Willowgate scandal mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
The establishment of the Daily News coincided with the formation of the MDC and the paper 
became a vital outlet for the opposition party. Its adversarial style meant a collision with the 
government which, was by then on its back foot, was inevitable. The clearest indication of this 
came in 2002 when the government passed the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). AIPPA compelled journalists to 
register with the Media and Information Commission (MIC), a body established under AIPPA to 
monitor and licence mass media services.  
 Many media organisations complied with the law, but ANZ refused to do so, resulting in 
its newspapers being discontinued in September 2003, thus triggering a protracted legal battle 
with the state. The Weekly Tribune, owned by a former journalist and Zanu (PF) Member of 
Parliament also fell victim to AIPPA after failing to comply with some sections of the Act 
resulting in their licences being withdrawn by MIC in 2004 (IRIN, 11 June 2004). In 2005 the 
Weekly Times based in the country’s second largest city, Bulawayo was also closed by the MIC 
for “misrepresenting” information on its application for accreditation (Pambazuka, 2005). The 
closure of these newspapers witnessed hoards of journalists emigrating in search of alternative 
means of livelihoods.  
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Some of the journalists who left the country started pirate radio stations beaming into 
Zimbabwe with the assistance of foreign donors, notably Studio 7 (hosted by the Voice of 
America), SW Radio
10
 based in the London and Voice of the People (VOP) while others started 
online news publications and websites catering for Zimbabwean citizens in the diaspora and 
those abroad, the major ones being ZimOnline.com, NewZimbabwe.com, the 
Zimbabwesituation.com, Zimdaily, The Zimbabwe Times
11
, Bulawayo24 and Nehanda Radio.  
Apart from political and legal factors, the haemorrhaging economy, particularly between 
2003 and 2008 (the dark decade of the press) also contributed to the shrinkage of media space. 
For instance, the Daily Mirror and The Sunday Mirror, owned by Dr. Ibbo Mandaza closed in 
March 2007, leaving the media space much thinner in terms of views and opinions
12
. Their 
ambiguous editorial policies (being neither pro-state nor pro-opposition) meant that they were 
able to balance the views of the state-owned press and the privately-owned press during the 
period of the interregnum. After the closure of the two newspapers only a few newspapers 
remained operating but the print-runs were very low.
13
 Former ANZ executive Chris Mbanga 
and his wife started the tabloid size, The Zimbabwean in London in 2004 to fill the lacuna left by 
the closure of the Daily News. Thus the government claimed the lion’s share of the press market 
with two daily newspapers
14
 (The Herald and The Chronicle) and the four weekly newspapers, 
The Sunday Mail, The Sunday News, Kwayedza/Umthunya (vernacular) and the Manica Post.  
                                                          
10
 SW Radio was closed in 2014 due to financial difficulties after losing its donors. 
11
 Now defunct, after its owner Geoff Nyarota returned to Zimbabwe in 2009. 
12
  It was very difficult to know the print run of newspapers as media organisations became very secretive about it 
because they did not want advertisers to know. There was a rumour that some of the major weekly newspapers 
were printing not more than 5000 copies. 
13
 Between 2007 and 2009 most of the newspapers operating were owned by the government. The only privately-
owned newspapers that were left include The Financial Gazette, owned by the then Reserve Bank Governor, 
Gideon Gono, The Zimbabwe Independent and The Standard, both owned by South Africa-based Zimbabwean 
entrepreneur, Trevor Ncube, who is also owner of Mail & Guardian (South Africa). 
14
 The state daily newspapers increased to four in 2009 after the introduction of two tabloid newspapers, the H-
Metro published in Harare and the B-Metro published in Bulawayo 
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In addition, New Ziana, a multi-media news agency ran newspapers through its 
newspaper publishing arm, the Community Newspapers Group (CNP) which were based in the 
country’s ten provinces.  
In terms of reporting, the press in Zimbabwe has for the better part of the last decade 
been polarised along political lines to such an extent that the public press is known as the 
government press while the privately owned press is called the opposition press.  The two have 
been engaged in a perpetual ‘warfare’ characterised by entrenched views with the state-owned 
press acting as a propaganda arm of the government while the privately-owned press has signed 
a pact with the opposition to hear no evil, speak no evil and see no evil concerning the affairs of 
the opposition (Chari 2009, 55). There is no reference point in terms of news meaning that news 
readers are forced to buy all the newspapers in order to get a complete account of what will be 
happening in the country because newspapers take extreme positions on any issue Zimbabwean. 
This dilemma is succinctly captured by one critic thus: 
The polarisation in our society is best depicted in the press. Basically the press is either pro-government or 
anti-government. Sometimes objectivity is sacrificed at the altar of expediency in order to be true to their 
chosen position…If you buy newspapers from one divide you will get half the story (Pathisa Nyathi, 
cited in MMPZ 2002, 87).   
Thus the social and political lives of Zimbabwean citizens are intricately interwoven with 
the press and in turn implicated in the country’s politics and society. After the inception of the 
Government of National Unity in 2009 the fortunes of the press also changed. Apart from the 
bouncing back to the streets of the Daily News and its sister paper, the Daily News on Sunday, 
more than 20 publications have been licensed by the reconstructed Media and Information 
Commission, now the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC).  
 The first newspapers to be granted licences in May 2010 were News Day owned by 
Trevor Ncube’s Alpha Media Holdings, The Mail owned by Fruitlink Ventures a privately-
owned company owned by a youth organisation (Afrol News 2010), the Daily Gazette, owned by 
Modus Publications, the Daily News and the Daily News on Sunday (re-licensed after being 
closed in 2003), both owned by ANZ (see Mpofu 2010; Banya 2010) (see Chapter One). Seven 
organisations were registered in April 2011.  
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These include New Times Media (monthly magazine), Ekxi Investment (monthly 
business magazine), Swim Africa Media (weekly newspaper and by-monthly magazine), 
Zimbabwe Heritage (weekly newspaper), Joe’s Low (motoring magazine), and the Sentinel 
Publications (weekly Christian magazine) (News Day, 2011). In addition, The Zimbabwean and 
its sister paper The Zimbabwean on Sunday run by UK based former Daily News executive and 
The Observer fronted by former Alpha Media Holdings journalist Barnabas Thondlana were 
granted licences in July 2012 (Bulawayo News 24 2012).
15
  Other newspapers that were licensed 
during the tenure of the inclusive government include The Patriot (2011) believed to be owned 
by former journalist and Minister of Information and Communication Technology, Postal and 
Courier Services, Super Mandiwanzira (Nehanda Radio 2014), the Southern Eye and the 
Southern Eye on Sunday
16
 (2013) both owned by Trevor Ncube’s Alpha Media Holdings 
(NewZimbabwe.com 2014). Some of the newspapers, notably, The Observer, The Daily Gazette 
and The National Daily which is owned by the family of the late  black empowerment activist, 
Roger Boka had not started operating in 2016 and the ZMC, the licensing body was concerned 
about this development (BiZCommunity.com 2011). Thus by 2014, Zimbabwe boasted of a 
fairly diversified and vibrant press, but unlike the last decade the economy and not politics is the 
major threat to press freedom and media diversity.  
Many of the licensed newspapers have failed to take off the ground and the majority of 
those existing are struggling to keep their operations afloat as the financial crunch persists 
(Biriwasha 2011). Copy sales and advertising revenues are declining (NewZimbabwe.com 7 
August 2014) and buying newspapers has become a luxury for many in an economy where the 
lowest civil servant is paid USD500 (NewZimbabwe.com 6 September 2014). News content still 
lacks diversity as many voices are excluded in the national discourse. As observed by one 
newspaper reader news headlines are “obsessed with politics yet very few people are benefitting 
from this kind of coverage” (Biriwasha 2011). 
                                                          
15
 See also News Day, 3 August 2012. 
16
 The Southern Eye on Sunday closed in  July 2014 due to lack of financial sustainability and there were reports 
that its sister paper, The Southern Eye would merge with the Newsday (NewZimbabwe.com 2014) 
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 Like many African countries, the distribution of newspapers is mainly in the urban 
centres while rural areas, where, in the case of Zimbabwe about, 70% of the population resides, 
are marginalised (Biriwasha 2011). After the 2013 elections won by ZANU (PF) and the second 
split of the opposition, MDC in 2014, the polarization is less poignant. Citizens pin their hopes 
for access to views alternative to the state on online social media such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Whatsapp and other social media platforms as prospects in the mobile telephony industry look 
brighter than ever. Through these platforms people can interact and share information with 
friends and relatives, thereby boosting the mobile Internet usage (Kabweza 2014). Through 
citizen journalism they are not only able to shape the news agenda but also safe-guard their rights 
(The Zimbabwemail.com 2014). 
Although there are infrastructural challenges, the prospects are bright. Internet and 
Mobile telephony subscriptions are growing in leaps and bounds. As at December 2013 there 
were 5.2 million Internet subscribers representing 39.8% penetration rate and there were 
14million mobile telephone subscribers (representing103.5% penetration) (The Herald 2014). 
The bulk of the internet subscribers are mobile internet connections using 2G, 2.5G and 3G 
connections mainly provided by Econet, Telecel, NetOne, Africom and Powertel (Kabweza, 
2014). Despite the economic challenges, the press situation is more optimistic compared to 1980. 
The unfolding technological revolution portends a growing citizen agency in the future as the 
press gradually loses its monopoly to set the media agenda and to frame issues. Citizens will be 
able to use the multiplicity of online sources at their disposal to interrogate press framing of key 
national debates and events such as political violence in a robust manner. 
  4.8  The Concept of Fragility 
Although many scholars foreground social fragility as the condition in which election 
violence thrives or as the root cause of election violence (see Mueller, 2011; Kirwin and Cho 
2009; Biegon 2009; Sisk 2008; Straus and Taylor 2007) there is no consensus on what it exactly 
means. In some cases the terms ‘fragile state’ and ‘failed state’ are conflated. Some scholars 
define a fragile state as a state that “fails to deliver to its citizens basic services and the security 
to go about their daily lives” (Sen 2008, 2).  
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Forrest (2003, 11) describes a fragile state as a state that is no longer able “to carry out its 
security and hegemony functions by more “normal” or peaceful means…”  A fragile state, 
however, is generally understood to mean a weak state or a state that is “failing to meet popular 
demands, leaving the masses in grinding poverty” (Biegon 2009, 5). The definition preferred in 
this thesis is given by Vallings and Moreno- Torres who content that: 
Fragility can occur when poverty or economic decline are combined with presence of weak state 
institutions that cannot manage the real grievances caused by, for example, inequitable distribution of 
resources or unequal access to formal institutions. Essentially, this means that in fragile states political 
institutions are not strong enough to manage effectively the natural conflicts that occur in society. The 
‘fragility’ or weakness will be evident at any time that the state undergoes processes of economic, political 
and social change (cited in Biegon 2009, 5). 
In the specific context of this thesis, therefore, a fragile state is one, which, owing 
to a number of underlying historical and contemporary factors lacks social, economic and 
political stability to the extent that it can no longer have authority and the efficiency to 
manage grievances pertaining to unequal distribution of natural resources, services and 
access to key national institutions to its wider population. As demonstrated in Chapter 
Four, the multi-layered crisis which afflicted Zimbabwe at the turn of the century laid 
bare its pretense of a stable democracy, thereby exposing its fragility.  
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4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter gave a socio-political and historical background by highlighting the key 
events that shaped discourses on electoral violence in Zimbabwe from independence in 1980 to 
2013. It examined the country’s colonial legacy, the struggles to liberate the country, the 
reconciliation policy, the civil war in Matebeleland, the one-party state debate, the adoption of 
neo-liberal policies, the land revolution and the ensuing economic crisis at the turn of the 
century. The chapter also showed that the elections which took place between 1980 and 1999 
demonstrate how certain patterns of narratives and practices engendered moods of bitterness 
throughout the electoral history of the country. In this regard the chapter also discussed how 
elections held between 2000 and 2013 in Zimbabwe have engendered social and political 
tensions.  The chapter also highlighted the media context in Zimbabwe from independence to the 
present, demonstrating its political economy, interface with the state and society and its 
enmeshment with the politics of the day.  
Discursive constructions of election violence cannot be fully comprehended outside the 
historical antecedents and the broader context in which electoral contests are performed. Finally, 
the chapter argues that the historical, social economic and political events highlighted in this 
chapter significantly shaped the press and citizen discourses on election violence. The concept of 
a fragile society (state) was also defined in order to shed light on the backdrop against which 
electoral violence is mediated and consumed. The next chapter analyses press discourses on 
election violence during presidential and parliamentary elections held between 2000 and 2013, 
paying particular attention to specific themes. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPETING NARRATIVES ON ELECTORAL VIOLENCE 
IN THE PRESS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The processes of selection and inclusion, and, by implication, of exclusion contradict the view that 
the news media give a full and comprehensive account of ‘world events’. They offer only a selection 
of world events. This has major implications for the ‘news’ and its claims of ‘truth’ (Negrine 
1989, 140). 
The above quotation is an apt summary of the key arguments made in this and the next 
chapter both of which are based on the corpus of archival textual data and examine press 
discourses on election violence during presidential and parliamentary elections held between 
2000 and 2013 in Zimbabwe.  The analysis in these two chapters brings to the fore the tension 
between theories that suggest that the media merely reflect on social reality and those that 
contend that reality is socially constructed. Underpinning this argument is the Foucauldian 
conception of discourse whereby discourse is viewed as the reproduction of a particular regime 
of truth and knowledge distributed through text and talk. Thus discourse is embedded in 
relations of power. Understood this way discourse is then viewed as representations of versions 
of reality whereby meanings are ascribed rather than being intrinsic. The way in which the 
press constructs stories on election violence creates certain expectations among the readers 
who become accustomed to certain regimes of truth. It is these competing versions of reality 
that are the focus of this and the next chapter.  
This chapter discusses three themes namely, discourses on levels of election violence, 
attribution of responsibility, and the authority-disorder discourse. In order to broaden the 
insights on the way in which power and control are enacted in the news production process and 
the institutional logic behind it, data drawn from interviews with journalists and editors (see 
Chapter Three) were used to complement the textual data analysed in this chapter and the next 
chapter.  
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The textual data principally address the HOW question of the research question, that is, 
how the selected newspapers discursively constructed electoral violence, while data from the 
interviews with journalists and editors are used to answer the WHY aspect of the research 
question which sheds light on the rationale for such construction. Since discourse is embedded 
in relations of power the press’s representation of electoral violence has the potential to set the 
limits on the citizens’ social knowledge (McCullough, 2002) and possibly influence their 
electoral choices.  
The main argument advanced in this chapter is that Zimbabwean state-owned and 
privately-owned newspapers produced competing discourses about electoral violence pitting 
what I have called a ‘national interest’ discourse against a liberal human rights discourse 
respectively. These discourses demonstrate the instrumental logic of electoral violence 
whereby the press becomes instruments for either retaining or capturing power. In addition 
these discursive constructions of electoral violence mirror the contours chalked by the political 
bifurcation of Zimbabwean society which became a hotbed for ‘activist journalism’.  
5.2 Responsibility Attribution: Constructions of Perpetrators and Victims of Electoral 
Violence 
5.2.1 MDC is the aggressor; Zanu (PF) is a passive victim 
Amid the deeply polarised electoral environment and the progressive intensification of 
the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, the representation of election violence produced antagonistic 
discourses with the state-owned press mainly attributing election violence to the opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) while the privately-owned press blamed the ruling 
Zanu (PF) and the state
17
. The state-owned press published a significant number of stories 
blaming the MDC for all or the election violence
18
, particularly during the 2000 general 
elections and the 2002 presidential elections (which were combined with municipal elections).  
                                                          
17
 As the economic and political crisis progressively worsened the distinction between the state and the ruling 
party became more and more blurred, largely attributable to the siege mentality occasioned by sanctions and 
external interference.  
18
 An example of news headlines which support this include: “31 injured as MDC supporters raid Zanu (PF) 
candidate’s home” (The Herald, 19-06-2000, p1),  “MDC supporters assault suspected Zanu (PF) youths”(The 
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The overwhelming number of news articles in the state press blaming the MDC for 
election violence harks back on fundamental questions relating to framing practices and 
semantic choices which lay the basis for ‘othering’ the opposition.  
This ‘othering’ meant blaming the opposition for most of the violence through the 
mobilisation of a repertoire of pejorative sobriquets which sought to diminish the MDC’s 
democratic credentials. Thus the state-owned press constructed MDC supporters as  “thugs” 
(The Herald, 19-06-2000, p5, 30-06-08), “mobs”(The Herald, 24-05-2000, p1,), “marauding 
gangs” (The Herald, 16-06-2000, p1)  “rowdy” (The Herald, 12-03-02, p4), “blood-
letting”(The Herald, 11-07-13, 10) or “berserk” which implies that the MDC was  violent, 
criminal, bloodthirsty and destructive and hence was not worth voting for. In the state press the 
MDC supporters were also described as “killers” (The Herald, 13-06-2000, 4, 03-06-2000, p5, 
The Sunday Mail, 07-06-08, p2), “assassins” (The Herald, 19-06-2000, 10), and “arsonists” 
(The Herald, 11-07-13, 3).  
Such depictions framed the MDC as an evil party deserving a brutal clampdown by the 
law- enforcement agents.  The accusation that the MDC had introduced “a culture of violence 
in Zimbabwe” (The Herald (16-03-02, p1) made it appear commonsensical that such a clamp- 
down was long overdue. The Herald reasoned that: 
The birth of the MDC brought pronounced violence to the Zimbabwean political scene. This can 
be understood from the perspective that the MDC leadership comprises people who in their years 
at the university have been militant in their approach to national issues.  
The Sunday Mail (11-06-00, p5) argued that the MDC’s violent streak had a long history 
dating as far back as the “run up to the February (2000) referendum on the draft constitution 
when the MDC/NCA alliance embarked on a violent campaign to disrupt report back meetings 
of the Constitutional Commission”.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Herald 19-06-2000, p5), “MDC youths provoke violence in Hwedza: Police”(The Herald, 23-06-2000, p5), “MDC 
plans pre-election country-wide terror campaign”(The Sunday Mail, 10-02-02, p1), “MDC youths embark on terror 
campaign” (The Sunday Mail, 24-02-02, p1),  “MDC unleashes violence” (The Herald, 05-04-05, p1), “MDC gun men 
kill two Zanu (PF) supporters” (The Sunday Mail, 07-06-08, p1),  “MDC –T attacks party supporter” (The Herald, 14-
07-13, p2),   
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It was also claimed that opposition supporters were emulating their leader, Morgan 
Tsvangirai who “had vowed to remove President Mugabe from power” (The Herald, 27-02-02, 
p4), a veiled reference to the Tsvangirai’s threat to remove President Mugabe “violently” 
(Ferret, 2000) if he did not step down voluntarily.
19
   In order to demonstrate that the culture of 
election violence was alien to Zimbabwe until the formation of the MDC the state-owned press 
claimed that Zimbabwe had held many multi-party elections since 1980 without any violence, 
which of course was inaccurate. Quoting the then ZANU (PF) Secretary for Information and 
Publicity, Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira (late) The Herald (27-02-02, p4) reported that Zimbabwe 
had “been holding multi-party elections without violence”. The newspaper went on to 
selectively recount the different political parties that had graced the Zimbabwean political 
scene in the 1990s adding that “there was no violence at all” during that time. This is not 
entirely correct particularly in view of the fact that cases of election violence since 
independence in 1980 are well-documented (Kriger, 2005). However, The Herald conveniently 
glossed over these in order to create the impression that election violence was a new 
phenomenon synonymous with the formation of the MDC.  
While the causes and scale of violence in previous elections is debatable, that violence 
has been a feature of electoral contests in Zimbabwe since 1980 is irrefutable. Attempts to 
understand why the state press constructs the opposition MDC as the aggressor and Zanu (PF) 
a passive victim of violence appear to be justified on the basis of conveniently selected past 
incidences that portray the MDC as an agent provocateur.  
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 Tsvangirai is reported to have said “What we would like to tell Mugabe today is that please go peacefully. If you 
don’t want to peacefully, we will remove you violently. The country cannot afford Mugabe a day longer than 
necessary”. He was addressing a gathering of his supporters in Harare at the occasion of his party’s first 
anniversary. 
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The Editor of The Herald, Caesar Zvayi said this was justified on the grounds that: 
We hold that view because we have seen a number of times, for instance, the MDC supporters can, 
they know that Zanu (PF) is holding a rally in this area, they go there to provoke a situation and 
then you have these correspondents, some of them who moonlight for international media take 
those images and send the outside world. But it’s not always the case that it is MDC that provokes, 
Zanu (PF) on the other hand they also provoke the MDC. So it’s 50:50 situation but you find that 
it is more on the side of the MDC because they have that agenda to portray the electoral 
environment as not conducive for elections. But of course the supporters clash in the residential 
areas, in the rural areas but you find that the contrived part of it, it comes from the opposition 
(Ceasar Zvayi, Interview, 7 May, 2015, Harare). 
These narratives demonstrate the power of selectivity at two levels. The first level entails 
sanitizing all past elections as violence free while amplifying violence in contemporary 
elections as a discursive strategy to justify the dubious causal link between ‘rising’ election 
violence and the MDC.  The second level of selectivity entails picking on an isolated event (the 
opposition leader’s speech at Rufaro stadium) making it the basis for all future actions of the 
opposition in order to justify the blame. This discursive strategy dovetails with Akpabio’s 
“framing up” technique discussed in Chapter Two, which essentially entails selecting and 
organising news stories in order to foster a one-dimensional interpretation of events (Akpabio, 
2011, 45). Such a technique might have mobilised negative feelings against the opposition 
thereby exacerbating rather than abating election violence. Akpabio (2011, 46) correctly 
observes that:   
…persistent and negative framings are always a precursor to something evil. A dominant 
portrayal of enemies is to dehumanize them which justifies any mistreatment meted out to them. 
The implication for this faulty premise is that the state-owned press might have 
advertently and inadvertently promoted election violence in the sense that, the persistent negative 
framing of the opposition created an alibi for the annihilation of the opposition while the 
selective and one-dimensional interpretation might have galvanised opposition members to 
indulge in unlawful activities since they viewed themselves as victims of unlawful persecution. 
This is important because discourse has consequences in that it always translates into particular 
action and behaviour.  
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The study by Steauter and Wills (2009) on Canadian media representation of the war on 
terror discussed in Chapter Two is salutary in this regard. They rightly point out that once an 
“enemy” has been stereotyped it becomes psychologically acceptable for him or her to engage in 
atrocities (Steatur and Wills, 2009, 19). Hobart concurs with this observation when he notes that 
stereotyping the “enemy” may make the case of the perpetrators of violence appear common 
cause (Hobart 2007, 190). He argues that:  
Particular assumptions about space, time narrative, personhood, agency, and causation are distinctive of 
different genres; and are combined in ways that, through reiteration, give a sense of naturalness and self-
evident truth to what are carefully constructed and inherently mediated accounts (Hobart 2007, 190). 
In the case of the state-owned press such assumptions about the opposition being 
responsible for introducing violence into Zimbabwean politics and their reiteration in the state-
owned press may justify violence against the opposition since it is blamed for having started it in 
the first place. 
5.2.2 MDC provokes violence, Zanu (PF) reacts 
Although Zanu (PF) was predominantly projected as an innocent victim of MDC, 
violence there were occasional discursive slippages in the state-owned press which unwittingly 
betrayed this as a façade. It was often reported that the MDC was largely responsible for 
“triggering the violence”(The Sunday Mail,  04-06-2000, p1-4) (see Appendix 1.1) while Zanu 
(PF) or the state “reacted”   or “retaliated” (The Herald, 23-05-2000, p1) in order to restore  
law and order. Examples of news headlines which support this are: “MDC committed most of 
political crimes” (The Herald, 16-03-02, p1), “MDC perpetrates more violence on the ruling 
party” (The Sunday Mail, 11-06-2000, p5). The words in bold suggest the existence of more 
than one agent, meaning that the MDC could not have possibly perpetrated violence alone.  
The Sunday Mail story (11-06-2000, p5) headlined “MDC perpetrates more violence on 
the ruling party” (see Appendix 1.2) is illustrative in this regard. The newspaper sought to 
rebut allegations by an Amnesty International report that Zanu (PF) was responsible for most 
of the violence in the run-up to the 2000 general elections.  
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It quoted police officials who refuted the Amnesty International report, adding that the 
MDC was responsible for the lion’s share of electoral violence in the country. The newspaper 
accused the Amnesty International report of being “one-sided” mentioning that:  
While the just released Amnesty International Report on the forthcoming elections chronicled in 
greater detail incidents of violence perpetrated against members of the MDC there were no reports 
of violence against members of the ruling Zanu (PF) party. 
The Sunday Mail gave a litany of incidents of election violence allegedly perpetrated by the 
MDC dating back to February 2000 in order to prove that the MDC was not “an innocent 
bystander” as far as election violence was concerned. In rationalizing the view that the MDC is 
the one that introduced political violence the blame discourse congeals into moral equivalence. 
The Herald Editor, Ceasar Zvayi said that: 
When the MDC was launched on September 11, 1999, a year after that we saw Tsvangirai at the 
first anniversary celebrations at Rufaro Stadium. On 11 September 2000 the MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai took to the podium and uttered his infamous statement that “What we are going to tell 
Mugabe today is please go peacefully. If you don’t go peacefully we will remove you violently”. 
It’s there on camera, it’s there on record, he said it at Rufaro Stadium. And in the grand stands 
MDC supporters were busy tearing the copies of The Herald, burning them in the grand stands. 
And from there when they left their rally as they went into town, they were beating up people, 
known Zanu (PF) supporters and from there, Tsvangirai’s language to his supporters they saw 
Zanu (PF) people as enemies and it escalated political clashes between Zanu (PF) and rival 
political parties which is why the MDC brought that culture of political violence because we never 
saw it when other political parties like ZUM, Zanu Ndonga and so on over the years but as soon 
as the MDC came onto the political scene we started seeing people beating each other which we 
had not seen with other opposition parties since independence (Ceasar Zvayi, Interview, 7 
May, 2015, Harare). 
Asked why the state-owned Sunday newspaper, The Sunday Mail tends to portray the 
MDC as the one that introduced a culture of violence in Zimbabwean politics the acting editor of 
the paper, Mabasa Sasa, was more circumspect than Zvayi, his counterpart at the state-owned 
daily, The Herald.  
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Sasa accentuated the moral equivalence frame (discussed below) suggesting that both 
MDC and Zanu (PF) are to blame for starting violence but went further to say that the MDC had 
a greater propensity to commit election violence because it stood to benefit financially and 
through what he termed the “politics of pity”. Sasa said: 
OK, ah, for starters I would think both, both major parties ehmm, have been quite responsible for 
acts of violence, have been involved, it becomes difficult to see exactly…it’s like a chicken and 
egg. It becomes difficult to see who exactly started the violence. What we do know is that the 
violence, having been started, ahmm, there is a political party that has thrived on that violence, 
with the politics of pity. One claiming we are a victim. Aah, two, it gives them access to resources, 
saying, we need money to defend ourselves or whatever reason. So they get money. Three, it 
serves to delegitimise the state. I do not think that Zanu (PF) would benefit as much from violence 
as MDC would, Zanu (PF) being a governing party, holding instruments of the state. It has 
nothing to gain by fighting people who have no instruments whatsoever. Whereas MDC stands to 
benefit the most from violence, one, by getting that pity, two, by financial support, three by de-
legitimising the state. So on the whole I believe its MDC which stands to gain more and naturally 
we will then assume that, eh, they are responsible for a lot of that violence. A-ahmm, there have 
been allegations of ah, due to that, ah, external influence we get allegations of serious training of 
these people where they start getting, ah, they start using the same tactics used by the Selous 
Scouts (Rhodesian hit squad), very simple things , ah, you go and dress up in Zanu (PF) regalia, 
you beat up people. You are an MDC person, you wear a Zanu (PF) T-shirt, you cause violence, 
and it’s blamed on Zanu (PF). So I really don’t see Zanu (PF) having benefited much from 
violence whereas MDC it seems, it, violence became quite a cornerstone of the, of the national 
policy, the drive to get into power (Mabasa Sasa, Interview, 15 May, 2015, Harare)  
The implication of this statement is that it does not matter whether the MDC started the 
violence or not, the fact that the party is perceived as profiting from election violence 
implies that it has more incentives for starting violence than the ruling party. Profiting 
from violence is no different from starting the violence. This implies that it was in the 
national interest for the state-owned press to project the MDC as a perpetrator of election 
violence since it is the only party that stood to benefit from election violence.   
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5.2.3 Mystification: Fighting against ‘invisible’ forces 
A story published in The Herald (12-06-2000, p8) in which the comment of  Zanu (PF) 
parliamentary candidate for Harare East in the 2000 general election, Mau Mau who is also a 
war veteran  reveals  the rationale for Zanu (PF)’s ‘retaliatory violence’ narrative. Mau Mau, 
who was addressing a rally in Harare, is reported to have commended his supporters “for not 
engaging in violence in the constituency in the count down to the elections, but said they would 
retaliate if provoked by the opposition” (emphasis added). The then Zanu (PF) Mashonaland 
Central provincial chairperson, Border Gezi who was accompanying Mau Mau made a 
revealing statement. Gezi is reported to have said: 
…the whites “whom we defeated” were now coming back through the back door through black puppets. 
This time they are using a puppet, Morgan Tsvangirai, but we know that it is them. Kana torova tsuro 
tinorova nedenhe racho (when we try to beat a hare hiding behind bushes we will not discriminate the hare 
from the bushes.  
The statement by Gezi, then a senior member of Zanu (PF) is quite crucial in 
understanding the instrumental logic of election violence and its mediation in the state owned-
press. The fact that Zanu (PF) believes that it is not fighting the MDC but formidable and 
invisible force is so significant in so far as it shapes the discursive constructions of election 
violence in the state-owned press, not only as inevitable under the circumstances but also as 
legitimate tool for repelling neo-colonial forces. The view that Zanu (PF) was battling bigger 
forces was made more succinctly by President Mugabe. Addressing the 43
rd
 Ordinary Session 
of his party’s Central Committee soon after the “close shave” 2000 general elections in which 
the party obtained 63 seats against the MDC’s 57.  
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Mugabe reminded his members that: 
Often a myth is peddled that ZANU (PF) lost to a nine months old opposition party. Nothing can be further 
from the truth. Whilst we expect our enemies to peddle such a myth, we should never allow it to take root 
in our minds. Such a misconception encourages us to underestimate the forces ranged against us, and to 
underplay the significance of our hard earned victory. The MDC should never be judged or characterised 
by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior 
professionals; never by its rough and violent high density lumpen elements. It is much deeper than these 
human superficies; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces 
wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. MDC is as old and as strong 
as the forces that control it; that converge on it and control it; that drive and direct; indeed that support, 
sponsor it. It is a counter-revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that 
enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday (Mugabe 2001, 88-89). 
Words and phrases such as “enemies”, “hard earned victory”, “forces against us”, 
“operation”, “violent”, “the forces that control it”, and “inimical forces” evoke a militaristic 
stance and did not just frame the MDC as the “other, but also laid the basis for its liquidation. 
Further, although Mugabe’s statement appears to be unpacking the MDC it has got the effect of 
mystifying it because that which harbours it is not fully known because of the “bushes”. If you 
are not sure about the strength of your enemy don’t underestimate them. A basis for the 
liquidation of the MDC using excessive force became material owing to the perception that the 
MDC was an enemy hiding behind bushes hence the state-owned press constructed discourses 
that legitimised violence against the MDC. The mystification of the MDC’s strength implied 
that discursively the opposition party was constructed not as a minion but a very treacherous 
force that needed to be repelled by any means necessary.  
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The view that the MDC is only but a front and that there are “invisible forces” behind 
much of the election violence in Zimbabwe was explained as follows by Mabasa Sasa, the 
acting editor of The Sunday Mail: 
There has been sufficient anecdotal evidence which indicates that there are outsiders who are prepared to 
finance Zimbabweans to fight each other. At one point it actually became an issue for the SADC summit, 
ah where it was alleged that ah, members of the opposition were getting military training abroad, in 
Botswana and Morocco and it was something that had to be addressed at Heads of State level. So I believe 
yaah, there is that very serious external interference. 
The perception that there are invisible forces behind election violence has forced the 
state-owned press to take a hard line stance in defending the ruling party position in relation to 
election violence. Again, Mabasa Sasa explains thus: 
Ah, umm, perhaps we would need to explain what it is that we stand for. We are a member of the 
Zimpapers Group and the name itself says a lot, Zimpapers 1980 Ltd. It is a statement, a declaration of 
independence. Eh, for us, it is a marker, a key marker of the timeline of this nation. 1980 represents 
everything that, eh, we want our country to be, sovereign, independent, eh, majority government, a peaceful 
united country. So our values as Zimpapers are inextricably linked to the values of the independence 
struggle. Hence, the name 1980. So our editorial policy is largely informed by the politics of nationalism, 
of Pan-Africanism, of independence. So when faced with threats such as these external threats, this external 
interference, this meddling in our politics to try and destabilise us as a country, naturally, we, we have the 
mandate to defend those values that are expressed in our independence of 1980. So naturally, we become 
more robust in defence of our national interest, when faced by such threats, ahmm, not just in a defensive 
manner, we have to go offensive as well in defence of our country. So yeah, over the years, the, as this 
external threat became more and more apparent we too have become more robust in our responses to that 
threat. Ah, with, our intent being, ah, upholding the integrity of our state (Interview with Mabasa 
Sasa, 15 May, 2015, Harare).  
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Sasa’s sentiments were corroborated by Ceasar Zavyi, The Editor of The Herald who stated that:  
I believe that there is really a third force. Whenever we have elections there is a third force behind the 
elections because Zimbabweans are generally peaceful people but whenever an election is called, some 
they, especially the youth they become violent towards each other and you find Western correspondents 
sneaking into the country through South Africa because they don’t want to be accredited, they will sneak 
into the country and report, file, ah, ah, inflammatory reports claiming they, will be covering things in 
hiding, contriving, ah, in fact there was the US ambassador at one point was implicated in stage managing 
a violent scene in Mashonaland West during the land reclamations when war veterans invaded a certain 
farm, he was accused of paying some people to clash so that they could record that as evidence that people 
were being beaten up. We have that in our archives. So really I believe to a certain extent especially, eh, 
from 2000 there was a 3
rd
 force at play in promoting this violence because you find that people who can’t 
afford a dollar for a grinding mill would afford some sophisticated weaponry, some teargas canisters, some 
paint canisters and so on to deface buildings. So really, some, it shows that a lot of effort, a lot of funding 
would have been poured to create that situation so that they justify their claim that there is no democracy 
in Zimbabwe (Interview with Ceasar Zvayi, 7 May, 2015, Harare) 
In the larger discursive scheme, projecting Zanu (PF) as responding to “invisible” external 
threats against national sovereignty could have possibly made the nation more polarized. The 
robustness and “offensive” strategies encompassed discursive strategies that tended to justify 
violence against the opposition and its alleged external funders as has been demonstrated in the 
example of Border Gezi above. At the same time, constructing the ruling party as engaged in a 
mortal fight with “invisible forces” helps to minimise the ruling party’s moral blameworthiness 
while at the same time sanitising the backlash on “fronts” of the external forces, who in this case 
would be the opposition. 
5.2.4 Both parties are to blame: A False Moral Equivalence?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 The ‘mystery’ about the existence of a much bigger and invisible force lurking behind 
the opposition gave way to discourses about a power symmetry in the state-owned press which 
found expression in a false moral equation  whereby Zanu (PF) and MDC were portrayed as 
equally to blame for the election violence.  Examples of news headlines which attest to this are 
“MDC-Zanu (PF) blamed for flare-up of violence” The Herald, 23-05-2000, p1), and “Fresh 
clashes in Karoi” (The Herald 21-03-02, p8).  
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In a story headlined “Political tension caused by extreme positions”, The Herald (19-05-
2000, p7) reported that the political tension prevailing at the time was a result of the “extreme 
positions adopted by the two main rival parties, Zanu (PF) and the Movement for Democratic 
Change”. Quoting a political commentator, Dr. Admore Kambudzi from the University of 
Zimbabwe, the newspaper claimed that the violence stemmed from the MDC’s “super 
ambition” to form the next government and Zanu (PF)’s “over-reaction” to the rejection of the 
draft constitution in the February 2000 referendum.  
Blaming the “extreme positions” of the two parties does not only rationalise violence but 
also creates the impression that both are equally morally culpable, what Carr (2000, 84) refers 
to as “moral equivalence” whereby two sides equally share blame for something. The 
commentator, an expert from the University (supposedly very knowledgeable) lends legitimacy 
to the narrative of equal blame as a way of rationalizing election violence. Discourses that 
project both political parties as equally to blame are effective because they shut out any 
possibilities for remedial action. The reasoning is that since both political parties are equally to 
blame nothing can be done about it.  
It could be argued that the moral equivalence frame has more to do with institutional 
processes of news-making such as the need to have a semblance of balance and impartiality 
and objectivity what (Toscano 1979, 177) called ‘dubious neutrality’. Thus the ruling party 
which is supposed to be an ‘innocent victim’ suddenly morphs into an active agent in a power 
symmetry. This clearly demonstrates how meaning is always in a constant flux as it is 
contingent on context, usage and circumstances (Hall 1997, 9). Thus, meanings are not simply 
there, but are actively constructed through selections, inflections, inclusion and exclusion. 
Apart from professional pressures the state-owned press has also come under the 
spotlight for its alleged bias in favour of the ruling party (see MMPZ reports mentioned Chapter 
Two) something which is quite common in Africa.  
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 My conversations with editors and journalists from the state-owned press suggest that 
the pressure to create a semblance of balance in their reports is palpable although the odds are 
stacked against them. One line editor said that: 
…there is the challenge of trying to balance the act. You have to balance the act, so you have to make sure 
the stories which reporters write are not biased towards one party you know…And also there are a lot of 
rules which you have to follow so you have to be alert (E1). 
A state media journalist who has covered elections for over a decade shows how any 
attempts to balance stories on election violence are frustrated by editorial control and ownership. 
He held that: 
…the owners, the owners of this paper for instance are related to the Zanu (PF) government. Usually those 
would always have a say in the story that you write. If it means, when you write a story, if probably there 
are, have been identified as perpetrators you will be forced not to write about it, then even if you write it 
would lose, it would be lost along the way because there is no official voice which says you have done this 
(J2).  
 This shows how discursive constructions of electoral violence in the state-owned press 
are circumscribed by tensions between ideological and professional considerations (Machin 
2008, 64). It is such considerations which played an important role in determining who was 
blamed for violence, how they were constructed, what was said about them as well as what was 
not said about them. 
5.2.5 Ex-nomination 
It would, however, be misleading to create the impression that the state-owned press only 
blamed the opposition for election violence. There were some instances where Zanu (PF) 
supporters were also blamed for election violence although such cases are rare. The statement by 
Mabasa Sasa quoted above is an example of this. Since this study was more interested in 
discourses rather than a quantitative trajectory of election violence there was a deliberate move 
to refrain from making further conjectures about quantitative trends. What is noteworthy is the 
fact that where Zanu- PF was the perpetrator of violence the identification of political affiliation 
was either delayed or completely omitted and could only be inferred.  
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For example,  in a story headlined “Political violence: MDC candidate killed in Bikita” 
(The Herald, 01-06-2000, p1) the identity of the victims of violence was also glossed over and 
pejorative adjectival phrases such as “mob”, “gang”, or “thug” which in the state-owned press 
would ordinarily be reserved for the opposition MDC  are conspicuous by their absence.  
Another example where the identity of the perpetrator is omitted is a story headlined 
“One dies, 13 hurt in Budiriro clashes” The Herald (20-05-2000, p5). The first two paragraphs of 
the story read:  
 
The Herald 
“The 47 Budiriro residents in Harare who were arrested in connection with the political violence which 
claimed one life and injured 13 other people this week, have not yet been charged as police investigations 
are still continuing. 
Police had by yesterday arrested 30 people in connection with the violence which also saw five buildings, 
including Dr Hunzvi’s surgery, damaged following stone and petrol bomb attacks in the suburb”.  
The perpetrators of election violence are simply “residents” and the political affiliation of 
the deceased and the injured are not mentioned. Neither is the nature of political violence 
mentioned. In another story headlined “15 missing, others injured in violent political clashes” 
(The Herald, 13-05-2000, p5) the political identity of the perpetrators of violence is 
camouflaged. The first two paragraphs read: 
AT LEAST 15 people are reported missing from their homes and several others injured in escalating 
violent political clashes in Mwenezi, which have led to the closure of at least five schools in the district, 
South of Masvingo. 
In Beatrice, another farmer, Mr. John Weeks was shot and wounded on Thursday night by a group of 
intruders at his farm. 
Curiously, the 15 people injured have no political affiliation and the people who shot and 
wounded the Beatrice farmer are simply an amorphous “group of unknown intruders”. Masking 
the political identity of the perpetrators of political violence through opaque discursive strategies 
means that nobody carries the moral burden associated with election violence.  
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While the motives for masking the identity of Zanu (PF) perpetrators is debatable,  
conversations with state press journalists suggest that the tightening of editorial controls, 
particularly during elections held after 2002 appears to be the most plausible reason. According 
to a journalist at a state-owned newspaper: 
There was a realization that the opposition and its NGO allies were fabricating stories on election violence 
in order to discredit our elections. So, publishing stories blaming Zanu (PF) would have been viewed as 
aiding the hand of the enemy. Even if you wrote such a story it would not have seen the light of day (E2). 
This view was supported by another state media journalist who said that: 
There are instances where people have brought stories that sort of eh, eh, are pointing fingers at the system 
(inaudible) and in the end as a journalist you should try to put your story in such a manner that you don’t, 
you are not seen as attacking the system but you are attached also to, you are highlighting issues of political 
violence between Zanu (PF) and MDC. You then say there has been violence between MDC and Zanu 
(PF), but it’s difficult to say Zanu (PF) started it. You then just say there was political violence. Anyway, 
you would discover that the other paper will come out with the idea that…even chronicling how the 
violence was started (J2). 
This shows that the construction of a moral equivalence between the opposition and the 
ruling party was a strategy by state-press journalists to circumvent censorship. The appearance of 
balance was therefore contrived and nor inspired by professional considerations. As already 
demonstrated in Mabasa Sasa’s statement above perceptions within state press circles that the 
privately-owned press was on a crusade to taint the image of the ruling party also forced the state 
press into a defensive mode, whereby they would rebut every story alleging that Zanu- PF was 
perpetrating election violence.  A case in point is a story published in The Herald (23-03-05,p1) 
in which the police were reported to have challenged the chairman of the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA) Dr. Lovemore Madhuku to produce evidence of his allegations that members 
of the uniformed forces committed acts of political violence. The Herald story did not disclose 
the full details of the allegations so that readers would be able to judge for themselves. This 
could have possibly created the impression among the newspaper’s readers that the allegations 
by the MDC were true. In any event, the rebuttals did not create an environment for 
understanding the complexities of election violence, but rather played host to a culture of denial 
and burying of heads in the sand by the political elite. 
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5.3 Nomination: Zanu- PF is the perpetrator, MDC victim 
Unlike the state-owned press which was sometimes ambiguous the privately owned press 
overwhelmingly blamed Zanu (PF) and state security agencies for perpetrating election 
violence.
20
  
The political affiliation of the perpetrators is immediately identified in the story to such 
an extent that readers are left in no doubt as to who is to blame for destabilising social harmony 
(For example, “Two Zanu (PF) supporters  up for political violence”, Newsday, 12-07-13, “Zanu 
(PF) threatens coup”, The Financial Gazette, 07-03-02). Hobart (2007, 197) notes that: 
Another aspect to the identification of perpetrators is that naming and using the active mood about a chosen 
grammatical subject has the effect of making it appear as the agent that disrupts the natural order. The 
contrary process, which Barthes called exnomination, has the effect of masking the agent that disrupts the 
natural order. 
In this instance the identification of the perpetrator is preceded by demands for “concrete 
action” to be taken against the perpetrators so as to “bring a semblance of normalcy to our 
tormented nation” (The Financial Gazette, 25-05-2000, p8).  
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 Examples of such headlines include: “Zanu (PF) brings Marondera to a halt” (Daily News, 22-05-2000, p2), 
“Sekeramayi threatens commercial farmers” (Daily News, 23-05, 2000, p2), “Violence: War vets, Zanu (PF) 
supporters remanded in custody”(Daily News, 23-05-2000, p2) “CIO, ZNA join farm invasions”(The Zimbabwe 
Independent, 13-07-2000, p10), “Zanu (PF) supporters burn MDC vehicle in Muzarabani, (Daily News, 13-03-02, 
p15) “Zanu (PF) trio charged with murder of two MDC activists”(Daily News, 01-02-02, p3), “Zanu (PF) forces 
people to rally”(Daily News 24-07-13, p1-2), “Zanu (PF) trio charged with murder of two MDC activists”(Daily News, 
01-02-02, p3),  “Militia seize hundreds of ID cards”(The Zimbabwe Independent, 08-02-02, p1), “Government sets 
up 146 militia bases”(The Zimbabwe Independent, 01-03-02, p4), “Zanu (PF) hijacks church to boots votes, political 
rallies disguised as prayer meetings”(The Financial Gazette, 17-01-02, p8), “Millions forced to buy Zanu (PF) cards: 
Extortion sees party raking $500m in three months”(The Financial Gazette, 24-01-02, p6), “Trigger happy cops 
ignite org of violence in Bulawayo; Police, Zanu (PF) gang up to thwart MDC rally” (The Financial Gazette, 24-01-02, 
p9), “Zanu (PF) unleashes militia on Byo”(The Financial Gazette, 07-02-02, p20), “Two Zanu (PF) supporters up for 
political violence”(NewsDay, 12-07-13,p4), “Retired general threatens villagers with war”(NewsDay, 30-07-13,p3). 
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To this extent a raft of drastic measures are prescribed; the “police must swiftly crack 
down on anyone perpetrating violence”(The Financial Gazette, 08-06-2000, p8) “SADC must 
stop collaborating with rogue rulers” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 22-o2-02, p6), that “Mugabe 
must step down”(Daily News, 23-03-02, p4) or simply that observers rein in Zanu (PF) lest the 
elections will be “rendered null and void” (The Financial Gazette, 08-06-2000, 8) and “We need 
to identify the impediments to a free and fair election so that they become a matter of public 
record”(The Zimbabwe Independent, 08-02-02, p6). The naming of the perpetrator is always 
followed by the prescription of some form of sanctions to be imposed on the perpetrators. This is 
consistent with Hobart’s assertion that “news is, and presumably sometimes intended to be, 
agentive. That is, its descriptions frame events so as to anticipate and imply the need for 
appropriate future action” (Hobart 2007, 200). Such an approach is also consistent with the 
watchdog function of the press espoused by the privately-owned press.  
The acting editor of the privately-owned daily newspaper, Newsday, Wisdom 
Mudzungaira explained his paper’s commitment to the watchdog function thus: 
…if we do not cover election violence, it therefore means we will be neglecting our role as the watchdog in 
society. Why? Because elections in Zimbabwe have been very very violent, from way back. Right? Even 
within the ruling party itself, they always fight alongside, along factional lines. So, so, what we, why we 
cover them is we want to give everybody a voice. We want to expose those things so that at least the world 
may know, they may stop to flourish, you, you have to have somebody who will manage the perceptions, 
who will tell the people what’s happening outside the country, ah, and so forth. And I am glad to say that, 
ah, when we covered the, the, event, the by-elections, ahmm, the 2013 elections they were very, very, 
peaceful, very, very peaceful. Why? Because the 2008 elections exposed all that happened, and we said we 
published, No we don’t want violence. Because we don’t want violence. Observers must come from all over 
to be with us (Interview with Wisdom Mudzungairi, 15 May 2015). 
The watchdog function of the private press seems to rest on the assumption that the press 
can deter politicians and their supporters from perpetrating violence the same way election 
observers monitor untoward electoral behaviour and if they detect an unfair play they blow the 
whistle. Thus the private press accentuates a liberal human rights discourse which foregrounds 
the sanctity of civil liberties as well and the sacredness of life.  
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5.3.1 Demonization 
In stressing Zanu (PF) culpability for election violence, the privately-owned press 
invoked a gamut of images that portrayed Zanu (PF) as an evil party undeserving of the 
electorate’s vote. The use of derogatory labels such as “mobs”, “terror squads, “thugs” “gangs”, 
to refer to Zanu (PF) supporters was more prevalent than they were used against the opposition 
by the state-owned press. Although the state-owned press used similar labels against the MDC, 
these were more tendentious in the privately-owned press. Examples of news headlines which 
portray this include: “Zanu (PF) gangs on a looting spree”(The Zimbabwe Independent, 18-02-
02, p2), “Zanu (PF) mobs burn down MDC polling agents’ homes”(Daily News, 25-03-02, p18), 
“Zanu (PF) mob attacks MPs house” (Daily News, 28-02-02, p3) “Ramaging Zanu (PF) 
supporters loot, damage house in Chinhoyi”(Daily News, 27-02-02, p19) (see Appendix 1.3) , 
“Rural folk flee orgy of terror”(Daily News, 16-05-2000, p1). The derogatory words in these 
headlines such as “gangs”, “mobs”, connote criminality while the manner in which the violence 
is executed, that is, “ramaging” and “rampage” and orgy of terror” evoke barbarism and 
senselessness.  
The privately-owned press also constructed alleged victims of Zanu (PF) violence as 
innocent, helpless, hapless and harmless. For instance, in a story headlined “MDC appeals for 
help to end violence”(The Zimbabwe Independent, 22-02-02, p2) The Zimbabwe Independent 
reported that  “besieged” Movement for Democratic Change leader, Morgan Tsvangirai was 
appealing for international intervention as “mobs loyal to President Mugabe stepped up their 
retribution against the party’s supporters”.  The MDC was complaining that its supporters were 
“being hounded and hunted down, kidnapped, tortured and killed by Zanu (PF) militias”. The 
story further gave a blow-by-blow chronicle of MDC supporters who had fallen victim to Zanu 
(PF)’s violence. Framing election violence as one-sided ensured that alleged victims of Zanu 
(PF) violence drew sufficient sympathy from the readers while at the same time magnifying the 
callousness of the ruling party.  Private press journalists justify the use of words such as “mobs”, 
“ramaging”, “gangs”, “orgy of terror” etc. on the grounds of professional considerations and 
their ability to capture reality at the material time.  
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The following statements by some editors of privately-owned newspapers are instructive: 
There is no other way of describing them (the perpetrators of violence. In 2008, 248 people were killed. For 
what? We want them to feel how bad it is that’s why we describe them like that. (E2, Interview, 
11May, 2015, Harare).  
The Independent press uses such language because these are journalistic stories. We are not writing official 
reports or diplomatic reports for embassies. We are writing for audiences that want vivid painting of events 
so that they make much more meaning to them, eh, so you tend to look, eh, not for inciting language but for 
the sharpest language you can find, eh,, that assumes the context that you are asking in which these words. 
Instead of just saying “Zanu (PF) officials or supporters beat up MDC supporters” we will use strong 
language and call them thugs because that’s what they are. If you are using extra-legal means to gain, eh, 
eh, an electoral advantage, you are unleashing violence we call it terror, depending on the scale. We use the 
words “violence”, “terror”, “intimidation” depending on the scale. If it is widespread its terror. If it is 
isolated, its intimidation. If it is systematic its violence. So we use those words depending on the prevailing 
conditions on the ground. We call it terror when it’s all over the places (Interview with Dumisani 
Muleya, 11 May, 2015, Harare) 
These views reflect an objectivist stance of social reality whereby certain words and 
phrases are used in order to effectively convey their message in a forthright manner consistent 
with the watchdog function whose hallmarks are negativity and aggressiveness (Goran and 
Otsman 2013, 309). Former editor of the Daily News, Geoff Nyarota acknowledges this 
adversarialism in the private press when he states that:  
You see by the nature of their profession there is a tendency, because you see journalists are 
always fighting for right and they sometimes, they always take the moral, they want to adopt a 
moral standpoint and to lecture even to politicians on what is good and what is not good. So they 
will say if five people were killed the politician may miss the point but if I say there was an orgy 
in their constituency the politician will…Their intention is good and noble but sometimes it can be 
misunderstood because the purist will say five people cannot be an orgy, ladies and gentlemen 
(Interview with Geoff Nyarota, 11 May 2015, Harare).   
This clearly shows that when reporting on election violence private press journalists tend 
to assume a higher moral pedestal which enables them to ‘lecture’ politicians on morality and the 
emotive words identified above become effective tools for drawing the attention of the 
politicians. 
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5.3.2 Humanistic Rhetoric in the private press 
The privately-owned press accentuated the human interest dimension of alleged victims 
of election violence in order to project Zanu (PF) as an evil party. An example of news headlines 
which speak to this include: “Police raid widow’s home” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 08-02-02, 
p4).  “Observer pastor assaulted”(Daily News, 13-03-02, p4) “War veterans murder guard, 
assault farmer”(Daily News, 18-03-02, p2), “Youth terrorise Chivhu villagers”(Daily News, 08-
02-02, p12), “War vets attack nurses” (Daily News, 25-03-02, p2), “Zanu (PF) youths stone 
Motswana woman’s car”(Daily News, 06-01-02, p6) and “Villagers flee violence to the 
cities”(The Financial Gazette, 25-02-02, p2) (see Appendix 1.4).  
The running thread in these victims of election violence (widow, pastor, nurse, guard, 
farmer, villagers, and women) is their vulnerability in society or presumed innocence.
21
  The 
private press exploited these vulnerabilities in order to portray Zanu (PF) as an evil party. This 
‘parasitic’ tendency is best illustrated in “Orphan’s house damaged in clashes”, (Daily News, 22-
05-2000, p2) a story which highlighted the plight of a teenage orphan, Tawanda Neshiri  whose 
house was allegedly damaged by war veterans and “suspected Zanu (PF) youths” in the high 
density suburb of Budiriro.
22
 The story is saturated with humanistic rhetoric intended to wring 
the sympathy of the reader by accentuating the “callousness” of his tormentors. The victim’s 
plight is graphically illustrated. The damage to the house is extensively covered in a riveting and 
emotional narrative style that leaves the reader completely bewildered. The victim is given a 
long leash to relieve his ordeal in a testimonial style, thereby heightening the emotions of the 
readers. He is reported to have said:  
They (Zanu (PF)) supporters threw stones at the house and one of them threw a ball of fire through one 
window…They later went around telling residents to stay in-doors. Those who refused were taken to 
Hunzvi’s Surgery where they were allegedly assaulted.  
                                                          
21
Although the white farmers belong to an economically powerful group in the specific context of farm occupations 
they were constructed in the international media and local privately-owned press as victims of “Mugabe’s 
tyrannical rule”.   
22
 Budiriro is a high density suburb in the capital city Harare. 
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The use of the pronoun ‘they’ is a way of ‘othering’ the alleged perpetrators of election 
violence which widens the gulf between the ‘evil’ perpetrators and the readers. Through the 
victim’s narrative readers learn about the ubiquity of Zanu (PF)’s “brutality” and “tyranny”. 
Readers are further told that victim’s father died in 1994 and his mother “succumbed in the same 
month four years later”.  The story is accompanied by a picture of the teenage boy in school 
uniform carrying a school bag in order to vividly show the misery of Zanu (PF)’s alleged victim 
of election violence. The emotive style of the story banishes rationality, thereby generating 
intense negative feelings against the ruling party. The default line seems to be ‘if Zanu (PF) can 
treat the most vulnerable in society like this how about the rest of the population’?   
As a discursive strategy, the power of humanistic rhetoric lies in suspending rationality 
by saturating readers with humanist values such as compassion, reason, love and the greater good 
so that the reader is compelled to empathise with the alleged victim (Harvey 2009). Humanistic 
rhetoric compels the reader to be outraged by the actions of the perpetrator and intensely 
sympathetic to the victim, what Herman and Chomsky (1988, 43) have described as “worthy 
victims”. The problem with humanistic rhetoric is that a person may become captive to emotion 
while reason is blighted.  Furthermore, it is a parasitic narrative which commodifies the weak, 
the meek and vulnerable in society by constructing simplistic binaries of ‘Devils’ and ‘Angels’ 
while the complexities of issues fall through the cracks. Such oversimplification plays host to 
episodic frames and sensational headlines that have more sound than substance. Geoff Nyarota 
disputes the view that the private press exploited the underdog class for self-fish reasons. He 
argues that the average reader of his newspaper, the Daily News was personally affected by the 
election violence and would have wanted to know what was happening around them adding that 
“the perpetrators were also interested that’s why they would beat up a rival reading a newspaper 
that covers violence”. 
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 Nyarota further adds that: 
As a journalist I have tended to align myself with the underdogs. Aah, if I see a rich man, rich, pompous, 
ah, evidence of being well fed, abusing the poor man, ah, it’s not just the Daily News, it’s not just me, even 
you, you will side with the poor man. Even you, you will side with the poor man. So, no apologies. I tended 
to side with the underdog as matter of policy, and underdogs come in different forms…. You have political 
underdogs. You have religious underdogs. You have professional underdogs. Not everybody is a professor. 
You have underdogs in business. Those that line up First Street, trying to sell two tomatoes, where the 
whole road, everybody on that road, I am talking about the vendors, is also trying to sell two tomatoes. 
Those are the underdogs of the business… They are business people by the way. They are business 
underdogs. And you hear the big wigs of First Street now saying “get rid of these people”. But the big wigs 
do not want to look into why those people came there in the first place. Why did they…I have a very 
interesting picture (retrieving a picture from his cellular phone, the picture shows a vendor hanging his 
clothes from his car in the Central Business District of Harare, the capital) what’s, happening to my... yaah, 
here we are. You have seen that….Now if I start a newspaper that highlights the plight of underdogs, the 
mayor will not be happy. The president will not be happy. But the tomato sellers on First Street will be 
extremely happy. So as a journalist, my own thing, it’s, its, ah, it’s better to please thousands of powerless 
people than to please two powerful people (Interview with Geoff Nyarota, 11 May 2015). 
The pro-underdog philosophy espoused in the above statement harks back to the liberal 
human rights philosophy which places high premium on the greater public-the essence for which 
newspapers are established in the first place. The problem with this argument, however, is that it 
is framed in normative terms but some scholars argue that the media in many democracies do not 
have the qualities to operate as effective watchdogs because they are too close to those who 
wield power (Voltmer 2010, 138). Voltmer (ibid) argues that: “… political reporting is regarded 
as too opinionated to provide balance gate-keeping; commercial pressure on the news coverage 
often encourages an emphasis on the trivial and popular at the expense of serious and sustained 
attention to international affairs and complex issues on the policy agenda”. The view of this 
thesis is that this indictment is not misplaced as it is an apt critique of the press’s watchdog 
function, particularly in politically polarised societies. 
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5.3.3 The Private Press, Election Violence and Hyperbole 
The private press’s reportage on election violence was couched in apocalyptic prophecies 
in order to draw the local and international public’s attention. During elections life was portrayed 
as short and brutish thereby creating the impression that violence was omnipresent
23
. Phrases 
such a “looting spree”, “terror campaign”, and “unleash”, connote the senselessness of violence 
while “brutal” and “hacked to death” denote extreme viciousness.  The motive behind such 
representation was to elicit and sustain attention and outrage from both the local and 
international public. A story headlined “Agency warns on genocide” (The Financial Gazette, 28-
02-02, p5) (see Appendix 1.5) demonstrates the hyperbolic constructions of election violence 
news in the private press. The story quoted the United States of America based Genocide Watch 
Group speculating that “Zimbabwe could slide into genocide” ahead of the presidential elections 
in March 2002. The group is reported to have said:  
The early warning signs for politicide (mass political killings) and possibly even genocide in Zimbabwe 
have now reached stage six” which is considered the final.  The US and the European Union are reported to 
have warned President Mugabe that they would use “military intervention if the situation deteriorated 
further (Financial Gazette, 28 February 2002, p5) 
Although there was election violence in Zimbabwe to argue that the situation was 
anywhere near genocide was ‘over the top’.  
Asked why his paper used such an apocalyptic headline, the Group Editor of The 
Financial Gazette, Sunsley Chamunorwa’s response was that: 
We believe that no one should die for any politician. The death of one person is one too many. What we 
believe at The Financial Gazette is that no politician is worth dying for whatever the circumstances are. The 
headline “Agency warns of genocide is very appropriate” because two years away from independence there 
were fears of ethnic cleavage and twelve years from Gukurahundi the politics of ethnic superiority is still 
very high (Sunsley Chamunorwa, Interview 11 May 2015).  
                                                          
23
 “Brutal attack leaves MDC officials in comma” (Daily News, 27-02-05, p3), “Zanu (PF) gangs on looting spree”(The 
Zimbabwe Independent, 18-01-02, p2) “16 die in Zanu (PF) terror campaign”(Daily News 09-02-02,p1), “Zanu (PF) 
unleashes militia on Byo” (The Financial Gazette, 14-02-02, p2)  “Terror squads camp of farms”(The Financial 
Gazette, 07-02-02, p1-51), and “MDC supporters hacked to death” (Daily News, 01-02-02, p2). 
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This suggests that The Financial Gazette used hyperbolic terms in order to sound alarm 
bells on the ruling party so as to forestall the worst possible scenarios rather than waiting for the 
worst to happen, something akin to prevention is better than cure. This is consistent with the 
classical sense of the watchdog whereby the press becomes some sort of a public sentinel 
(Norris, 2010). However, it could be argued that raising the spectre of another Rwanda-Burundi 
was a discursive strategy beyond the realm of the watchdog function as it was a way of 
instigating a military intervention in Zimbabwe, a familiar trope used by hegemonic powers to 
meddle in the affairs of sovereign nations. Herald editor Ceasar, Zvayi, sheds some light on the 
“hidden motives” for which the hyperbolic representation of election violence in the state-owned 
press and its response to the privately-owned press and the Western media’s representation of 
election violence. He states that:  
You would find that since the launch of the MDC, as I said it was launched with the support of the 
powerful Western countries who have always tried to use, for instance the United Nationals 
system itself to portray Zimbabwe as a case requiring the so-called “Responsibility to Protect”, 
which is chapter seven of the United Nations Charter. So they want to portray Zimbabwe as a 
country at war, requiring external ah, ah, salvation, external, intervention. So you would find the 
MDCs would be crying Wolf every time, “People are being beaten, government is sending the 
army and the police on innocent citizens”, and they will try to put to and raise the spectre of 
Gukurahundi, you know the clashes between the Shonas and the Ndebeles, in the, soon after 
independence. So they always try to raise the tribal card and try to create a siege mentality. So we 
face that situation where, whenever, the MDCs cry Wolf we try as much as possible to find out if 
really they would have seen a Wolf and most of the time we find out that they grandstand for the 
external gallery so that they justify their..., because they receive a lot of funding over the years to 
depose Zanu (PF). They would want to justify the electoral outcome saying that Zanu (PF) has 
closed democratic space, there is no way we can win a free and fair election. So they always try to 
cry Wolf, always try to, to them they don’t care how they come to power, whether through illegal 
regime change or legal regime change, whether military intervention by Westerners to overthrow 
the government like what happened in Libya, they don’t care. What they want is to come to power 
so that they justify the millions of dollars that they have received over the years (Ceasar Zvayi, 
Interview 07 May 2015). 
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Tendi (2013, 833) seems to agree that the threats of military intervention in Zimbabwe by 
the British were not necessarily unfounded. Tendi cites Field Marshal Lord Charles Guthrie who 
was Chief of General Staff and a professional head in the British army between 1994 and 1997 
who confirms that he was asked by the British government to consider invading Zimbabwe but 
refused. He says “I was absolutely dead set against it because it is a very difficult military 
operation…My strong recommendation was do not touch Zimbabwe” (Tendi 2013, 833).   
In June 2004 the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair admitted that his government 
was working with the opposition MDC to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. Blair said: 
We work closely with the MDC on the measures that we should take in respect of Zimbabwe, although I 
am afraid that these measures and sanctions, although we have them in place, are of limited effect on the 
Mugabe regime. We must be realistic about that. It is still important that we give every chance to, and make 
every effort to try to help those in the southern part of Africa to put more pressure for change on the 
Mugabe regime, because there is no salvation for the people of Zimbabwe until that regime is changed 
(Grebe, cited in Moyo 2014, 42) 
Although the private press did not explicitly endorse military intervention in Zimbabwe 
the use of hyperbole and the projection of election violence through the prism of a liberal human 
rights frame resonated with the regime change discourse.  
Private press journalists pursue the watchdog function with a great measure of zeal, but 
uncritically. A senior editor at Alpha Media Holdings, the publishers of News Day, The 
Zimbabwe Independent and The Standard newspapers said: 
Basically, our editorial policy is that we are operating as a private news organisation, our role; we see it as 
a public watchdog. This is what we do but in the process we have got to meet particular editorial standards 
and guidelines.
24
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Interview with Vincent Kahiya (05-09-13) 
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Dumisani Muleya, who edits The Zimbabwe Independent was more forthright and 
said: 
Let me, let me be very honest with you, because oftentimes newspapers have got something that we 
represent. We represent fundamental freedoms. We believe in fundamental freedoms. We believe in 
fundamental freedoms. We believe in open so…in freedom of speech, opening up the democratic space, 
freedom of enterprise, free market enterprise.
25
  
The watchdog function is viewed as unproblematic by the private press. For instance, the 
over-reliance on NGOs (or civil society) with obvious incestuous relationships to the opposition 
is one challenge the private press face in their execution of their watchdog function. The other is 
the presence of “political activists” masquerading as journalists who indiscreetly root for certain 
political parties-an admission that was made by one journalist as will be shown below.  
What is worth noting here is the fact that the representation of elections seems to be 
informed by divergent values in the sense that, while the private-press accentuates human rights 
or simply put the imperative to save life by sounding their sirens the state-owned press 
discourses allude to the safeguarding of the ‘national interest’ or more appropriately, state 
interest; the preservation of the Zimbabwean state’s sovereignty. 
5.3.4 State Sponsored or Spontaneous Violence? 
 
Unlike the state-owned press which largely constructed election violence as spontaneous 
the private press stressed that election violence was orchestrated by government, state agencies 
or some other paramilitary force controlled by the state. The army, the police, the Central 
Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and war veterans of the 1970s liberation struggle were mainly 
blamed for perpetrating election violence.   
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 Interview with Dumisani Muleya (05-08-13) 
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However, the private press did not feel obliged to prove their allegations but treated them 
as common cause. An example of news headlines that indicate orchestration of election violence 
include: “Mugabe ropes in own troops” (NewsDay 23-07-13, p1), “July 31: Army versus people” 
(The Zimbabwe Independent, 1207-13, p1), “Police fire shots, teargas at Tsvangirai convoy 
(Daily News, 23-02-02, 2) and “Soldiers assault MDC activist for putting up posters” (Daily 
News, 23-02-02, p1). These headlines create the impression that the state security agencies were 
used as instruments of violence by the state. Reportage on paramilitary groups that allegedly 
committed violence in the name of the government was more pointed. For instance, a story 
headlined “Chipangano: An organized criminal network” the Daily News (20-07-13) had a 
feature story on the activities of Chipangano (Shona word for agreement or oath), a quasi-militia 
group based in the ghetto township of Mbare which claims to have links with the ruling, Zanu 
(PF)
26. The newspapers chronicled the group’s alleged crimes including murder, robbery, rape, 
assault and intimidation and stressed that despite its known history of committing atrocities the 
group had not been brought to book. By stressing its links to the ruling party the Daily News 
sought to project Zanu (PF) as a dishonourable party that harbours criminality in its rank and file. 
One more point needs to be made about the perception that violence is orchestrated by the state 
particularly with regard to the army and the police. Owing to its liberation background Zanu (PF) 
through its leader president Robert Mugabe has effective control over the military (Tendi, 2013). 
Hence the state security agents are viewed by the opposition as the game changer. Throughout 
the tenure of the Government of National Unity (GNU) the opposition lobbied for what it called 
“security sector reforms” albeit without success.  
The game changer status of the security sector was partly the reason for the delay in the 
consummation of the Government of National Unity because the parties could not agree on the 
sharing of the security ministries. While the MDC’s demands for reforms in the security sector 
were premised on human rights, Zanu (PF) stuck to its position, citing the overarching 
imperative of national sovereignty.  
                                                          
26
 However Zanu (PF) denied any links with the group. See “Zanu (PF) youths disown Chipangano”(12-05-12)  
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5.3.5 Escalating or De-escalating Election Violence 
Competing narratives on electoral violence also manifested themselves through 
representation of the level of election violence. While the state-owned press portrayed the best of 
possible worlds whereby election violence was projected as decreasing the private press almost 
always constructed election violence as increasing. As election violence increasingly became the 
exclusive pivot upon which the legitimacy of elections revolved, the state-press was determined 
to create the impression that violence was decreasing.
27
 For instance, on the first of the two 
polling days in the 2002 presidential elections The Herald (08-03-02, p2) published a story 
which held  that “only five cases of political violence were reported countrywide indicating that 
there will be peace and tolerance as people vote…today and tomorrow”.  
The phrases only “five cases” suggests that there were probably more cases of violence 
expected, an indication that the newspaper was trying to sanitize if not ‘normalise’ the abnormal. 
This story did not say anything about cases of electoral violence which may have been 
perpetrated since the beginning of the election campaign. This type of sanitization of electoral 
violence takes place through omission whereby the uninitiated reader will end up forming 
unrealistic impressions about the level of election violence.  
Apart from omission sanitization of election violence also takes the form of 
rationalization whereby a person tries to proffer “good” reasons why there was very little 
election violence. In the example given above, the spokesperson of the police (the only source in 
the story) waxes lyrical about Zimbabweans being “peace loving” people who “would not want 
to plunge the country into chaos by perpetrating violence”. The police spokesperson goes on to 
give an account of the five cases of election violence and predictably in all the cases the victims 
were Zanu (PF) supporters while the perpetrators were all MDC supporters. Although this could 
not possibly have been true, noteworthy is the currency of selectivity whereby the state-owned 
press sought to suppress certain facts while amplifying others thereby constructing a particular 
version of events.   
                                                          
27
 Examples of headlines which suggest this include: “Political violence on the decrease”(The Herald, 04-01-2000, 
p1), “Political violence decreases”(The Herald, 06-06-2000, p1), “Violence on decrease”(The Sunday Mail, 28-05-
2000, p4), political violence declines” (The Herald, 08-03-02, 2) “Political violence continues to decline”(The Herald 
05-02-02, p4) “Political violence cases continue to decline, say police”(The Herald, 19-06-08, p1). 
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5.3.6 Optimism, Legitimacy and Official Sources 
The de-escalation of election violence discourse in the state-owned press was 
underpinned by an optimistic narrative which found expression through trite statements and 
standard public relations rhetoric such as the “police were winning the fight against political 
violence” (The Herald, 06-06-2000, p1) or that the police’s “anti-violence campaign was 
beginning to bear fruit” (The Herald, 26-02-2000, p1), and “police had managed to quell 
political violence through roadblocks and awareness campaigns”(The Sunday Mail, 28-05-2000, 
p5).  
Such statements were meant to undercut perceptions in the private press that the electoral 
environment was untenable, an argument that was used by the opposition leader, Morgan 
Tsvangirai to pull out of the presidential run-off election in June 2008.  Although Tsvangirai’s 
withdrawal came very late the actual reasons for the withdrawal are debatable. It is however, 
incontrovertible that the opposition used it as a political bargaining chip in order to morally 
weaken the ruling party or to deter it from employing unorthodox means to win elections since 
this would taint its international image (Tendi 2014, 1268). This shows that election violence 
was instrumentalized for gaining as well as retaining political power.  
The state-owned press relied on official sources, primarily the police to prove that 
violence was declining. Police were dutifully quoted pontificating on why election violence was 
decreasing. For instance, one week after the 2008 presidential run-off The Herald (19-06-08, p1) 
published a front page story headlined political violence cases decline”.  
A police spokesperson was quoted refuting claims by the MDC that four of its supporters 
“had been killed in Harare”. The police spokesperson attributed the “decline” in election 
violence to the efficacy of police campaigns which had “managed to persuade party supporters to 
desist from violence and tolerate each other”. This way, the police became the primary definers 
of reality in the construction of public discourse (Matthews 2013, 297) around election violence.  
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Projecting election violence as declining was meant to harness the goodwill of the 
internal and external public, particularly election observers. The problem, however, was that the 
responsibility to define reality and “establish the boundaries of public discourse” was differed to 
the police and yet the police alleged to be biased in favour of the ruling party.  
Scholars have lamented the press’s obsession with official sources or institutions that 
wield power in society who then draw the boundaries for knowledge and discourse (Matthews 
2013, 278). The over-dependency on police sources came out clearly during conversations with 
state-press journalists and editors. A reporter who reported on all the elections under study had 
this to say: 
I think one of my main sources were the police. Then apart from the police, the different 
candidates of political parties, be they council, MPS, e-eh, even party structures, both from within 
Zanu (PF) and MDC. E-eh, and then apart from that we also have some other people from 
different residential areas. They would just phone you if they have your number. So you would 
find on the desk a message saying something of this nature has happened come and cover this, and 
that has been very important. Then as I said before, you then have to verify with the police even if 
you went there you saw what happened, then you get the official figures, the facts from the police. 
(J2)  
The reporter’s view was corroborated by William Chikoto, the Executive Editor of The 
Sunday Mail who said that: 
Well again, when it comes to the issue of violence, eh, for you to credibly report on it you really 
have to base it on what has been reported, especially what has been recorded by the police, so our 
reporting, you are quoting the police, what are they saying? Are they saying how many incidents 
of violence have been committed, how many arrests have been made? So if there are those 
statistics that then say this is the level of violence that is there isusu (us) as newspapers of record 
we want to go by that. But our other colleagues, ah, when we say we are reporting again what we 
are seeing, what is there, there is violence there, eh; again you have extremes like the case of the 
Magunje woman who was allegedly decapitated, things that did not happen. So there is that 
danger of going with what the political parties are saying, your civil rights bodies are saying, they 
are saying this that and yet you do not have the proof yourself. So there is that danger of 
exaggerating. And there is also danger on our side if you just go by what the police are saying. 
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There is also the danger of them, eh, under-reporting (Interview with William Chikoto, 11 
May 2015, Harare). 
The fact that the police always have the last word on election violence stories sits 
awkwardly against the dictates of independent journalism. It implies that the police exercise a 
significant amount of power on electoral violence discourses. This presents a dilemma to the 
state press journalists particularly in a context where the memory of violence and residual fear 
may constitute an obstacle for victims of political violence to open up about their experiences. 
The researcher’s conversations with state press journalists are revealing in this regard: 
I remember there was the Headlands incident in 2008, where people, a whole village lost homes. 
There was an accusation that MDC was saying its Zanu (PF), then Zanu (PF) saying its MDC. We 
actually had problems trying to come to terms with who had actually done it. We ended up relying 
on having to go to the police and the police accused MDC. But you could see when you talked 
some of the victims that they were victims from MDC. There were victims who said they were 
aligned Zanu (PF), it was sort of a reprisal, the attack was on Zanu (PF). That gave us a lot of 
problems. So we ended up just having to listen to what the police were had supp…said, the official 
investigation (J2). 
By deferring to the police to authenticate the veracity of incidents of election violence 
state press journalists abdicate their power to assert their versions of reality on public discourses 
around election violence. This implies discourses on election violence were a negotiated 
outcome between the official version constructed by the police and the editorial processing by 
the state media journalists. 
5.3.7 Ambiguous Morality 
Although the dominant discourse on the level of election violence in the state press 
portrayed election violence as decreasing there were a few instances where the state press 
projected election violence as increasing. In such circumstances the MDC was exclusively 
blamed for the spiraling “terror” and the victims would be Zanu (PF) supporters. Examples of 
headlines which suggest this are: “Politically motivated violence starts to rise” (The Herald, 06-
02-02, p4), “Another Zanu (PF) member murdered” (The Herald, 16-06-08, p1), “Two more 
Zanu (PF) supporters murdered” (The Herald, 13-06-08, p1).  
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Such stories chronicled ad infinitum the MDC’s increasing “terror campaign” (The 
Sunday Mail, 24-02-02, p4), the MDC’s “new wave of terror” (The Herald, 02-02-02, p4) or 
some other acts of treachery by the opposition party. There was a significant amount of 
editorialising whereby the MDC was warned to desist from acts of violence. 
 For example, ten days before the 2008 presidential run-off The Herald’s lead was 
headlined “President warns MDC-T: This wave of violence must stop” (The Herald, 17-06-08, 
p1). The newspaper reported that president Mugabe had warned the MDC that government 
would hold them vicariously responsible for the orgy of organised violence that had rocked some 
parts of the country”. President Mugabe was addressing a campaign rally in the resort tourist 
town of Kariba when he made the statement. He is reported to have told the gathering that: 
There is a definite plan of violence, an organised system of violence aimed at disturbing law and 
order. Let them be warned that we will invoke what is known as vicarious responsibility and 
liability which means we will hold them responsible for the violence across the country (The 
Herald, 17 June, 2008, p1). 
In a strongly worded editorial The Sunday Mail (07-06-08, p1) warned the MDC to “stop 
its barbaric campaign of arson, destroying and harming people, destroying lives”. While the 
MDC was singled out as the primary culprit the newspaper blamed an ‘invisible third force’ or 
“some gremlins strategically planted to compromise the credibility of the June 27 run-off”. By 
blaming an unknown force for election violence meant that election violence discourse coalesced 
into the realm of myths. The newspaper added that the opposition and its western allies were 
bent on “creating the impression that Zanu (PF) was responsible for all politically motivated 
violence in Zimbabwe. Even deaths due to natural causes are sometimes beamed as political 
murders by the international media to discredit Zanu (PF)” (The Sunday Mail, 7 June, 2008, p1).  
While there is some credence to the view that the opposition and its media allies used 
election violence as a tool to discredit the electoral process through exaggerations and half-truths 
it was not correct to say that the MDC perpetrated all the violence. While Zanu (PF) blamed the 
MDC for the escalating violence the MDC claimed that over 200 of its supporters had been 
killed in the run up to the 27 June 2008 presidential election run-off thus giving rise to 
antagonistic narratives. 
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 As election violence itself became the battleground for power with either political and its 
press constructing versions of reality that advanced its own political agenda. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 7 when the truth became the first casualty it became impossible to rely 
on a newspaper for news and information. This has serious implications for democracy. 
5.3.8 Anonymous Sources 
 
One distinct feature of election violence stories in the state-owned press was their 
reliance on unmanned sources. For example, The Sunday Mail (10-02-02, p1-4) had a story 
headlined “MDC plans pre-election country-wide terror” which alleged that the MDC was 
planning a terror campaign through-out the whole country in the run-up to the 2002 presidential 
election. The paper claimed that the motive for the terror campaign was to give election 
observers the impression that the election had not been peaceful. The entire story was based on 
an unmanned “MDC legislator who spoke to The Sunday Mail on condition of anonymity”. The 
so-called MDC legislator was quoted as having said that the MDC’ objective was “to create the 
impression that the campaign period is not peaceful so that the election observers will declare 
that the elections were not free and fair”. He added that “we definitely have a problem in the 
party. You see our chances of winning in the presidential election are fading with every passing 
day and the leadership thinks we have to find a way of making sure that the results are nullified” 
(The Sunday Mail, 10 February, 2002, p4). Here is a supposedly “very authoritative source” who 
goes to a great length to expose the strategy of their party to the opponent under the cover of 
anonymity. Although the opposition would have itched to see the elections tainted through 
whatever means, fair or foul, using anonymous sources became the fodder for constructing 
opaque discourses through which the real perpetrators of election violence would be absolved. 
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5.4 Escalating Violence Discourse  
   Unlike the state press which projected election violence as declining, the private press 
consistently portrayed violence as escalating, if not spiraling out of control.
28
 To a great extent 
the private press engaged in “body counting” whereby the death toll due to election violence was 
portrayed as progressively rising but “there is nothing which is being done” about it. Statistics of 
people who had been allegedly killed by Zanu (PF) or state security agents were routinely 
bandied around. Examples include: 
 “…more than 10 people died since voting ended” (Daily News, 23-03-02, p4).  
 “..the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) says more than 100 of its 
supporters have been murdered by pro-government militias since February 2000” (The 
Financial Gazette, 14-03-02, p7). 
 “…twenty-eight people have died in election campaign related violence since February 
(Daily News, 12-06-2000, p10). 
 Political violence after Zimbabwe’s presidential election has killed at least six people; 
human rights groups reported this week” (The Financial Gazette, 21-03-02, p6). 
 At least  40 MDC supporters were murdered before and during the ballot” (The Financial 
Gazette, 17-02-02, p6) 
 “Police yesterday said only 11 people had been killed despite overwhelming evidence of 
at least 26 people who have perished in the disturbances”(Daily News, 31-05-2000, p2) 
                                                          
28
 Examples of headlines which show this are: “Terror spreads as door-to-door poll campaign starts” (The Financial 
Gazette, 18-05-2000, p1), “As rural violence mounts CIO, ZNA join farm invasions” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 
06-07-2000) “2 MDC supporters killed as violence continues” (Daily News, 16-03-02, p2), “Norwegian observers say 
violence on the increase in Zimbabwe”(Daily News, 25-03-02, p18), “Zanu (PF) intensifies onslaught on MDC” (The 
Zimbabwe Independent, 15-02-02, p2) “Renewed fear grips farming sector” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 22-03-
02, p4), “Terror spreads despite peace calls” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 25-01-02, p2), “Terror spreads” (Daily 
News, 01-03-02, p1), “Fears of violence rises as Zanu (PF) sets up bases at polling stations” (Daily News, 08-03-02, 
p2), “3 MDC supporters, farmer killed in fresh terror” (Daily News, 19-03-02, p2), “Zanu (PF) widens terror 
campaign” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 18-01-02, p1), “Violence on the increase” (Daily News, 12-02-02, p2), 
“Zanu (PF) fires teachers as terror spreads”(Daily News, 11-02-02, p2), “MDC says assaults on supporters on the 
increase in Manicaland”(Daily News, 08-02-02, p14). 
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 “More than 40 people were killed in the parliamentary election” (Daily News, 11-02-02, 
p6). 
 “Ford’s murder this week takes the toll of slain commercial farmers to 10 since farm 
invasions began in 2000” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 22-03-02, p2). 
           While the real motive of using these figures may have been to give the stories a modicum 
of authenticity their sources were not usually revealed as much as the figures given by the police 
were. By using unauthenticated statistics of people killed during election violence the privately-
owned press suffered from the very same transgression that they accused the police of.   
The private press dutifully chronicled alleged cases of election violence in order to 
demonstrate that the situation was getting out of hand. For instance, the first few paragraphs of a 
story in The Zimbabwe Independent (25-01-2002, p2) headlined “Terror spreads despite peace 
talks” opened thus: 
Electoral violence intensified this week spreading from Mashonaland Central to Mashonaland west where 
scores of opposition Movement for Democratic Change supporters have been attacked. The current wave of 
attacks on MDC members began on December 18 and has continued despite calls for peace and calm by 
Zanu (PF) leaders this week.  
The rest of the story is a lurid account of the incidences of election violence in which all 
the victims are MDC and the perpetrators Zanu (PF). Some of the victims were given a long 
leash to relate their ordeals with one of them claiming that “I lost all my property as my huts 
were burnt, grain was looted and property worth more than $10000 was destroyed”. The private 
press relied on ‘human rights organisations’ and also voiced the victims of violence and 
emphasized the desperate human condition arising from the election violence in order to wring 
the sympathy of the readers.  
It was apparent that news about election violence in the privately-owned press was not 
only meant for the consumption of the local audience but also for readers beyond the borders of 
Zimbabwe.  
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The internationalised status of the Zimbabwean political situation and the human rights 
frame deployed by the private press in their representation of election violence implied that 
western countries, primarily Britain and the United States of America were expected rein-in 
President Mugabe for alleged ‘crimes against humanity’ and the private press came sought 
construct a certain version of reality to justify such an intervention. The Zimbabwe Independent 
(18-01-02, p1) acknowledges this as much.  
The newspaper claimed that the escalating violence by the ruling party was Mugabe’s act 
of defiance against “western governments led by the United States” who were calling for the 
restoration of law to ensure the build-up to the polls was fair”. By projecting the election as 
escalating the private press sought to bring the Zanu (PF) government into the spotlight for 
possible censure by the ‘international community’. Such a task resonated with the private press’s 
avowal to the liberal human rights framework which places premium on the protection of 
individual rights. Haines (2009, 482) notes that the responsibility to protect doctrine which 
justifies military intervention in any country on humanitarian grounds has been frequently 
referred to in relation to Sudan and Zimbabwe. Haines, however, hazards that the doctrine has 
been “couched in terms and applied to situations for which the original conception was not 
designed” (Haines 2009, 483-484) suggesting that the principle might have been abused.  
Although the private press did not explicitly agitate for military intervention, their 
appeals to the international community “to do something” about the situation could be 
interpreted as a call for military intervention. Their insistence that violence was ‘escalating’ even 
when it was not and the obsession with death tolls demonstrate their framing of election violence 
as a human rights disaster warranting external intervention. Private press journalists appear to 
justify their cynicism by arguing that they were simply reflecting the prevailing situation at the 
material time.  
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Group Editor at the Financial Gazette, Sunsley Chamunorwa said:  
These headlines (depicting violence as escalating) are quite appropriate because at the material time the 
authorities were not in control of anything. We also believe that peace does not mean the absence of war. 
Our skepticism derives from the fact that in spite of calls for election violence to end, there was a lot of 
violence and lawlessness...If you check you will find that in the late 1990s, we had some opposition parties 
like ZUM but you will find that the violence was not that much relative to those elections held after the 
formation of the most formidable opposition party to Zanu (PF) rule; the MDC. The violence in previous 
elections was unprecedented. From 2002, 2005 it escalated. You will find that there has been a correlation 
between Zanu (PF) rulership and violence (Sunsley Chamunorwa, Interview, 11 May 2015, 
Harare).  
Chamunorwa’s sentiment is echoed by two other private-press editors, namely Dumisani 
Muleya, the editor of The Zimbabwe Independent and the founding editor of the Daily News, 
Geoff Nyarota. Like Chamunorwa, Muleya stated that:  
At the material time that you are showing some of these stories (the news headlines that I was showing him 
from the Zimbabwe Independent) that was the height of the violence. Come 2013 election, you won’t see 
any stories about violence, you see stories about other problems but electoral violence was absent, therefore 
it was absent from our pages (Dumisani Muleya, Interview, 11 May 2015, Harare).  
The objectivist view of the privately owned press in relation to electoral violence implies that 
private press journalists view themselves as neutral, as simply ‘covering’ election violence, 
rather than constructing ‘competing explanations of reality’ (Street 2001, 33) or alternative 
versions of reality that can be challenged. This is clearly demonstrated by Geoff Nyarota when 
he says that: 
Journalists are not in the business of creating news or creating the circumstances. In the case of ah, ah, 
election coverage it is the politicians, it is the political party followers who are responsible…I was the 
founding editor of the Daily News. I know, I know why we created this newspaper. I know more than 
anybody else. What motivated me after being fired from The Chronicle for telling the truth was to start a 
paper that would tell the people of Zimbabwe the truth as it unfolds. 
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As stated earlier the Daily News’s and by extension the privately-owned press’s philosophy of 
telling the “truth as it is” finds expression in an adversarial brand of journalism pivoted on a 
singular truth. This is at odds with the views of scholars like John Street who reject such 
essentialism. 
News is a media product, and like all such products it is the result of a complex process of history…in 
representing a version of the world, news has first to persuade us of its veracity through the use of various 
techniques, and secondly, the character and role of that news have to be seen as circumscribed by wider 
commercial and political processes. 
The argument advanced in this chapter is that entrenched views about what is truth and 
what it is not reflect the competing ideological values between the state-owned press and the 
privately-owned press at the material time. Such irreconcilable clash of values could have 
possibly contributed to the propagation of anti-democratic practices.   
5.4.1 Over-reliance on NGO Sources  
 
An overwhelming majority of the stories which claimed that election violence was 
escalating were based on information supplied by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOS), 
opposition politicians and the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) who in most instances are 
uncritically quoted. For example, The Financial Gazette (21-03-02, p6) had a story headlined 
“Violence dogs Zimbabwe as six die after poll” in which “human rights groups” and opposition 
party officials” were reported saying politically motivated violence had worsened since the 
March 9-10 presidential elections. An Amnesty International official was quoted at length 
confirming that violence was escalating. The official claimed that: 
As many of the international observers leave (Zimbabwe), Amnesty International fears that opposition 
supporters, members of non-governmental organisations, employees of the independent press and other 
perceived opponents of the government are at risk, both immediately and in the event of any popular 
protest against the election results (The Financial Gazette, 21 March, 2002, p6).  
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It is trite to say that the prophesied clampdown on non-governmental organisations and 
the independent press never came to pass. On the basis of perceptions that election violence was 
spiraling out of control Zimbabwe has been accustomed to speculations of another ‘looming’ 
Rwanda-Burundi scenario. Such speculations fed into the private press’s exhortations of the 
international community to act ‘before another Rwanda-Burundi’ happened. Furthermore, 
uncritically depending on NGOs and opposition politicians bred an incestuous relationship 
between the private press and their sources which compromises the press’s role to enrich 
democracy. For instance, in a story headlined “Renewed fear grips farming sector” The 
Zimbabwe Independent (22-03-02, p2) reported that fear had gripped the commercial farming 
sector due to a worsening “terror campaign to force farmers off their land”. More than half of the 
story is based on direct quotes from an official of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and 
there is no other voice to counterbalance the information from this official.  
Although The Zimbabwe Independent was skeptical about information from government 
sources the newspaper was more than willing to be led by the nose by its NGO sources. In a 
story headlined “Police say only 11 people killed in violence” the Daily News (31-05-2000, p2) 
refuted police claims that only 11 people had been killed in the run-up to the 2002 presidential 
election campaign but was more pliant in accepting the MDC’s claim that the figure was more 
than 26 people. The Daily News went on to quote five non-state and western funded NGOS 
(namely the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZIMRIGHTS), the Non-Governmental 
Organisation Forum, Amani Trust, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Commercial 
Farmers Union (CFU) all of which disagreed with the police figure, but also went on to allege 
that Zanu (PF) and not MDC was the perpetrator of election violence. As a matter of fact one of 
the NGOs, Amani Trust was described as “an experienced violence monitoring group” in order 
to give legitimacy to its election violence statistics. This shows that reality is purposefully 
constructed to achieve political objectives. By relying on NGO sources the private press 
saturated public discourses amplified perceptions of election violence. 
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 One journalist at The Zimbabwe Independent confirmed that some of their NGO sources 
are prone to exaggerating the levels of election violence. She said: 
Some of these sources, eh, especially exaggeration, that’s where I have got a problem because they could, 
they maybe deliberately misinform. For me I think it’s a big eh, because they know that we don’t have the 
resources sometimes to go and check. That makes it, eh…so we got to a stage where and I think if you look 
at, in terms of the reports that we are getting, unlike the way we reported in 2000, 2002 whatever came 
would be in the paper. If you look at …there was a shift. If you look at this past…especially these elections 
where we were not taking whatever we were getting as fact. (J4). 
This clearly shows that some of the private press reports on election violence are 
negatively influenced by the ideologies of their sources who are Non-Governmental 
Organisations. Institutional constraints such as lack of resources to verify incidence of election 
violence in different parts of the country puts journalists at the mercy of these sources, thereby 
negatively compromising their ability to exercise their democratic functions as primary definers 
of reality by abdicating their agenda-setting function to parties that have their own agendas.  It is, 
however, noteworthy to state that the prevalence of discourses on escalation of political violence 
was never uniform for all the elections selected for this study but was contingent upon a variety 
of factors such as presence of election observers and popular perceptions.  
Where election violence was perceived to be low such as the 2005 and 2013 elections the 
discourse was less focused on physical violence and more on psychological violence and the 
resuscitation of memories of election violence (Nyambi 2014, 1). The press used psychological 
violence in order to secure the support of the electorate (Tendi 2013) through residual fear, what 
Zamchiya refers to as “the harvest of fear” (Zamchiya 2013, 960) a theme which will be revisited 
in the next chapter. The next section turns to the third and last theme to be discussed in this 
chapter; the representation of election violence through a lens of order and disorder. 
5.5 Authority-Disorder Discourse on Election Violence 
 
The preceding section alludes to the fact that the major motive behind the private press’s 
framing of election violence as escalating was to create the impression that there was a total 
break-down of law and order in Zimbabwe and that the centre could no longer hold.  
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Machin (2008, 76) rightly points out that “news likes to frame things in terms of threats, 
such as to social order, to democracy, to our children etc. even when these things themselves are 
part of complex social changes or political situations”. Machin’s statement holds true in relation 
to the manner in which the press in Zimbabwe represented election violence during the period 
under study.  
5.5.1 The Authority Discourse 
 
While the state-owned press projected the state as being in control of the situation the 
private press portrayed the state as losing control. The state-owned press’s law and order 
discourse was bolstered by a number of stories focused on police blitz on perpetrators of election 
violence, increased police deployments and publicity campaigns against election violence by the 
police and a host of other measures put in place to deal with political violence.
29
  
News reports focused on police “blitz” on perpetrators of political violence (The Herald, 
15-03-02, p4) laws to curb political violence (The Herald, 25-01-02, p4)  tightening of security 
(The Herald, 08-05-2000, p8) and banning “dangerous weapons”(The Herald 20-02-08, p1) and 
arms (The Sunday Mail, 24-02-02, p4).   
When  a security law, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) was passed in 2002, The 
Herald (16-02-02, p4) published a story quoting police spokesperson Assistant Commissioner 
Wayne Bvudzijena  who claimed that the law would  help police to effectively deal “with 
perpetrators of political violence and public disorder”. 
                                                          
29
 Examples of headlines in the state press include: “Matabeleland South police on alert for political violence” (The 
Herald, 15-03-02, p4), “450 nabbed in blitz on political violence”(The Herald, 03-05-2000, p1) “Police deployed 
countrywide to ensure post-poll calm”(The Herald, 27-06-2000, p1), “Supporters of political parties warned” (The 
Herald, 25-02-02, 2), “Police bans arms possession” (The Sunday Mail, 24-02-02, p4), “Ban on carrying of weapons” 
(The Herald, 13-02-02, p4), “Security tightened after bomb blast last month” (The Herald, 05-2000, p8), “State 
warns against violence”(the Herald, 11-03-08, p1), “Police ban dangerous weapons” (the Herald, 10-06-08, p4), 
“Police step up war against violence”(The Herald, 26-02-08, p1-2), “Blitz on political violence nets 13” (The Herald, 
21-02-08, p1-2), “Act will aid fight against terrorism” (The Herald, 25-01-02, p4), “25 magistrates to handle political 
violence cases”(The Herald 16-07-13, p1). “Cops assure Sadc observers of peaceful election” (The Herald, 23-07-13, 
p4) and “There will be heavy police presence during elections” (the Herald, 12-07-13, p2). 
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 The police Commissioner reportedly said that cases of political violence “continued to 
decrease as the country draws closer to the March 9 and 10 presidential elections”, implying that 
there was a correlation between the promulgation of the Act and political stability. Projecting the 
controversial law as beneficial to the nation was meant to moderate the inundation of criticism 
directed at the law by the opposition who described it as ‘draconian’.  The story in question did 
not say anything about this criticism particularly allegations that it restricted individual civil 
liberties. This shows that in its representation of election violence the state-owned press 
accentuated state interests ahead of individual civil liberties.  
Similarly, before the 31 March harmonised elections and the 27 June presidential run-off 
in 2008 the police issued warnings to the public that they would not hesitate to use “the full 
might of the law” (a veiled reference to shoot to kill) in dealing with political “malcontents”. 
Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri reported “we will not hesitate to use full force including 
fire arms to quell politically motivated violence before, during and after” the elections. He added 
that: 
The use of full force by the police the world over has always attracted criticism and is deliberately 
exaggerated most of the times for a purpose. This is a sticky point so designed to undermine and discredit 
the entire electoral process. We are not deterred by the utterances of hate from the Western World 
concerning these issues as it is in their interest to discredit all who are not their puppets in their quest to 
defend their interests (The Herald, 27 February 2008, p1). 
Although Chinhuri was talking about the police’s intention to use the full force of law 
against perpetrators of political violence (which is ordinarily an acceptable thing), some critics 
argued that his statement went beyond the realm of policing in the sense that his reference to 
“Western world” and “puppets” was viewed as partisan thus undermining the ability of the police 
force to enforce law and order. Furthermore, the statement rationalises the use of force against a 
particular group by engaging in philosophical generalities (i.e. “the world over” and “a sticky 
point”).  
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On the one hand Chihuri’s statement could be interpreted as an attempt by the police to 
assert their authority. On the other, it could be read as a veiled warning to MDC supporters, who 
before the harmonised elections in 2008 were reportedly planning demonstrations if the elections 
were rigged after the then party spokesperson, Nelson Chamisa threatened to resort to “Kenyan-
style” demonstrations if the 2008 harmonised elections were rigged.  
Chamisa is reported to have told a gathering of his party’s supporters that “you saw and 
heard what happened in Kenya. Its nothing compared to what we have here if (President) 
Mugabe rigs the election) (The Herald, 27-02-08, p4). Chamisa was referring to the violence 
which broke out in Kenya after the 2007 elections in which over 1000 people died and 500 000 
others were displaced (BBC World Service Trust 2008, 2). Chihuri further warned that: 
It is time for political parties to own up when they lose. Machete, axes, bows and arrows cannot put 
anybody into office. We will never allow it to happen in this country. We will nip it in the bud. We are 
adequately resourced to cover this election (The Herald, 27 February 2008, p4).  
Chihuri’s warning was ominous and couched in violent language and could have possibly 
had a chilling effect on members of the public and the media. While the opposition’s threats to 
stage Kenyan style demonstrations is clearly anti-democratic, The Herald failed to critique police 
insistence that there was law and order in the country particularly against the backdrop of 
widespread allegations by the opposition and their civil society alliances that the police applied 
the law selectively.  
The state-owned press’s tacit endorsement of the state’s crackdown on election violence 
was meant to counter private press claims that there was no law and order in the country since 
not doing so would imply that the electoral environment was not conducive for the holding of 
free and fair elections.  Hence reports on police blitz on election violence often stressed the 
number of people arrested or those languishing in jail. It also emphasized that police were well 
prepared to deal with members of the public who violate the law (for example in The Herald, 12-
07-13, 2). Thus, police visibility, deployments, the banning of traditional weapons; indictments 
of perpetrators enactment of laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) were 
constructed as evidence of vigilance by the police vigilance in quelling possible threats to 
national security.  
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The state-owned press vigorously stated that the police were ever ready to stamp out 
anarchy and the claim that the police would “never treat perpetrators of violence with kid 
gloves” was often reiterated at every opportunity available (The Herald, 01-02-08, p1-8, The 
Herald, 27-02-08, p1). The Herald’s endorsement of the law and order discourse, regardless of 
the violent subtext in such a discourse implies that the newspaper endorsed the state’s legitimate 
monopoly to violence at the expense of individual human rights.  
In order to deflect the criticism that the law was being selectively applied, the moral 
equivalence trope was conveniently retrieved and “police statistics” depicting equal culpability 
for election violence between MDC and Zanu (PF) were routinely quoted. For instance, The 
Herald (09-06-08, p1) claimed that “In some provinces it was almost 50-50 with both parties 
(MDC and Zanu (PF)) violating the law”. 
When the Attorney General’s Office announced that it would no longer grant bail to all 
suspects arrested on charges of election related violence a few weeks before the June 27, 2008 
presidential run-off The Herald hailed the move and uncritically describing it as a “progressive 
decision” which would “go a long way in deterring the election violence” (The Herald, 10-06-08, 
p4). 
 The newspaper also cynically added that “…the decision to lock all perpetrators is bound 
to enforce tolerance and peace ahead of the presidential run-off”. That this decision possibly 
violated the constitutional rights of the detained was not an issue for The Herald implying that 
the newspaper subordinated individual human rights to the state.   
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The imperative by the state-press to construct a narrative of the state to assert its authority 
is succinctly illustrated in a commentary in The Herald (11-05-2000) which stated that: 
Zimbabwe has a powerful government that works. Its power is pervasive and ubiquitous and can be felt in 
every corner of the country, through structures, like the civil service and the police. Warnings by Mr. 
Tsvangirai’s cheerleaders that the country was descending into chaos date back to the days Mr. Tsvangirai 
led the ZCTU into violent strikes and stayaways. It was then that he introduced violence to Zimbabwe in an 
orgy of destruction, looting and burning.  
The Herald sought to debunk perceptions in public discourses that the Zimbabwean state 
was collapsing by emphasizing the ubiquity of its bureaucratic and coercive authority. However, 
the emphasis placed on the state’s power betrayed its lack of confidence in the face of mounting 
economic and political challenges. Predatory tendencies epitomised by the heavy handed 
approach in dealing with internal dissenting voices also demonstrate the gradual flagging of the 
state’s ideological and consensus-building power. 
5.5.2 The Disorder Discourse 
 
Unlike the state press which foregrounded the state’s ability to maintain order during 
electoral periods the private press constructed elections, the electoral environment as disorderly. 
The disorder frame was sustained through the salience on alleged human rights abuses and the 
breakdown of civilian authority while at the same time privileging the liberal human rights trope. 
The arraignment of perpetrators of violence was constructed as human rights violations rather 
than an ability by the state to enforce law and order.  
For instance, the News Day (12-07-13, p5) described people who had been arrested for 
pulling down President Mugabe’s posters during the 2013 harmonised elections as “seeing red” 
and the Electoral Act under which these people had been detained was described as “an 
obnoxious piece of legislation” meaning that the arrests were illegal. Such descriptive phrases 
engendered the notion that people are illegally persecuted.  
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The arrests themselves were described as a “clampdown” implying that this was not a just 
application but an abuse of the law. The implication for this is that in the context of Zimbabwean 
elections considered in this study the meaning of election violence was slippery, shifting and  
hinged on who invoked it when, where and for what purpose. This is consistent with Stuart 
Hall’s argument that the meaning of objects or concepts “…is never finally fixed. It is always 
putting off or ‘deferring its rendezvous with Absolute truth. It is always being negotiated and 
inflected to resonate with new situations. It is contested and sometimes bitterly fought over”, 
(Hall 1997, 9).This implies that the press do not necessarily abhor election violence but may be 
concerned about who reaps the benefits from its use since election violence becomes a medium 
for appropriating or retaining power.  In the specific context of this thesis, the press sought to 
distribute, power through discourses of legitimation and de-legitimation, a discussion that will be 
revisited in greater detail in the next chapter. 
5.5.3 Election violence and land occupations 
The occupation of white-owned commercial farms by war veterans of the 1970s 
Chimurenga war and “land hungry” peasants which began after a constitutional amendment in 
February 2000 and continued with varying degrees of intensity through the 2000 general and the 
2002 presidential elections lent itself to the construction of discourses of disorder in the private 
press.
30
 Phrases in these headlines such as “invasions”, “evicted”, “fleeing”, “hostage”, “force”, 
“seizure” and “threatens” invoke criminality while words such as “militia” connote a civilian 
authority that has been displaced by paramilitary rule. White commercial farmers were projected 
as being under siege and the impression was given that the government through various state 
security arms was condoning violence rather than curbing it. 
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 Examples of such headlines include: “Farmer held hostage” (Daily News, 23-03-02, p13), “Zanu (PF) supporters 
hold farmer hostage”(Daily News, 21-03-02, p18), “Commercial farmers flee to Mozambique”(Daily News, 09-03-
02, p3), “Zanu (PF) unleashes militias on commercial farms” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 15-05-02, p2), “War 
veterans force tobacco farmers to sell their crops”(The Financial Gazette, 18-05-2000, p1), “Seizure of farms 
begins”(The Financial Gazette, 29-07-2000, p1), “Invasions: Schools forced to close” (The Financial Gazette, 11-05-
2000, p39), “CIO, ZNA join farm invasions”(The Zimbabwe Independent, 13-07-2000, p1), “Border Timbers shuts 
down operations”(Daily News, 18-05-2000, p1), “Zanu (PF) unleashes militias on commercial farms” (The 
Zimbabwe Independent, 15-05-02, p3), “Mugabe threatens fresh farm invasions”(Daily News, 12-06-06-2000, p1) 
and “100 framers evicted ahead of poll”(The Financial Gazette, 07-03-02, p34). 
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 Some scholars have argued that the unprecedented attention given to the plight of the 
white commercial farmers in the private press was mainly to do with their economic power and 
their ethnic links with the former colonial master, Britain (Willems, 2005). Portraying white 
commercial farms as under serious threat served to amplify narrative about “rampant human 
rights abuses” during elections. However, saturating public discourse with the victimhood of 
white commercial farmers marginalised other dimensions of human rights such as the rights of 
the black peasants who had a legitimate right to land ownership. Since lawlessness was 
constructed as “state sponsored” the remedy prescribed to restore order was that the government 
must act. President Mugabe was singled out as being responsible for the breakdown in the law. 
Similarly, it was reasoned that “Mugabe must do something”. In a commentary headlined “Only 
Mugabe can end violence” the Daily News (18-05-2000, p6) stated that since Mugabe had 
“condoned the invasion of white-owned commercial farms and virtually ordered the police not to 
intervene many people believed Mugabe had decided to suspend the rule of law in the country”. 
According to the Daily News Mugabe was singularly liable for the breakdown in law and order. 
The newspaper further stated that: 
If Mugabe genuinely loves his country and believes that it is important than his own survival, then we have 
no doubt that he will make every effort to end the violence which, for the moment makes a pipe dream the 
prospect of a free and fair election. 
The argument that Mugabe alone could restore sanity to the country rehashes the 
narrative on the instrumentalisation of election violence discussed earlier, but also brings to the 
fore the privately-owned press’s assumption that there is a correlation between election violence 
and the freeness and fairness of elections. However, the portraying Mugabe as solely responsible 
for election violence was an oversimplification that precluded the private press from viewing 
election violence in a broader context. Willems (2005, 100) contends that: 
..by presenting Mugabe as the “bad guy” solely responsible for the crisis in Zimbabwe, the media failed to 
contextualise the situation and failed to take into account more externally related factors which have also 
contributed to the catastrophic situation in the economic situation in Zimbabwe… 
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The view that election violence was a responsibility of one individual sharply contradicts 
my findings from my conversations with ordinary Zimbabwean citizens (see Chapter Seven) the 
majority of whom do not believe that election violence in Zimbabwe is one-sided let alone the 
responsibility of one person. However, the personalisation of election violence absolved the 
private press from tackling the multiple facets of election violence while at the same time 
justifying external intervention in Zimbabwe. However, contradictory discourses emerged in the 
private press in the sense that attributing all the blame for election violence to Mugabe and 
suggesting that he alone held the key to the restoration of law and order created the impression of 
an omnipotent and pervasive Mugabe. This narrative contradicted allegations that Mugabe had 
lost total control of the state as he had abdicated power to paramilitary structures, the upshot of 
which was that Mugabe had literally become a pawn of the securocrats.   
News headlines that accentuate Mugabe’s agency include “Mugabe orders ‘war-like’ 
campaign” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 23-05-08, p1), “Mugabe ropes in own troops” (News 
Day, 23-07-13, p1). These headlines suggest that Mugabe is still in control of everything.  On the 
contrary, “July 3: Army versus people” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 12-07-13, p2), and “Police 
take charge of poll” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 30-05-08, p1) suggest the security agents and 
not Mugabe were in control of the levers of power.  In the Zimbabwe Independent story (12-07-
13, p1) a senior army commander reportedly said “As soldiers, we are not ready and will not 
allow bringing back the whites because they have been calling their friends from outside the 
country to impose sanctions that are hurting us now”. Although the motive for projecting the 
army in this way was to demonstrate the breakdown in law and order and the absence of human 
rights the statement is also significant in that it reveals the role of sanctions in promoting election 
violence.  
Some scholars argue that economic sanctions in Zimbabwe have failed to induce 
democracy and that to the contrary they have provided a scapegoat for the state to clamp down 
on the citizens while hiding under external forces (Chingono, 2010, 192).  
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It could also be argued that sanctions were a form of soft violence whose effect was to 
induce the electorate to reject the incumbent government and its leadership since they were 
blamed for human rights violations. This view is echoed by acting editor of The Sunday Mail, 
Mabasa Sasa, who says that: 
Our position on sanctions has always been that sanctions are a form of warfare. This is informed 
by the sanctions that were put on Iraqi before we had any sanctions imposed on us. The sanctions 
on Iraqi before the first Gulf War killed more people than the war itself did. So the very 
impositions of sanctions right from the onset on Zimbabwe to us was a declaration of war. Having 
seen what had happened to Iraq, so right from the onset ah, sanctions were never,  a tool to 
ostensibly create a more democratic environment, ah, to further the interests of human rights 
groups, so from the onset for us it was a declaration of war, and war by any definition is a very 
violent thing, ah, umm, attacking our economy is attacking livelihoods of people, and that is 
extremely violent, ah, emm, blocking access to lines of credit in the global environment that we 
live in, the global financial architecture we have and blocking us from accessing such things that is 
a serious form of violence because you are trying to cripple us, you are crippling service delivery, 
you are crippling food security and that is war (Interview with Mabasa Sasa, 14 May 
2015, Harare). 
This view is instructive in the sense that viewing sanctions as worse than election 
violence might have forced The Sunday Mail to downplay the human rights dimension of 
election violence in the spirit of national interest and national sovereignty, particularly given the 
fact that wars are regarded as higher order threats than domestic problems like election violence.  
5.5.4 Public Order, Disorder and Securocrats 
While the state-owned press represented POSA as having enhanced the police’s ability to 
deal with the scourge of electoral violence the privately-owned press denounced the law often 
describing it as draconian and “anti-democratic” as it was used to deny the opposition permission 
to hold rallies (Daily News, 22-02-02, p2). While the state-owned press celebrated the statements 
by the police that they would use fire arms to stamp out election violence the private press 
condemned such statements as grossly irresponsible.  
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In a commentary headlined “Public Order is not about shooting” The Zimbabwe 
Independent (29-02-08, p8) described Commissioner Chihuri’s warning that the use of fire arms 
against perpetrators of election violence as “gratuitous threats” which were as bad as “the threats 
of street protests and violence by those who lose elections” The newspaper argued that by 
advocating shooting, Chihuri “extolling degrees in violence was as bad as glorifying the mayhem 
which followed the announcement of the Kenyan election results” a reference to Chamisa’s 
utterances mentioned earlier. The newspaper argued that maintaining order did not have anything 
to do with shooting and implored the police to be impartial in the execution of their duties.  
The paper stated that: 
The police can only hope to get as much public respect as it deserves in terms of how impartial it is seen to 
be in applying the law. Once the police are seen to partially enforce a law already discredited as the Public 
Order and Security Act (POSA) they can only bring dishonour on themselves. It starts with the way the law 
is applied regarding public meetings, gatherings and rallies. All parties must be seen and feel that they are 
being treated equally. The conduct of the police must be beyond reproach, a tall order in such a charged 
atmosphere but one that must be executed with honour (The Zimbabwe Independent, 29 February, 
2008, p8). 
In the context of political polarisation, the meaning of ‘law and order’ and the 
methodology of policing it were highly contested terms which meant different things to different 
people. While the state press viewed POSA as a panacea for maintaining law and order, the 
private press saw POSA particularly its “selective application” as an obstacle to the maintenance 
and restoration of order. The selective application of the law thus became a motif in the 
authority-order discourse. For instance The Zimbabwe Independent (08-02-02, p1) claimed that 
“illegal farm occupiers” had become a law unto themselves while The Daily News, (28-02-02, 
p6) reported that war veterans had “effectively” become “the law of the land and the de-facto 
rulers” adding that  “the rule of law was set aside and has remained suspended right up to 
present- to be substituted by a government of Zanu (PF), for Zanu (PF) supporters by war 
veterans”. This contradicted the narrative that the authorities were in full control of the situation. 
The private press constructed a counter-narrative of total breakdown of law and order whereby 
impunity was the order of the day (Daily News, 28-02-02, p6). 
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In order to bolster their view that there was a breakdown of law and order and the 
impartiality in its application the private press gave considerable attention to the alleged 
involvement of state security agencies primarily the police and the army in acts of election 
violence. Examples of such news headlines are: “Police storm MDC offices” (Daily News, 04-
07-13, p1), “MDC implicate soldiers in terror” (Daily News, 19-02-02, p14), “Mugabe ropes in 
own troops” (News Day, 23-07-13, p1) and “Army boosts Mugabe campaign” (The Zimbabwe 
Independent, 13-06-08). These headlines suggest breakdown of civilian authority and 
securitization of the state and a legal vacuum.  
Perceptions that civilian authority has been deferred to the securocrats have been linked 
to the defence forces’ declarations that they can only recognise leadership with liberation war 
credentials. For instance, on the eve of elections in 2002  the then Army Commander, General 
Vitalis Zvinavashe who was representing the heads of the Defence Forces  issued a statement 
declaring that they would not recognise any leader without any liberation background
31
. Since 
the statement has been widely quoted as an example of total breakdown civilian authority it is 
worth quoting at length. Zvinavashe said: 
We wish to make it very clear for all Zimbabweans that the security organisations will only stand in 
support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which 
thousands of lives were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard won independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and national interests…To this end let it be known that the highest office in the land is a 
straightjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will 
therefore not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very 
existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people (cited in Tendi, 2013, 830). 
The above and similar statements by various heads of the security services sector have 
been a cause for consternation during elections and became the cause and hinge around which 
agitations for security sector reforms were mounted by the opposition parties during the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) between 2009 and 2014). Tendi (2013, 831) argues that 
Zvinavashe’s statement has been selectively interpreted by some scholars.  
                                                          
31
 The statement was interpreted by most people as a veiled reference to the opposition MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai who does not have a liberation war background and has often lampooned in the state media that he ran 
away from the liberation war. 
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He accuses some scholars of neglecting the external factors that prompted the security 
agencies to intervene in the political affairs of the country. Tendi observes that the “perceived 
onslaught on Zimbabwe’s sovereignty” through tendentious and partial media coverage, the 
imposition of sanctions by the United States of America and the unceremonious withdrawal of 
military assistance by Britain in 2001 precipitated the security agencies’ statement (Tendi 2013, 
831). Tendi rightly points out that the statement was a culmination of “a strong sense of siege” 
caused by malicious “international and local private media coverage about the military, a hostile 
western foreign policy towards Zimbabwe and “targeted sanctions”.  
This study, however, disputes with Tendi’s characterisation of the economic embargo as 
being “targeted” and argues that the declared and undeclared sanctions coupled with the hostile 
foreign and local private media coverage and threats by the British to intervene militarily in 
Zimbabwe exacerbated Zanu (PF)’s siege mentality since the party regarded the economic 
embargo as a form of soft violence which induced disaffection against the ruling party and 
thereby generate votes for the opposition. The view that sanctions were a form of soft violence 
meant to “extort” votes from the sanctions battered electorate is echoed by Mpetiwa (2008) who 
alludes to the coercive effect of economic sanctions at the height of the economic melt-down 
after the first round of voting in 2008. Mpetiwa writes that:   
Now some people voted for him (Tsvangirai) not because they like or love him and his leadership, but 
simply because they are afraid of starving to death. If Tsvangirai really cared for the people, he would have 
long called for the removal of the illegal sanctions (Mpetiwa, 2008, p8).  
In the specific context of Zimbabwean electoral contests election violence did not just 
mean physical violence but encompassed all other coercive measures such as soft violence (a 
recurrent theme in this researcher’s conversations with citizens in Chapter Seven) and was meant 
to tilt the scale in favour of the other party. Zanu (PF) viewed sanctions as a measure to 
blackmail the populace so that they could vote for the opposition. The state security viewed their 
role as that of guarding against this blackmail.  
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The lessons learnt here are, firstly; that external interference in societies characterised by 
social and political cleavages does not always bring about the desired outcomes, if anything it 
may fuel suspicions and mistrust among belligerents since the outsider can be viewed as aiding 
the opposite side to gain power.  
Secondly, the impartiality of national institutions (the media included) can nurture 
feelings of resentment among citizens and possibly sow seeds of retaliatory violence because 
impartiality creates a vacuum whereby people are tempted to take the law into their own hands. 
Nyamnjoh (2005) argues that unbalanced news is a violation of human rights and is, therefore, 
inimical to the accomplishment of the democratic project.    
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed discursive constructions of electoral violence by the state-owned 
and the privately-owned press in Zimbabwe during Presidential and Parliamentary elections held 
in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2013. It was apparent that the two press camps produced 
competing, if not antagonistic discourses in relation to the level of election violence, 
blameworthiness, and the conduciveness or lack of conduciveness thereof and the environment 
for a free and fair electoral contest.  
As election violence became the singular determinant for a free and fair election the state-
owned and the privately-owned press adopted divergent discursive strategies for defining and 
representing election violence. On the one hand an optimistic state-owned press doing its bidding 
for the government and ruling party blamed the opposition MDC for most of the election 
violence while it constructed election violence as decreasing and the state as in full control of the 
situation. On the other, a cynical privately-owned press blamed Zanu (PF) for the election 
violence, depicted violence as always escalating and the political environment as characterised 
by the breakdown of law and order. As election violence became a tool for either legitimating or 
de-legitimating political players the state-owned press used mystification, a moral equivalence 
frame, denialism, ex-nomination, ambiguous morality and anonymous sources to mask the ruling 
party’s culpability for election violence. The private press on the other hand used nomination, 
demonization, humanistic rhetoric and hyperbole to construct the Zanu (PF) as the party 
responsible for election violence while portraying the MDC as the victims of election violence. 
However, both camps depended on institutional sources, with the state-owned press relying more 
on the police while the privately-owned press depended on Non-Governmental sources.  
The private-press accentuated the liberal human rights framework supportive of 
intervention on humanitarian grounds while the state-owned press drew attention to the national 
interest and sovereignty of the state and its monopoly to restore law and order. As a consequence 
each side gave salience to some aspects of election violence which legitimised their view while 
suppressing those which de-legitimised it.  
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Thus the discursive construction of electoral violence by the privately-owned press and 
the state-owned press reflects the clash of ideological values, with the private press accentuating 
liberal democratic values epitomised by the sanctity of human rights, democracy and good 
governance, while on the other hand the state-owned press extolled the virtues of national 
interest and state sovereignty.  
In the ensuing dialogue of the deaf the meaning of violence became elastic, depending as 
it was on who was the victim or perpetrator or who stood to benefit from it. It became clear that 
contrary to the view that simply media reflect on reality and that meanings are free-floating 
reality it is a socially constructed and deeply implicated in relations of power. This has wider 
implications for democracy.  
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CHAPTER SIX: MEMORIALISATION, CONDEMNATION AND PEACE 
ADVOCACY DISCOURSE  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The media play two crucial roles with respect to election violence. First, they provide evidence- or at least 
the external implication - that an election is illegitimate or being contested domestically, regardless of the 
fairness of the election or its certification by independent election commissions and election monitoring 
organizations. Interpretive frames may imply that an election has not been “free and fair” and has been 
rigged through voter intimidation or vote-counting fraud (Meadow 2009, 237). 
The above quotation alludes to the main focus of this chapter, which is an extension of 
the previous chapter. It examines additional themes emanating from the corpus of textual data 
from the press, and interviews with journalists and editors from the newspapers selected for this 
study. Three themes that relate to the way in which the press sought to either legitimise or de-
legitimise elections through particular modes of representation of electoral violence are 
discussed in this chapter. These are memorialisation (the accentuation of residual electoral 
violence), condemnation, and peace advocacy discourses. The intention is to map out how 
election violence is constituted through these discursive constructions. Data from interviews with 
journalists and editors are used to the answer the WHY component of the research question so as 
to gain deeper insights on why different newspapers represented election violence in the way 
they did during elections held between 2000 and 2013.   
Reflections are made on the implications for theory and democracy through an engagement with 
the literature reviewed. The chapter argues that the two press camps constructed competing 
versions of reality in relation to the three themes in order to either legitimise or de-legitimise the 
electoral process and the outcome, thus bringing to the fore the discretionary power of the press 
to shape public opinion and perceptions. 
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6.2 Memorialisation 
 
Both the privately-owned and the state-owned press framed election violence in a wider 
context by invoking memories of election violence experienced in previous electoral contests
32
. 
As demonstrated below the intensity with which this was done tilted more in the direction of the 
privately-owned press than in the state-owned press. Largely, this entailed making reference, 
alluding to, or incorporating or activating past incidences of election violence and making them 
germane to an ongoing electoral context, akin to what Fairclough (cited in Fisker 2009, 36) calls 
inter-textuality or “the way in which specific texts draw on earlier meaning formations and how 
they mix different discourses” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 139). Thus election violence 
discourse about for example, the 2013 elections recalls and articulates discourses about the 
violence in the 2008 presidential run-off or an earlier election.  Fisker (2009,36) argues that the 
significance of analysing inter-textuality is that one will be able to understand what and why 
particular texts are included in a communication act and what texts are not included and why. 
Since the news-making process is premised on particular journalistic conventions, the selection 
of stories that invoke past memories of election violence (throw back) was a conscious editorial 
decision.  
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 For example, “Mugabe reneges on pledge to compensate Fifth Brigade victims” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 
30-06-2000, p1-21), “Tsvangirai to compensate victims of violence” (The Financial Gazette, 07-03-02, p7), “Former 
dissidents part of youth training team” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 01-02-02, p12), “Investigate Mugabe for 
atrocities says foreign media” (Daily News, 06-03-02, p16), “MDC ledges to compensate victims of violence” (Daily 
News, 06-03-02, p16), “People’s desire for change cannot be suppressed” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 01-03-02, 
p8). “Violence victims bank on new government” (Newsday, 15-07-13, p8), “Murambatsvina victims’ decade of 
nightmare, desolation” (Newsday, 10-07-13, p7), “2008 poll nightmare still haunts rural areas” (Newsday, 10-07-
13, p3), “Fear of violence linger on in Mash Central: PM” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 12-07-13, p4), “Jerera 
villagers fear repeat of murders if Zanu (PF) loses” “Daily News, 23-07-13, p7), “Gukurahundi sore point in 
Matabeleland- Dube” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 12-07-13, p5).  
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Given that news is generally defined as that which is new (Harcup and O’neill 2001, 
261), the intertextualising of election violence as was particularly the case during the 2013 
harmonised elections, was disrupted in traditional news values and there must be a rationale for 
that.   
Unlike in previous electoral contexts, in 2013 the newspapers focused more on election 
violence from previous elections than on violence that was taking place at the time. For instance, 
the Daily News (23-07-13, p7) published a story headlined “Jerera villagers fear repeat of 
murders if Zanu (PF) loses” (see Appendix 1.6). The story dwelt on the experiences of villagers 
in Jerera, in the southern province of Masvingo, who reportedly feared voting in the 2013 
harmonised elections because of their experiences of violence during the 2008 presidential run-
off. The alleged victims of election violence were given a long leash to adumbrate their traumatic 
experiences in 2008. The alleged victims were able to construct riveting narratives that enable 
the reader to visualize their horrendous experiences. Thus, the alleged victims of election 
violence become active agents who are able to tell their own stories. The message is that in spite 
of perceptions of relative peace during the 2013 elections, any mention of elections triggers 
memories of what happened in 2008.  
The perception that the experience of 2008 is “too difficult to rub off” is a motif in the 
narratives of the alleged victims of election violence. Thus, fear is constructed as residual, 
pervasive and adversely affecting electoral behaviour during 2013 elections. The alternating of 
the first and third person narrative style helps construct election violence as a permanent 
traumatic experience, thereby, enhancing the credibility of the victims’ testimonies about 
violence. One of the alleged victims of the 2008 election violence is quoted saying:  
I still have strong memories of this day, June 3, 2003 when I woke up early in the morning from my village 
to Jerera Growth point to book a better place on the mealie-meal queue (Daily News, 23-07-13, p7). 
The newspaper adds that: 
The memories of June, 3, 2008 are still fresh and linger in the brains and hearts of scores of Jerera villages. 
They fear the repeat of heinous political murders if Zanu (PF) is trounced again in the coming make or 
break general polls slated for July 31 (Daily News, 23-07-13, p7). 
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Words such as “memories”, “brains”, “hearts” “fresh”, and “linger” connote enduring 
trauma, implying that election violence cannot be treated as a single episode, but has long-lasting 
effects on victims.  
The reader is told in straight prose that despite the relative peace during the 2013 
harmonised elections, people are still afraid to vote for their preferred candidates. Alleged 
survivors of the 2008 election violence are assembled to relive their “horrific” experiences using 
a testimonial narrative style. The following excerpts from the story are Illustrative:  
As a survivor who has a first-hand account of what happened on June 3, I don’t think I will be able to go to 
the polling station…I am afraid that if I cast my vote for the political party I prefer, lots of people will lose 
their lives again (Daily News, 23-07-13, p7).  
The Daily News’s use of the first person narrative style enhances the newspaper’s claim to a 
particular regime of truth by forcing readers into an “emotional solidarity” (Nyambi 2009, 5) 
with the victims of election violence. The testimonial accounts are poignantly undergirded by an 
evocative third person narrative which lucidly captures the traumatic experiences of the victims 
of violence. The excerpts below are instructive in this regard: 
 Clemence Chikovo of Chandipwisa village in Ward 28 under chief Bota said fear is still gripping many 
villagers. He said MDC supporters were fearful of wearing party regalia given to them (Daily News, 23-
07-13, p7) 
 But for Mbuya Gweme, the memories of the 2008 have been too difficult to rub off and will affect how she 
votes on July 31 (Daily News, 23-07-13, p7) 
 Memory Pedzerai is a survivor of June 3 arson attack, who was bundled into an unregistered Mitsubishi 
single cab truck (Daily News, 23-07-13, p7). 
Words such as “fear”, “fearful” “memories”, and “survivor” signify that election violence 
is traumatic and can affect voting behaviour long after the violent event has passed. This is 
significant in so far as it opens up other ways of thinking about election violence and the role of 
the media in representing election violence, particularly in fragile societies with a long history of 
violence and social cleavages.  
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It is ironic that these victims of election violence were able to disclose their identities yet 
they claim that they were afraid to vote for their preferred candidates. This might be an 
indication that voters associate election violence more with electoral outcomes rather than 
processes. It might also suggest that residual violence lingers much longer in the minds of 
victims and can be equally effective in biasing the electoral outcomes, the same way as visible 
election violence.  
Although this is a subject that warrants a separate investigation, it is clear that the impact 
of electoral violence on electoral outcomes is a complex issue. Further, it could be argued that 
the disclosure of the identity of the victims of election violence helped to humanize them thereby 
making the readers emphathise with them, something that cannot easily be done if they had been 
depersonalised. 
Similarly, Newsday (15-07-13, p8) had a story with the headline “Violence victims bank 
on new government” whereby alleged victims of election violence were interviewed. Using a 
human interest narrative style of reporting, the alleged survivors of election violence, who are 
opposition party supporters were helped to memorize their heart-rending experiences of election 
violence in a cinematic way. They divulge that they are still living in fear in spite of the fact that 
five years had passed since their ordeal at the hands of Zanu (PF) supporters. One of the alleged 
victims of violence laments the fact that: 
Fear is still there sometimes because of what we went through. Some people died but we are lucky to be 
alive. It’s unfair for politicians to be elected at our expense. I fought in this struggle and spent months with 
a baby in cells with no nappies or what and I hope they will recognise us (Newsday, 15-07-13, p8). 
Further, the newspaper quoted an opposition member of parliament who suggested that 
the new government (presumably an MDC government) should reunite families of the victims so 
that they heal emotionally.  
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A spokesperson of the smaller faction of the MDC who was quoted by the newspaper 
underscores the subtle but profound effects of election violence commenting thus: 
Victims of political violence are many. The reality is that there are generations which are now indirect 
victims of the violence. The Gukurahundi atrocities were our highest level of black on black violence and 
the solution to the psychological and physical scars are very complex. The beginning of dealing with all 
this is seeking and telling the truth. When the truth is told people will be able to express what they desire. It 
is important to allow the victims to participate in finding solutions. A prescriptive approach cannot be 
adequate (Newsday, 15-07-13, p8). 
The cyclical and residual nature of election violence, particularly in societies riddled with 
cleavages engender a culture of entitlement by the victims of election violence and might in turn 
trigger more violence if certain expectations are not met or if restorative and rehabilitative needs 
are not given to the victims so that they can be fully integrated into society.  In this instance, the 
press becomes highly implicated in the sense that they are able to provide some interpretative 
frameworks that shape social reality. 
Treating election violence as an inter-textual text enabled the privately-owned press to 
project the traumatic experiences of election violence and its residual effects on the citizens 
thereby constructing election violence as a seamless experience whose effects transcend a single 
electoral episode. Juxtaposing the 2008 to the 2013 election obliterates the context in which the 
2008 and 2013 elections were held, thus rendering their time and space boundaries seamless.  
The fact that readers are not told that the photographs of the alleged victims of election 
violence who are dressed in hospital garb are from the archives constitutes a conspiracy of 
silence.  This shows how the privately-owned press sought to project the victims of election 
violence as “damaged survivors” (Henri and Grunebaum, n.d. 2) by venturing into the 
psychological realm of election violence. The irreparable damage of election violence has led 
some scholars to argue that Zanu (PF) benefited from a “harvest of fear” (Zamuchiya 2013) 
during the 2013 harmonised elections.  
A significant percentage of Zimbabwean citizens refused to disclose their political 
affiliation in a survey on voting intentions because of fear of intimidation in what has been 
described as a “margin of terror” (Bratton and Masunungure 2012, 1).  
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This suggests that, as a discursive formation, electoral violence has the capacity to foster 
behaviour and meanings that undermine democratic values. Bekoe (2010, 3) supports this view 
when she says that: 
Violence can also undermine the election itself. With the presence or threat of violence, voters may opt not 
to register or decide to stay away from the polls, altogether, candidates may withdraw or politicians may 
use it as a reason to cancel or postpone the election. 
 It can be argued that through its excavation of past experiences of election violence text 
the Daily News implicitly sought to delegitimize the 2013 harmonised general elections.  
The Daily News was not the only newspaper which deployed “memorialization”as a 
discursive strategy. Newsday and The Zimbabwe Independent also did that. For instance, 
Newsday (10-07-13, p3) had a story with the headline “2008 poll nightmare still haunts rural 
areas” (see Appendix 1.7), whereby MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai reportedly paid tribute 
to his party supporters in Mashonaland Central for their “resilience in the midst of adversity”. 
Tsvangirai claimed that “the aura of fear pervaded the province, five years after the bloody 2008 
presidential run-off election”. He stated that: 
There is a strong element of fear among the people. My message is that fear has to be translated 
into hope of a new government and a new era. If you need hope, vote MDC so that we don’t go 
back to the 2008 (Newsday, 10-07-13, p3). 
The evocation of memories of past electoral violence went beyond the reflective function 
of the press in the sense that the act of remembering was followed by certain concrete actions by 
the victims of election violence. The spectre of 2008 was meant to galvanize the electorate to 
overwhelmingly vote out Zanu (PF) and vote the MDC into power instead so that ‘lasting peace’ 
would return to Zimbabwe. 
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 In the context of the 2013 elections, the memorialisation of violence became some kind 
of a scarecrow similar to the wads of the Zimbabwean dollar notes
33
 used by the opposition 
leader, Morgan Tsvangirai at rallies to remind the electorate about the economic meltdown of the 
previous decade. The Zimbabwe Independent (12-07-13, p4) (see Appendix 1.8) took up the 
same story and its headline was “Fear of violence lingers in Mash central: PM”. The headline 
underscored the idea that residual fear was palpable. MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai reportedly 
lamented the fact that, although election violence had declined during the 2013 elections fear 
was still prevalent among the people.  Tsvangirai claimed that his supporters were still being 
reminded of the “horrors of the 2008 disputed elections”. He claimed that “Zanu (PF) was 
employing discreet methods of intimidating his supporters in the province in order to frustrate his 
supporters”.  
By voicing Tsvangirai this way, The Zimbabwe Independent discarded the view that 
election violence was a single episode. Hence the privately-owned press re-inscribed election 
violence as residual and durable rather than being an ephemeral and a transient event, thus 
undercutting the official narrative whereby the relative peacefulness of the 2013 elections was 
equated to free and fairness of the elections. This dovetails with the argument made in Chapter 
Two, that the media can define election violence narrowly or broadly depending on their agenda 
(Meadow 2009).  
Meadow argues that through their interpretative frameworks the media can legitimise or 
de-legitimise elections by providing external evidence to that effect. By venturing into the 
psychic realm of electoral violence the privately-owned press undercut the official grand 
narrative that the absence of physical violence in 2013 was synonymous with peace.  In the same 
vein, some critics argue that judging elections to be free and fair on the grounds of mere absence 
of physical violence is “too simplistic” (Ntuli 2013, 8).  
 
                                                          
33
 During the 2013 election campaigns the MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai carried bundles of the replaced national 
currency, the Zimbabwean dollar to remind voters that failure to vote the ruling party, Zanu (PF) out power would 
mean a return to the Zimbabwean dollar, hyperinflation and the disappearance of commodities from supermarket 
shelves as was the case in 2008. 
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 But as Meadow asserts the media play different roles with respect to election violence. 
Firstly, they provide evidence or at least the external implication- that an election is illegitimate or being 
contested domestically regardless of the fairness of the election or its certification by the independent 
election commission and election monitoring organisations. Interpretive frames may imply that the election 
has not been “free and fair” and has been rigged through voter intimidation or vote counting fraud. Second, 
by showing compatriots being hurt or killed the media serve to inform the domestic audience of the risks 
and dangers of participating in or protecting the election while graphic images of violence may incite 
further protests, such protests more often dissipate in response to the risks, especially where the media also 
cover suppression of protests (like those in Tianaimen Square or more recently in Iran) and officials use the 
media to threaten violence against protesters (Meadow 2009, 237). 
As a discursive strategy the memorialisation of election violence necessitated the 
deployment of an interpretative framework for de-legitimising elections by the private press. 
These interpretative frameworks recall the professional norms and functions of watchdog 
journalism (Eriksson and Ostman 2013, 306) whereby, the acts of scrutinising and exposing the 
hidden agendas of those in power are highly prized ideals of the press. 
6.2.1 Raising the spectre of Gukurahundi and Operation Murambatsvina 
 
The memorialisation of election violence did not just entail juxtaposing past election 
violence with the present, but also evoking other forms of violence outside electoral contexts. An 
example is the evocation of Operation Murambatsvina, a violent urban clean-up operation 
carried out by the government after the 2005 general elections (Mlambo 2008) and reference to 
Gukurahundi, the killing of over 20 000 civilians by the security forces in the Ndebele speaking 
Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the early 1980s. Although these events happened many 
years back the privately-owned press made reference to them, within the framework of elections, 
particularly the 2013 harmonised elections. For instance, Newsday (10-07-13, p7) (see Appendix 
1.9) published a story with the headline “Murambatsvina victims’ decade of nightmare, 
desolation” where it was reported that families displaced during Operation 
Murambatsvina/Operation Restore Order in 2005 were “still wallowing in poverty, without  
decent shelter eight years after government destroyed their homes”.  
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The story extensively focuses on the deplorable human conditions of the victims of 
Operation Murambatsvina, what can be referred to as “the commodification of suffering”, 
whereby the plight of the poor is exploited for political profit through excessive imagery of their 
appalling living conditions.  
The place in which the victims of Murambatsvina live is described as a “squatter camp” 
and their houses are “makeshift” and the resettlement in which they live is described as 
“desolate” symbolising alienation, neglect and lack of care. The reader is overwhelmed by the 
ubiquitous images of despair in the story. Thus, the residents of the settlement are described as 
“jobless” and without any source of income, hence most of them cannot send their children to 
school while their “appeals to government for help”, are said to have “fallen on deaf ears”. Many 
of them “have lost hope of getting any help from anywhere”.  Although the story foregrounds 
Operation Murambatsvina as the source of their victimhood, upon further inspection one realises 
that some of the residents at the settlement predate the clean-up operation. For instance, Zimba 
who is extensively quoted expressing his victimhood has been at the informal settlement since 
1993, twelve years before the clean-up operation was implemented.  
By suppressing facts about the history and actual circumstances of the informal 
settlement while attributing the suffering of the residents to negligence by the government 
Newsday constructs  the Zanu (PF) as a party that is insensitive to the plight of the poor. The 
notion that the government is heartless and ruthless saturates the story and is signified by the 
following statements:  “The government is not sensitive to the plight of the people. Their 
interests are self-enrichment”. 
 “Residents of this squatter camp have also been subjected to political violence 
because they are perceived to be MDC-T”. 
 “If you ask anyone here you will be told that this government cannot help”. 
 “People are just numbers. We are not treated as human beings”. 
 “…our efforts have fallen on deaf ears”. 
210 
 
The residents of this squatter camp are portrayed as victims of double tragedy in the 
sense that they are subjected to political persecution (because they are perceived to be supporters 
of the MDC-T) and they also suffer from neglect by an “uncaring” government. However, all 
hope is not lost because they are now banking on the July 31 (2013) election to transform their 
despair into hope through the vote.  Thus, Newsday employed an interpretive framework loaded 
with evaluative and explanatory quotations from the news sources. Benson and Hallin contend 
that interpretive journalism positions journalists to shape and control the news (cited in Salgado 
and Stromback 2011, 15). In this instance, the interpretative journalistic framework enabled 
Newsday to accentuate the perception that Zanu (PF) was not electable because it was insensitive 
to the plight of the poor. This view corroborates Meadow’s (2007) observation that political 
violence can be instrumentalised for gaining or retaining power. 
Apart from Operation Murambatsvina, the private press also evoked the spectre of the 
civil war in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the 1980s, known as Gukurahundi. It 
must be pointed however, that although Gukurahundi has been a recurring issue in the news 
media during election time it was more visible during the 2013 election.  
The Zimbabwe Independent (12-07-13, p5) had a story with the headline “Gukurahundi 
sore point in Matabeleland-Dube”, (see Appendix 1.10) in which Zanu (PF) central committee 
member and parliamentary candidate for Bulawayo-Makokoba constituency, retired Colonel 
Tshinga Dube reportedly lamented his party’s failure to “effectively resolve long-standing 
concerns in Matabeleland, including the 1980s Gukurahundi massacres”, which he described as a 
“sore point for people in the region”.  
Dube reportedly mourned the failure by his party to address the Gukurahundi and 
complaints about the marginalisation of the region, adding that this could cost the party votes in 
the 2013 elections. He reportedly said that: 
I have said it over and over again that we have failed to address these issues (Gukurahundi and 
marginalisation). A lot of unpleasant things happened here. Somebody who was not affected might just say 
it was war while those who were affected will call it by a different name (The Zimbabwe 
Independent, 12-07-13, p5).  
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Dube’s sentiments testify that violence and memory are inextricably intertwined and the 
attempts by the state to embargo the memory on Gukurahundi brings to the fore the hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic dimensions of election violence. For instance, there are phrases in the 
Zimbabwean Independent story referred above which suggest that Gukurahundi is a taboo 
subject. Examples include: “A lot of unpleasant things happened here”, “We are not even 
touching the nerve centre of the problems”, “People may smile at you, but deep down they still 
retain a lot of hatred” and “Somebody who was not affected might just say it was war while 
those who were affected will call it by a different name”.  
These phrases suggest that Gukurahundi cannot be spoken about openly. Hence, 
resuscitating the memories of Gukurahundi during election time became a discursive strategy to 
“break the silence” and remind the electorate, particularly in the Matabeleland and the Midlands 
provinces not to forget about the “state sponsored violence” visited upon them by the Zanu (PF) 
government.  
Zanu (PF) is projected as a violent, cruel, undemocratic and unrepentant party implying 
that it does not deserve the electorate’s vote. Significantly, some private-press journalists do not 
agree with the idea of truncating violent episodes such as Gukurahundi from the electoral 
context.  
Dumisani Muleya, the editor of The Zimbabwe Independent argues that Gukurahundi was 
very much linked to electoral politics, particularly Zanu (PF)’s desire to impose a one-party state. 
He argues that: 
… we later saw, I mean eh, eh, Mugabe going all out to crush his political opponent, Joshua Nkomo and 
Zapu and of-course he deployed the army, the military, the 5
th
 Brigade thing and then we had things like 
the Gukurahundi issue, which most of the time people are, remove it from the political and electoral 
context. That was an outcome of an election that was violent and a rivalry that has not, eh, that had not 
been put to a stop. So in order to gain eh, political advantage Mugabe had to unleash that. And remember 
also the context of the election was that Zanu was campaigning; in its manifesto in 1980 it had one party 
state as one of the key principles of that manifesto (Interview with Dumisani Muleya, 11 May 
2015, Harare).  
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Muleya justifies the inclusion of on Gukurahundi in the context of 2013 elections on the 
grounds of providing a context and background. He reasons that:  
…you cannot just report incidence of violence in isolation they have to be connected to the past, they need 
context, and they need background. We need to remind people, it’s for context, background and, and, and, 
and, eh, eh, historical records… what I am trying, trying to paint, a picture that there is a historical context 
that the use of political and electoral violence by political parties, in this case Zanu (PF) has been 
systematic. That’s the approach, it’s not isolated, it’s systematic. Eh, it’s like it continuously happens, eh, 
eh, situation of incidents of violence which are not connected. So these are not incidents which are not 
connected. These are eh, events that are defined by violence (Interview with Dumisani Muleya, 11 
May 2015, Harare). This suggests that election violence is viewed as seamless and 
continuous rather than episodic. This also implies that electoral contests are viewed as 
interrelated rather than disconnected, hence the need for back-grounding.  Geoff Nyarota 
concurs with the necessity of back-grounding and providing a context when reporting on 
election violence. His explanation was that:  
…events are placed by the media in their proper context (clearing his throat) and context in some cases 
emanates from the previous occurrences, ah, ah, if in 2002 there was violence, ah and in the previous election in 
2000, 2002 was the presidential, wasn’t it?... 2000 was the parliamentary. A reporter in covering an incident of 
violence in say Marambapfungwa (sic), if the reporter went to the National Archives or went online and discovered 
that in the same constituency there has been a lot of violence in the previous election, surely he would be within his 
rights to inform his readership of that. A-a, what I tend to disagree with myself is predict…I have been fond of 
criticising journalists, especially foreign journalists who say, ah, there is no violence in Makoni District this time 
and makes a news item of a non-event, that nothing has happened. They could justify that by saying, yaah, we see 
nothing has happened. There has always been violence. People have been murdered, but this time surprisingly there 
is no, there is no violence of that nature. And to them it is worthy of recording and maybe in a certain perspective it 
may be worthy of recording that there is an improvement in the political maturity of the people resident in the 
constituencies in question. But then it may be discovered that there is no rival candidate in that election (laughs) so 
there is no reason for violence. But the point I am making is a-a, your coverage, journalists, foreign correspondents 
will record in this first or second paragraph that there was no violence. This is totally different. I personally, as a 
reporter, am, ah, somewhat opposed to that, highlighting that which has not happened, and, but newspapers are 
published for different readerships (Interview with Geoff Nyarota, 11 May 2015, Harare). 
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Recalling past violence goes beyond the back-grounding function in the sense that it 
enhances watchdog journalism espoused by the privately-owned press in Zimbabwe. Wisdom 
Mudzungairi, the acting editor of Newsday, the daily newspaper under the Alpha Media 
illustrates watchdog notion of journalism thus: 
It’s very important, you know, in order for you to correct the present. If you have a challenge, you must 
look back. How did it happen? How was it sorted out and how should we deal with this current problem? 
2008, it’s not easy to forget that because it was bloody, some say 200 people died, some say 300 people 
died. But all these people, these are numbers of people who died but what is sad is that the way these 
people died, the way how they were killed is what is very crucial, right? Some were even burnt, so many 
other heinous acts also happened. Many people were also maimed. So each time there is an election and 
people go out to vote you will realise that even today when you go out to the rural areas and you are 
campaigning you will realise that, ah,  people will still come, right? They won’t say anything. They will be 
coming. Zanu (PF) comes they will be (makes sound and gesture of a stampede); they will go there in large 
numbers, not because they support Zanu (PF) sometimes, but because they fear what happened. Remember 
Zanu (PF) has also used that. Remember these people died in the run-up to the, to the ahmm, eh, 
presidential run-off, June 27, right? Was it June 27 or June 28? Right? And you know what then 
happened? The next elections Zanu (PF) had to make sure the same elections were held in June again, 
June again, June 27, why? It’s psychological. So that people can remember 2008. This is the point 
(laughs). So it is important for us to refer people to that and say, you know what, when an election comes, 
remember that. Do you need this monster? That’s one. And secondly, you go there to an election, you must 
go to an election, when they call you to a rally go there, don’t remain at home, you will be killed, go to the 
rally, but you know what, because if you read the same story, we, I think we even stated that you, No, No, 
it’s not possible for somebody to use binoculars and see who you vote for. It’s not possible. So remember 
that it’s not possible. This is simply propaganda (Interview with Wisdom Mudzungairi, 15 May 
2015, Harare). 
It is instructive to note that the privately-owned press used the memory of election 
violence to remind them of their obligations as citizens and to educate them on how to 
survive a violent electoral environment as well as to ensure that they make the ‘right 
electoral’ choices. Hence the privately-owned press adopted an activist journalistic model 
whereby they discarded any pretense of non-partisanship.  
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Although the dominant view among privately-owned journalists locates 
memorialisation of election violence within a journalistic logic of back-grounding some 
critics attribute this to the desire by the privately-owned press to de-legitimise elections. 
Some critics argue that dwelling on past incidents of violence is part of a private press 
strategy to discredit the elections on behalf of the opposition. Editor of The Herald 
Ceasar Zvayi argues that: 
So they (the private press) want to portray Zimbabwe as a country at war requiring external ah, ah, 
salvation, external intervention. So, you would find the MDCs would be crying Wolf every time, 
“People are being beaten, government is sending the army and the police on innocent citizens and 
they will try to put to and raise the spectre of Gukurahundi, you know the clashes between the 
Shonas and the Ndebeles, in the, soon after independence. So they always try to raise the tribal 
card and try to create a siege mentality. So we face that situation where, whenever, the MDCs cry 
Wolf we try as much as possible to find out if really they would have seen a wolf and most of the 
time we find out that they grandstand for the external gallery so that they justify their, because 
they receive a lot of funding over the years to depose Zanu (PF). They would want to justify the 
electoral outcome saying that Zanu (PF) has closed democratic space, there is no way we can win 
a free and fair election. So they always try to cry wolf, always try to, to them they don’t care how 
they come to power, whether through illegal regime change or legal regime change, whether 
military intervention by Westerners to overthrow the government like what happened in Libya, 
they don’t care. What they want is to come to power so that they justify the millions of dollars that 
they have received over the years (Interview with Ceasar Zvayi, 7 May 2015, Harare). 
This suggests evoking past memories of violence is viewed by the state-owned press as 
motivated by a divisive political agenda to open up old wounds in an already divided society. 
However, for the private-press the justification for evoking memories of previous electoral 
violence firmly rests on their conviction that the effects of electoral violence are hardly confined 
to a single electoral episode as every election is bound to trigger fresh memories of the bad 
experiences.   
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This view is boldly captured in a commentary published in The Financial Gazette two 
weeks before the 2005 general elections thus: 
It is an understatement of significant proportions to say that the insanity of the past five years has 
left permanent emotional scars among disenfranchised whole families, orphaned children and 
wrought division, frustration, anger and hatred among the country’s citizenry. Indeed there are no 
big enough words to describe the sad story. It is like saying the sea is wet. Suffice to say that the 
trauma spawned by this violence will haunt the nation for years to come when political skeletons 
from times past inevitably come tumbling out of the closet (The Financial Gazette, 2005). 
The implications of the above extract are that the extent and impact of election violence 
cannot be determined by the physical human destruction in a single electoral episode, but should 
be looked at in a holistic and contextual circumstances and the role of the media in this instance 
becomes that of unearthing the historical dimensions of election violence. This shows that 
electoral violence is a terrain for serious contestation and the press is deeply implicated in this 
contestation in the in the sense that through their discursive choices they can either ignore or give 
salience to the subliminal effects of election violence. 
6.2.2 Memorialisation of Violence in the State Press 
 
To a lesser degree, the state-owned press also evoked memories of past violence in an 
indirect way compared to the privately-owned press in that its focus was on colonial violence 
and atrocities rather than election violence per se. For instance, The Herald (18-04-08, p1) 
carried a story with the headline “Chimoio victims remembered” whereby  it reported on  a 
delegation of Zimbabweans that were touring former liberation war camps and shrines in 
Chimoio, Mozambique, where some of the country’s liberation war heroes killed by the 
Rhodesian forces during the liberation war of the 1970s were buried. On the face of it this story 
appears innocent and unrelated to elections. In any case such events were an annual event 
(remembering war heroes in Mozambique). But when one takes into account that this was in the 
run-up to the 29 March 2008 harmonised elections a picture begins to emerge.  
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For instance, the leader of the delegation, the then deputy minister of Youth Development 
and Employment Creation, Saviour Kasukuwere reportedly urged the youth “to be politically 
conscious especially in these trying times” and “to emulate and appreciate as well as jealously 
safeguard what their sisters and brothers died for” (The Herald, 18-04-08, p1). It is 
incontrovertible that memory and violence were used as a discursive strategy to affirm the ruling 
party as the authentic patriotic party because of its liberation struggle credentials. Not that this 
was the first time Zanu (PF) officials were doing this, but the fact that the party had suffered a 
major reversal in its hegemony was poignant. Even before the harmonised elections of 29 March 
2008 there had been exhumations of war time mass graves in Mount Darwin, in the north-eastern 
part of the country.  
The Sunday Mail (13-01-13, p7) extensively reported on the exhumations in which 
colonial violence was came into the spotlight. The story in question had a headline “Mt Darwin’s 
killing fields: Rhodesia’s wartime graves exposed”.  
 It was emphasized that the “scars”, “wounds”, “skeletons”, and “mass graves believed to 
be holding bodies of more than 1000 combatants and villagers” are emblematic of this residual 
colonial violence which was still “bare for everyone to see”. One of the officials involved in the 
reburial of people found in mass graves reportedly said: 
Most of the atrocities committed by Rhodesian forces have been well documented and several fierce battles 
that occurred in Mt Darwin have been written about. However, the discovery of the skeletons has brought 
to the fore what we previously did not know about the brutal war (The Sunday Mail, 13-01-08, p7).  
Chilling details of the Rhodesian atrocities are cinematically piled up one after the other 
thus: “Rhodesians dumped 280 bodies in a grave they dug at Mt Fura”…”at least 700 bodies 
were thought to be lying in graves scattered in the vicinity of the airstrip”, “A further 750 bodies 
are believed to have been dumped in a disused shaft at Chibondo gold mine” and “More bodies 
continue to emerge in the district (The Sunday Mail, 13-01-08, p7). 
The chilling details of colonial mass murder supply a cognitive frame for linking the 
colonial violence and the temporary reversal of the liberation project.  
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One editor from state-owned Zimpapers, however, refuted the view that stories like these 
were meant to influence people’s electoral choices in the run-up to the make-or break 
presidential run-off, arguing instead, that these were published in the national interest. He argued 
that: 
I think those reports are really in my view, are not related to election violence but they are more about 
reminding people where they came from. Again, coming from that, eh, background where as you know we 
are aligned to the liberation ethos, that’s what we believe in. So when it comes to elections, Zimpapers, if 
you study all our newspapers, we take a stand for and against. So when we bring up those articles they are 
meant to say people should take a stand, they should vote this particular way to say the liberation was about 
this and this is the price that was paid. That struggle, and we bring your Chimoio articles and things like 
that. So as I said before, elections in Zimbabwe from 2000 to date it’s like a real war because there is this 
element of saying regime change. It’s like you want to reverse the gains of independence, you want to 
reverse land reform and that kind of thing. So when we bring those stories from the past our justification 
for that is that we believe we are acting in the national interest and we also believe that our sense of 
national interest is informed by our history. So when we are taking a position to say vote this particular 
way, do this, that is informed by our history and that is the history of the liberation struggle so we don’t 
equivocate on that. We come out clear and say, I think this is the reason we bring up those stories and in 
some instances when then there is condemnation of incidences of violence here and there is that attempt to 
then portray the government that this is the worst violence that has ever happened. Yeah, at times then we 
say, but look at our history, this is what has happened but that is not to justify violence (Interview with 
William Chikoto, 12 May 2015, Harare). 
It is instructive to note that memory of the liberation struggle is mentioned in the 
same breath as the need to safeguard the “gains of independence” and there is no better 
way of doing that than urging the electorate to vote in a particular way. Highlighting the 
violence of the colonial regime’s injustices provided an interpretative framework to the 
electorate to make electoral choices that guaranteed the preservation of the history of the 
struggle.  
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This is demonstrated in a Herald (11-05-00, p10) story with a headline “MDC 
seeking to create another Zimbabwe-Rhodesia” (The Herald, 11-05-00, p10) in which the 
newspaper accuses the MDC of seeking to “create another Zimbabwe-Rhodesia”.34 The 
paper wrote: 
The MDC alliance revives nightmares of Zimbabwe- Rhodesia, the failed attempt to legitimise 
Rhodesia through the façade of a black government. The people saw through it and the liberation 
movement swept it aside. MDC is the Trojan horse for Rhodesia and foreign interests…The war 
veterans and many Zimbabweans who had suffered under Rhodesia and who fought and destroyed 
Rhodesia and its half-sister, Zimbabwe Rhodesia, were alarmed. The Rhodesian enemy had 
defeated and forgiven, in alliance with Mr Tsvangirai, who had fled the liberation struggle back to 
rejoin Rhodesia, was declaring war anew and threatening to reverse the gains of the liberation 
struggle. Worse still, the MDC even threatened to put on trial the comrades for crimes supposedly 
committed after independence. Had the alliance suddenly turned into democrats and human rights 
activists? No, not at all. What about the crimes committed by the Rhodesian and other colonial 
regimes? And the massacres committed by Ian n Smith, his Selous Scouts, the Grey Scouts, the 
Rhodesian African Rifles, Muzorewa’s madzakutsaku (sell-outs) and the Rhodesian air force? 
(The Herald, 11-05-00, p10). 
The reference to “suffering under Rhodesia”, “crimes committed after independence”, 
“crimes committed by the Rhodesian and other colonial regimes” and “massacres committed by 
Ian Smith” might have fostered revulsion towards anyone or anything associated with Rhodesia, 
particularly for people who lived under the colonial system in Zimbabwe. It could be argued that, 
accentuating colonial violence while being silent on current election violence may suggest a way 
of rationalizing election violence.  
Although both the privately-owned and the state-owned focused on residual violence 
their selections and motives were different. The privately-owned press sought to show the 
historical antecedence of election violence thereby de-legitimising the electoral outcome while 
the state-owned press sought to rationalise the current electoral violence by excavating past 
memories of colonial violence. 
                                                          
34
 Reference to the brief Government of National Unity formed after a compromise agreement between whites 
and some African leaders under the banner of internal settlement. The deal was shunned by the main liberation 
political parties Zanu (PF) and ZAPU and the war intensified resulting in the death of thousands of civilians. 
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From the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that as a discursive strategy 
memorialisation makes the meaning of election violence more elastic and complex particularly in 
contexts where violence is embedded in the historical circumstances of the state.  As pointed out 
by De Los Ros (2009, 30) (Chapter Two) election violence “is a continuum influenced by 
different factors”. 
Apart from colonial violence, another way in which memorialisation manifested itself 
was the allusion to the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya which resulted in the death of about 
1500 people (BBC cited in Onyebadi and Oyedeji, 216).  
In a commentary titled “Zim must not fall into the same trap as Kenya”, The Sunday 
Mail, (06-01-08. P9) opined that Britain and the United States of America’s reaction to the 
Kenyan violence demonstrated the application of double standards by opting to use diplomatic 
means to resolve the conflict in Kenya while preferring confrontation and sanctions in 
Zimbabwe. The paper rhetorically asked: 
Let’s just imagine what has happened in Kenya, where hundreds of people were slaughtered following the 
disputed results, had been in Zimbabwe, what would have been the reaction of Britain and America. We 
know what we see on the faces of these imperialists are crocodile tears. Their interests are superior to the 
lives of Kenyan blacks. One word which would definitely not be flying around is “diplomacy”. If a handful 
of Zimbabweans were to die during post-election violence words and phrases like “genocide” and “ethnic 
cleansing would be the order of the day. To Britain it would not matter who was responsible for the 
violence. Even if it were opposition instigated all the blame would be laid at the feet of Zanu (PF) (The 
Sunday Mail, 06-01-08, p9). 
By foregrounding the “double standards” of the powerful western countries The Sunday 
Mail constructed election violence as an instrument for regime change rather than a travesty of 
democracy, thus insinuating the existence of a dubious link between democracy and electoral 
violence. The newspaper’s view that “Democracy as defined by the West is very different from 
our concept of the same ideology” clearly underscores the clash of political values between 
Zimbabwe and the West and by extension the press sympathetic to it (Chingono 2010).  
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In the ensuing contest of ideas it becomes evident that there is no consensus on the 
meaning of election violence. While the privately-owned press views election violence as a 
human rights issue the state-owned sees election violence as an instrument of imperialists.  
Two contending discourses about election violence emerged in the press; the human 
rights discourse dominant discourses about election violence emerge, namely, the privately-
owned press’s “human rights” discourse and the state-owned press’s “national interest 
discourse”. 
6.2.3 Condemnation 
 
Both the privately-owned and the state-owned press published a number of stories 
condemning election violence. However, there were significant differences in the manner in 
which these condemnations were represented in the news. While the privately-owned press 
incorporated institutional voices in the condemnation of the violence, the state-owned press 
voiced ruling party officials.  
During the 2002 presidential campaign for example, the Daily News published several 
stories condemning election violence. In those stories church leaders, civil society groups and 
election observer groups were quoted condemning election violence. Examples of such news 
headlines in the Daily News include: “Commonwealth ministers call for immediate end to 
violence and intimidation” (01-02-02, p20), “Church calls on regional leaders to urge Mugabe to 
end violence” (04-02-02, p24), “Churches deplore coercion of rural voters in no-go areas” (06-
03-02, p3), “CZI deplores violence” (02-02-02, p25), “Australia warns of violence” (11-03-02, 
p3), “Bishops condemn political violence” (13-02-02, p20), “Anglican Church condemns 
violence, urges free campaign” (29-01-02, p2) and “Cosatu urges Zanu (PF) to disband youth 
brigade” (06-03-02, p3).  
The newspaper also enlisted the voices of prominent personalities in society in its 
condemnation of election violence. Such examples include “Judge denounces political violence” 
(27-02-02, p16) and “Judge calls for Zimbabweans to refrain from violence ahead of poll” (06-
02-02, p16).  
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However, the newspaper hardly voiced the political leadership of the main political 
parties, i.e. Zanu (PF) and MDC or any other political party for that matter, denouncing 
violence.
35
  
Other privately-owned newspapers equally had a similar thrust, with The Financial 
Gazette (13-03-08, p1-31) declaring “Churches break silence on violence, results delay” and The 
Zimbabwe Independent (08-03-02, p2) had “Church calls for peace”. The general tone of these 
stories was an appeal by church authorities for an end election violence, an appeal for tolerance 
among political players, general lamentation of political intolerance, pointing out the 
“destructive consequences” of (Daily News, 13-02-02, p20) election violence on human life and 
dignity, and a call to prosecute perpetrators of election violence “without fear or favour” (Daily 
News, 29-02-02).  
In many instances such appeals were preceded by a chronicle of incidences of violence in 
which the perpetrator would be the ruling party. In The Zimbabwe Independent story (08-02-02, 
p20) the chairman of Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Committee of the Anglican Church in 
Zimbabwe, George Wauchope reportedly have lamented the lack of openness regarding the 
injustices of “the colonial past, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the 
Matabeleland Gukurahundi as well as the atrocities since the 2000 parliamentary election”, 
suggesting that there was a connection between the election violence which was taking place in 
Zimbabwe and past cases of violence. The incorporation of institutional voices in the 
condemnation of election violence was both for practical and strategic reasons. Practical in the 
sense that it institutions are easy to hold to account and their voices are considered to be 
representative of the broader society.  
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 A notable exception is a June 2000 story headlined “Top Zanu (PF) leaders call for end to violence” (Daily News 
08-06-00, p1-2). 
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Veteran journalist, Geoff Nyarota sheds light thus: 
A-a, violence is sometimes, is an event, which many ordinary citizens in a country such as Zimbabwe tend 
to oppose or tend to dislike. Aa, a news reporter could walk down First Street asking people what they 
think of violence. I want to believe that the response would be uniform, in that people would say violence is 
not good, especially during election time but the prospects of a reporter interviewing, a-a, that many 
respondents or sources is reduced if the reporter goes to institutions, institutional, the church, what does 
the church say about political violence? The church is representative. A-a, the political parties themselves 
become institutions in so far as they would condemn violence and they would speak on behalf of their 
thousands of supporters. So they, they become institutional commentators on the issue of violence 
(Interview with Geoff Nyarota, 11 May 2015, Harare).  
The Editor of The Zimbabwe Independent, Dumisani Muleya concurs: 
Well, one of the reasons is that institutional voices, they are easy to hold to account for what they say. They 
are easy to access their credibility, eh; they are also easy to go back, to hold, to account, if they give you 
wrong information. Eh, the other one is they carry weight because basically they are institutional. They are 
organised. They are an organised voice. Eh, the other is that institutional voices, they have capacity to 
verify things, to go and check if something happens, whereas individuals have difficulties to have that 
capacity to do so (Interview with Dumisani Muleya, 11 May, 2015, Harare). 
Upon closer inspection of the above news headlines one realises that 
incorporation of institutional voices such as the church in the condemnation of election 
violence goes beyond simple professional considerations of ‘easy access’ and  
‘accountability’ in the sense that it is a discursive strategy for rendering weight and 
authority to such messages.  
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Nyarota acknowledges this when he says that: 
A-a, the church speaks for many. It is the voice of its followers. In normal circumstances, any 
political organisation would respect the word of the church. Although I want to believe that, the, 
the voice of the church is now being watered down by the multiplicity of church organisations 
(smiles). But In the traditional sense, and we are speaking of the traditional sense here because at 
that particular time, at the material time the church was still, ah, very representative of the 
original churches, Catholics, Anglicans, and the Catholics spoke on an issue with authority, say in 
condemnation of violence the politicians would listen. If the church had evidence that Zanu (PF) 
was involved in violence, for instance and they condemned violence, naturally I would expect one 
of ah, their leaders, President Robert Mugabe as a catholic himself to take heed. So indeed the 
church has authority. It has moral authority and in an area where there is violence you find that 
people are fleeing from violence in some cases, they flee in the direction of the church because 
they believe the church will offer them protection. So the church has that authority. And going 
back to time immemorial, in the case of Zimbabwe, before independence the church was expected 
to speak against violence. Talking about the war of liberation the church was divided, but the 
catholic church was for instance, took up a posi…took a position, ah, and condemned in many 
instances the RF (Rhodesian Front) government of Mr Ian Smith, and this is what the church 
followers expected of their churches. So the church has that moral authority, moral responsibility 
to speak on behalf of the people (Interview with Geoff Nyarota, 11 May 2015, Harare). 
By conscripting the voice of the church the privately-owned press sought to act as 
the moral conscience of society, a role which is consistent with the watchdog role 
espoused by the privately-owned press. The voice of the church as a moral institution 
lends moral authority to the version of reality constructed about election violence so 
much so that that constructed reality becomes uncontested, thereby, foreclosing other 
possible interpretations of reality.  Said (cited in Hergaden 2013, 19) emphasizes the 
importance of authority in discourse when she argues that “truth” owes its status from 
who is saying what and how they say it.  In their study of newspaper coverage of post-
election violence in Kenya, Onyebadi and Oyedeji (2011, 227) note how some sections of 
the press in Kenya acted as moral witnesses by advocating for peace during a period of 
crisis. 
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 The practices of the privately-owned press examined in this thesis do not 
necessarily fit into Onyebadi and Oyedeji’s framework, but their moral agency argument 
somewhat echoes the watchdog role of the press observed in this thesis. However, their 
tendency to leverage a narrow selection of sources in condemning acts of election 
violence seems to be motivated by an agenda to de-legitimise the electoral process rather 
than to promote accountability.  
Condemnation of election violence was characterised by insinuations and 
extrapolations meant to strangulate the supposed perpetrators of election violence rather 
than advocating for a return to peace and denunciation of election violence was followed 
by appeals not to endorse the electoral outcome on the grounds that there was violence. 
For instance, it was hinted that action would be taken against the political authorities in 
Harare if the issue of election violence was not addressed. Such a sentiment was 
contained in a story  headlined “UN warns Mugabe on abuses” (The Financial Gazette, 
22-06-02, p1) which quoted Mary Robinson, the then United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights who reportedly warned Mugabe to “stop violations of 
human rights and the intimidation of opponents by his supporters which she says 
threatened the credibility” of the impending elections. Robinson is reported to have 
written to Mugabe expressing her concerns about “reports of wide-spread human rights 
violations occurring in Zimbabwe” and how those abuses “threatened to undermine the 
validity of the upcoming parliamentary elections”.  
This shows that condemnation discourse on election violence in the private press 
was tied to the invalidation of the electoral verdict and possible prosecution of the 
instigators of the violence. Any endorsements of the electoral outcome were scoffed at as 
disingenuous by the privately-owned press. For instance, in a story with the headline 
“Wutawunashe endorses Mugabe’s re-election” the Daily News (19-03-02, p3) reported 
that Andrew Wutawunashe “the chairman of Faith for the Nation, a group of churches” 
had endorsed “the re-election of President Mugabe in what has been a roundly 
condemned process”. 
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 It is worth noting that unlike those churches that condemned election violence 
which were addressed collectively as “the church” the protagonist in this particular case 
was disaggregated from the church as an institution hence his opinion was 
‘individualised’ thereby, portraying him as a lone voice in the lunatic fringe. Further, the 
subjection of the protagonist’s statement of endorsement of Mugabe’s electoral mandate 
to interpretative evaluations, for example, that he did not mention that Mugabe’s victory 
had been rejected by other election observation groups appears to scandalise him. In the 
specific context of the 2002 presidential election, which was closely contested, it is a fact 
that not all election observers endorsed the electoral outcome. Neither did all the election 
observers condemn it. Thus the Daily News accentuated the discourse of condemnation, 
while it suppressed voices that endorsed the election. Predictably, the newspaper 
castigated head of the Commonwealth observer mission to Zimbabwe, for the 2002 
presidential election, former Nigerian head of state, General Abdulsalami Abubakar for 
having suggested that some sections of the media in Zimbabwe “were deliberately 
exaggerating the level of violence” in the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections (Daily 
News, 04-04-02, p6).  
In a commentary titled “Abubakar has become accomplice in violence” (see 
Appendix 1.11) the newspaper described Abubakar’s statements as “an insult to the 
memory of those who have died or have been injured in pre-election violence”, a “blight 
on the reputation of the Commonwealth” and a betrayal of the trust “that the ordinary 
people of the world have in the outside world and international organisations coming to 
their rescue”. The paper opined: 
Is the Commonwealth, as it stands today of any real value to the ordinary people if it so readily 
accommodates such excesses of human rights abuses by those in power? By showing their 
willingness to condone these abuses they have become accomplices in the oppression of the 
ordinary people- the real victims of terror being unleashed by the rulers (Daily News 04-03-
02, p6). 
In the rest of the commentary, Abubakar is conflated with the Commonwealth Observer 
Group and both are scandalised for failing to ‘condemn’ election violence.  
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It is argued that  Abubakar’s failure to condemn election violence demonstrates that  
Africans place “little value on human life” and that African leaders are keen to protect “their 
peers at the expense of their citizens”, while “ignoring the tragic events unfolding right under 
their noses” Daily News, 04-03-02, p6). In this legitimisation of the electoral process entailed 
voicing negative sentiments while suppressing positive ones. This affirms the stance taken in this 
thesis that news neither reflects nor distort reality but construct reality discursively. The 
constructionist approach is process-oriented in the sense that it focuses on how certain discourses 
“are able to achieve hegemony in the news” (Lau 2012, 893) by deploying particular news 
making practices that make those particular discourses appear commonsensical or uncontestable. 
Just like the privately-owned press, the state-owned press also published a considerable number 
of stories condemning election violence. However, unlike the privately-owned press which 
conscripted institutional voices to condemn election violence, the state-owned press used 
institutional voices to for endorsements of the elections rather than for the condemnation of 
election violence. The state-owned press focused on statements by Zanu (PF) leaders, 
particularly President Robert Mugabe (and the police) denouncing election violence, (and in very 
few instances the voices of institutional bodies, notably in the 2000 parliamentary election)
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violence but hardly voiced opposition leaders in this regard.  
Examples of such news headlines are: “President slams violence” (The Herald, 30-05-08, 
p1), “President warns MDC-T” (The Herald, 17-06-08, p1), “Police warns MDC against 
violence” (The Herald, 9 July 2013, p1) (see Appendix 1.12) “Don’t make reckless political 
statements, Madzore warned” (The Herald, 10-07-13, p4) and “Chamisa’s threats alarming: 
Minister” (The Herald, 29-02-13, p2) and “Madzore must remember he is on bail” (The Herald, 
12 July 2013, p7) (see Appendix 1.13). The latter two headlines deserve a more detailed analysis 
and shall be revisited later in this section.  
                                                          
36
 See for example, “Group deplores political violence” (The Herald, 17-06-00, p3), “Perpetrators of violence must 
be brought to justice: EU team” (The Herald, 30-06-00, p4). “Abubakar calls for cessation of inter-party hostilities” 
(The Herald, 20-06-00, p1) 
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In the state-owned press, the condemnation of election violence mainly focused on 
President Mugabe’s speeches and sometimes the police.37 For instance, a month before the 27 
June Presidential run-off The Herald (30-05-08, p1) published a story with a headline “President 
slams violence” and a cliff hanger which read “MDC-T must stop these barbaric attacks 
forthwith”. The newspaper reported that President Mugabe and his wife Grace Mugabe had 
visited victims of the opposition party’s violence in Shamva. He reportedly said: 
We have seen the violent activities of the MDC-T in Shamva and other areas across the country. 
Tasuruvara nezvataona. (We have been saddened by what we saw). Hatisi mhuka dzinopisirana 
dzimba (We are not animals that burnt each other homes) destroying other people’s property…The 
MDC should stop immediately this barbaric campaign of arson, destroying and harming people, 
destroying lives (The Herald, 30-05-08, p1). 
First Lady, Grace Mugabe
38
 reportedly weighed in saying: 
Musarovana, musapisirana dzimba nekuti pamunorwisana varungu vanenge varikudzimba dzavo 
vachiona vachingoti onai vanhu vatema havafunge, havana kurongeka; sei vasingabatsire kana 
pakaitika matambudziko akadai? (Don’t beat up each other, don’t burn each other’s homes 
because when you fight the whites will be at home watching saying look at these black people, 
they don’t think, they are not organised; why don’t they help when such a tragedy happens?). 
Condemnation of election violence was followed by blame on the alleged perpetrators 
(MDC-T) who are constructed as barbaric or uncivilised “Others”, and therefore, deserving to be 
disciplined. The language used in this story bears resemblance with that used in another Herald 
story published a month before the 2002 presidential election whose headline read “Mugabe 
launches presidential drive” and had a cliff hanger which read “Shun violence, be on the lookout 
for political witches” (The Herald, 02-02-02, p1). President Mugabe reportedly told his party 
supporters at a rally in Mashonaland East province to shun violence and blamed the MDC and 
some Western sponsored-Non-Governmental organisations for fanning violence in the country. 
Mugabe told his supporters that they must “be on the lookout for political witches and those bent 
on provoking violence”.   
                                                          
37
 See “Police warn MDC-T against violence” (The Herald, 09-07-13, p1) 
38
 She was speaking, in Shona, the main indigenous language spoken in Zimbabwe. 
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The Herald reported thus: 
But he said they (his supporters) had the right to defend themselves if attacked in their homes by 
MDC supporters…President Mugabe warned people to be on the lookout for MDC which thrived 
on terror. He said even the call by the MDC leader, Mr Morgan Tsvangirai, to violently remove 
him from the office showed that it was a terrorist party (The Herald, 02-02-02, p1). 
Like the privately-owned press, the condemnation of election violence in the state-owned 
press was accompanied by blame and the language used in the excerpts above demonstrates how 
this discourse of blame was enduring given the fact that the elections in question were separated 
by six years. As noted in Chapter Five, the reason why the condemnation of violence was 
followed by blame was because of the conviction by the ruling party that MDC perpetrated more 
violence than the ruling party. Consequently, apart from the voicing of Mugabe in the 
condemnation of election violence, there was a significant number of editorials devoted to the 
denunciation of election violence. Examples include: “MDC-T’s violent campaign should stop” 
(The Sunday Mail, 01-06-08, p6) (see Appendix, 1.14) “Reject advocates of post-poll anarchy” 
(The Sunday Mail, 24-02-08, p6), “Tsvangirai a sick, dangerous man” (The Herald, 15-02-02, 
p8) and “We need peace, not violence” (The Herald, 01-03-02, p10).  
The refrain in these editorials was that violence must be condemned “in the strongest 
terms” and went on to identify the perpetrators of violence as opposition MDC supporters. It was 
also pointed out that the motive for such violence was to discredit the elections. When a group of 
foreign election observers was attacked by what the private press identified as Zanu (PF) 
supporters (see Chapter Five) The Herald (01-03-02, p10) condemned the violence but argued 
that the supposed Zanu (PF) supporters were in fact a “force other than Zanu (PF)” because the 
ruling party had nothing to gain from attacking foreign election observers.  The paper reported 
that:  
It follows therefore that those bent on tarnishing the name of Zanu (PF) are more likely to attack observers 
with the comforting knowledge that they will not get the blame… Attacking them (observers) is meant to frighten 
and sway their views ahead of the March 9 and 10 elections. It is good that they have reported the violence to the 
police and are not; in any way hysterical about it…It is in the interest of all Zimbabweans that violence of any kind 
stops forthwith. We cannot have our presidential election discredited and rejected by the outside world because of 
violence we know we can do without (The Herald, 01-03-02, p10).  
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Election violence thus became a turf for point-scoring characterised by blame and 
counter-blame, conspiracy and counter-conspiracy.  This suggests that incidences of election 
violence are carefully selected and hyped, while others are swept under the carpet. One state-
owned press editor sheds light on the way political polarisation led to opposing press camps 
selectively choosing to condemn particular incidents of election violence in order to de-
legitimise rivals thus:  
So what has really happened is that the media also, has been also like polarised, the media would tend to 
take positions aligning itself with those forces, forces that want to say the elections are free and fair, are 
legitimate and those that want to say, No, they are not free and free should the result not be according to 
plan. So what then you tend, tends to happen is, eh, even in the reportage of electoral violence you find that 
the tendency, when it happens is to want to apportion blame to say, no its Zanu (PF) that is violent, 
depending on the position of that media organisation. It’s not just condemnation of violence but to then 
apportion…So if you find that when you then look at the state media, the public media that ideologically 
tends to lean and align itself with Zanu (PF), we are caught in that web of, of saying “Yaa, there is 
violence but it’s not that bad, it does not really affect, the, the result” or even to say “Yaa it’s the MDC that 
is violent, it has done ABCD”. So there is a competition of saying who has perpetrated what violence (E6, 
12 May 2015).  
As election violence became a tool for legitimising and de-legitimising the electoral 
process and verdicts the citizens were subjected to competing versions of reality, which possibly 
did not tally with their lived experiences. The implications are that the citizens were denied an 
opportunity to make meaningful decisions, thereby stunting the democracy. 
The Chamisa and Madzore Cases  
In order to illustrate how the state-owned press used the condemnation of election 
violence as a discursive strategy to de-legitimise the opposition two separate (but similar) events 
will be used. The first story was about the then spokesperson of the MDC-T, Mr. Nelson 
Chamisa who in the run-up to the 29 March, 2008 harmonised elections, allegedly told his 
party’s supporters that MDC-T was going to engage in violence “similar to that which rocked in 
Kenya after the disputed December 27 (2007) polls if Zanu (PF) won the election” (The Herald, 
28-02-08, p2) (see Appendix 1.15).  
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The statement was roundly criticised by Zanu (PF) and the state-owned press, although 
Chamisa denied having made the statement. The second example relates to the MDC-T National 
Youth Assembly chairperson, Mr Solomon Madzore, who allegedly told a gathering of 
supporters at the launch of the party’s election campaign and manifesto for the 2013 harmonised 
elections in Marondera, that the MDC-T youths were “prepared to take up arms and shed their 
blood if his party lost the elections” (The Herald, 10-07-13, p10).  
Like the Chamisa case, the main frame in the Madzore story was that of condemnation. 
In both cases the statements were described as “threats” to unleash violence by the opposition. 
Like Chamisa, Madzore reportedly refuted having made the statements and the language used by 
the state-owned press is that they were climbing down (or “backtracking” in the case of 
Madzore) (The Herald, 10-07-13, p2) from their positions. Although these incidents are 
separated by a period of five years (2008-2013) the similarity in their treatment by the state-
owned press is striking.   
The Herald (10-07-13, p14) had a story with the headline “Don’t Make reckless political 
statements, Madzore warned” (see Appendix 1.16). The only source in the story, Air Force of 
Zimbabwe Commander, Air Marshal Perrence Shiri, reportedly chastised Madzore for “making 
reckless political statements that had the potential of destabilising the country”, adding that such 
utterances were “foolish”, “stretching the patience of the security forces to the limit” and “an 
insult to those charged with national security and all who waged the liberation struggle”. He also 
said, “Why are you insulting us? Haven’t we laid our guns down and allowed people to live 
peacefully, do their work in harmony? Do not force us to do that which we did not want to do” 
(The Herald, 10-07-13, p4). Condemnation was followed by threats of unspecified action against 
the perpetrators of violence.  
In the Chamisa story, condemnation was followed by a pledge by the authorities to 
review the election process so that there were no “loopholes in the security of the process” and 
counter-threats to bring about “additional measures to thwart acts of political violence being 
planned against the electoral process”.  
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In addition, Chinamasa warned “those who embark on violence during and after the 
election” that the full wrath of the law would “descend upon them”. In both cases, the 
blameworthiness of the opposition was made to appear common cause by making reference to its 
past ‘record’ of election violence.  
This is clearly illustrated in a Herald story with a headline “Police warn MDC-T against 
violence” (The Herald 09-07-13, p1) whereby the newspaper stated that:   
MDC-T has been implicated in several violent incidents countrywide that analysts said were 
designed to not only trash the political environment, but to create self-fulfilling prophecies ahead 
of the party’s pending defeat in harmonised elections. The terror campaign began last year, but 
was intensified from January with over 48 cases being recorded country-wide since the beginning 
of the year. In all the recorded cases, the MDC-T supporters were at the forefront of attacking their 
colleagues or those from other political parties, especially Zanu (PF). Journalists were not spared. 
Mashudu Netsianda of Chronicle and Herbert Moyo of The Zimbabwe Independent fell victim to 
MDC-T thugs in separate incidents in Harare and Bulawayo. The attacks on journalists followed 
threats issued by MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai who rapped journalists and media houses that 
do not toe his party line, saying that they had no future in his perceived “new Zimbabwe” (The 
Herald, 09-07-13, p1). 
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The blame on the opposition is rationalised on the grounds of the opposition’s politics of 
victimhood and the ‘politics of pity’. The Sunday Mail Acting editor, Mabasa Sasa’s statement 
below sheds some light. 
What we do know is that the violence, having been started, ahmm, there is a political party that 
has thrived on that violence, with the politics of pity. One, claiming we are a victim. Aah, two, it 
gives them access to resources, saying, we need money to defend ourselves or whatever reason. So 
they get money. Three, it serves to de-legitimise the state. I do not think that Zanu (PF) would 
benefit as much from violence as MDC would, Zanu (PF) being a governing party, holding 
instruments of the state. It has nothing to gain by fighting people who have no instruments 
whatsoever. Whereas MDC stands to benefit the most from violence, one, by getting that pity, two, 
by financial support, three by de-legitimising the state. So on the whole I believe its MDC which 
has still to gain more and naturally we will then assume that, eh, they are responsible for a lot of 
that violence. A-ahmm, there have been allegations of ah, due to that, ah, external influence we 
get allegations of serious training of these people where they start getting, ah, they start using the 
same tactics used by the Selous Scouts (Rhodesian hit squad), very simple things , ah, you go and 
dress up in Zanu (PF) regalia, you beat up people. You are an MDC person, you wear a Zanu 
(PF) T-shirt, you cause violence, and it’s blamed on Zanu (PF). So I really don’t see Zanu (PF) 
having benefited much from violence whereas MDC it seems, it, violence became quite a 
cornerstone of the, of their national policy, the drive to get into power (Interview with 
Mabasa Sasa, 14 May 2015, Harare). 
A similar framing was echoed in a commentary with a headline “Madzore must 
remember he is out on bail” (The Herald, 12-07-13, p7) whereby Madzore, and by extension, the 
MDC’s past record of election violence were reiterated. The newspaper reminded Madzore that 
he was on bail “on charges of murdering a police inspector” and that “One would have thought 
that the 14 months Madzore spent behind bars would have taught him a lesson”.  Thus Madzore 
was constructed as an unrepentant criminal who had a history of violence. Madzore’s statements 
were linked up with the MDC leader’s statement about forcibly removing Mugabe from power. 
The newspaper went on to tabulate the opposition party’s past transgressions which include “50 
cases of political violence committed since January” which were attributed to the opposition 
party and the attack on private and state-owned media journalists mentioned above was also 
mentioned to buttress the frame that the MDC had an unbridled ‘history of violence’.  
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As already mentioned condemnation discourse slipped into a discourse of blame which 
found expression in recalling the opposition party’s supposed previous record of election 
violence and its use of election violence as a strategy to discredit the elections. Typically, it was 
stated that: “We know that MDC-T is determined to spoil the prevailing peaceful environment in 
a bid to trash the political environment and to provide fodder for its Western allies to discredit 
the poll” (The Herald, 12-07-13, p7). In the larger discursive scheme, the condemnation of 
election violence paved way to the inflection of an endorsement discourse, whereby the 
legitimacy and credibility of the electoral outcome was deliberately hyped. This issue will be 
revisited in the last section of this chapter. 
6.3 The Peace Discourse 
6.3.1 Appeal for Peace and Anti-Violence  
As pointed out earlier, a key issue that loomed large throughout the electoral contests 
which are the focus of this thesis was that the legitimacy of elections was tied to the existence or 
non-existence of election violence. As a consequence, the state-owned press stressed the 
discourse of peace, while the privately-owned press suppressed or ignored the ruling party’s 
message of peace. To this extent, the state-owned press published numerous stories which voiced 
advocates of peace or anti-violence. 
Three different frames were identified in this regard. The first frame relates to appeals for 
peace (or anti-violence frame). This frame is accorded more space in this section. The second 
frame relates to endorsements of the elections as peaceful, either before, during and after the 
vote. The sources attributed to the peace advocacy frame were mainly ruling party officials 
(principally President Mugabe whose campaign, theme during the 2013 harmonised elections 
was “Peace begins with me, peace begins with you, peace begins with all of us”), the police or 
other government officials who made appeals to the electorate to observe peace or “shun 
violence”.39  
                                                          
39
 Examples of such news headlines include: “President repeats call for peaceful election” (The Herald, 30-01-
02,p2), “Non-violence, land reform highlights of President’s campaign” (The Herald, 26-02-02, p1),”Chihuri appeals 
for calm, peace” (The Herald, 28-06-00, p5), “Refrain from political violence” (The Herald, 14-07-00, p5), 
“Sikhanyiso Ndlovu urges supporters to refrain from violence” (The Herald, 07-06-00, p4) “Exercise political 
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For the state-owned press, being peaceful meant many things; it meant political maturity 
(The Herald, 05-02-08, p3), “shaming detractors” who always use election violence as an alibi 
for not accepting the electoral outcome (The Sunday Mail, 30-04-08, p6) or tolerance. Given that 
it was so important that the elections were seen to be peaceful, the peace message took centre 
stage in the state-press editorial columns as well. One such editorial was published in The 
Sunday Mail (24-04-00, p4) on the first polling day of the 2000 parliamentary elections and 
carried the headline “Let’s shame our enemies by voting peacefully”. The commentary exhorted 
the Zimbabwean electorate to vote peacefully in order to show “the whole world that Zimbabwe 
is a politically mature nation that is capable of holding peaceful, free, and fair elections”. The 
newspaper added that:   
It is time that we put to shame the prophets of doom who have predicted chaos and anarchy during and in 
the aftermath of the elections. To many in the outside world, Zimbabwe is a disaster waiting to happen. 
Although they are not saying it, we know that some of the so-called observers are hoping to witness a 
bloodbath. This will give them the satisfaction of saying ‘we told you so’ (The Herald, 24-06-00, p4). 
The view that the message of peace was used to neutralise the negative perceptions about 
the country internationally is further demonstrated in another Herald editorial titled “Election 
2000: Peaceful atmosphere must continue”, (The Herald, 26-06-00, p6) where it was argued that 
“The outside world cannot but be impressed by the businesslike way that Zimbabweans went out 
this week to choose their new parliament. External observers have already commented 
favourably on the standard measures taken by the Zimbabwean authorities to prevent any 
suspicion of rigging” (The Herald, 26-06-00, p6). In this discursive scheme peace was not only 
equated to the absence of violence, but also translated to free and fair elections. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
maturity” (The Herald, 05-02-08, p3), “Calmness should continue” (The Herald, 31-03-08, p4), “Election 2000: 
Peaceful atmosphere must continue” (26-06-00, p6), “Lets shame our enemies by voting peacefully” (The Herald, 
24-06-00, p4), “Sekeramayi calls for peaceful polls”, (The Herald, 20-05-00, p1), “Pull together on a peaceful path” 
(The Herald, 03-04-08, p4), “Lets campaign, vote peacefully” (16-02-08, p4), “Let there be after-election peace” 
(The Sunday Mail, 30-04-08, p6), “Exercise restraint, work towards peaceful poll” (The Sunday Mail, 20-03-05, p8), 
“Lets promote violence-free polls” (The Herald, 02-02-08, p4), “Reject advocates of post-poll anarchy” (The Sunday 
Mail, 24-02-08, p9), “Zero tolerance to violence” (The Sunday Mail,30-03-08, p7). 
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 A close inspection of interview data reveals that the rationale for emphasizing peace in 
the state-owned press rests on a combination of moral justifications, professional considerations 
and political imperatives such as the national interest. The following statement from a journalist 
who works for a state-owned newspaper is illustrative: 
That, eeh, as I mentioned earlier, we always try to seek the national interest, yah. We always, there is also 
advocacy journalism. Violence is something that the nation does not need. So as a paper we need to be 
responsible. So whatever politician they are, if we feel that this is not what the country needs, yah, sure, 
you are not going to let your relationship with them determine how you are going to cover, if there is any 
incident of violence because this is going to affect the perception of the country internationally, regionally 
and even continentally. So we are trying to safeguard that national interest. We are also going to preserve 
social fabric where you don’t want people to maim each other. Yah, because you also come from homes, 
you don’t want your human capital be affected in any way. Because as a newspaper, we are also 
responsible journalists. Yah, and we try to advocate good things, yah, good morals, good behaviour, so 
that is what we always try to project, yah. So in a nutshell I don’t think the relationships we might have 
with particular politicians might affect the way we perceive things. We don’t condone bad things just to 
preserve our friendship (J1, State Press Journalist, 04-09-13, Harare).  
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This sentiment is echoed by Mabasa Sasa, the Acting Editor of The Sunday Mail who 
argues that: 
I would say there are primarily two issues that come to the fore. The first is that any publication, 
any serious publication that has its country’s best interest at heart will certainly promote peace. 
This goes whether peace is prevailing or there is a threat to that peace or there has recently been 
violence. Naturally if you are a reputable organization, certainly you would want to promote 
peace, peace being the bedrock for development, peace being a foundation for growth, for 
economic growth. So whether there is an election or an election is coming peace should remain a 
major issue within a discourse of publications. Secondly, within particular contexts of ah, 
electoral contests over the past ah, I could say 15 years, there have been a lot of umm, lots of 
threats to peace, to stability, to development, so naturally, we then have to step in and promote 
peace. This political context is informed by active attempts to destabilise the country. We felt that 
there was or is an active agenda to destabilise the country for whatever political purposes of those 
behind that agenda. And for us being a public paper our, our interest would be promoting stability 
rather than promoting anarchy. So within the past 15 years there was greater call for publications 
to promote peace, a-mm at the same time, it was also an attempt to counter, to counterbalance ah, 
ah, reports of instability in Zimbabwe, reports that ah, would serve to paint the image of the 
country, that of a pariah essentially which any sane person would see kuti (that) does not dovetail 
with our national aspirations for development, for unity, for tranquility. So we also had to actively 
counter those reports for the sake of our own development (Interview with Mabasa Sasa, 14 
May 2015, Harare). 
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Clearly, political imperatives took precedence over all other considerations in the sense 
that agitations for peace were fixated on placating the international community- a very fastidious 
constituency at the material time. Herald editor, Ceasar Zvayi’s comments corroborate this view: 
The Herald is a-a, influenced, is public media, 51%  owned by the government and our editorial 
policy is to follow the flag, whenever it’s a case of Zimbabwe and the world, our thrust is we 
follow the flag, our flag. So we are generally supportive, but not blindly supportive of the 
government of the day. So over the past, since the turn of the millennium there has been political 
contestation in Zimbabwe pitting the Zanu (PF) led government against its erstwhile allies after 
the fallout over land reforms. So you find out that after that fallout, the Western governments 
sponsored a political opposition in Zimbabwe and they have been trying to effect regime change 
and it’s on record, they have been trying to depose the Zanu (PF) government. So to them, 
whenever its election time in Zimbabwe they always try, their media, they sponsor certain 
newspapers here in Zimbabwe, the privately owned newspapers that support the opposition, the 
South African apartheid press, the remnants of it and the international media. They always try to 
paint a picture of a crisis here in Zimbabwe to create self-fulfilling prophecies so that they will 
reject the electoral outcome. Because as we know Zanu (PF), because as we know Zanu (PF) has 
been dominating the political scene up to the last election. So there is always a campaign to 
fabricate images, images imported from other countries. We have cases of images that were 
imported from Kenya with some people trying to pass them off as violence in some outpost in 
Zimbabwe. They imported images from Ethiopia of malnourished children and tried to pass them 
off as the situation in Zimbabwe. So we always, there is always these contrived situations.  So as 
The Herald we work closely with the police. We always try to check these reports against the 
official record and that is why we always say, we always try to emphasize that the environment 
that is prevailing, contrary to what is portrayed by these embedded media, its peaceful, let people 
vote peacefully so that the outcome itself, as has been happening over the years is endorsed as 
legitimate. But you find out that the Westerners always reject, they always try to create these self-
fulfilling prophecies. Like right now, Zimbabwe is peaceful, Robert Mugabe has been elected 
Chairman of SADC and the AU but Tsvangirai is in Germany right now claiming that there is a 
crisis in Zimbabwe. He is going all over the world to drum…So this is where you find The Herald 
in the middle. The Herald is ranged against these international media trying to tar and feather 
Zimbabwe and The Herald is the only voice out of Zimbabwe trying to give that correct political 
picture. So that is why we always…basically, we do not fabricate this, we tell it what exactly it will 
be happening on the ground (Interview with Ceasar Zvayi, 07-05-15, Harare). 
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It is instructive to note that constructions of the peace discourse in the state-
owned press have everything to do with their perception that election violence has 
become a tool in an asymmetrical war pitting proxies of neo-colonial forces and a 
powerless developing country. Emphasis on peace is necessitated by the imperative to 
foster particular perceptions about the social and political reality in Zimbabwe. From a 
theoretical perspective this is significant to this study in the sense that it recalls the 
agenda-setting effect and the framing effect of the press (McCombs 2005, 546) whereby 
“elements prominent on the media agenda become prominent over time on the public 
agenda”. By foregrounding peace while suppressing violence, the state-owned press 
sought to transfer salience from the press to the public domain. This is because, although 
the press may not be successful in telling people what to think it can be successful in 
telling people what to think about and how to think about particular issues (McCombs 
2005, 546). Of particular interest to this thesis is how the state-press sought to create the 
perception that peace was reigning during election time and the causal link between the 
peace message and the electoral verdict. This harks back to Entman’s framing theory 
which entails selecting “some aspects of social reality and make them salient in a 
communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described”(cited in McCombs 2005, 546).  
As demonstrated below, when the state-owned press chose to emphasize the peace 
message they initiated a causal link between the shrill calls for peace and a free and fair 
electoral verdict, thereby bringing to the fore the view advanced in Chapter Two, that 
discourse is a social construct and all discursive practices entail some form of framing. 
Just like framing discourse “is created and perpetuated by those who have power and 
means of communication” (Pistoe and Letseka 2013, 4).  The argument advanced here is 
that the social construction of peace was calculated to project a version of social reality or 
(to put it in a Foucauldian parlance) a particular “regime of truth” consistent with the 
grand political scheme and design of the state press. Within that grand scheme was the 
desire for the elections to be accepted as a credible and a legitimate expression of the will 
of the people.  
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Predictably the advocacy for peace gave way to a flurry of endorsements on the 
electoral verdict (second frame of peace) and euphoric declarations that the elections 
would be or had been peaceful or free even when other voices were saying something to 
the contrary. Hence, there were news headlines such as “SA hails peace in Zimbabwe 
ahead of elections” (The Herald, 24-07-13, p2), “Chiefs endorse Zim poll preps”(The 
Herald, 07-03-05, p1),  “SADC reaffirms endorsement”(The Herald, 03-09-13, p1), 
“Polls free and fair: SADC, AU”(The Herald, 04-04-05, p1), “Zimbabweans endorse 
election”(The Herald, 28-06-08, p6), “More observer teams endorse Zim polls” (The 
Herald, 05-04-08, p1). There were also more interpretative headlines such as “Violence 
does not preclude fair poll: Mbeki” (The Herald, 24-06-00, p3) where it was stated that 
election violence did not mean that elections were not free and fair.  
To bolster his argument Mbeki drew parallels between the violence in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa in 1994 where about 1000 people died in the run-up to South Africa’s 
first democratic elections, and yet the election was declared free and fair.  This clearly 
attests the point made earlier that discourse has consequences in the sense that the 
tendentious discourses on peace in the state-owned press were designed to fit into the 
template of a credible election. This version was contradicted by the privately-owned 
press which was cynical of the prospects of peace. 
6.3.2 Silence and Cynicism 
For all the elections held between 2000 and 2013 the state-owned press’s campaign for 
peace did not find any takers among the privately-owned press. If anything, it was met with 
disdain, downplayed or completely suppressed in the media discourse, particularly during the 
harmonised elections held in 2013. The privately-owned press deliberately avoided the word 
‘peace’ even where they were reporting on peace initiatives or activities framed as such, rather 
preferring the phraseology “anti-violence”, thus stressing violence and not peace. Two such 
examples are taken from elections that are separated by more than a decade. One is from the 
2000 general election and the other from the 2013 harmonised election. The 2000 election story 
was a lead story in the Daily News of 8 June 2000 whose headline was “Top Zanu (PF) leaders 
call for end to violence”.  
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The story was about a meeting convened by some top Zanu (PF) leaders to drum up the 
message to their supporters that “violence against the opposition must stop and that the 24 and 25 
June (2000) election must be seen to be free and fair”.  The import of this interpretation is that 
the Zanu (PF) leadership was preaching an “anti-violence” message to their supporters and not a 
peace message. The phrase “anti-violence” connotes that there is violence taking place and that it 
must stop, it might also mean people should not contemplate committing violence.  
One of the top politicians reportedly told party supporters that “We should tell our 
followers not to use violence…We should campaign by convincing people- not by fighting them 
and beating them up”, (Daily News, 08-06-00) a message which implies that some of the 
supporters might have been engaging in election violence. Another leader reportedly said, “We 
have stood firm against violence. But we must make an unequivocal statement to denounce 
violence not because we want to appease anyone”.   
The Daily News then introduced an interpretative frame where it was suggested that the 
reason why Zanu (PF) was preaching against violence was that “the eagle eye of international 
observers monitoring the election would be riveted on Zimbabwe and any irregularity would be 
capitalised on to declare the poll not free and fair”.  Foregrounding violence rather than peace 
shows that the Daily News was skeptical about the prospects of peace. 
The second example is a story published in Newsday (15-07-13, p3) which had the 
headline “Churches take peace message to rural areas” and was about a peace-building initiative 
workshop held in a rural village in the Midlands province. The newspaper described the 
workshop as a “fight against violence” and described the main presentation at the workshop as 
centred on denouncing “political violence”. A close inspection of the story reveals that the main 
thrust of the workshop was to “preach the gospel of peace” (Newsday, 15-07-15, p3). Most of the 
people who spoke at the workshop foregrounded peace and the word peace was used 8 (eight 
times). “The search for peace cannot be postponed, be belittled or trivialised at a time when our 
nation is at the cross-roads”, said the main presenter at the workshop. By choosing to emphasise 
violence as opposed to peace the newspaper showed some scepticism. This scepticism gradually 
morphed into cynicism in other privately-owned newspapers as succinctly shown in an editorial 
titled “Not the lull before the storm” published in the Daily News (29-06-00, p10).  
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The newspaper noted how, in a televised address, after the 2000 constitutional 
referendum, President Mugabe had graciously conceded defeat before violence broke out in the 
June 2000 elections. The Daily News opined that the tranquility which was being experienced 
after the 2000 general elections was possibly a bad omen for more violence to come, given Zanu 
(PF)’s history of insincerity and trickery. The newspaper wrote that: 
The future looks bleak unless Mugabe is sincere in his declaration to seek “greater unity and stability, 
cutting across race and in building institutions which serve the people”. This is the same man who said 
white farmers had become “the enemies of the state”, a man who sounded so filled with bigotry he 
frightened many people, including foreigners. He will have to work very hard to convince many people in 
Zimbabwe that his word is now his bond. So far he has failed that test dismally (Daily News, 29-06-00, 
p10). 
The perception that ruling party politicians were not sincere in their peace campaigns 
might be the reason why, to a large measure the privately-owned press muffled or were cynical 
about the peace discourse which dominated the state-owned press pages during elections held 
between 2000 and 2013. Geoff Nyarota, who edited the Daily News at the time, sheds more light 
on this when he says that: 
I would say if you detect any amount of scepticism on the part of the Daily News as a newspaper, 
in the face of utterances about the prospects of peace and non-violence it is because the paper was 
weighing these utterances against its own observations. If MP Border Gezi, may his soul rest in 
peace, stated in public that there will be no violence, that there will be, you know, peace, the Daily 
News was likely to say but Cde Border Gezi said the opposite last week, and acted in a manner 
that does not lend credibility to his new utterances. This was on the basis of observation. Now if 
the MDC claimed that its members had been violently attacked and produced evidence and these 
were indeed its members and the MDC produced evidence that the attackers or the perpetrators 
were Zanu (PF) or vice-versa. If Zanu (PF) alleged that its members had been attacked by the 
MDC, because that also happens and produced such evidence, and the MDC says we are a non-
violent party, well the newspaper, on the basis of its own observation, its own findings would be 
right to be cynical about such claims especially, if they contradict its observations (Interview 
with Geoff Nyarota, 11 May, 2015, Harare). 
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The private newspapers justified their cynicism about the calls for peace by ruling party 
politicians on the grounds that the peace message by Zanu (PF) politicians did not commensurate 
with their actions. The private press saw insincerity in their appeals for peace based on previous 
records of the politicians. In other words they felt that the politicians were speaking with “forked 
tongues”. Because of this mistrust any appeals for peace by Zanu (PF) were sneered at regardless 
of the circumstances. It is, therefore, not surprising that even during the 2013 harmonised 
election, which is generally regarded as a peaceful election (Raftopoulos 2013, Comesa, 2013, 
African Union Commission 2013, Electoral Commission of SADC Countries 2013) the private 
press maintained a cynical stance towards the peace message. An example is an editorial 
published in Newsday (19-07-13, 10) titled “How sincere are Mugabe’s calls” (see Appendix 
1.17). The editorial queried why merely 24 hours after Mugabe’s rally in the dormitory town of 
Chitungwiza, where he preached peace and tolerance during the elections, “seven MDC-T 
officials…were brutally attacked by alleged Zanu (PF) supporters in the same town where 
Mugabe had addressed his rally. The editorial cast aspersions on Mugabe’s sincerity in his call 
for peace on account of this single incident, asking rhetorically: 
Is Mugabe speaking white, but acting black, indicating left while turning right, preaching peace 
but acting war? Or has he lost control of Zanu (PF) and his grassroots supporters no longer take 
him seriously- a sign that may signal Mugabe, turning 90 next February, is now a spent force 
rumbling what no longer resonates with the thinking of his followers? (Newsday, 19-07-13, 
p10). 
The newspaper added that “grandstanding and preaching mixed messages should not be 
condoned in any circumstances”, an indication that the newspaper doubted the sincerity of 
President Mugabe’s message for peace.  
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Wisdom Mudzungairi, the acting editor of the Newsday explains why his paper received 
the peace message by Zanu (PF) politicians during the 2013 harmonised elections with 
scepticism: 
We don’t have to take hook, line and sinker what, what the politicians say. In any case if you 
believe in a politician then either you are a fool or you don’t know exactly what you should be 
doing as a journalist. Journalists must be skeptical about anything, even if somebody brings a 
story to you and tells you this is what is happening elsewhere you must be skeptical. You don’t 
have to take everything on face value. You have to go deeper and then say ah, is this also true that 
this happened? Ok, that’s one aspect. The second aspect is that Mugabe has been president since; 
I mean he has been ruling the country since 1980. He has got a history of trickery and because of 
that why should we believe his word when there is no action. Remember this was the same period, 
eh, Mugabe, eh, was going to attend and AU (African Union) meeting in about, ah, ah, the 
political situation in Zimbabwe in Tanzania and then Tsvangirai was addressing a rally in 
Gwanzura (stadium) and then he was beaten by the police and the security, the other security 
forces, and then the same day Chamisa tried to run away from the country and he was beaten 
seriously at the Airport and the same old man also went to Tanzania, to go and meet, discuss the 
political situation in the country and what does he say there? He says he (Tsvangirai) was beaten 
to the pulp. This is what he was telling reporters in Tanzania. On arrival and when he came back 
he says, no, no let’s have peace. Now you see you are talking to a double-tongued somebody who 
doesn’t believe in the other, who doesn’t believe in discussions to solve problems. He believes in 
violence and Mugabe is on record saying Zanu (PF) has degrees in violence and that’s what he 
said, and is on record on that one. So whenever he calls for peace why should…we must be 
skeptical. (Interview with Wisdom Mudzungairi, 15 May 2015, Harare).  
It is instructive to note that the basis the scepticism about the call for peace is informed 
by selected historical accounts about the private press’s past experiences and interactions with 
ruling party politicians as well as journalistic attributes consistent with the watchdog function 
whereby the press is expected to hold public officials to account. As noted earlier the watchdog 
role of the press is adversarial and distrustful of political authority.  
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The necessity of the press to question authority in journalism is clearly enunciated by 
Dumisani Muleya when he says that:  
…you see, people don’t operate in a vacuum, people have histories, they have patterns of behaviour. When 
politicians tell us that, because most of the time, in the first place they are the sources of the problem. They 
don’t exclusively cause violence but largely they incite violence they themselves. So when they turn around 
and say no more violence, no more this, we report what they say but skeptically so, because we tend to 
think that they are not being honest because we have seen them acting, eh, eh, eh, this, what do they say in 
South Africa? We have seen them indicating right and turning left, so in other words they have double 
standards. Eh, we do not trust them all that much and in any case Journalism is based quite a lot on 
scepticism most of the time, particularly things official, report them fairly, accurately, but be skeptical 
about them because you do not want to end up being a tabula rassa, eh, we use an approach that is based 
on scepticism because that way you are able to question how, since Mugabe is calling for an end to 
violence when he has been mainly the chief instigator of violence. He has used electoral violence to gain 
power, he has used electoral violence to consolidate power and maintain power. So why should we believe 
him this time around? (Interview with Dumisani Muleya, 11 May, 2015, Harare.  
These sentiments demonstrate that privately-owned journalists hold pre-conceived ideas 
about ruling party politicians whom they regard as dishonest, people with double standards, and 
therefore lacking in integrity. Naturally, they are bound to be dismissive of their peace messages. 
With such a background it is also not difficult to appreciate why, when the private press 
discredited the electoral verdicts, the main basis for that, (with the exception of the 2013 
harmonised elections)
40
, was that the alleged prevalence of “coercion”41 (The Zimbabwe 
Independent, 15-03-2002, p6).  
 
                                                          
40
 In 2013 the justification for discrediting the elections was mainly to do with electoral irregularities other than 
violence. For example “Peaceful vote marred by anomalies”(Daily News, 03-08-13, p11) “EU says Zim poll peaceful, 
withholds judgement on fairness” (Newsday, 03-08-13, p4), “Sadc, AU blast ‘flawed poll’(Newsday, 03-08-13, p3), 
“Free but not fair”(The Zimbabwe Independent, 02-08-13, p8), “Polls may be peaceful, not fair- ZDI” (Newsday, 29-
07-13, p5) 
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Tellingly, the competing versions of reality constructed by the state-owned and the 
privately-owned press on the advocacy for peace bring to light the issue of how the press 
exercises its discretionary power to construct particular versions of reality. It also shows that 
concepts such “violence” and “peace” are invested with hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
value.  While the state-owned press positioned themselves as moral agents in the national interest 
the privately-owned press was cynical about the Zanu (PF)’s sincerity in the appeal for peace. 
The implication of this is that the reportage of election violence became a terrain for strategically 
managing news and representations. To this extent Wolsfeld’s (1992) arguments about the role 
of the media in situations of unequal power come to mind. He argues that in an unequal conflict, 
the weaker party must find ways of “bringing third parties to the conflict on its side in order to 
create a more equal balance of power” (Wolfsfeld 1992, 1). He adds that in that scenario the 
media play a critical role to bring the case to the public agenda so that other third parties can also 
respond (Wolfsfeld 1991, 2).  
The view of this thesis is that the two press camps became part of the conflict between 
the opposition and the ruling party. Onyebadi and Oyedeji (2011, 226) also made similar 
observations to those of Wolfsfeld when they concluded that the press’s role during the 2007 
Kenyan election fluctuated from incitement of violence to ‘moral witnesses’ when political 
violence broke out in December 2007. The findings in this chapter suggest a consistent pattern of 
competing discursive constructions of reality which is motivated by ideological differences. This 
has got wider implications for democracy. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to discuss three themes emanating from the textual data and 
interviews with media practitioners from the state-owned and the privately-owned newspapers. 
The three themes examined are memorialisation, condemnation and peace advocacy. The two 
press camps constructed contrasting versions of reality in relation to election violence which 
speak to their diametrically opposed ideological values. Different discursive strategies were 
deployed to construct a reality of election violence that either legitimised or de-legitimised the 
electoral process and the outcome. The competing versions of reality constructed by the press in 
the context of Zimbabwean elections brings to the fore new ways of thing thinking about election 
violence and the role of the press in the mediation of electoral violence. The findings in this 
chapter throw open conceptions of election violence in that the meaning of election violence 
depends on who is invoking it and for what purpose or under what condition.  
From a theoretical standpoint the discursive constructions on memorialisation and 
condemnation of election violence and advocacy for peace are significant in so far as they bring 
under the spotlight the fact that the press does not report news, nor does it reflect on social 
reality, but constructs particular regimes of truth circumscribed by given socio-political 
considerations. This has far reaching implications for reporting political conflict and raises 
questions about the efficacy of the liberal democratic normative model on the role of the media 
in societies saddled by social and political cleavages. Normative prescriptions about the role of 
the press in a democracy are pivoted on the presumption that the press reports the “truth” and 
furnish the citizenry with information to make informed choices. If what the press produces is 
anything but versions of reality the implications are that the role of the press’s role in a 
democracy needs continuous rethinking. The next chapter examines citizen discourses on 
election violence and its mediation.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CITIZEN DISCOURSES ON ELECTORAL 
VIOLENCE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the discursive constructions of electoral violence by selected 
Zimbabwean citizens who live in the capital city, Harare in order to gain insights into how 
citizens vocalise their conceptions and experiences of election violence. Empirical data was 
obtained from a corpus of text from transcripts of interviews with twenty-one participants who 
are regular readers of the mainstream newspapers in Zimbabwe. The texts were subjected to 
discourse analysis using the hermeneutic approach (see Chapter Three).  
The analysis was aimed at mapping out particular discursive themes and narratives about 
the way in which citizens conceive and experience election violence in real life and in the press 
and how those experiences are projected through language. Theoretically the analysis is pivoted 
on the social constructionist epistemology which posits that language does not merely reflect the 
world and social phenomena but constructs and shapes “ideas, social processes and phenomena 
that make up our social world” (Nikander 2006, 2).  McGregor (2003, 2) rightly posits that 
discourse analysis “challenges us to move from seeing language as abstract to seeing our words 
as having meaning in a particular historical, social and political condition”. The chapter 
addresses three key questions namely: 
 How do citizens make sense of electoral violence in Zimbabwe? 
 How do citizens assess and evaluate press discursive constructions of electoral violence? 
 What normative roles do the citizens prescribe for the press in relation to election 
violence? 
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Guided by these questions a number of discourses and sub-discourses that speak to the way 
in which citizens construct their experiences of election violence or their assessments of 
press reporting of election violence were identified. The main discourses discussed in this 
chapter revolve around citizen conceptions of election violence, citizen assessments of press 
reporting of election violence, the influence of press reporting of election violence on citizens 
and citizen prescriptions on election violence. Theses discourses constitute a significant shift 
in the way in which we think about citizens in the sense that, although their interpretations 
remain in the private domain, citizens become privileged social actors capable of critically 
engaging with the press, thereby altering current thinking about the political communication 
process. 
7.2 The Respondents 
The purposive sampling strategy employed in this thesis implies that the selection of 
participants was informed by predetermined considerations that are in line with the objectives of 
the study. For instance, the readership of newspapers, particularly those published in the English 
language required above basic functional literacy skills. Participants for this study had a 
minimum of Ordinary Level education, with the highest level of education being a Master’s 
Degree. Participants read newspapers from across the media regularly and all of them read more 
than one newspaper. The majority of participants read almost all the printed newspapers 
published in Zimbabwe at the time of the study. A few of them read the online versions of the 
mainstream Zimbabwean newspapers and other online news sources that focus on Zimbabwe. 
Among my respondents were an airtime vendor, a university lecturer, a teacher, a priest, a 
business woman, a medical student, and a laboratory technician.  
As mentioned in Chapter Three respondents were assigned pseudonyms in order to 
protect their identity. Figure 7.1 below outlines in graphic form the newspapers that the 
participants read for news and information about elections in Zimbabwe.
42
 
 
                                                          
42
 The values indicated in the graph reflect the number of times a specific newspaper was mentioned by 
participants as constituting a source of news and information about elections in Zimbabwe and not necessarily a 
popularity of a particular newspaper. 
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Figure 7.1: Newspapers read by participants for news and information on elections. 
As shown in Figure 7.1 above, The Herald and Newsday had the highest number of ‘mentions’ 
having been mentioned by all the 21 respondents. This is followed by the Daily News (14), The 
Standard (8), The Sunday Mail (7), The Zimbabwe Independent (5) and The Chronicle, Manica 
Post
43
, The Patriot and The Zimbabwean were all mentioned once (1).  
Although the question on newspapers read was primarily meant as an entry point for 
substantive discussion about press reporting on election violence, it also served to validate the 
rationale for selecting newspapers from which archival textual material analysed in Chapters 
Five and Six was drawn. The specific question asked was “which newspapers do you read for 
news and information on elections in Zimbabwe?” It must  however, be borne in mind that this 
was by no means an attempt at a public opinion survey on the most read or the most popular 
newspaper, but rather an indication of the off the cuff responses about the newspapers 
participants read to access news and information about elections. 
                                                          
43
 The Chronicle and The Manica Post are mainly distributed in Matabeleland and Manicaland provinces 
respectively and less in the capital Harare where the interviews were conducted. 
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 As no survey questionnaire was used respondents were not obliged to mention any 
specific number of newspapers they read for news and information about elections, but could 
only mention those that came to mind without probing. The open ended nature of the question 
meant that respondents could either preface their list with a statement such as “I read all the 
newspapers” or they could first attempt to list them, but could realise that they read many 
newspapers and then they would say “I can say I read all the newspapers”. Be that as it may, this 
information provides an insight on newspapers that shape public opinion on elections in 
Zimbabwe.   
7.3 Making Sense of Election Violence: Citizen Perspectives 
 
Some of the respondents used language in a particular way to construct their conceptions 
and perceptions about the reality of election violence in the Zimbabwean context. They talked 
about their experiences of election violence, the nature of election violence, causes of election 
violence, perpetrators of election violence and responsibility for election violence, all of which 
were conveyed through certain linguistic constructs that speak to their social and political 
context. Although respondents foregrounded physical violence, they also talked about non-
physical manifestations of election violence. They used a repertoire of words to describe their 
experiences of election violence and to distinguish its physical from its non-physical forms. In 
the words of one respondent:  
There is violence which is silent violence, like some form of a cold war where you don’t notice 
how violent these people are, but they will be sabotaging everything which led to our economy 
falling down, but they were not physical, but the impact was felt nationwide that something 
somewhere is happening, sabotage, something like that. Whereas the physical part of it resulted in 
people losing their homes, farms and so forth, where people destroyed things just for political 
reasons. So it has negatively impacted on the development of the country. (C1). 
Respondents construct election violence as both visible and invisible but its 
destructive effects are widespread rather than localised. Election violence is also 
constructed as signifying loss and destruction.  
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This conception of election violence has close affinity to classifications by Fisher 
(2002), Albert (2007) and Reif (2012) who view election violence as encompassing 
physical, psychological and structural elements of election violence and other forms of 
coercion. Respondents thus viewed election violence in a much wider sense and 
highlighted its multiple dimensions. The following statements illustrate this: 
My understanding of election violence, it’s any abuse, physical abuse, intimidation as well. Basically, any 
utterance or anything, that is said or if you are forced to do something.  For me that’s eeh, violence, 
because you are going against my, my, my will. Aha. If I don’t volunteer to do something but I am forced to 
do something, then that violence as far as I am concerned. Aha (C11). 
My understanding of election violence is forcing somebody to think the way you think. Maybe you are 
forcing that person through fighting, or beating him or using words through scolding that person or 
labeling him, or giving him names, maybe you might say the person is illiterate or whatever just because 
you want him to think the way you think. For me that is election violence (C2). 
My understanding of election violence is fighting between competing political parties. This fighting might 
be singing parody songs directed at an opponent usually who will have been defeated. The victors will sing 
songs that lampooning the losers. This verbal or vocal violence which has the potential to degenerate into 
physical or even arsenal violence which can destroy human life. You see, or even infrastructure. It 
destroys. So it has far reaching consequences (C9). 
Words such as “fighting”, “beating”, “forcing” , “coercion”, “brutal”, and “burnt”, 
“arsenal” connote physical electoral violence which is destructive, what Reif (2012, 6) 
refers to as “noisy” or “observable physical and “observable coercion” which he 
distinguishes from “quiet” or non-physical and unobservable election violence”. “Quiet” 
electoral violence is signified by such words and phrases as “intimidation”, “forcing 
someone to think”, “scolding”, “giving names”, “lampooning”, “verbal”, “vocal” and 
“labeling”. Thus election violence is more than just the infliction of physical harm as it is 
also perpetrated through verbal communication or silent forms. These narratives show 
that election violence transcends visible physical violence which is often highlighted by 
the press. Citizen narratives on election violence view election violence through a wider 
lens and they are borne out of the lived experiences and memory of the citizens.  
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Their narratives bear the imprints of victimhood, but also of moral witnesses to 
the destructive impulses of election violence. The following statement illustrates this: 
From my own point of view, from my experience, actually it was back in 2002 when I personally 
experienced election violence which took place in the neighbourhood where I was staying back in 
Kwekwe, where houses were burnt. My own grandfather’s place was burnt down. Actually, it was 
a group of Zanu (PF) youth who would try to coerce you if your political affiliation was different. 
They would coerce you to support their party using different means like brutal means or 
otherwise. That’s how the violence comes in. And the two parties would end up fighting for 
support through that form of coercion. So for me election violence involves two sides, actually 
multiple sides (C1). 
Respondents were able to remember and reconstruct incidences of election 
violence which happened many years back because they personally experienced and 
witnessed them. As privileged discursive actors, they are able to dissect the beast that 
election violence with the authority of experts. Thus election violence is viewed as a 
product of unhealthy political competition. The use of the second person and 
indeterminate pronouns, “you” and your” in the statement “who would try to coerce you 
if your political affiliation was different. They would coerce you to support their party 
using different means like brutal means or otherwise”, signify that the election violence 
was indiscriminate. It might also mean that some respondents were afraid to mention the 
names of the perpetrators or victims of violence, thus underscoring the subterranean 
nature of election violence. Thus citizen narratives about election violence were bounded 
by the political context. It is, however, instructive, to note that unlike Reif (2012) who 
conceives election violence as both a spontaneous and organic phenomenon, citizen 
narratives in this thesis mainly accentuate election violence as an organised activity. 
Respondents’ stories about election violence were replete with words that underscore the 
currency of intrigue, subterfuge, and the machinations and manipulative antics of an 
invisible third force.  
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The statements below demonstrate this instrumental logic of election violence: 
But also even if we look at the level of violence that happened it wasn’t like nationwide violence. It 
was in certain…here and there. And also even planned violence, planned violence, a way whereby 
people don’t just haphazardly get pushed into a corner so that they become violent. The violence 
is well planned by people who want to achieve certain objectives. Either way, either party, you 
know is planned. It’s planned for by people because people in this country eeh, if you take away 
their things they will just say let it be so, they just get pained. But violence in this country is well 
orchestrated; it’s planned for by people taking advantage of the unemployed youths, take 
advantage of hunger during difficult times, taking advantage of their ignorance (C15). 
It seems Zimbabwe is a peace-loving country but there is a group of people who are only being 
used by these political leaders in orchestrating violence. So what I would think would improve the 
situation through the media is to expose those elements, where, whoever is trying to orchestrate 
violence should be exposed. The public should know about what they are doing, so that they would 
not go ahead and cause such troubles for the country. At the moment the media are not doing this 
because they are afraid of exposing some political party leaders and so forth. They only report 
along their political allegiance (C1). 
There are certain individuals in every country, everywhere, who…There are people who will 
always be violent. Right? And there are people who are lazy. So when you get a combination of 
laziness and a violent character now… And somebody who wants to get into power, that equation 
now it will stir violence because this lazy person now, all they want is money now… He brings 
now, hoards of people, now and then violence starts. So it’s just like something that is in every 
human being that there is always a certain quota of people who are violent and lazy. But because 
we do not have an industry; that’s a problem now, when you have idle people. They can easily be 
influenced because somebody says “I will give you 50 dollars, you know, I will buy you beer, 
wear this T-Shirt, Dad lets go, I want you to be dancing the whole night, you will be dancing you 
know, spreading  posters. Like even yesterday, the MDC trucks they were moving, you could see 
that these guys at the back of the pickup they are all drunk… (C13). 
They are being influenced, they are being influenced. As far as I am concerned no one can just 
come and go outside without an incentive. They are given some incentives to do that. And then 
when they are arrested, somebody is going to pay for them. Yeah, the party, yeah. If they could 
have done as what as what eh, eh, a person like Joyce Mujuru actually said in Bindura at one 
time. She actually stood up, after the 2008, eh, eh general election and she said; if somebody is 
sending you to go and beat somebody do not think that the party is going to do something for you. 
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Two, do not think that the person who has sent you is going to be arrested, it’s you. According to 
our Shona culture, ngozi inouya kwauri iwewe wauraya (an avenging spirit will go and torment 
the person who has killed and not the person who sent him). You see. Mukangange muchitumwa 
imi vakomana muchienda muchienda kunouraya vanhu imhosva yenyu. Wazvionaka iwe (If you 
are being send to kill by someone it’s your fault. Do you see that?  Don’t be sent by somebody to 
kill because nemhaka yekuti unoda nhanikire (because you want, I mean) He sends you to kill and 
you are culpable. Kanazve iwe ukasungwa uyu haasungwe uyu, nokuti (If you are arrested the 
person who sent you will not be arrested, because…) the police will just arrest the person who 
has committed the crime, not the person who sent you. Because unoramba, unoti handina 
kumbomutuma ini (Because he will deny responsibility. He will say I did not send him). You can’t 
produce evidence that you were sent. So these people knew that the people who committed crimes 
were being send by other people, Wazviona? (You see?) (C5).  
Citizens project election violence as isolated and coordinated thus accentuating the 
instrumentality of election violence. The instrumental discourse underscores the lack of agency 
by perpetrators of election violence. The instrumental logic of election violence projected in this 
thesis speaks to the very contextual circumstances of fragile societies whereby election violence 
is underpinned by rent-seeking behaviour. This shows that discourse is circumscribed by context, 
suggesting that the participants’ discursive constructions of electoral violence are shaped by their 
socio-political context. The statements above are replete with words and phrases which not only 
suggest that election violence is organised, but also that people who commit election violence 
lack agency. Such words and phrases include, “being used”, “being influenced”, “easily 
influenced”, “given incentives” “sent to kill” and “being send by other people”. The lack of 
agency by perpetrators of election violence resonates with findings by scholars like Mueller 
(2013) who has documented how violent gangs and vigilante groups controlled by the state and 
opposition politicians in Kenya were mobilised to intimidate, kill, maim and displace opponents 
before and during elections between 1990 and 2007.  De Smedt (2009,595) also notes how the 
opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Raila Odinga in Kenya mobilised 
youthful gangs in the slum residence of Kibera to loot and destroy opponent Kikuyu shops and 
houses in return for rewards and advantages symptomatic of a “patron-client” relationship and 
politics of the “big Man” (De Smedt 2009, 595). This demonstrates that perpetrators of election 
violence are in the majority of cases organised and sponsored. However, the Kenyan experience 
shows that political principals, be they state or individual politicians may lose control or 
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sponsorship of their gangs, in which case they take “a life of their own” or become “ virtual 
shadow states” resulting in the state losing its “legitimate monopoly of force”  ( De Smedt 2009, 
105). 
Apart from the organic or sponsorship frame of election violence, respondents also 
viewed election violence through the “Bad Apples” discourse, whereby election violence is 
attributable to a few “misguided”, “lazy”, “unemployed” youths who are manipulated by the 
political elite. This “Few Bad Apples” discourse is pivoted on essentialist claims like “Zimbabwe 
is a Christian country”, “Zimbabweans are peace-loving people”, or that “there is no culture of 
violence in Zimbabwe”. Such claims give way to a religious mantra whereby election violence is 
associated with evil spirits. For instance, one participant described Zimbabweans as people who 
are “blessed” because they like “good life”. She said: 
So I think that Zimbabweans generally don’t have a culture of violence. They have a culture of taking 
advantage of opportunities. They always want to grab opportunities for work, where an opportunity to 
work arises they grab them quickly. They want to enhance their material conditions. Although, sometimes, 
because violence is a spirit it can possess anyone who would have been agitated (C15). 
Constructing Zimbabweans in this way raises two salient issues in relation to election 
violence. Firstly, the statement suggests the existence of a link between election violence and the 
economic crisis occasioned by land reform and economic sanctions and the effects of Operation 
Murambatsvina (see Chapter Four).  
The deepening economic crisis characterised by high unemployment and the shrinking of 
economic opportunities created a fertile ground for patron-client relationships whereby the youth 
and other vulnerable groups become cannon fodder on the chess-board of political God-fathers. 
This shows that election violence is deeply intertwined with the economy. Secondly, 
constructing electoral violence as a spirit evokes theological discourses on election violence 
whereby it is regarded as a moral rather than a political problem (Matikiti, 2012). According to 
Matikiti (2012, 34) “Violence is at odds with the spirit of the gospels. Jesus was consistently 
non-violent throughout his ministry. He advised his followers to learn to love their enemies”. 
Constructions of election violence suggest that citizens view election violence as senseless or 
irrational (Juris, 2005) and they defer to the metaphysical world.  
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Viewing election violence this way fed into the instrumental discourses of election 
violence in the sense that any person could get possessed by a spirit if it chooses to. By the same 
reasoning anyone can get “possessed” by the “demon” of violence if the demon chose to because 
a “spirit” comes and goes as it wishes. Zimbabwe is constructed as a “Christian nation” with 
“peace-loving” and election violence only erupts during election time; the moments of madness. 
Constructing election violence as a spirit reinforces discourses about election violence being a 
preserve of a ‘few misguided elements’. Thus, when they talked about election violence 
respondents evoked discourses about Zimbabwean exceptionalism whereby the country is 
constructed as different from the rest of the African countries. The statements below illustrate 
this:   
I do not necessarily think that there is a culture of violence in this country, because of the high 
level of education in the country, because most people who engage in violence, they are people 
who do not have anything to do in life. But if someone is employed and goes to work they cannot 
afford to spend the night at a political gathering or toyi-toying in the streets, this is not possible. 
The people who engage in political violence are people who do not have anything to do in life. 
These are people who do not have anything to do to such an extent that someone will just come 
and buy them beer and say to them “right, guys, I would like you to go and do 1, 2, 3 things”. 
Such people are in the minority. But the rest of the population, because the other issue is that 
there are many Christians in our country. They value life. But the issue is that there are some 
bad apples who engage in violence. But the issue is that when it happens, people get frightened 
and you know the number of people affected by this is huge and you know, because of the fear 
factor and also because the minority can also see that, the majority can also see that this is how 
our society has a culture of violence, no its just a small percentage of people. (C7). 
What I have observed is that the violence, especially the perpetrators of the violence, they are 
coming from one age-group. That’s my observation. They are coming from the youth, especially, 
the youth. If ever there is a case of violence, the perpetrators mainly are the youth. And if you go 
down, down, down, if there is a case of violence again, if there is a case of violence, one or two of 
those cases and in 2008 the perpetrators of the violence they were the youth. And if you go down, 
down, down, those youth, they are being given something to perpetrate violence. So I think it’s 
not a culture, it’s an artificial thing, or it’s a manipulated thing for the violence. If there was a 
culture we all know that my grandmother could practise it, my father could practise it, my sister 
could practise it and myself, could practice it. But I can’t say there is a culture of violence, there 
is no… because one or two cases, especially this time now, of those one or two cases you can see 
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that the perpetrator of the violence they are coming from the youths, and it is being paid violence 
also. (C20). 
It seems the country is a Christian country, they are peace-loving people, comparing to other 
countries where there are Muslims, Christianity, wars and civil wars and something like that. It 
seems Zimbabwe is a peace-loving country but there is a group of people who are only being 
used by these political leaders in orchestrating violence (C1). 
Although constitutionally Zimbabwe is a secular state there has been a tendency 
by various actors, primarily the media to construct the country as a Christian country. 
Such discourses have been fed by the fact that the country has generally enjoyed relative 
peace and stability, particularly after the signing on 22 December 1987 of the peace 
accord between the two the country’s arch political rivals, Zanu (PF) and PF Zapu. It is 
against the backdrop of this artifice of stability and tranquility that the country that the 
‘Christian country’ discourse thrived. Zimbabwean exceptionalism was thus undergirded 
by a discourse of abnormality, whereby election violence was projected as an aberration 
rather than a norm. The abnormality discourse was in turn sustained by essentialist tropes 
and claims that “most people” who perpetrate election violence “are unemployed” or “the 
youth”; constructions which mirror the elitist hegemony of respondents in this study. 
Election violence is thus constructed in relativist terms, a form of rationalization whereby 
election violence is constructed as comparatively lower than that of other African 
countries.  
The following statements are illustrative in this regard: 
Violence is relative. You can’t compare us with Egyptians; you know we are not there. Ehe. 
General violence, there is the South African one, it’s not as bad as in…but it’s bad, that of South 
Africa. It’s bad. You have people moving around with spears and all that, it’s not that bad in 
Zimbabwe. It’s not; it’s not as if there is a lot of violence that happens in Zimbabwe. But 2008 
there was quite a lot of you know, of violence. Eeh, but it has since died down, though personally I 
never saw any people fighting but I remember… (C16). 
Someone was saying to me because, even if you look back, back to Lobengula it was violence, 
after independence, Gukurahundi, it was violence and this person convinced me that Zimbabwe 
only knows the culture of violence because of all these struggles, and that’s why we continue to 
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always fight. But also, if I look at other countries the levels of our violence, I think maybe because 
of my work, I travel a lot. I have been to Sudan for six months. I have been to Kenya to observe 
elections. I look at the extent of violence there, this is nothing. Our violence is nothing. Yeah. 
It’s not comparable. So then I don’t want to normalize violence, but then I would think conflict is 
inevitable in any community but ours, if you compare to other countries, we have not taken guns, 
we have not gone, you see, we don’t have civil unrest, you know those kinds of things, so I think 
I would say our level of violence are…I am not normalizing violence. No. (C10). 
In comparing election violence in Zimbabwe with that of other African countries 
respondents sought to depict election violence in Zimbabwe as less serious. Through this 
comparison respondents sought to rationalise election violence by constructing it as 
relative as well as inevitable. Further, election violence was constructed as part of a larger 
continuum of social, political and historical nation-building processes dating back from 
time immemorial. Election violence was, therefore, synonymous with the birthing of the 
Zimbabwean nation. Hence election violence was conflated with general violence, 
particularly when citizens talked about a “culture of violence” in Zimbabwe. This shows 
that there is an organic link between broader violence in society and electoral violence. 
 Reif (2012, 7) alludes to the connection between election violence and other 
forms of violence in society when she notes that the severity or level of election violence 
correlates with the existence or non-existence of a “high base line of other forms of 
violence”.  De Los Ros (2004, 30) notes that social, economic, and political violence are 
intricately intertwined and “interact simultaneously”. Straus (2012, 195) contends that 
“violent conflicts over access to vital resources are critical forms of political violence that 
deserve greater empirical and theoretical attention”. 
 Straus further notes how in the electoral cases of Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cote d’ 
Ivo ire, the issue of access to land was central to the election violence that occurred in 
these countries. This shows that election violence is a complex phenomenon and is 
intricately interwoven with other forms of violence in society. A profound understanding 
of election violence must of necessity examine how it interacts with other forms of 
general violence in society.  
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7.3.1 Causes of Election Violence 
 
Respondents viewed election violence through an instrumentalist lens whereby election 
violence was constructed as a tool for gaining or retaining political power. The majority of 
respondents projected politicians as people who are intrinsically motivated by the desire for 
power and are prepared to conscript violence as part of the “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 
2002, 36). This election violence-power nexus is discursively illustrated in the following 
statements: 
It’s a desire for power. The desire for power under every circumstance. By any means necessary. You 
want to remain in power; you want to get into power, without anything. Then that is, that causes violence. 
If a person would want to lead, to lead, having been requested by the people, then you are confident, but, 
these people are going to vote for you, why beating them? Why forcing them? (C5). 
I think the causes have to do with power. And power is not in ordinary people. Its power of people who are 
above, the leaders. That’s where there is too much hunger for power. So if people are power hungry they 
will go out of their way to gain power by hook and crook. They are willing to bend the law in order to get 
what they want. I think that is the major problem. The issue of power. People want power and they are 
determined to get it at all costs (C21).  
I think it’s normally driven by greedy by a few individuals because normally we are when we are, working 
towards elections that’s when people, these things normally start coming up. And elections mean that one 
has to get into power and so on and so forth. All the resources that are associated with getting into power. 
So I think electoral violence is driven, you know by those who want to get into power. It will never, it will 
never be an initiative from the electorate itself. (C17). 
These citizen discourses demonstrate that the desire for power is the main motive behind 
election violence. Respondents mentioned both “power retention” and “power gaining”, 
implying that both aspirants for political office and incumbents were culpable of election 
violence. The use of phrases such like  “power under every circumstance”, “remaining in 
power”, “hunger for power”, “willing to bend the rules”, and “greedy” connotes criminality in 
the manner in which election violence is perpetrated and the deficiency in legitimacy by those 
who vie for power.  
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Muller (2011) (see Chapter Two) argues that a politician’s unwillingness to lose elections 
may motivate them to kill their opponents (Muller 2011, 99) or to employ campaign strategies 
that will bias the election process or result in one way or the other (Reif 2012). Mueller further 
argues that that “politicians have powerful incentives to subvert laws and institutions that keep 
them from gaining or retaining power” and will do whatever it takes not to lose power (2011, 
100).  
 In fragile states such as Zimbabwe the acquisition of power is linked to access to 
resources and prospects of enhanced livelihoods. In their narratives respondents talked about 
patronage politics as an irresistible incentive for electoral violence. The following statements are 
poignant examples in this regard: 
Sometimes it is, it is because of poverty, some people, if they are given money, unemployment. They have no 
money. They have nothing to do. They are given money for beer. You see? They enjoy. You see? Just the 
small money that they get will give them the access to good life. They are given transport so that they enjoy 
a free ride, the whole day enjoying themselves. Its lack of commitment to job because a person who has his 
job will not do that, will not find time to beat up another person because he will be having something to do. 
But if you check, because of lack of employment if you go to that Ximex Mall, the number of unemployed 
youths there. They just loiter around the whole day. If you go there with your car and give them $10 each, 
let’s go, they will go with you. That’s a job. To them that’s a job (C5). 
Mainly people fear losing, because in Zimbabwe now those (political office) have become jobs, you know. 
A person will say to his wife, I mean, I am going to work. He is going to Parliament and you say you are 
going to work. It’s not a job. That’s the problem now. It has to be demystified, that being in public office 
you can get out any time. So once people, like in America they change, they give each other an opportunity 
to prove their stupidity. Like if Tsvangirai had won maybe the elections in 2005, in 2010 people would have 
noticed that this one ah, we were wrong, they choose another one. But now people would be thinking that 
it’s a job now, (C13). 
I think maybe basically people know that whoever is coming into government is going to have an effect or 
impact on their lives so what they believe is that the person whom they don’t think carries their values 
comes into power then it will be disastrous for them. So that very same person thought he will make them 
want to force other people to support their cause or candidate so that they have their own way. I think that 
is the reason why there is violence. (C3). 
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These statements show that respondents view election violence in Zimbabwe as 
intricately interwoven with the country’s social and economic problems. They view 
election violence as a product of unequal socio-economic structures which reproduce 
unequal relations between the poor and the powerful political elite. These inequalities 
breed networks of patronage in which the poor become pawns on the chessboards of the 
political elite. For the reason that political office becomes a source of livelihood the poor 
are more than prepared to die for politicians as their fates become intertwined. Sisk 
(discussed in Chapter Two) argues that: 
When winning a state office is the key to livelihood not just for an individual, but for the entire 
clan, faction, or even ethnic group, the stakes involved in prevailing in electoral competition are 
incidentally high. Studies of election-related violence often highlight the perpetuation of patronage 
politics , or a system in which politicians are gang-like “bosses” that control resources (such as 
access to jobs and income) and dispense public services such as housing, healthcare or lucrative 
government contracts (Sisk 2008, 9).  
This demonstrates that election violence is deeply implicated in a society’s social 
structures. One respondent attributed election violence to the destruction of these 
networks of political patronage through sanctions imposed on ruling party politicians. 
According to this respondent, sanctions did not just undercut networks of patronage, but 
also polarised society along political lines. He said that: 
Because what happens now with those people, even if you look at organisations which are under 
sanctions and all those asset freezes. If you just look at a travel ban, like for one major politician 
now. You will now have maybe his wife, the wife will have relatives. And then he himself has 
relatives, young brothers who have their children and they are all looking up to this person. It will 
be like a pyramid with that person at the top and it will be going down. So when that person is no 
longer able to go to London to do his business and do whatever they now feel like somebody 
caused this because they would know from a long time, you know when Babamukuru (uncle) 
comes from London we will get this and that and we get some clothes, we get these things. Those 
things will stop coming. Maybe when he will go to London, he will get those free buses, these 
ones which have no place to dump. He comes with about 10 buses and he gives a lot. When he 
goes to the people and say ah, no guys I can no longer go to London, you know those buses you 
we cannot get them because of the sanctions. It’s because of these guys. Those people now have 
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got this mentality to say we have to kill them (those advocating for sanctions). They are making us 
suffer. We should make them suffer as well. (C13). 
These statements reveal that citizens do not view election violence as an event, but rather 
deeply implicated in larger power contestations. This brings to the fore the efficacy of externally 
driven political intervention strategies such as economic sanctions and other embargoes, 
particularly in socially and politically fractured societies. Although economic sanctions may be a 
useful remedy for effecting equal balance of power in unequal power conflicts (Wolfsfeld 1992, 
1) such interventions may backfire if they are externally driven. Sanctions may help undercut the 
power of the superior party in the conflict by weakening structures of patronage but they may 
also polarize and breed a culture of impunity, vindictiveness, and violent reprisals against the 
weaker party. This is significant as it is revealing in understanding some of the causes election 
violence.  
A profound understanding of the causes of election violence in Zimbabwe can be gained 
by paying attention to participants’ narratives on the connection between election violence in 
contemporary Zimbabwe and historical violence such as the liberation struggle. Some 
respondents interpreted election violence as part of a seamless culture of violence rooted in the 
country’s colonial and anti-colonial legacy. In this sense election violence was conceived as part 
and parcel of the broader culture of political violence seeded through colonialism and the 
liberation struggle. The following statements are instructive in this regard: 
I think that at times it’s something (violence) that the whole nation just acquired, probably coming from the 
liberation struggle and so forth because if you look at The Herald, you know. If you buy it, its use of you 
know, its use of, what isit called, this Chibombo exhumations, gruesome you know, those things that took 
place and then it’s displayed in a national paper for everyone to see. So that culture already is being 
celebrated that this is who we are, we are from this. This is what is going to identify us. So right now I 
know people who I know, who got involved in violence just because they think that it has some historical, 
you know, it has got a historical background. Being violent in itself becomes something which is 
indispensable because people believe that this is how we construct our, what, our nation and our policies 
were born out of violence. So violence is now being celebrated, which is not supposed to happen. And you 
also see that it doesn’t go back to the liberation struggle. The pro-democracy movement is also beginning 
to buy into the same, the same story, to say there were people who were victimised you know, from 2000 
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and so forth and so forth. They also trace events like Gukurahundi and so forth. So the whole culture has 
become an issue of violence. Its mooted everywhere, wherever you go, it’s always…yeah. (C17). 
Basically, the way this country like came up was violently. So we would blame the liberation struggle, the 
people who advocated for that because in South Africa such issues don’t occur because there was no 
violence to start with for them to get in there. There were just a few people shot in demonstrations. People 
who were put in prison, but you know, but violence that comes out in war puts a certain mindset in people, 
that you know we can do anything. And even after the war there was that issue of the small civil war that, 
so people generally were now violent because they go into that war, so the real reason that this violence is 
occurring is because of the liberation struggle. So the person to blame obviously will be people who 
organized that liberation struggle. But even if now, but now if you try to go against those people now, they 
will be saying you know, this education that you are enjoying, you know that University there, you know 
you wouldn’t just have black people and you now feel like violence is justified. That’s like maybe the 
problem that’s occurring. Because these people they started the whole thing, right and they justified and 
said no, we have to fight for our country. And the people they felt like it’s correct. And they said “Aah we 
fought for it”. (C13). 
Respondents constructed a historicisation discourse whereby election violence was 
constructed as part of the broader process of nation-building and national identity formation 
starting with the liberation struggle. This historicisation is pivoted on rationalisation and blame 
discourses in the sense that the liberation struggle is portrayed as a necessary evil and election 
violence is constructed as inevitable because it is embedded in the nation’s history. Such 
discourses run counter to exceptionalist discourses, particularly the view that there is no culture 
of election violence in Zimbabwe. This shows that citizens constructed contradictory discourses 
in relation to causes of election violence.  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011, 2) attributes election violence to the existence of a culture of 
violence. His contention is that the ruling party, Zanu (PF) has constructed and deployed 
ideologies of violence to silence its enemies and opponents and to eventually claim to be the 
divinely ordained heir to the nationalist revolutionary spirit running from the primary resistance 
of the 1890s to mass nationalism of the 1960s, the armed liberation struggle of the 1970s up to 
the present”. Similarly, Darnolf (1997, 15) argues “that countries whose independence processes 
were violent can be expected to have lower tolerance for deviance”.  
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Citizen narratives on election violence demonstrate that a nation’s history plays a pivotal 
role in shaping a nation’s political culture, values, attitudes and norms ((Darnolf 1997). 
Understanding election violence as part of a historical continuum is significant in that it 
demonstrates that election violence is intricately interwoven with history. 
 
7.4 Questioning the Press: Citizen Assessments of Press Reporting of Election Violence 
The respondents constructed various discourses around the way in which the press 
represented election violence in Zimbabwe. Four types of discourses are discussed in this regard, 
namely; polarisation discourse, exaggeration discourse, cover-ups and the influence of election 
reporting. 
7.4.1 Polarisation 
All the 21 respondents complained about press polarisation in reporting election violence. 
They projected polarisation of the press along political lines as undesirable, harmful and 
detrimental to ethical and informative reporting.  Respondents were generally in agreement in 
their observation that the press was partial in its reportage. On the one hand the state press 
focused on violence perpetrated by the opposition while maintaining silence on election violence 
perpetrated by the ruling party. On the other hand, the privately-owned press paid attention to 
election violence perpetrated by the ruling party while ignoring election violence perpetrated by 
the opposition party. Thus interview respondents accentuated words and phrases that depict 
‘bias’, ‘partiality’, ‘imbalance’, ‘selectivity’ and ‘lack of neutrality’ in reports on election 
violence.  
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The following statements illustrate of these sentiments: 
The issue of election violence is handled by newspapers; let me call them media houses in different ways 
because each media house has got its own agenda. So for their seed which they sowed secretly to germinate 
in a manner that they like they must use newspapers for their seed, be it a seed of violence or peace it must 
germinate…So violence can be talked about in different ways depending on the political agenda of a 
particular newspaper and the political agenda of their sponsors or funders. The state-owned newspapers 
will not report that the government is killing people because people will say you are bad. The privately 
owned newspaper, which is the one that has brought opposition political parties, because that is the one 
that brings the opposition, must say opposition party supporters are being beaten. But where in the world 
have you seen a situation whereby only supporters of a single party are killed while they are folding their 
arms. That is not possible. Where there is a fight it is always two bulls that fight. (C9). 
The coverage of election violence has largely depended on which newspaper is reporting on the issue. If it 
is the Daily news, it will report that Zanu (PF) has wronged in such and such a way, it caused this and that 
and sometimes criticising even the good things that Zanu (PF) might have done, but the Daily News will 
find faults. Then The Herald will report in such a way that there is nothing positive that comes out of the 
MDC, nothing good will come out of the party. The paper will write in such a way that whatever the MDC 
does is wrong. You will find that as citizens, we may have respect for our leaders, Prime Minister, 
President and so on, but the impression that the MDC is a party which is there to cause violence this and 
that, in a propagandist way. Then comes the MDC it will also be propagating its own propaganda. Because 
of this it becomes difficult for you to get the real truth; you will be left ignorant and biased to such an 
extent that if you read The Herald only you will be left thinking that Mr. Tsvangirai is not good. If you read 
the Daily News, you will also be left thinking that President Mugabe is not good. (C6). 
What I have noticed is that The Herald usually covers violence within the MDC most of the time. I am not 
sure if this is intra-party violence that is violence within the MDC party itself, unlike what the likes of Daily 
News and Newsday will be reporting that people were beaten in Chitungwiza and in Mutare as well. This 
you find in independent newspapers, but the likes of The Herald they try as much as possible to just ignore 
such things. Unless if it is violence within the party. (C21). 
I notice that the News Day focuses on violence perpetrated by Zanu (PF) while The Herald focuses on the 
violence perpetrated by the MDC, which means the two newspapers contradict each other, it’s like they 
blame the other party which they are not supporting for perpetrating violence, while the other paper is also 
on the other side. So at the end of the day you have to check the facts yourself as a person… I have got a lot 
of things that I feel I don’t like. It’s mostly to do with bias whereby a certain newspaper might be hitting on 
one party to the extent that  it even ignores things that are happening next to them, because, like this thing, 
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like violence in Zanu (PF). The Herald would ignore such reports whereby they hear Zanu (PF) people 
have attacked so and so, but they would rather ignore the thing because they are in support of the party, 
while the News Day would also ignore things that MDC would do like violence, they would keep a blind 
eye on such issues and yet it’s happening more often within the party. Sometimes they sensationalize also, 
where they say people have been raped, people have been what, what, and all those things but we have 
never seen some of those things happening. (C1). 
Eh, I will categorise these newspapers. There is state media, you can see even if you take today’s 
newspaper, you can see that this paper is covering the, the, they are de- campaigning, if, if violence 
happens they will say it’s not happening. No matter, there are some people who have been killed or who 
have been injured because of that. As long as the people who perpetrate that violence belong to the state 
they don’t cover it as violence. And when we go to the private press, eh, yeah, they do report but sometimes 
their view on election violence we, we can, its balanced but sometimes they exaggerate a bit, so that maybe 
because they want to sensitize, the, the, the issue so that people can respond the way they want.(C8) 
These statements illustrate the press constructed competing versions of reality about the 
same event, meaning that the informative mandate of the press is compromised. Respondents 
view press reporting of election violence as driven by the political agendas rather than the need 
to inform the public.  
Respondents use words and phrases that underscore antagonism between the state press 
and the privately-owned press in relation to reporting of election violence. Such words include 
“differently”, “it depends”, “the other side”, “one party” and “contradict”. These words and 
phrases construct the press as irreconcilable polar opposites. Further, phrases, such as “own 
agendas”, “political agendas”, and “propaganda” evoke conspiratorial motives behind the 
polarisation and partisanship. Some respondents highlighted negative manifestations of 
polarisation such as selectivity whereby news about some incidents of political violence were 
given salience while others were suppressed depending on the political party involved.  
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One respondent talked about how the press may suppress news about deaths caused by 
election violence. 
I think these newspapers are skewed in either direction. I had the privilege of having gone to the rural 
areas, like what I said, I went to Rusape over the weekend; I went on Saturday and came back on Sunday. I 
actually witnessed violence which happened there first hand. I just thought maybe this incident was not 
going to come out in the papers but then quite interestingly around, I think I came back around lunch hour 
and I saw an article in Newsday, but in terms of content now what actually transpired and what was in the 
article, there are so many details that are not what, that are not there. Myself. I am not a journalist but you 
know I was even able to tell the story for more than ten minutes, what actually transpired and names and 
everything. But then the courage, it had almost, it had less than 100 words in the newspaper. There were so 
many things that were not mentioned. So I really feel that the papers are not doing enough. They are 
leaving out some crucial information which would make a person who did not witness the event first hand 
understand what really transpired. You can even conform this in the online user generated comments that 
are there. These are some of the questions that people ask, that when was this, but we didn’t know who 
killed the person or who killed who, that information is really not there. People really want the actual, the 
factual information, it’s not really there. What is mostly there is the analysis and then they are into 
propaganda and things like that, into sensationalism. (C17) 
Partisanship in reporting election violence militated against citizens getting 
factual information about what had transpired. Election violence reporting was prone to 
selectivity resulting in citizens being ignorant about what exactly was happening in the 
country. In order to bridge the information gaps some respondents said they resorted to 
reading different newspapers or the online media in order to obtain complete or 
alternative accounts of events.  
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One respondent said:  
If you read all the newspapers like myself, I read all the newspapers because of the access to the 
Internet that I have, I can read all the newspapers. If you have access to the Internet you can read 
all the newspapers. If you read all the newspapers you can be satisfied with the coverage of 
election violence and you can feel that the coverage is better. But let us say a person does not have 
access to all the newspapers or you only read one newspaper like The Herald. Sometimes there 
might be a problem that you cannot say the coverage is adequate. (C7). 
The polarised reporting of election violence motivated citizens to look for alternative 
sources of information in order to balance their perspectives. Citizens construct themselves as 
active agents who deliberately expose themselves to diverse political views. The fact citizens 
cannot rely on a single newspaper for news and information about election violence is an 
indictment on the press and testament of the fact that election violence reporting is unlike any 
other political beat. There are policy implications here. The lesson learnt is that monopolistic 
ownership structures are inimical to diversity of political views and democratisation. As 
demonstrated by the views of the respondents the solution lies in harnessing online media 
platforms. One respondent, for instance, talked about how selectivity and suppression of 
information complicated things for readers but commented that new communication technologies 
such as Facebook and online newspapers created opportunities for him to triangulate news 
sources in order to establish the veracity of certain news reports about election violence. He 
complained as follows: 
Ya, this kinds of complicates things for the reader in terms of…though with the coming of new 
technology such as Facebook and so forth, you check through the Internet, whether people in 
those areas are agreed with the facts. For example, The Herald Online or the News Day Online 
people comment on the news article confirming whether it is true or not. Then you can see 
whether there has been violence in those areas or not. (C1). 
This suggests that the new media will be the game changer in the new political 
communication dispensation. Moyo (2009) notes how online news websites became 
“parallel markets” for news and information about the 2008 Zimbabwean  harmonised 
election by providing perspectives that were alternative views to those of the state media.  
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Similarly, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter may be 
efficacious for cross-checking news on election violence. However, this is a subject for 
separate investigation. It is trite to say that political polarisation of the press is 
detrimental to the entrenchment of democratization in that the press becomes agents of 
misinformation rather than education and information. The democratic mandate of the 
press to inform and educate the citizenry is predicated on the assumptions that the press 
provides accurate and complete accounts of events rather than sanitized or distorted 
versions of reality.  
A report on the official inquiry into the state of the information and media 
Industry in Zimbabwe (IMPI) (Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Service, 
2014, 146) concluded that media polarisation in Zimbabwe had fuelled deep divisions 
among citizens. Due to the polarization of the press in the country many people were 
“avoiding reading certain newspapers as well as listening to or watching some radio and 
television stations to avoid biased reporting by these outlets” (IMPI Report, 2014, 162). 
This shows that polarisation can exacerbate social and political tensions by sowing seeds 
of mistrust and even demobilising the citizenry politically through its anti-democratic 
tendencies.  
7.4.2 Exaggerations 
The majority of the respondents talked about the negative effects of exaggerations in 
election violence reporting. Significantly, exaggerations were mentioned in the same breath or 
interchangeably referred to as “sensationalism”. Senastionalism has been defined as 
communication that is aimed at arousing immediate and strong emotional reactions among the 
public and “focuses on the senses as a key site of stimulation, and emphasizes bodily and non-
rational actions” (Wiltenburg cited by Green 2012, 98). Sensational news is very loud and 
appeals to the vulgar tastes of the audience, and is aimed at generating empathy among the 
audiences (Uribe and Gunter, cited by Green, 78). From a journalistic perspective sensationalism 
has a pejorative connotation in the sense that the hyping of news is generally regarded as 
unethical. The respondents talked about sensationalism in different ways. Some respondents 
projected it through a pejorative lens while others depicted it euphemistically.  
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Pejorative discursive constructions of sensationalism equated it to exaggerations. Thus, 
respondents complained about the “spicing up of stories”, “exaggerations”, events being “blown 
out of proportion”,  “hyping”, “heightening” and “a lot of nose” in the reporting of election 
violence by the press. The following excerpts from the interviews are illustrative: 
As far as the state media is concerned they make a lot of noise if something has been done by the 
opposition. They will make sure that they have blown it out of proportion. They will give it front page 
coverage. Right? But eeh, whereas nhingiriki (I mean) on the other hand, newspapers like The Standard, 
Newsday and Daily News, anything done by Zanu (PF), they always give it wide coverage, in terms of 
those, the violence.(C11). 
I would say that newspapers, especially those that are controlled by the opposition politics do not at all 
give people information, but only sensationalize. They can have a headline, but if you read the actual story 
you will find that what is in the headline and what is in the actual story is totally different. The reason why 
they do this is that they want to sell the newspaper. And indeed the newspaper will sell. (C9). 
The problem is that the media may continue spicing up stories. That’s how I see it. These things will be 
happening, but the media may continue repeating these stories even where the events are non-existent. 
(C7). 
The respondents projected sensationalism as detrimental to quality journalism in 
that sensational news reports misled the public. Interestingly some respondents talked 
about sensationalism in a euphemistic or positive way in which case they foregrounded 
its necessity to enhance the watchdog function of the press. They argued that 
exaggeration or sensationalism enabled the press to sound the sirens on perpetrators of 
election violence and to draw the attention of the international community on what was 
happening in the country. One respondent conceded that the private press exaggerated 
when they reported on election violence issues but justified it on the grounds that it 
deterred perpetrators of election violence.  
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He said: 
The private press, from my own view I think they just want to sensitize the situation so that no form of any 
violence can, should happen to any person. So they will try to exaggerate so that people would react, even 
the outside world would react so that the people are protected. Maybe that’s their motive, from the way I 
see it…But when the private media of course they try to cover, but on certain issues, maybe, they do it to 
prevent something not to happen. They exaggerate so that they, they, these ones can stop because the 
papers have reported. (C8). 
It is instructive to note how the word sensationalism acquires an instrumental connotation 
of “sensitizing”, meaning to make people aware. This positive instrumentalisation evokes the 
watchdog or the “burglar alarm” journalism function whereby the press acts a public sentinel 
(Norris, 2010), or the public’s eyes and ears as opposed to a “passive recorder of events” 
(Coronel 2010, 112). Coronel notes that “…the myth of the intrepid journalist doggedly pursuing 
the trial of wrongdoing remains very much alive both in the media as well as popular lore”. The 
“burglar alarm” (McQuail 2013, 112) function of the press lends itself well to the reporting of 
election violence because it acts as a deterrent to would be perpetrators of election violence. The 
juxtaposition of optimistic and pessimistic discourses about sensationalism demonstrates that 
there is no consensus regarding the desirability of the watchdog function of the press. Coronel 
(2010, 114) notes how, some critics hold that the adversarial nature of the press may erode public 
trust of the government and democracy itself. This shows that the watchdog role is both desirable 
and undesirable, depending on the specific context; an ambivalence that was quite evident in the 
narratives of some of the respondents.  
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For instance, some respondents indicated that, although reports on election violence were 
sensational they had some grain of truth.  
The following excerpts illustrate this: 
There has been some form of exaggeration in the manner in which newspapers report on election violence. 
Here and there people get angry over one or two issues. (C2). 
…while we say there is some tendency of exaggerating, but the grain of truth can also be found there. So 
much so that there is that balance between truthfulness and some exaggeration, eh, a clever person would 
take a caution for a story covered as that. (C8). 
You will see it probably if you look at The Herald when it is covering issues to do with the opposition. 
There is an element of vilifying. They try to vilify whoever is mentioned in the article. You read probably in 
The Herald and Newsday, the same article, there is an element of sensationalizing the event. Those are 
major differences whereby you cannot really tell what the truth is about the event, what really transpired. 
But you can see now when you read, you can deduce from the subtext, that this one is saying this, this one 
is saying that, so probably this is what is happened. So you can see that there is no paper with the last word 
that one can really visit in order to get a true picture of what transpired. The Herald vilifies and then when 
you look at the other ones they sensationalise so that people become emotional and angry. Those are the 
major differences that you see. (C17). 
Phrases such as “some form of exaggeration”, “a tendency”, “deduce”, and “an element” 
suggest that sensationalized election reports become some kind of a “foggy zone” whereby what 
is reported in the press is neither true nor false.  The implications are that the quality of 
information that citizens get from the press cannot be relied on for making crucial 
decisions.Some participants did not just register their misgivings about sensationalization of 
election violence, but also identified the motives behind it. Respondents mainly attributed 
sensationalism to commercial imperatives, funding models, political agendas and unethical 
behaviour by journalists.  
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The following excerpts illustrate the potency of commercial imperatives: 
I think it has to do with probably, funding and expectations of a newspaper, you know obviously it’s 
commercial. They also want to sell, probably more copies per day. So, on the other hand I think that it does 
not do them any good to just present a story as it is but then if they sensationalize they will sell more 
copies. For example, when the likes of Daily News came they were quite controversial and they started 
taking a larger market share of The Herald, but then it was because of those stories that they thought 
maybe were controversial. Things that people never thought were happening. So I think that probably that 
is one of the reasons why we justify that is why they produce articles like that, to also survive in the market. 
(C17). 
That’s what I was talking about, the issue of sensational reporting, because most of the other newspapers 
are tabloids and what they write about is probably that one story on political violence will be the story for 
the whole newspaper and that’s where they get their money. And now if you look at newspapers like The 
Herald they will not sensationalise because their core business as far as their core business is concerned is 
the classified columns, although they will report on other stories but most of their money comes from the 
classifieds. But these other ones, because that is their cash cow they make sure, because the more people 
rush for a newspaper, for a newspaper it means the sales are increasing.(C4). 
So they are now more looking for money using the situation and emotions surrounding violence. Because 
it’s very emotional because if somebody dies the person has relatives, friends and all those people, they are 
now becoming emotional. So when they see a paper they are now saying so and so is in trouble and they 
might just go to prison. Yet maybe it was just a small warning. People buy that paper, when they read they 
see there is nothing. That person is not even in so much trouble. (C13). 
Interestingly, the polarisation between the state-owned and the privately-owned press is 
also mirrored in the narratives of the respondents when they rationalise sensationalism 
differently. The common thread connecting these discourses, however is that, it is the emotive 
nature of election reporting that lends itself to the newsworthiness logic.  
This is consistent with the maxim “if it bleeds it leads” (Meadow 2009, 239) referred to 
in Chapter Two. Green (2012, 98) argues that sensationalist accounts of crime “build their 
potency on both the visceral response to violence itself and the quasi-religious dilemma posed by 
transgression on core values”. Like crime, election violence elicits empathy from the audience 
easily if it is sensationalised because sensationalism avoids explicit polemics and relies on 
“unanalyzed emotional responses” (Wiltenburg, cited in Green, 2012, 98).  
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The deliberate inflections of some incidents of election violence while suppressing others 
may whip up the emotions of the readers. Green (2012, 2) rightly points out that the commercial 
imperative results in the construction of particular reality and version of violence and 
explanations for it.  
The outcome is a tension filled triadic relationship between the press’s moral, economic 
and political agenda, whereby reporting on election violence treads a very thin line between the 
watchdog function of the press and the activist journalism of truthful reporting and advocacy 
journalism.  
7.4.3 Cover-ups 
It is instructive to note that sensationalism and cover-ups were mentioned in the same 
breath. Respondents mentioned that, while some incidents would be blown out of proportion by 
the press, others were suppressed, thereby demonstrating that the motive behind sensationalising 
election violence was more than commercially driven as it was also driven by political agendas.  
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As election violence became a site for political struggles certain incidents of election 
violence would be deliberately singled out for hyping while others were swept under the carpet.  
The following statements illustrate this: 
But you, you may not be surprised to find that with certain media houses there is a deliberate attempt at 
covering up the things of this one, especially during election time where the heightened portrayal of what 
is good about this person and ignoring, you know, deliberately, calculatively the negatives of this other 
person. All because they want to prop up the faults for that person. (C18). 
Whereas The Herald was just you know saying MDC is very violent, they burnt ZUPCO buses, they went 
and did this and that, they are attacking. They were just you know, covering those small things that will be 
done by the MDC and the other paper will be trying to cover up, cover these things that Zanu (PF) will be 
doing in response or which they actually do for the first time because the MDC is the only strong party 
which gave an opposition which was a bit strong. (C13). 
At the end of the day newspapers are not informing the public as far as electoral violence is concerned, 
because, especially due to cover ups. The state media, because of funding is more capitalised, in terms of 
human capital, so they are almost everywhere, in terms of the whole parts of the country are concerned. 
And as such, eeh, anything that happens as long as it is negative to Zanu (PF) is not even, eeh, eeh, eeh, 
eeh, exposed to the people. So they always play it down. (C11).  
Election violence was projected as being prone to journalistic selectivity because of 
political motives. Words such as “cover-ups”, “play it down”, and “deliberate” and 
“calculatively” connote a high level of selectivity and agenda-setting. Respondents mobilised 
discourses of “conspiracy of silence” and salience when talking about election violence. 
However, this selectivity is more than a result of professional misdemeanours as it also a 
determinant of political economics. This clearly demonstrates how in fragile societies the press is 
instrumentalised for both economic and political objectives. The implications are that the 
credibility and reliability of the press is compromised as citizens cannot make meaningful 
choices.  
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Voltmer (2010, 140) rightly states that: 
Without reliable information it would not be difficult for citizens to use their power effectively at election 
time, nor would they be aware of the problems and issues that need active consideration beyond voting. 
The daily flow of news generates a running tally of government policies, political events, and the actions of 
the political officials, on the basis of which citizens make their choices. An unreliable press thus 
undermines the rooting of a vibrant specific culture among the citizenry by making citizens more ignorant 
of their social and political obligations. 
An unreliable press is not only the midwife of ignorance, but also a source of social 
tensions and anti-democratic practices.  
7.4.4 Political Influence of the Press 
Narratives on citizen engagement with press reporting of election violence yielded a rich 
tapestry of insights in relation to how they are influenced by press discourses on election 
violence. Although this influence was largely projected through a negative lens a few of the 
respondents projected the influence of the press through a positivity lens.  
On the one hand, the negativity ranged from the harmful effects of cover-ups, bias, 
inaccuracies, falsehoods, silence, and exaggerations. On the other hand, positive influences 
included claims that certain styles and practices of reporting election violence nudged citizens to 
take a stand against election violence and to participate in political processes.  
Beyond this dichotomy, there were contingent discourses where the influence of the press 
discourses on citizens hinged on certain conditions. The majority of respondents said that 
sensational reporting, bias and inaccuracies in reporting election violence engendered hatred 
among citizens.  
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The following excerpts from the interviews demonstrate this: 
After sensationalizing news for example, it’s more like they create a sense of hatred towards each other in 
the society. Members of the society tend to blame each other saying you have caused violence and start 
fighting that moment. So we can say the media at times orchestrate violence rather than quelling it. (C1). 
You know it will go a long way in making other people hate that person, eh, eh, if it is craftily cultivated. 
Eh, eh, it tends to be heightened especially where you make a physical contact with that person because 
that person has been portrayed in such a bad light that you also see your problems closely associated with 
the actions of that person. So you find no good reason to forgive, you know, you may even cause physical 
harm, you know because everybody in their individuality they want to survive normally but then if you are 
faced with information that your problems are because of this person, you are failing to provide for your 
family because of this person, ah, you cannot have anything kind about that person. (C18). 
The manner in which some stories are being reported by some newspapers can cause violence because if a 
newspaper reports that, that our political party that we subscribe to is, fighting another political party we 
will begin to think that it is right for us to fight with people of that particular party. The idea of violence 
itself is enough to instigate violence but the problem is that some people may give a different 
interpretation to the story and end up engaging in some violent activities just because they have read about 
violent acts. Because there is a certain book on Love, after reading the book I went home and that day 
there was a lot of love in the house just because I had read a book on love but I had not realised that it was 
because of the book which I had read.(C6). 
I for one, the influence that I get is one that makes me to be able to make choices, it can be choices about 
the leadership that I want and then choices about maybe, my one councillor where I say depending on what 
is there. But I find that there is a lot of influence because there are certain things that you cannot stop 
thinking about them. They are so touching as if you are the one who is mentioned in the story. Sometimes 
you feel your heart aching (laughs) as if you will suffer from high blood pressure but at the end of the day 
it’s what you have read which is affecting you. And it’s also what other sectors or sections of the media are 
saying about maybe your leader that you like so much being belittled whatever, whatever, it’s as if you are 
the one who has been insulted. And I have noticed that I can’t stop thinking about it, most of the times 
when it is happening and I will be saying to myself don’t people see that what is happening is not good. 
Forgetting that these people (vendor interrupts conversation). So at times it really affects you, and it 
affects you emotionally, as if you are the one who has been insulted. You will feel it. And at times when it 
happens and it touches you and you look at the next person and you see that they are not even worried 
about it. She might actually say “so what?” do you eat at his house?” eh things like that. (C21). 
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The range of effects of election violence reporting on the citizens varied from fostering 
hatred, legitimising election violence, ‘negative’ ‘role modeling’ or identification, emotional 
effects, promoting political engagement to  incitement of violence. This shows that the effect of 
press discourses on election violence was complex. This brings under the spotlight the social 
constructivist perspective of reality which underpins this thesis. For instance, the view that the 
press engendered hatred among people (as reflected in statements by C1 and C18 above) echoes 
the “Rwandan model” (Onyebadi and Oyedeji 2011, 215) the notion that the media were 
“lubricants” for heightening conflicts in society (Gardner cited in Onyebadi and Oyedeji 2011, 
218). However, unlike the Rwandan and the Kenyan situation model the press did not directly 
advocate or incite violence.Underpinning this “bad influence” frame is the perception that 
through their polarising reporting the press can exacerbate conflict. Citizen narratives on election 
violence also construct the press as perpetuating the vicious cycle of election violence in the 
sense that the way the press frames election violence was perceived by some respondents as a 
tacit endorsement of election violence. However, in some instances the press’s influence on the 
citizens is both negative and positive in that press framing of election violence can cause some 
citizens to grieve but that pain may motivate them to participate in political processes. This 
ambivalence is further demonstrated through citizen discourses whereby some respondents 
constructed the influence of the press as contingent on particular factors. One respondent, for 
example, said that the influence of the press depends on whether election violence was exposed 
or not. He said:  
I will say, in fact, once these, eh, the violence has been exposed and then the results are actually told and 
then the consequences are seen by the public, then these are likely to influence…But if they are not exposed 
then, they cannot influence… (C5). 
If perpetrators of election violence are exposed in the press this may act as a deterrent to 
would-be offenders, but if perpetrators go unpunished this becomes an incentive for impunity as 
well as negative social learning. Thus reporting has both negative and positive effects on 
citizens. 
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A leitmotif of the negative effects of reporting election violence in the narratives of the 
respondents was the discourse of “fear”. Respondents talked about how particular ways of 
framing election violence by the press engendered fear and a culture of silence among the 
citizens. The following excerpts from the interviews illustrate this: 
Yes, and then, me as an individual again, how I am now afraid of just talking anywhere because 
of the violence which is being reported, the effect upon…You don’t normally comment as far as 
the po-litics (hesitation) are concerned to people you don’t know. You can only talk after 
establishing who you are talking to. Because at the end of the day, we all read about people 
disappearing. So one is not sure, you trust nobody and suspect everyone. So for those people that 
are close to you… So that’s the, another effect of media coverage of violence. (C11). 
If I hear that there is violence somewhere, usually I feel that what people are doing is bad. I begin 
to feel as if I am being personally attacked because my body and spirit are important to me. So I 
become frightened. Stories about violence make me feel frightened because since I was young I 
have never liked violence. (C6). 
Fear is inimical to democratization in that it stifles expression and association and 
engenders mistrust. Fear breeds suspicion among citizens and may make election violence 
appear ubiquitous. Fear is constructed as undermining the development of positive civic values. 
In some instances, the polarising effects of press reporting of election violence induces pain 
which in turn may trigger schizophrenic reflexes since citizens may become unsure of how they 
should conduct themselves or relate to people who subscribe to different political views. One 
respondent illustrated this thus: 
So when the truth is not told I feel pain. Sometimes I am influenced to talk even where I am not 
supposed to talk, sometimes to the extent of failing to disguise my political affiliation when I am 
not supposed to do that. It means I would have been influenced and affected. Secondly, I can be 
affected and influenced to such an extent that I do not talk; I remain silent when I am supposed 
to talk. Those who were supposed to hear my views will also get affected in the sense that those 
who were supposed to hear the truth lose out because I have been affected, resulting in me 
remaining silent, so I am affected both ways and usually when I am affected other people also 
get affected because where I am supposed to tell the truth and when I don’t others are affected 
because they won’t know the truth. If they are influenced to react they will be doing so using a 
wrong judgment so I can say that really it disturbs me. (C9). 
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Election violence induces multiple and contradictory effects in individuals; pain, talking, 
silence or simply brings about new vocabularies of talking about politics. It is common for 
people not to make direct reference to names of political parties or personalities when discussing 
politics in Zimbabwe. This demonstrates that election violence has far reaching impact on the 
social fabric of the country and the way it is reported has significantly shapes everyday practices. 
Apart from inducing fear, participants constructed the press reporting of election violence 
as having a demobilising effect. A significant number of respondents talked about how certain 
styles of reporting election violence engendered apathy, forced them to withdraw from politics, 
not only because they were afraid to express themselves, but because election violence makes 
them feel that there is no fair play. The following excerpts illustrate this: 
For me their biggest shortfall, myself as a Christian and other Christians, Zimbabwe is a Christian 
country, these newspapers distort the world view of Christians and the way they think in the sense that 
some of them begin to spread falsehoods or are made to propagate lies by these newspapers saying “we 
don’t do politics, we don’t like politics or worldly affairs. If you ask them what worldly affairs are you 
talking about they don’t understand because they would have been filled with fear because of the way in 
which the media’s sensational reporting. They become afraid of expressing their beliefs because they 
don’t want to be associated with one thing or the other. Even if they have a political affiliation they won’t 
show like what the Bible says, they begin to behave like sheep for slaughter. They become too scared to 
such an extent that anyone can do what they like to them (C9). 
What the state media has done to me is to kill my hope (C8). 
People now have a tendency of creating their own Islands wherever they are, just seeing that there is 
violence out there, even at times when it’s not even there. People now have a preconceived idea that there 
is always violence. They don’t want even to vote. Even when the violence is not even there, they may not 
vote. (C13). 
Yes there might be violence but maybe for me how they report on the violence, rather the way they express 
what happened. Because, to some people, at the end, some people will not even read newspapers because 
there won’t be anything positive in the newspaper. It’s all about violence. In other words everything is too 
negative. (C3). 
The way in which newspapers cover election issues is that sometimes I just lose interest in voting 
immediately after reading the story. Even if I want to vote I just lose interest. (C6). 
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What I know is that all these newspapers at one time or the other they will be lying. Today, right now I 
don’t even have the zeal to go and buy a newspaper. I just go maybe and read a headline. In other words, 
let me say this; these days what the newspapers are doing is that they write a very attractive headline so 
that we can go and buy the newspaper. If you buy the newspaper you find that maybe it’s a recycled story 
and I ask. It has been the trend; maybe it’s meant to attract us to buy the newspapers or what. And at the 
end of the day that maybe they fabricated stories. Some of these events are supposed to have happened 
within us where we live but the way they are reported by the newspapers makes you wonder whether those 
things will be happening under cover or what because sometimes you don’t see these things happening 
were we live (C2). 
The above statements are revealing as much as they are instructive in that they 
demonstrate how citizen (mis)-perceptions about the press may engender citizen disengagement 
from political processes.  
If citizens perceive the press to be distorting reality through sensational reporting, 
outright lies or thriving on negativity they may become mistrustful, demobilised, depoliticised, 
contemptuous, apathetic, cynical, or completely disengage from politics.  Some scholars have 
pointed how suspicion and cynicism about the press’s handling of public issues has been 
growing in the West, resulting in “the crisis of public communication” (Blumler and Gurevitch, 
1995, 1). Blumler and Gurevitch contend that the failure by the press to fulfill many of the 
obligations and duties contemplated in the fourth estate realm has engendered dissatisfaction 
among citizens resulting in them disengaging from their civic duties. Norris (2011, 1) concurs 
and further observes that there is a need to determine how many post-industrial societies have 
been experiencing “a tidal wave of public withdrawal from traditional channels of political 
activism”. Similarly, Voltmer (2010, 149-150), notes how there has been growing political 
cynicism, alienation and citizen disillusionment about politics in some established and new 
democracies, leading to their disengagement from politics.  
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Voltmer notes that: 
It is argued that the way in which the media portray politics – the general anti-political bias and the distrust 
of political officials displayed by journalists breeds cynicism among citizens. Furthermore, as the current 
styles of covering the news emphasize strategic maneuverings of political actors over policy debates, the 
media are believed to create an image of politics that has more to do with fighting for its own sake than 
finding solutions to the problems that face the country.  
The pessimistic view portrayed in the above-quoted statement is counterbalanced by 
minority views which indicate that press reporting of electoral violence also promoted citizen 
engagement in politics. In fact some respondents indicated that the manner in which the press 
reports election violence may make them emotional, and because of this emotion they are 
nudged to take particular political positions. For instance, one respondent said that if the press 
consistently reports falsely that members of one particular party are perpetrating election 
violence, members of the political party being falsely accused of perpetrating election violence 
could commit more violence. He said:  
If a person is called a thief when that person is not and yet society believes that that’s what you are, 
sometimes someone will just take a decision to become what people think they are because even if you 
don’t do it your name still gets tarnished. Isn’t it? Doing it or not doing it is just the same. That has got a 
lot of influence especially to those alleged to be perpetrating violence. That you have stories that come out 
time and again alleging that certain individuals are causing violence. Especially if some of the stories are 
false. (C7). 
The above statement shows that some people do not necessarily make people disengaged 
but the way the press reports election violence may make things worse. This is a form of 
negative engagement, whereby citizens who feel blackmailed by the press may perpetrate more 
violence. In some instances the engagement is positive, such as when the press reporting of 
election violence reinforces someone to vote for a particular party or to participate in political 
activities because they want political change.  
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The following excerpts are illustrative of this behaviour: 
I remember that June 2008 was the most violent period and this information was coming from newspapers. 
That’s when I would read that the body of a dead person has been found in such and such a place, in the 
mortuary at Parirenyatwa Hospital, that is when so and so’s body who is said to have disappeared has 
been found. He disappeared on such a day, and all those things. I remember that, I even kept a diary in 
2008. What happened is that I had arrived here, I had gone to Europe. I had gone to Netherlands, then I 
came back on the same day that voting had ended or is it a day after the voting? But then with what I was 
hearing when I was abroad, people were telling me that it was a peaceful election and so forth. And then 
what happened, that waiting period is the one which sparked the violence. So while I was waiting for the 
results, I would diarise what had been said, the following day, and the following day. I remember that 
almost every day I was writing something in my diary. And then of course then the disappearances started 
after it was announced that there would be a presidential run-off because there was no clear winner. That 
period of run-off, I still remember that even what I was writing was also a bit violent as well because there 
were emotions, it was now becoming emotional. That you have read about this thing and it has touched 
you so much that somebody has lost a father, somebody has lost a mother, ehe, that. (C21). 
The media have made me more critical. I now have a critical eye,that eye which, how can I put it?, with a 
mind-set that, no, no, this is what we are talking about (C4). 
These, the reporting, I can say have reinforced people’s support on party lines, it has reinforced. If it is an 
MDC-T supporter reading the independent newspapers his support for MDC-T has been reinforced 
because of that coverage. If it is a Zanu (PF) supporter and the reporting of state media, Herald and so on 
have reinforced his or her support for Zanu (PF). (C20). 
Eh, many people became hard line in terms of opposing Zanu (PF). Ehe. That actually worked against 
Zanu (PF). Though unfortunately an incident yes, so it drew people to hate Zanu (PF), the perpetrators, 
the supposed perpetrators. So in a way it influenced the perception. So what you report is very important. 
If you report falsehoods they will affect people. (C11). 
The statements show that far from making citizens apathetic towards politics 
press reports on election violence elicit various forms of engagement with politics, some 
subtle, some not so subtle. Reporting on election violence can foster certain forms of 
political consciousness and engagements that have far-reaching implications for 
democratic politics.  
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It can lead to entrenched citizen’s political convictions, push citizens to re-affirm 
their political affiliations, make citizens engage with news more critically than before or 
trigger a flurry of subtle forms of political activism. Thus the press affects citizens in 
different ways, depending on their social and political circumstances. The exact manner 
and the socio-economic and political circumstances in which the press engender political 
engagement or disengagement, however needs further investigation. 
7.5 Critical Readers: Engaged Citizenry 
Citizen discourses demonstrate the way in which the press has been reporting on election 
violence has spawned new practices of negotiating news content in the context of polarisation. 
Such practices include triangulating news sources and reading the news more analytically than 
before as a way of coping with a polarised mediascape.  
As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, citizens reported that they read more than 
one newspaper for news and information about elections. Upon further inspection it was 
established that the rationale for the triangulation of sources was that they were not satisfied with 
the way news on election violence was reported by a single newspaper.  
Almost every respondent talked about reading “other newspapers” in order to get a 
balanced or complete picture of events. By reading more than one newspaper or consulting 
alternative sources of news such as social media like Facebook and user generated comments 
became a form of self-empowerment by the citizens.  
Reading a variety of news sources enabled them to establish the veracity of certain 
reports on election as well as “resisting” undue influence by the partisan press. Although 
respondents differed in their degree of apportioning culpability to the press, most respondents 
agreed the press had serious shortfalls in reporting election violence. In order to safeguard 
themselves against these shortfalls citizens, adopted particular reading practices, such as cross-
checking with alternative news sources either in the printed press or online.  
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The following statements illustrate this: 
Being able to read all the newspapers, I am satisfied because I was actually, I could pick what has been 
hidden by this paper in a different paper. (C5). 
What I have observed is that if I read all the newspapers on a particular story, let’s say a story about 
political violence in Mudzi, what I do is I try to find out if the particular story has been published in the 
Daily News, has it also been published in News Day and how it is being framed in all these newspapers. If 
it is treated in the same way in both newspapers then I try to find out whether the same story has also been 
published in The Herald, how it has been covered in the paper. If it has been published and treated in the 
same way as well I will then accept that it is a true story but if the story is only published in one 
newspaper, I will have to keep on checking for the story in order to establish its veracity. (C6). 
Ok, what was actually happening was that, you always hear all negative aspects especially the opposition. 
And then as a person who has brains you ask yourself why this person is always writing something which 
is negative. And then, you then want to investigate and you see that OK how is the situation like. So at the 
end of the day, as a result, especially the issue of the press, I have resorted now to now to the electronic 
media, social networks which gives us the other side of the story for me to cross-check, to find out how the 
situation is like. And as a result again the effect of that coverage, it is now causing, I have alluded to the 
fact that, normally the reporting, it’s not balanced, you now tend to read a variety of a-a, so that you get to 
the gist of the matter. (C11). 
Ya, this kinds of complicates things for the reader in terms of…though with the coming of new technology 
such as Facebook and so forth, you check through the Internet, whether people in those areas are agreed 
with the facts. For example, The Herald Online or the News Day Online people comment on the news 
article confirming whether it is true or not. Then you can see whether there has been violence in those 
areas or not. (C1). 
Citizens construct themselves as active agents in their interaction with news about 
election violence in the sense that they question, interrogate, and interact with what they read 
critically. They go out of their way to look for different sources so that they have a balanced 
view of what is happening on the ground. This is testimony that the press in Zimbabwe lacks 
internal diversity, particularly in relation to election issues.  
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Voltmer (2010, 144) defines internal diversity as “a situation in which a single media 
outlet comprises all relevant points without favouring a particular position”.   
The above statements show that citizens actively seek alternative views in order to 
balance their perspectives on the topics different diverse views at both the agenda-setting level 
(the topics published by the newspapers) and the framing level (the angling, slanting and general 
treatment given to particular stories). There is an array of words and phrases in the above 
excerpts which demonstrate that citizens are critical and proactive in their interaction with news 
on election violence. Such words and phrases include “able to read”, “I could pick”, “If I read”, 
“what I do is”, “I try to find out”, “how it is being framed”, “I will have to keep on checking”, 
“as a person who has brains”, “investigate” and “I find out”. This is an affirmation that citizens 
are active seekers of alternative perspectives and accentuates their cognitive abilities to question, 
and analyse what they read, a point that will be revisited below.  
The fact that citizens look for alternative information from online media sources validates 
the argument that in future citizens will have more options to undercut partisan political 
reporting by acting as a “parallel market” (Moyo 2010, 53), particularly in political contexts 
where information is held in the interregnum (Saunders, 1991).  
Apart from their efforts to look for alternative sources of information the agency of the 
citizens is also vocalised through discourses that accentuate citizens’ cognitive abilities to 
critique press reportage of election violence. Thus respondents talked about how they were able 
to circumvent the negative influence of the press by being able to “read in-between the lines” 
analyse news and information on electoral violence. Citizens talk about their ability to spot 
information gaps in the news, discrepancies between media reality and actual reality or do an 
aberrant decoding of the news and their skeptical dispositions.  
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The following excerpts from the interviews highlight this skepticism:  
And I think if you really want to know what is going on it’s a matter of reading in-between the lines 
because their coverage I can say it’s predictable or it’s pre-determined. (C19). 
If you read in between the lines you can sense that this newspaper is trying to campaign for this one, this 
one is trying…..They don’t actually cover fairly, giving a balanced view of it, but you could sense that this 
one is maybe campaigning for this particular party, this one is for this particular party. You can sense from 
the way they write their, the way they report, from they report. (C8). 
And I think if you really want to know what is going on it’s a matter of reading in-between the lines 
because their coverage I can say it’s predictable or it’s pre-determined. (C19). 
I think, I think this is…the challenge we have here in Zimbabwe, I think it just confirms what I have heard 
from so many people that when you buy newspapers you have got to buy two, one that you know that it 
supports this dispensation and one that supports that dispensation then you read the same article and 
probably try to do content analysis and really establish what happened. So there is a general lack of an 
ideal newspaper which can tell you what really happened. (C17). 
What I normally do is I can read The Herald, but after finishing reading it I will say I now know The 
Herald’s version of events now, let me get the Independent’s version so that I get a balanced view of events 
because I know that The Herald is pro-Zanu (PF). The Independent, most of the independent newspapers 
are biased in favour of the opposition, so I read the independent newspapers, I read the public media and 
then afterwards I look for the middle ground and say, The Standard is saying ABC about the issue, so 
maybe this could have happened. (C14). 
These statements demonstrate that citizens do not swallow everything that they read but 
critically interrogate media texts and are skeptical, if not cynical of what they get from the press. 
They construct themselves are “privileged discursive actors” in the political communication 
process who are able to analyse media texts and come up with their own “balanced” assessments 
of the situation.  
This enlightened autonomy” (Garcia-Blanco, 2011, 178) implies that although citizens 
may disengage from politics they are far from being passive. If anything disengagement can be 
viewed as a form of engagement, albeit negative engagement.  
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Thus citizens have the ability to insert themselves in the political communication process 
as active discursive actors with the capacity to challenge hegemonic representations of the press.  
 
7.6 Normative Prescriptions: A Manifesto for Conflict Reporting 
The participants in this study did not just register their misgivings about press reporting 
of election violence, but went further to proffer normative prescriptions of reporting election in 
general and election violence in particular. When they talked about limitations of the press in 
reporting election violence they also suggested how the press should report. Apart from the 
normative ethical and professional considerations such as fairness, balance, objectivity, accuracy, 
impartiality, neutrality and truthfulness, participants repeatedly mentioned the need for evidential 
reporting, the need to engage in objectivist journalism while shunning interpretive journalism. In 
relation to the need to observe general journalistic ethics the following statements are illustrative: 
The media should just give people a fair report of what would have transpired. I think that would make 
certain people control themselves because some of the violence is a result of certain individuals failing to 
control themselves. There is a need for fair reporting on some of these issues. (C2). 
Under the circumstances if journalists from all the newspapers could have time to have their own meetings 
with no-holds barred talk, then they use the correct ethics of reporting, a situation or a scenario openly 
without fear or favour I think that, that can improve the situation. (12). 
If an accurate coverage is done it is now left to the electorate to say, with his faults craftily covered to the 
extent that only the good part is what comes out, is that not misleading the voter into voting a person that 
you would later regret voting for, when that person is already in office. (C18). 
What I would prefer is that whatever is happening in the form of violence should be covered without fear 
or favour and the citizens must know what is happening in the different parts of the country and be aware, 
it might be someone’s relative in Mutoko or someone has a relative in Bulawayo. If it is not covered then 
you are not able to know what is happening in Matabeleland or what is happening in Mashonaland. Some 
of these things should be highlighted and should actually be presented properly. (C5). 
Maybe if they are to report the facts as they are. (C3) 
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Citizens construct the press reporting of election violence as devoid of journalistic ethics. 
However, citizen discourses go beyond orthodox journalistic ethics in that they propose ethical 
approaches that are unique to the reportage of election violence as a special kind of journalistic 
beat.  
For instance, a number of respondents recommended what could be referred to as 
“evidence based” reporting, a form of reporting that entails the press furnishing concrete 
evidence to support stories on election violence. Such evidence could be in the form of audio-
visual material which proves beyond any shadow of doubt that a particular incident took place.   
The following excerpts from the interviews support the necessity of evidence-reporting 
thus: 
Unless the media support what they report with audio and visuals, there is no way of knowing whether 
what they report on is true or not. But the problem in Zimbabwe is that even if you see a photograph of a 
person who is alleged to have been beaten up say, in Muzarabani because of this and this, you may find 
that the people in the photography maybe, were involved in a family fight, which is now being presented as 
election violence. The picture might be there but the reporter is not telling you what was happening. What 
this means is that what the media give us is not authentic at times. (C2). 
…especially, where some newspapers which publish pictures to substantiate their claims. So in that case I 
definitely agree that the levels in the newspapers match with what will be happening on the ground because 
you can actually see it. Like what happened in 2008 there were people who were burnt, there were people 
who were amputated; people who were beaten etc. you can actually see these people. You will definitely 
think that the level of violence is high. Then there are situations whereby the press report that the level of 
election violence is high but you can’t see it. I will end up thinking that someone is fabricating the news, 
somebody who is just reporting from his office without any knowledge of what is happening out there. 
(C14) 
I would like to believe that if the same way or the newspapers if it is completed by the, complemented by the 
electronic media we can get firsthand information of what they are saying. Because what is written in the 
newspaper, I can say a statement can be interpreted in any way they like but if everyone is given the same  
access to television, electronic media to have first have first-hand information of what they have seen, 
what I can say, what they can improve is if really a person has commented  on something, why not quote 
him, why not publish his picture and so on, so that we see that this is the person, maybe that person will 
fear political punishment and so on, but we need their facts to, we need the facts to, to come out clearly to 
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be reinforced by other means. So I think, I am not a media person per se, but what I think is for the media 
to respect ethical reporting. I think that’s the best way. If the media just follows, eh, their rules and 
regulations of media reporting to say where, when and who and so on. I don’t know, and to get comments 
from all the political parties, whatever, if they just stick to good reporting practices, the elements which 
they are taught on…If they can just stick to what they were taught at school… And in terms of online 
reporting what I can say is if the newspapers publish their article online, can it also, that story , the online 
story, can it also have accompanying evidence like audio. Isn’t it? If you get a comment from the minister, 
you got a comment, you write it in the newspaper, we can say a newspaper cannot have another attachment 
but if you go online can I also have, can I also hear that audio recording. If you have got it from the 
Minister or the political figure, whoever said it in that the sense it is being reported. (C20). 
Citizens construct press reporting on election violence as suffering from a credibility 
crisis which could be addressed through evidential reporting in the form of audio-visuals and 
hard facts. As a highly contested beat election reporting is prone to fabrications, speculations and 
second-hand views which compromise the credibility of the press. Beyond this fact-based 
reporting citizens are also averse to interpretative journalism in election reporting. They advocate 
objectivist journalism whereby the press report without infusing their opinions. Respondents 
construct the interpretative style of reporting unsuitable for election reporting because 
interpretative journalism seeks to interpret rather than report the news. The respondents viewed 
the judgmental character of interpretative journalism as complicity in fuelling election violence 
rather than curbing it. The following statements are illustrative of this: 
First of all I would suggest that maybe if they are to report the facts as they are rather than taking one side 
and say the other party is innocent like you get a reporter actually judging or rather putting a stamp 
saying this party is the one to blame for every incident of political violence. I think that shouldn’t be the 
case because it actually encourages other party members to act upon and actually cause violence because 
they would be in a retaliatory mode because of the reports that would have been made by the newspapers 
because they actually know that they are not the sole cause of election violence and yet the newspaper 
reports would be saying they are the sole causes of election violence. So if they are just to report the facts 
because I think that the reporters’ duty is to report the facts and nothing else but the facts not to take a 
side. (C3). 
So if they could report it in a way that could show that no, this is a dispute between people and people 
should resolve their disputes in a manner that’s Ok. But now we have violence reported in one paper, they 
say no, the guys who were wrong were those guys. Then if it’s reported in another newspaper, they say 
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those guys are the ones who were wrong. Just report the details, you see, such and such a thing happened 
at such and such a place. Not to say no, you see because the people are disgruntled with his 33 year rule, 
no. That becomes irrelevant. Or that because these people feel like the sanctions came from…they are now 
getting, that’s where elections and violence begin to, to mix. They should report violence as violence. They 
should say, they should not however say that the people who were participating whether from Zanu (PF) or 
from what, but they should not express it as a way of you know, the elections are the cause of this violence 
and what, what.  It’s because people will always have different opinions and people should find better ways 
to iron out their differences. (C13). 
On their part I think it’s good to report objectively without putting opinions. Yes. I have seen it in the 
independent newspapers where the journalists’ opinion is attached to a report to say it’s believed that this 
incident was perpetrated by Zanu (PF) support and to me I don’t know whose belief it is, or who believed, 
“it’s believed” by whom? I have seen also “it’s believed this act violence was perpetrated by MDC 
supporters” I have had cases, I can single out cases of, in Manicaland where there was a case of Maisiri 
something, something in the newspapers, whose hut was burnt, what, what and so on. But eh, we don’t 
know whether it was an act of arson or it was on political lines. No one knows. So it’s good if facts are not 
yet there. (C20). 
Words and phrases such as “violence”, “judging”, “putting a stamp”, “blame”, 
“encourages”, “causes violence”, and “were wrong” indicate that citizens abhor 
interpretative journalism in reporting election violence because interpretative journalism 
lends itself to opinionated reporting as well as accentuating the “blame discourse” all of 
which are recipes for election violence. In order to show that citizens prefer objectivist 
journalism words and phrases such as “facts as they are”, “report the facts”, “not 
express”, objectively”, “without putting opinions”, “objectively” and “just report details” 
are used.  The respondents believe that the interpretative reporting style is deeply 
implicated in election violence. 
The respondents also talked about the imperative for follow-ups in reporting 
election violence. They pointed out that follow-ups act as deterrents to would-be 
perpetrators of election violence in the sense that they created confidence among 
members of the public when justice is done or at the very least when it is seen to be done.  
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The respondents complained about how the press failed to keep track of major 
cases of election violence resulting in public disillusionment about the efficacy of the 
justice system to curb election violence.   
The following excerpts from the interview illustrate this: 
Eh, what I would like actually to happen is that it must for all, all the newspapers must really make a 
follow-up, eh, really a follow-up to every incident and come to a definite conclusion, result, the end 
result, what has happened to the person who did that particular activity. Because if the results are not 
disclosed that means people will continue to perpetrate punishments, eh, sentences, must be really 
highlighted so that you can curb, curb, the violence. (C5). 
But coming to the issue of follow-ups it’s something that I have discussed with a colleague as well, that at 
times when things are written, the journalist who is covering the story, I don’t know whether it is the norm 
these days or it’s just a case of dereliction of duty on the part of the journalists. Its unlike if you read 
stories covered by veteran journalists who can bring you out records of what happened in 2002, 2003, this 
is what happened in 2004, 2004… There is no longer that element of research that you get in a story for 
you to really see that there has been a follow-up. Because, maybe if they had followed up these things they 
could have discovered that maybe when the farm invasions took place in 1999, 2000 there some after 
effects later regarding that. If it was the issue of avenging spirits they can then tell us that in Chipinge a 
similar issue once happened, this way or that way. But there is nothing, there is nothing which could have 
been a precedent of the Chokuda case. There are really no follow-ups on election violence stories that we 
can see…And also now, people are talking about it on social media, on Facebook. People are putting some 
comments, saying aah; we don’t want violence, whatever whatever. I think if the newspaper takes these 
seriously and then document cases of violence that happened and what happened to the perpetrators as 
well. Because it seems that in this country you don’t really see justice being served. (C21). 
In the independent press there is no follow-up. They raise an issue today, its dead. Tomorrow there is no 
follow up which takes place. If you hear of it again….So there is no follow-up. (C4). 
The perceived failure by the press to make follow-ups signifies that the human costs of 
election violence makes election violence a unique genre that requires special journalistic skills 
if violence is to be curbed. The perception that the press was failing to give complete accounts of 
election violence motivated citizens to use alternative sources of news such as online media, thus 
highlighting of the potency of new media technologies in obviating the limitations of the press.  
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The respondents constructed election violence reporting as a story-telling genre, with a 
beginning, middle and an ending. They expect the press to highlight precedents, antecedents and 
the consequences of perpetrating election violence.  
They believe that this will curb violence. This view of political reporting is predicated on 
the assumption that failure to show the logical conclusion of election violence is a form of 
symbolically rewarding perpetrators of election violence. This way election reporting becomes 
preoccupied with identifying connections between different incidences of election violence 
through research and documentation. Citizens construct election reporting as a tool for deterring 
would be perpetrators as well as curbing election violence. This way, election reporting becomes 
some kind of deductive media akin to the folk-tale. To be able to execute their democratic 
mandate, the press is expected to report election violence fairly, impartially and to give a 
complete account of what would have transpired. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed citizen discourses on election violence based on the corpus of text 
from interviews with 21 purposely selected citizens of Zimbabwe. The analysis focused on three 
key questions relating to how citizens make sense of election violence, how they evaluate press 
the reporting of election violence and the normative prescriptions than can guide the press in 
reporting elections.  
The chapter argues that citizen discourses on election violence reveal a complex 
conception of the causes, attributes, and manifestations of election violence that are 
circumscribed by Zimbabwe’s history, social, economic and political context of the country. The 
respondents’ understanding of election violence fits into the framework and typologies of 
election violence propounded by earlier studies, but also bring to the fore the conceptions of 
election violence coloured by the uniqueness of their experiences and socio-political context. 
Thus, they talk about election violence as “sponsored”, “isolated”, “exceptional”, and “relative”. 
They also construct a variety of discourses in relation to the causes of election violence, but 
mainly foreground its nexus with power contests and as part of a historical continuum dating 
back to the colonial period.  
Citizen assessments of press reporting of election violence mainly relate to consequences 
of framing such as polarisation, exaggerations, interpretive journalism and critical engagements 
with texts. Thus citizens construct themselves as active agents with a capacity to interrogate 
press texts at different levels. They are skeptical, critical (even cynical) about the way in which 
the press reports, thereby signaling the existence of agency. 
 In relation to normative prescriptions, citizens also prescribe a number of standards and 
practices for reporting election violence. Although some of these normative prescriptions are 
generic to traditional journalism others are specific to election violence reporting and are 
informed by the imperatives of conflict sensitivity. Citizen normative journalistic prescriptions 
are a response to the need for credibility of the press in contexts where information is in the 
interregnum. The range of citizen discourses on election violence discussed in this chapter 
demonstrate that citizens construct themselves as privileged discursive actors in the political 
communication process rather than passive victims on the political chessboard.  
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Further, citizens construct election violence as a unique genre that can be effectively 
instrumentalised to curb election violence 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: PROBING THE INTERFACE: COMPARING 
CITIZEN AND PRESS DISCOURSES ON ELECTION VIOLENCE 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the interaction between press discourses (Chapters Five and Six) and 
citizen discourses (Chapter Seven) on election violence by bringing the two into dialogue in 
order to gain deeper insights on the political and cultural values that underpin the social 
construction of election violence. It compares and contrasts press and citizen discourses focusing 
on three themes, namely, the conception of election violence, the framing of election violence, 
and the influence of press discourses on citizen attitudes and practices.  
The chapter concludes by reflecting on the theoretical implications of the interface between press 
and citizen discourses for democratic theory and motivates for the revitalisation of the concept of 
political culture in understanding this interface. The chapter addresses three key questions, 
namely; 
 What are the similarities and differences between press and citizen discourses on election 
violence? 
 How do press and citizens discourses on election violence interact and shape each other? 
 What are the implications for the interplay between press and citizen discourses on 
democracy? 
In order to address these questions a synthesis of the data presented in Chapter Five, Six and 
Seven is done in order to tease out the mutual interrelation between press and citizen discourses 
with the ultimate aim of gaining insights on the values, norms beliefs and practices that underpin 
discursive constructions of election violence in fragile societies (Voltmer and Dobreva 2009, 2).  
The chapter argues that the interface between press and citizen discourses represents a zone 
in which a society’s political culture is paraded, contested as well as altered. 
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 Although citizen narratives about election violence incorporate a great deal of the press’s 
frames, they also represent counterpoints to the hegemonic constructions of the press whereby 
election violence is instrumentalised for capturing or retaining political power. This contest is 
played out through the interpretive journalistic posture of the press and the normative objectivist 
stance of the citizens.  
In a context where the press is deeply embedded in political structures information becomes a 
“manufactured artifice” the integrity of the public sphere is diminished and as Brian McNair 
argues, it’s “authenticity becomes something rather more sinister” (McNair 1995, 25). 
8.2 Making Sense of Election Violence: Contest and Confluence 
 
Citizen conceptions of election violence, to some degree mirror those of the press, 
particularly in respect of their characterisation of election violence as organised, 
instrumentalised, orchestrated and historical. However, there is a minor disjuncture as well.  For 
instance, while the press mainly focused on physical (visible) election violence, citizen 
discourses are cross-cutting, encompassing some elements of subtle election violence such as 
intimidation, verbal threats, and other discrete forms of coercion.  
Citizens conceive election violence in a wider sense, reflective of the richness of their 
mediated and lived experiences, thus making citizen discourses on election violence more 
authoritative than those of the press. Citizen discourses encompass both ‘noisy’ and “quiet’ 
forms of election violence (Reif 2009, 6) in that they read about election violence as well as 
experience it during elections. Thus citizens’ narratives on election violence bore imprints of 
their lived experiences of election violence as well the mediated reality. For practical reasons the 
press mostly focuses on physical election violence because it occurs in the public domain and its 
dramaturgy lends itself to certain criteria for newsworthiness, marked by episodic framing and 
sentimentalism. On the contrary, citizen narratives on election violence transcend rehearsals of 
election violence by incorporating the real life experiences of victims, audiences and 
interpersonal interactions. 
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 Thus citizens conceive election violence through the prism of its most subtle like the 
‘singing of parody songs’ and ‘lampooning’ other political parties, ‘utterances’, or simply 
‘forcing someone to think in a certain way’ (see Chapter Seven). Citizen conceptions of electoral 
violence bring physical violence into the communicative and symbolic realm thereby projecting 
election violence as a form of language or discourse through which a society’s political attitudes, 
beliefs and communicative practices can be understood. In this context, the type of political 
discourse signals impending physical violence.  
Reif (2009, 6) asserts thus: 
There is more than meets the eye to election violence. The eruption of physical election violence is the 
result of sequences of events and constellation of factors that affect actors’ decisions  to choose one 
strategy over another from the “menu of manipulation” (Andreas Schedler 2002a) which in addition to 
fraud includes what I term “quiet” (non-physical and often unobservable) and “noisy”(physical and 
observable) coercion. 
By placing election violence in a wider frame, citizen discourses bring under the spotlight 
the interconnectedness of physical violence with its symbolic forms. Thus, the physical elements 
of election violence are always inscribed in a “symbolic economy”, whereby, “…the symbolic 
impact of the very physical violence; ideological apparatuses always- already prepare the ground 
for the exercise of physical violence” by legitimising the use of force in defence of national 
interests (Zizek 1996, 16).  
It needs to be pointed out that although the newspapers selected for this study did not 
focus much on subtle forms of election violence, there were some instances where (particularly 
the state press) they focused on overt forms of election violence. The case of ‘utterances’ by 
MDC politicians, Madzore and Chamisa discussed in Chapter Six are examples. There were also 
references by the privately-owned press on acts of intimidation, “pulling down of posters”, but 
these were not given sufficient attention
44
.  
                                                          
44
 A few journalists also mentioned subtle forms of election violence such as hate speech but did not dwell much 
on it. 
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By conceiving election violence largely as covert, while downplaying its subtle forms, 
the press tended to view election violence through a narrow prism which failed to capture the full 
gamut of election violence in Zimbabwe.  As a consequence, overt and covert election violence 
were erroneously conceived as disconnected. Through this simplistic lens overt and covert 
election violence were viewed as disconnected rather than interlinked. This goes against the 
grain of scholarly opinion that suggests that the press can polarise society or even incite violence 
through the language it uses to report events (Nwankow 2011; Ismail and Dean 2008; Chari 
2010; Thompson 2007; Bonde n.d. Coronell, n.d.), a scenario that has been referred to as the 
‘Rwanda Model’45(Onyebadi and Oyedeji 2011). Discourse has a consequence, and so does 
language. The rationale for physical violence is rooted in symbolic violence. 
Steuter and Wills (2009, 7) note how the Canadian media, during the war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan engaged in an “uncritical reproduction of metaphors that linguistically frame the 
enemy” in a manner that de-humanized and de-individualized the ‘enemy-Other’, thereby 
rendering the enemy expendable. Similarly, Lakoff (1991), through an analysis of metaphors 
used by George Bush (senior) and his administration concluded that Iraq would be attacked 
during the Gulf War. Lakoff argues that the panorama of metaphors used to describe Saddam 
Hussein by Bush and other US government officials indicated that an attack on Iraq was 
inevitable. For instance, the US Secretary of State viewed Saddam Hussein as “sitting on our 
economic lifeline”, while President Bush described Saddam as  having “a stranglehold”on the 
US economy. Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait was described by General Scwarzkopf as “rape”” 
and the presence of the US military in the Gulf region was described by Bush as justified on the 
grounds of protecting “freedom”, “our future” and “the innocent”. Further, Saddam was 
portrayed as a “Hitler” who needed to be “pushed back”, thereby suggesting that an attack on 
Iraq was inevitable (Lakoff 1991). This demonstrates that symbolic violence can be a prelude to 
physical violence.  
 
                                                          
45
 Reference to the role of hate language radio during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda where thousands of people 
died after the broadcast of hate messages on radio. 
300 
 
From a discourse analysis point of view, this is significant in that, as a form of social 
practice discourse “both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices” 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 61). A narrower conception of election violence which privileges 
physical violence at the expense of non-physical violence suits the constricted logic of the press 
in two respects.  
As mentioned in Chapter Two, physical violence lends itself to newsworthiness in 
keeping with the dictum “if it bleeds, it leads” (Meadow 2009, 232). Physical violence lends 
itself to interpretive journalism because the press has the leverage to “mix personal attitudes and 
factual reporting” (Bonde, n.d., 14) and make imputations that either discredit the opponent or 
legitimise the political party they would be rooting for through euphemistic language. Such a 
conception of election violence is limiting in that it does not enable one to gain deeper insights 
into election violence as a key ingredient of a society’s political culture.  The assumption in this 
thesis is that election violence is rooted in societal structures, culture, language, discourse, and 
everyday practices and interactions. For instance, a significant number of the respondents in the 
category of citizens talked about election violence as being sometimes ‘mischaracterised’ by the 
press in the sense that some of what the press reports as election violence were most likely 
ordinary fights which arose from some long-standing vendettas between people who knew each 
other, but were opportunistically revived during election time to settle scores.  
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One respondent said that:  
Violence, violence, it’s very unfortunate that its existence in society, like in 2008 there was a lot of 
mistrust among people and there was a lot of grudges, there was a lot of …all sorts of things. 
Maybe I have a personal score with, between you and me, right? Eh, it was the opportune time for 
somebody to settle that score in the guise of politics. Some, in the guise of politics… Some of these 
things really, because you will be surprised because people who would have fought if they were to 
be sat down one-on-one to say tell us, where are you differing you may find that their conflict has 
nothing to do with politics but they will just be using politics as an excuse. These are people who 
would have harboured grudges against one another. Like it was said that in the rural areas people 
are burning each other’s homesteads… Some of these people would be having long time vendettas 
against one another, but will be waiting for an opportunity to settle those scores. When they see 
that their enemies are perceived to be now on the weaker side-the receiving end. Then someone 
will say this is my time. Like how it is at the moment here and there you hear about political 
violence, then the following week (C4).   
Reference to election violence as a spirit (discussed in Chapter Seven) reflects a wider 
conception of election violence among citizen discourses in the sense that election violence is 
elevated to the spiritual and metaphysical realms, thus constructing it as a complex phenomenon. 
Election violence does not always manifest itself in an explainable manner, but is sometimes 
camouflaged in social struggles which are opportunistically portrayed as political conflicts by the 
press. Thus election violence provides a fertile ground for accentuating these struggles. This 
affirms De Los Rios’s argument that any attempts to conceptualise political violence (and by the 
same reasoning) must recognise that election violence should entail “addressing the notion of 
power” (De Los Rios 2009, 29). De Los Rios (2009, 30) rightly observes that election violence is 
“driven by desires for power that lead people to transgress others’ private domains”. Although 
De Los Rios was referring to political violence in its broad sense, this is equally true in relation 
to election violence during Zimbabwean elections held between 2000 and 2013 in that the 
retention or acquisition of power was the main motivation behind particular discursive 
constructions.  
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It is instructive to note that citizens construct conceptions of election violence that 
contradict those of the press, an indication that citizens do not always imbibe what they read in 
the newspapers. Citizen agency is demonstrated when they question the authenticity of some acts 
of election violence and the opportunistic instrumentalisation of election violence by political 
parties to gain power.  
Citing Neuman et al, Shah, Domke and Wackman (2001, 229) note that  mass media 
audiences “do not slavishly follow the framing of issues presented in the mass media” but rather 
“actively filter, sort, and recognize  information in personally meaningful ways in constructing 
an understanding of public issues”. Shah et al further note that when they are “confronted with 
information, individuals are thought to first locate relevant schemas to guide processing” (Shah 
et al. 2009, 229). This shows that the interface between press and citizen discourses is a zone in 
which meanings about election violence are negotiated, constructed and reconstructed again.  
Hall (1997, 44) notes that “discourse is about the production of knowledge through 
language…since all social practices entail meaning, and meanings shape and influence what we 
do - our conduct - all practices have a discursive aspect”.  
 Locating the meaning of election violence within the press and citizen discursive 
interface immerses us into the various ways in which election violence is talked and thought  
about, and how that language makes thoughts, talk, practices and journalistic reports  meaningful 
(Hobbs 2008, 7). Compared to press reports, citizen discourses reflect election violence in a 
complex way and relate it to broader violence in society. This demonstrates that election 
violence has multiple dimensions spanning a number of ideological perspectives. It could be 
argued that the polarisation of the press along political lines contributed to the overt manner in 
which the press represented electoral violence in Zimbabwe.  
As discussed in Chapter Six, political polarisation made it difficult for the press to report 
election violence in a dispassionate manner in the sense that their alignment to political parties 
forced the press to forsake the professional and ‘objectivist’ approach  as they became highly 
politicised resulting in a blurred distinction between journalism and activism.  
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This point is illustrated by the statement by a journalist working for the privately owned 
press who said: 
I think eh, the polarisation for me it’s, it’s a big problem. Sometimes I feel journalists have become 
politicians more than journalists, which, which I find very sad. Ah, and because they have aligned 
themselves to certain parties, they choose to either ignore or to exaggerate certain stories which is in line 
with their ability. I think we have moved away from that period when we started when a journalist 
was…Even here they ask you “who do you support? You can’t tell me that you don’t support…”. Even in 
the newsroom. You know what I mean? That eh “who do you support; you must support certain political 
parties”. Which is not the journalism that I was taught. So I think in terms of our professionalism, eh, eh, I 
think we are on the decline, because of this polarisation. Yeah. Which is very, very sad? Very few 
journalists, you can count that have remained, eh, eh balanced. Most are not. They are activists. Actually, I 
want to call them activists. Journalists have become activists (laughs). They are no longer journalists (J4). 
The view that journalistic practice borders on activist journalism is echoed by Group Editor-in-
Chief at Alpha Media Holdings, Vincent Kahiya thus: 
When we set about to cover the elections, when we set about, let me talk about our institution first. First 
thing we had to come up remind all of us editors, reporters about ethical guidelines. To the extent that I 
sent out a little document, just an ethical guideline on elections, reminding ourselves about that. Reporters 
are political creatures. They have got political aspirations, and the inclination to become activist’s 
journalists is always there, the appetite by journalists to root for political parties in their personal 
capacities is reflected a lot in stories. So the challenge was taking journalists out of stories, and say, I 
always say to a certain journalist take yourself out the story and replace yourself with the people. Aah, so 
that was one challenge which is an internal challenge which is an internal challenge (Interview with 
Vincent Kahiya, 2 September 2013, Harare) 
Whether it is politics that polarises the press or the press that polarises society is 
debatable. Judging from the statements above it is plausible to argue that the press and politics 
shaped each other during elections and the discursive construction of elections was driven by 
political imperatives the upshot of which was the anti-democratic discursive practices.  For 
instance, as discussed in Chapter Six, the perceptions of external threats forced the state-owned 
press to mobilise a political economy of nationalist discourses that relegated human rights issues 
to the back burner. As argued by The Sunday Mail Acting Editor, Mabasa Sasa, perceptions of 
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“threats”, “external interference”, and “meddling in our politics” meant that the state-owned 
press became 
…more robust in defence of the national interest…not just in a defensive manner, but to go on the 
offensive in defence of our country…As this external threat became more and more apparent we have to be 
more robust in our responses to the threat…our intent being, ah, upholding the integrity of the state 
(Interview with Mabasa Sasa, Harare, 15 May 2015).  
In the polarised political and electoral context, this robustness in defence of the national 
interest could mean anything ranging from cover-ups, glossing over incidents of election 
violence, to outright lies depending on who the alleged perpetrator of election violence was. 
Similarly, the private-press did not feel obliged to verify allegations of election violence as long 
as Zanu (PF) or the state was the alleged perpetrator, with the consequence that privately-owned 
press became prone to manipulation by its sources.  
Owing to its skepticism about the sincerity and commitment of Zanu (PF) to upholding 
peaceful elections, the privately-owned press prejudged the peacefulness or lack thereof, of 
elections (such as the 2013 harmonised elections) on account of the country’s previous record, 
thereby creating apprehension among the populace. As already indicated earlier in Dumisani 
Muleya’s statement, such skepticism appears to be justified on the the private press’s view that 
ruling party politicians are dodgy, have a penchant for dishonesty and most of the time tend to 
indicate right while actually  “turning left”.  
Such skepticism and the highly “highly politicized” (Skjerdal 2011, 1) politicized nature 
of the press resulted in the press failing to report election violence accurately and impartially 
because of their preconceived ideas regarding who the perpetrator and the victim of election 
violence were. This contradicts the normative ideals of the press prescribed by citizens whereby 
the press reports on election violence factually and dispassionately rather than infusing its 
opinions in the news reports. 
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 One respondent succinctly captured the judgmental approach of the press to reporting 
election violence thus: 
…are to report the facts as they are rather than taking one side and say the other party is innocent like 
you get a reporter actually judging or rather putting a stamp saying this party is the one to blame for every 
incident of political violence. I think that shouldn’t be the case because it actually encourages other party 
members to act upon and actually cause violence because they would be in a retaliatory mode because of 
the reports that would have been made by the newspapers because they actually know that they are not the 
sole causes of election violence and yet the newspaper reports would be saying they are the sole causes of 
election violence. So if they are just to report the facts, because I think that the reporters’ duty is to report 
the facts and nothing else but the facts not to take a side (C3). 
 In the larger discursive scheme, what is critical is HOW the press framed election 
violence and how this framing shaped citizens’ perceptions and attitudes about election violence 
in Zimbabwe. 
8.3 Framing Election Violence: Versions, Sub-Versions and Convergence 
                                                                                                                             
The data from interviews with citizens reveals that citizens did not unproblematically 
accept the polarised frames on the election violence proffered by the press. While the press 
framed election violence in binary terms the citizens generated multiple perspectives. For 
instance, citizens rejected framing which depicted the ruling party, Zanu (PF) as the perpetrator 
and the opposition MDC as the innocent victim polarity.  
Contrary to press portrayal of election violence as a perpetual struggle between ‘Good 
and Evil’, citizens mobilise multiple discourses whereby election violence was projected through 
a congealment of historical, political, economic and social factors. Citizens projected election 
violence as embedded in everyday discursive practices rather than simply as a phenomenon 
associated with elections.  
The majority of respondents in the category of citizens viewed election violence as a two-
sided affair pitting the ruling party, Zanu (PF) and the opposition, the MDC, although they did 
not attribute equal blame to the two political parties.  
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This view was mainly undergirded by instrumentalist notions of election violence 
whereby election violence is conceived as a tool for gaining or retaining power. 
 The binary view of election violence oversimplifies a complex issue by projecting 
election violence as senseless. Thus, press discourses on election violence accentuate a moralistic 
stance whereby election violence is attributable to the inherent moral and political bankruptcy of 
a particular party. Devices employed by the press, such as nomination, exnomination, selectivity, 
hyperbole, humanistic rhetoric, depersonalisation, personalisation, demonization (discussed in 
Chapter Five and Six) mask the reality of election violence rather  illuminate it. Such anti-
democratic discursive practices have the potential to predispose society to conflict rather than 
towards consensus. 
Citizens provided a rich tapestry of the complexities of election violence, reflecting on its 
underlying causes as well as on the assumptions about its intersection with power. Unlike press 
discourses which framed election violence in binary terms, citizen discourses construct election 
violence through multiple lenses, locating election violence across and within political 
formations. Thus citizen discourses contradict the polarising frames of election violence whereby 
violence is blamed on one political party and not the other.  
Citizen discourses foreground structural, behavioural and institutional factors as 
contributors to election violence. They also talked about external factors such as sanctions as 
indirect contributors to election violence. Citizen discourses provided alternative approaches for 
thinking and talking about election violence and the role of the press during elections. These 
alternative frames locate election violence in the realm of the wider societal political culture 
rather than a stereotypical trait of particular political parties. Citizens attribute election violence 
to varied factors including “hunger for power” (C1), intolerance, (C3), media reportage (C4 and 
C18), poverty and unemployment (C1 and C5), ignorance ( C6 and C 21), land reform (C20) and 
“sponsored political parties and newspapers”(C9).   
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The excerpts below are illustrative: 
In Zimbabwe, it’s mostly because of the hunger for power by the parties involved, and also I think we are 
lacking in terms of maturity, in terms of learning how to conduct ourselves or how to gain power. We lack 
an understanding of the whole concept…. We can also talk of political immaturity. And also fear, like some, 
we can say, fear of loss of power. There are parties who are trying to protect their power through violence 
(C1). 
I think one of the main causes of election violence is the issue of power. It’s like a competition, like a soccer 
match. Isn’t it? So everyone who will be contesting like the situation that we are in at the moment, everyone 
who is contesting wants to win but it now depends on the techniques and strategies that one believes can 
make him win. Does the individual believe that one can win by simply trying to persuade them or 
intimidating people so that they vote for you and so on? That is what usually causes election violence 
because someone may believe that if he threatens or beats people and because of the fear factor they will 
vote for him (C7). 
It’s a desire for power. The desire for power under every circumstance. By any means necessary. You want 
to remain in power; you want to get into power, without anything. Then that is, that causes violence (C5). 
I think the causes have to do with power. And power is not in ordinary people. It’s power of people who are 
above, the leaders. That’s where there is too much hunger for power. So if people are power hungry for 
power they will go out of their way to gain power by hook and crook. They are willing to bend the law in 
order to get what they want. I think that is the major problem. The issue of power. People want power and 
they are determined to get it at all costs. So, that question of education, to say what we really need. Is it 
textbook education or the education of life skills or education about governance for us to know? (C21). 
…most people who engage in violence, they are people who do not have anything to do in life. But if 
someone is employed and goes to work they cannot afford to spend the night at a political gathering or toy-
toying in the streets, this is not possible. The people who engage in political violence are people who do not 
have anything to do in life. These are people who do not have anything to such an extent that someone will 
just come and buy them beer and say to them “right, guys, I would like you to go and do 1, 2, 3 things 
(C7). 
I can say we have witnessed violence, like in 2008 we know there was land reform, isn’t it? It was done 
towards and it continued during election time. From Zanu (PF)’s point of view it was, can I say it was done 
quickly, giving people land, the land and so on, that’s their ideology. So Zanu (PF) supports, if they see 
someone trying to block that then they can go against that person. And from the MDC-T’s point of view 
they perceived it as being biased, the land being given to Zanu (PF) supporters. So where there was land 
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being given the MDC could try to block it, and where there was land being given the Zanu (PF) could try to 
promote the land being given to people. MDC try to block it and so on. So I can basically say…Yeah, it 
may have been partly responsible. Then I have… right, in towns, I have also witnessed where the councils 
we know the councils were being run by the MDC trying to undermine or to repossess certain assets from 
especially blacks, can I say the black community, I heard where the cases where these councils, because of 
their ideology as well, to say these councils are now being independently run and they should be free and 
fair, so if someone owes the council some money that person can go to courts (C20). 
I think is, it is media coverage. That’s one cause. Now and the way it, I think it is at the core. Eh, media 
coverage. The way of media coverage is at the core. Now downstream, because they will be covering, say if 
it is a personality or a political organisation they will be covering it in terms of what it is going to provide 
to the people. Now in terms of what this organization or personality is going to provide for the people there 
tends to be competition for political posts, your power is also increased. Your access for opportunities is 
also increased. Isn’t it? So the competition tends to heighten and to be harmful at times. To the extent that I 
always feel that if we were, we were to eh, eh adopt this culture where we would have our political leaders 
those vying for big political leadership, those vying for big political posts hauled before a panel of 
journalists like what happens in other nations so that they talk to the people, so that every citizen who has 
access to that coverage has an opportunity now to say I think I like what he said because there are more 
promises that what he said we would have very little of this (C18). 
The way I see it, what causes political violence is that what is good for the goose is not good for the 
gander. Do you understand what I am saying? What I think is good you may say it is bad. So if you see me 
doing what you think is bad then it means you won’t be happy which may result in us fighting. That is what 
I think causes election violence because if a person does not understand, let me say knowledge causes 
violence as well, ignorance because if a person is ignorant… (C6). 
These statements illustrate that, unlike press discourses, citizen discourses attribute 
election violence to socio-cultural, political and economic factors rather than to a single cause, 
thus, demonstrating that the interface between press and citizen discourses on election violence is 
a zone in which the meaning of election violence is contested and negotiated.These contrasting 
versions of reality about election violence between the press and citizens hark back on the social 
construction of reality theory which underpins this thesis in that the meanings of election 
violence are not fixed by the press but shift continuously as determined by the mutual 
negotiation between the press and the readers (citizens) who bring to bear their own interpretive 
frameworks to the political communication process.  
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The alternative discursive constructions of electoral violence embedded in citizen 
discourses recall Stuart Hall’s contention that meaning does not lie in an “object, person or idea 
or even the real world” (2013, 10) nor is it fixed or predetermined by the communicator, but is 
constructed through discourse rooted in symbolic practices and cultural conventions (Hall 2013, 
11). This recalls assumptions about meaning being located in the domain of interpretation rather 
than in the encoding processes, whereby during “interpretations never produce a final moment of 
absolute truth” but are “always followed by other interpretations, in an endless chain” a cyclical 
chain of meaning production (Hall 2013, 27). Hall argues that:  
Any notion of a final meaning is always endlessly put off, deferred. Cultural studies of this interpretive 
kind, like other qualitative forms of sociological inquiry, are inevitably caught up in this ‘circle of meaning 
(Hall 2013, 27).   
Viewed through a discursive lens the press and citizen discourses on election violence 
examined in this thesis bring to the fore the possible divergent (and complementary) ways in 
which these discourses shape one another. As distinct discourses they produce knowledge about 
election violence in Zimbabwe, while at the same time imposing limits on the possible range of 
ways in which people can talk about election violence. In Foucauldian discursive parlance, the 
press and citizen representations of election violence in Zimbabwe establish the “epistemes” (or 
the state of knowledge at any one time) and ways of talking about election violence (Hall 2013, 
29). Hall states that: 
The same discourse, characteristic of the way of thinking or the state of knowledge at any time…will, 
appear across a range of texts, and as forms of conduct, at a number of different institutional sites within 
society. However, whenever these discursive events ‘refer to the same object, share the same style 
and…support a strategy…a common institutional, administrative or political drift and pattern…then they 
are said by Foucault to belong to the same discursive formation (Hall 2013, 29). 
The competing versions of reality about election violence are solidified through 
antagonistic perspectives on the role of the press in reporting election violence.  
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While the press accentuated an objectivist journalistic frame (Chapter Five and Six) 
citizens prescriptions on the ideal role of the press in reporting election violence reflect an 
objectivist style of journalism, whereby the journalist is a “mere cypher” (Street 2001, 152), 
reporting on the goings on in the country in a dispassionate, “impersonal, dry, matter- of- fact” 
(Street 2001, 153) manner.  
The interpretive journalistic style in the state-owned press was underpinned by the 
‘national interest’ while in the privately-owned press it was pivoted on the watchdog function. 
Press discursive practices  such as the deliberate masking of the identities of the perpetrators of 
election violence, demonization, moralising, humanistic rhetoric, hyperbole, sanitization and 
rationalization of election violence, selectivity, emotive language and the conspiracy of silence 
(discussed in Chapter Five), memorialisation, condemnation and advocacy for peace (discussed 
Chapter Six) debunk the myth that journalists merely observe events as they unfold.  
Street (2001, 157) notes that “Journalism is necessarily selective and partial, but the 
selectivity and partiality are not the product of individual values and skills or professional 
codes”. The interpretive journalist style reflected in press representation of election violence laid 
the basis for the press to promote evaluative and explanatory framing of election violence 
whereby negativity was the hallmark (Hanitzch et al, (2011) or as Djerf-Pierre (cited by Salgado 
and Stromback 2011, 146) puts  it, journalists assumed  “the role of Ombudsmen of the public”  
whereby  the press became  advocates  for the “presumed interests of the needs of the 
public/audience” (Salgado and Stromback 2011, 146). The interpretive frames of the press were 
challenged by the objectivist frames in citizen discourses, whereby the role of the press in 
framing election violence was prescribed as that of simply “reporting the news” and “let the 
readers be the judge”.  
The objectivist function of the press reflected in citizen discourses on election violence is 
at odds with the interpretive journalistic style of the press and suggests that newspaper readers 
are able to pick up discrepancies between journalistic rhetoric, embellishments in professional 
codes and mission statements and actual practice. This shows that readers can construct 
discourses that counterbalance that of the press- a recall of the Foucauldian view that meanings 
are never fixed, but  contested and “sometimes bitterly fought over” (Hall 2013, xxv).  
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As Hall argues there are always numerous circuits of meaning circulating in any culture 
at any one time from which the audience can draw meanings (Hall 2013, xxv). Viewed through 
an epistemic lens the press and citizens circulate competing meanings and values that set the 
boundaries on how election violence should or should not be communicated and why it should 
be communicated in a particular way.  
The contention in this thesis is that, although, the press endorses particular ways of 
thinking and talking about election violence through their agenda-setting and framing practices 
the press’s interpretation of reality does not always prevail.  
Press discursive practices discussed in Chapter Five and Six, such as legitimation, de-
legitimation, condemnation of perpetrators of election violence, accentuation of peace message 
and memorialisation is predicated on the assumption that election violence negatively impinges 
on the validity of electoral verdicts. Interpretive journalism invites discursive practices that seek 
to endorse or impugn electoral contests through discursive practices where  information is 
infused with the opinions of the writer or news articles that proffer views “about motivations, 
tactics, and consequences of political events” (Esser and Umbricht 2014, 12) are instrumental in 
nature.  Similarly, the objectivism reflected in citizen discourses produces a particular type of 
knowledge whereby journalists are preoccupied with reporting the truth “as it is” (Hanitzsch et 
al, (2011, 276) whereby one should be able to separate facts from opinion (Hanitzsch et al, 
(2011, 276).   
A careful examination of citizen discourses on election violence  are hinged on certain 
assumptions about the existence of an ‘Absolute Truth’ which finds an outlet through statements 
like “the media should give people a fair report”( C2), “reporting an event as it is” (C17), “media 
should report violence as violence” (C13), “impartiality and lack of balance can cause 
violence”(C6), “may be if they are to report facts as they are” (C3) and the belief that the press 
can be and should be ‘neutral’ and ‘straightforward’ (C5). These statements signal claims to a 
particular regime of truth that runs counter to interpretive discursive practices in the press, thus 
demonstrating the extent to which press and citizen discourses on election violence were 
divergent and constituted competing discursive formations imbued with contesting epistemes.  
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There were, however, instances in which citizen and press frames on election violence 
overlapped. This was particularly the case in relation to the organic instrumentality of election 
violence. As discussed in Chapter seven, citizens constructed election violence as “orchestrated”, 
“planned”, or “sponsored”, the  way the press constructed it as “organised” rather than 
spontaneous.  
Among the citizens the discourse on orchestrated violence was anchored by words and 
phrases like “well planned”, “planned”, “orchestrated”, “to achieve certain objectives” and 
“being influenced”  as discussed in Chapter Seven, in the press, such as the “orchestrated” frame 
of election violence found resonance around the discourse of blame whereby the state-press 
blamed the opposition (MDC) “provoking violence”, while the privately-owned press 
characterised election violence as “state terror” suggesting that election violence was pre-
mediated rather than haphazard. Thus press and citizen discourses converge and intersect in 
relation to the organic nature of election violence. 
A key frame on election violence that runs through press and citizen discourses on 
election violence was the notion of election violence being organised and purposeful (Sisk 2008)  
as well as the perception that it was ‘orchestrated’ rather than spontaneous or haphazard.  
Based upon the contention that election violence was organized, the press employed 
particular discursive practices to expose election violence, with the state-owned press invoking 
the ‘national interest’ while the privately-owned press appealed to the ‘watchdog’ function in 
‘exposing’ the ruling party and the state for orchestrating election violence. Citizens, however, 
framed election violence as organised, but blamed “all politicians” for spearheading election 
violence, although a few of them singled out particular political parties for blame. Thus citizen 
discourses frame election violence as being deeply implicated in the systemic, structural and 
everyday political practices and values of Zimbabwean society rather than a phenomenon linked 
to particular individuals. The true value of incorporating citizen discourses as part of the political 
communication system is that citizen versions of reality about election violence undercut those 
of the press thereby stretching to the limit the press’s claims to the truth (Hobbs 2008, 11).  
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Hall (cited by Hobbs 2008, 12) succinctly demonstrates the limits of the press’s claims to 
truth when he notes that: 
It is discourse, not the subject who speaks it, which produces knowledge. Subjects may produce particular 
texts, but they are operating within the limits of the episteme, the discursive formation, the regime of truth, 
of a particular period or culture… the ‘subject’ is produced within discourse. The subject of discourse 
cannot be outside discourse, because it must be subjected to discourses. It must submit to its rules and 
conventions, to its dispositions of power/knowledge. The subject can become the bearer of the kind of 
knowledge which discourse produces. It can become the object through which power is relayed. But it 
cannot stand outside power/knowledge as its source and author. 
Citizen discourses thus intersect with press discourses while at the same time acting as a 
countervailing force to the press’s versions of reality by marking the boundaries to their ‘truth’ 
claims and power.   
Waldahl (2004, 102) notes how the “pro-opposition press” in Zimbabwe viewed 
politically motivated violence during the 2000 elections as “both systematic and organised”. 
Waldahl further notes that, according to these newspapers “the violence was being organised by 
circles close to the government and under its control. This took many forms”.  
Similarly, the vernacular media in Kenya have been accused of orchestrating election 
violence in the aftermath of the 2007 elections through the deployment of tribal discursive 
frames (Cosmos, 2013, Ismail and Dean 2008) a scenario reminiscent of the “Rwanda Model” , 
(Onyebadi and Oyedeji 2012) discussed in Chapter One and Two. In the context of this thesis 
citizens confirmed that due to their anti-democratic discursive practices on election violence the 
press engendered a culture of political intolerance. 
Sisk (2008, 13), notes how a significant amount of election violence is “not accidental or 
spontaneous” but “purposeful”, meaning that violence, including election violence is 
intrumentaluised, organised and mobilized rather than haphazard. Although press and citizen 
discourses differ on the perpetrators there is agreement that election violence is mobilised and 
instrumentalised to gain or retain power, even if the real perpetrators may lack agency.  
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Consequently, the identification of perpetrators of election violence in both the press and 
citizen discourses is a highly contested discursive practice which follows the rivulets chalked by 
political polarization. 
Merilainen (2012, 5) argues that “elections can also trigger random or spontaneous acts 
of violence among various stakeholders, particularly during the post-election violence phase” but 
is quick to acknowledge that random violence follows a different logic than organised electoral 
violence. She further notes that “politicians do not always have full control over the perpetrators 
of political violence…even when they operate under the direct payroll of the politicians. 
Sometimes things get out of the politicians’ hands and escalate” (2012, 6).  
 The organised nature of election violence underscores how election violence is 
instrumentalised for the accessing or retaining power, and the challenge faced by the press in 
exposing the complex but hidden networks of patronage connecting the perpetrators of election 
violence and their benefactors.  
Apart from the orchestration frame both citizens and the press constructed election 
violence as intertwined with the history of the nation.  In the case of the state-owned press the 
historicisation was actualised through references to how the violent character of the liberation 
struggle shaped political attitudes and behaviour in the country and how those attitudes 
crystallised into an exclusive and alienating narratives of violence such as, the Gukurahundi 
strategy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011), “patriotic history” (Ranger 2004) and “patriotic journalism” 
(Ranger 2005). The historicisation trope also found an outlet through discursive strategies such 
as “memorialisation” (discussed in Chapter Six), a deliberate attempt to retrieve past memories 
of election violence for hegemonic purposes. 
 In relation to citizen discourses historicity is articulated through tropes of historical 
continuity, whereby election violence is constructed as a residual consequence of the nation’s 
liberation ethos and political culture. In this sense election violence is constructed as inevitable, 
meaning that it is conceived within the broader framework of societal values, attitudes and 
practices which manifest themselves beyond a singular electoral episode. 
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 As a discursive device, historicisation constructs election violence as seamless connected 
within the broader societal questions and tensions rather than as a side-product of the 
democratisation process (Merilainen 2012). This echoes some scholars like Sisk (2008) and 
Merilainen (2012) who argue that in fragile societies, underlying political and socio-economic 
tensions and rivalries dating back to the colonial period have been responsible for the outbreak of 
violence during election time. Kenya is an example of a country where deep-seated “ethnic 
rivalries, and land disputes” (Merilainen 2012, 78) are said to have contributed to the outbreak of 
post-election violence in 2007. For Merilainen this “serves as an example of how unresolved 
social/ethnic grievances may catalyse a violent reaction towards electoral malpractices” 
Merilainen (2012, 78). 
Press and citizen discourses on election violence also reflect the nexus between election 
violence and the unfinished historical question of land in Zimbabwe. As discussed in Chapter 
Five, some of the election violence during the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential 
elections relates to the land issue, thus demonstrating how election violence is intricately 
intertwined with broader societal questions in fragile societies.  
Some of the news headlines make reference to the violent confrontation between war 
veterans and white commercial farmers, ‘shootings’, ‘murders’, or ‘killings’  during farm 
invasions (discussed in Chapter Five), an indication that land struggles were inseparable from 
political struggles. In fact, the land issue has been described as the epicentre of Zimbabwe’s 
socio-economic and political crisis, particularly after the introduction of the ‘fast-track’ land 
reform, also known as The Third Chimurenga or Jambanja (violence) (Chari, 2010; Chari 2014). 
References to the land reform and its violence-inducing character in press and citizen discourses 
validate that election violence is intricately interwoven in Zimbabwe’s political struggles.  
Press and citizen framings of election violence reflect the intersection between local 
politics and global processes. For instance, the press justified certain framings of election 
violence (e.g. sensationalism and hyperbole) on the basis that there was a need to alert the 
international community about the human rights situation in Zimbabwe, implying that 
Zimbabwean elections (local events) were put on the global spotlight by the press, with the 
assumption that the international community could intervene if the need arose.  
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This underscores the instrumentality of supranational institutions in resolving local 
conflicts – a counterpoint to the national interest (sovereignty) discourse flagged by the state-
owned press. On the one hand, the privately-owned press rationalises the deployment of 
hyperbole on the grounds of “sounding the siren” on the perpetrators of election violence as a 
way of soliciting the military intervention of the West- a point that has been elaborated on in 
Chapter Six. On the other hand, the state-owned press accuses the privately-owned press of 
contriving or stage-managing election violence in order to gain sympathy from its “Western 
sponsors”, thereby underscoring the fact that the discursive construction of election violence was 
conditioned by a nexus of the forces of globalisation and localisation (Zimbabwean nationalism). 
The global angle was underpinned by what Wolfsfeld (1992, 1) refers to “unequal political 
conflicts”, defined as “a public confrontation between a government and at least one other 
antagonist in which the state… has significantly superior amount of coercive resources at its 
disposal”, thereby creating an alibi for intervening in a domestic conflict. 
8.4 The Consequences of Discourse  
 The language which the press uses to describe election violence has consequences in so 
far as it affects citizens’ perceptions about the scale of election violence, who is the perpetrator 
of the violence, who are the victims and why election violence is used.  This is because the 
language used by the press to communicate such “facts” “interferes with the reader’s process of 
finally deciding what is true and what is false” (Hall 2006, 167).  
The power of the press lies in the fact that it produces certain knowledge or truth claims 
about what is being communicated and the person communicating the message. Hall (2006, 173) 
contends that discourse “produces knowledge that shapes perceptions and practice. It is part of 
the way power operates. Therefore, it has consequences for both those who employ it and those 
who are” subjected to it…” (Hall 2006, 173).  
Through their ‘framing practices’ (Hobbs 2008) the press engendered certain ways of 
thinking and talking about election violence among the citizens.  
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For instance, press discursive devices like exaggerations, bias, concealment of facts, lack 
of follow-ups, sensationalism, and partisanship fostered ignorance  among the citizens as they 
glossed over the reality of election violence during elections forcing citizens to buy more than 
one newspaper or read online newspapers in order to get a complete picture of the situation.  
 Reading more than one newspaper, reading news online and ‘alternative’ sources for 
news and information on elections was the clearest testimony of the existence of competing 
regimes of truth in the press. The fact that citizens viewed the press as fostering ignorance rather 
than enlightenment was an indictment on the press’s inability to execute its informational and 
educational mandate, and the loss of citizen trust was not only an indictment on the press’s anti-
democratic practices. 
While exaggerations, sensationalism and blowing events out of proportion created the 
impression that election violence was ubiquitous, ‘cover-ups’, suppression of stories and 
omissions blurred citizens’ perceptions about election violence at a particular time.  
The idea of an informed and active citizenry is one of the “most basic (and desirable) 
elements of a well-functioning democratic society (Blanco 2011, 178), and rests on the 
supposition that an informed citizenry is able to participate in the governance process. Citing 
Carpini and Keeter, Garcia-Blanco (2011, 178) argues that, “this conception of citizenship rests 
on the assumption that citizens need to be satisfactorily informed if they have to engage in 
politics, as a central resource for democratic participation is political information”.  
When the information disseminated by the press is no longer credible it means that the 
press perpetuates false perceptions about the reality, resulting in inappropriate actions and 
behaviour, a scenario that Edelman, in his book, The Politics of Misinformation, (2001, 112) 
refers to as “obstacles to change and occasions of error”. This clearly shows that the press, 
particularly in fragile societies, and being marked by socio-political cleavages, does not always 
promote democratic values and can become an agent of anti-democratic tendencies.  
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Nyamnjoh (2005, 2) acknowledges this shortfall as much when he argues that, although 
the mass media have the potential to inform and educate society they can also be “a vehicle for 
uncritical assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes, ideologies and orthodoxies that blunt critical 
awareness and make participatory democratisation difficult”.   
Nyamnjoh attributes the shortcomings of the press to “journalistic excesses” and 
unprofessional journalism compounded by the press’s misconceptions of liberal democracy, 
whereby democracy is conceived purely in political terms or as a  “struggle between those with a 
nation’s interests at heart and those who merely want to satisfy their narrow interests”, the upshot 
of which is that  journalism is narrowly viewed as  “an exercise in turning a blind eye to the 
shortcomings of political allies, while exaggerating the weaknesses of the paper’s political 
opponents” (Nyamnjoh 2005, 185-186). Nyamnjoh adds that: 
Depending on what side of the political spectrum a paper finds itself on, truth derives either from the 
opposition or from the government. There is little respect for evidence, honesty, fairness, balance or 
neutrality…Such partisan journalism is little informed by the professional canons of honesty, accuracy and 
fairness. The ability of politicised or partisan journalism to give all sides of the story, to avoid biased 
language, comment and opinion in news stories and reports, to dwell on the issues and avoid ad hominem 
remarks, has been crippled by the tendency to break Cameroonians down into the ‘righteous’ and the 
‘wicked’ depending on whether they are in opposition or in government… (Nyamnjoh 2005, 186). 
The argument advanced in this thesis is that partisanship alone is not a sufficient 
explanation of the press’s shortfalls. There is a need to pay more attention to the whole gamut of 
political values and practices embedded in press texts and their toxic effects on the citizens’ 
psyche, particularly their potential to foster anti-democratic tendencies such as intolerance. The 
contention here is that anti-democratic practices are a consequence of the triadic interaction 
between the press, politicians and the citizens - the three main components of a society’s political 
communication system. 
 It is imperative to look beyond the ethical consequences of partisan representations of 
election violence and begin to engage with the political consequences of unprofessional reporting 
on the citizens, particularly its demobilising effects.  
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The numerous misgivings expressed by citizens about the press’s inability to execute its 
informational mandate - a critical task of the press envisaged in the public sphere concept, 
demonstrates that citizenship emerges from  a discursive interaction between media 
audiences/readers and media output (Dahlgren and Sparks 1991, 17). A press that distorts reality, 
polarises society or fosters ignorance engenders negative citizenship in the sense that it is a 
breeding ground for “incivility” (Mutz 2006, 6), intolerance, dishonest and chicanery.  
 Some of the anti-democratic effects of press discourses on citizens were manifested 
through citizen disengagement from political issues. These anti-democratic practices were 
crystallized by the grammar of fear, trauma, social and political alienation, self-censorship, a 
culture of silence, resignation to fate and divinity and discursive closure. As discussed in Chapter 
Seven, these negative sentiments were attributed to the way in which the press represented 
election violence. This shows that discourse has social and political consequences and as 
observed by Street (2001, 80) media “content matters only because it has an effect”.   
The demobilising effects of press discourses on citizens undermine democracy because 
they bias the electoral terrain. Furthermore, political cynicism interferes with the citizens’ ability 
to participate freely in electoral processes, to enact their citizenship and “to make political 
judgments and act upon them” (Street 2001, 80) thereby undermining the democratic process. 
However, a cautionary note in relation to the demobilising effects is in order.  
It must be pointed out that the effects of press discourses on the citizens were not always 
straightforward in that some demobilisation discourses were juxtaposed with mobilisation 
discourses. As much as disenchantment engendered by the anti-democratic practices mentioned 
above entrenched polarisation and ‘cognitive dissonance’, it also motivated some people to vote 
in a particular way in protest against propaganda. Further, others were goaded to search for 
alternative sources of information in order to fortify their political views towards certain political 
parties and in the process became hardened. Thus, citizens constructed multiple complex (and 
multiple) meanings when they interacted with press discourses on election violence. This shows 
that the way in which citizens interacted with press content on election violence was dynamic.  
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What is instructive to note is that the question of citizen agency is brought to the fore in 
political communication, particularly the vocalisation of citizens in primary rather than 
secondary roles and as constructors of reality and privileged political actors rather than 
constructed subjects (Garcia-Blanco 2011).  
8.5 Rethinking the Democratic Role of the Press: Understanding Election Violence through 
the Political Culture Framework 
 
Press discourses on election violence discussed in Chapter Five and Six demonstrate the 
limits of liberal ideas in relation to the role of the media and democratization (Norris 2004). The 
activist journalism model (underpinned by competing narratives on election violence i.e. 
‘national interest’ and ‘watchdog’ function) constrains the press from executing its informational 
and public sphere role through the deployment of anti-democratic discursive practices which 
leave citizens less informed about election violence. 
 The high level of cynicism about and the loss of trust in the press and the emerging 
citizen newspaper consumption practices (such as triangulation of news sources and resorting to 
alternative sources of information such as new media; discussed in Chapter Seven) is an 
indictment on the limits of the press in influencing the democratic agenda. 
 Discursive practices such as exaggeration, hyperbole, selective reporting and salience, 
partisanship, cover-ups, and a conspiracy of silence on election violence attest to the failure by 
the press to live up to the dictates of the liberal democratic mandate and its watchdog function.  
Norris (2004, 116) contends that freedom of the press and media access are necessary for 
democratisation, but are not sufficient in themselves in the sense that “if the press is subservient 
to established interests, uncritical of government failures, and unable to hold the powerful to 
account for their actions” the development of society is stunted.  
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Norris (2004, 118) adds that: 
If the channels of communication reflect the social and cultural diversity within each society, in a fair and 
impartial balance, then multiple interests and multiple voices are heard in public deliberation. This role is 
particularly important in political campaigns. 
 The activist model of journalism adopted by the state-owned and the privately-owned 
press is at odds with democratisation in the sense that, as hostages of political forces, they 
produce competing versions of reality about election violence. As much as election violence 
renders democracy meaningless, political information which is a product of a “manufactured 
artifice” (McNair 1995, 23) compromises democracy. The anti-democratic discursive practices in 
the press (discussed in Chapter Five and Six) constitute a “major flaw in democratic theory” 
(McNair 1995, 23). In the specific context of this thesis, this flaw manifests itself through 
discursive practices that diminish the efficacy of the press in the democratic process. This 
diminished efficacy of the press finds expression through discourses of political disengagement, 
apathy, mistrust of politics and politicians, and cynicism, what Baudrillard (cited in McNair 
1995, 22) refers to as an “intelligible strategy of resistance to bourgeois attempts to incorporate 
the masses into a ‘game’ which they can never really win. Beyond the general shortfalls of the 
liberal democratic role of the media one can discern the rather palpable tenstion between citizen 
expectations of the media which are couched in a liberal democratic flavor and a critique of the 
same. This normative tension might be a result of the fact that citizens derive the language with 
which to evaluate the media from what the media say in their editorial charters and other claism 
by journalists. In other words, citizens use the media’s own proclamations and statements of 
intention to hold to account the press, and more often than not there is a disjuncture in what the 
media set out to do and what they actually do, or at least what the citizens believe the media are 
doing. However, this normative tension between what citizens expect the media to do and what 
the media do could be a separate topic for investigation.   
McNair (1995, 24) contends that the liberal democratic role of the press is in conflict with 
journalistic practices like deceit, propaganda, concealment or suppression of convenient 
information from citizens in the sense that citizens will be exposed to unreliable information or a 
“manufactured artifice rather than the objective truth”.  
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He adds that “only those with a touching and naïve faith in the ethical purity of 
politicians would deny that” manipulation plays an increasingly important role in contemporary 
democratic politics. Against this backdrop, the role of the press in democratic politics, not least 
in reporting elections is not unproblematic. 
 Theoretical debates about the role of the press in politics, particularly, in relation to the 
less powerful developing countries of the global South have not made much headway. An 
attempt to superimpose the liberal democratic model which was developed for the powerful 
democracies of the West has not yielded useful theoretical insights.  
The contention in this thesis is that work on theory building in relation to the role of the 
press in democracy could be broadened by generating scholarly data on the norms, values, 
beliefs and practices through which politics is performed. An understanding of the role of the 
press in democracy could be enhanced by turning attention to the concept of political culture and 
political communication culture by paying attention to the interactions between different 
components of the political communication process. There is a need to gain insights on the 
values, norms and practices which inform discourses on election violence. Democracy is a 
culture, and only a press that is sufficiently predisposed to a democratic culture can promote 
democracy. An anti-democratic press cannot advance democracy no matter how much 
democratic rhetoric it propagates. Nyamnjoh is correct in his contention that the predicament 
faced by the media in relation to their democratic role has been their emphasis on “the need for 
more domesticated understandings of democracy as mediated by the quest for conviviality 
between individual and community interests” (Nyamnjoh 2005, 3).  
Nyamnjoh’s contention that the media can also be a “vehicle for uncritical assumptions, 
beliefs, stereotypes, ideologies and orthodoxies that blunt critical awareness and make 
participatory democratisation difficult” is plausible.  Attempts to replicate theoretical templates 
designed for powerful Western nations in explaining the situation in Africa is a futile exercise.  
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Nyamnjoh’s observation on the mismatch between liberal democratic theory and African 
experience is so apt. He states that:  
Implementing democracy in Africa has been like trying to force onto the body of a full-figured person, rich 
in all the cultural indicators of health with which Africans are familiar, a dress made to fit the slim, de-
fleshed Hollywood consumer model of a Barbie-doll entertainment icon. But instead of blaming the tiny 
dress or its designer, tradition has been to fault the popular body or the popular ideal of beauty, for 
emphasizing too much bulk, for parading the wrong sizes, for just not being the right thing. Not often is the 
experience and expertise of the designer or dressmaker questioned, nor his/her audacity in assuming that 
the parochial cultural palates that inform his/her peculiar sense of beauty should play God in the lives of 
regions and cultures where different criteria of beauty and good life obtain. This insensitivity is akin to the 
behaviour of a Lilliputian undertaker who would rather trim a corpse than expand his coffin to 
accommodate a man-mountain, or a carpenter whose only tool is a huge hammer and to whom every 
problem is a nail. The history of  implementing liberal democracy in Africa attests to this clash of values 
and attempts to ignore African cultural realities that might well have enriched and domesticated liberal 
democracy towards greater relevance (1995, 23).    
The search for appropriate theories to guide the understanding of the role of the media in 
Africa must begin with the generation of data on the experiences of African countries in relation 
to the role played by the press in the democratic process. Data on the press and citizen discourses 
on election violence can help shed light on the role of the press in democracy. Election violence 
is, therefore, deeply implicated in every day discursive practices, in communication practices, 
and in the way in which people relate to one another during mundane aspects of life. In other 
words, election violence is intricately intertwined in broader societal culture and practices and 
the press is deeply implicated in the formation of this culture through its discursive practices 
which can either nature democratic or anti-democratic tendencies.  
The press, therefore, can be a key institution in transforming an anti-democratic culture 
into a democratic one through the deployment of discursive practices that do not engender 
hatred, intolerance, arrogance, blind loyalty, partisanship and other anti-democratic practices that 
may make politicians and citizens speak past each other. It must be underscored that the findings 
in this study neither endorse the notion that the press fuels election violence, nor the belief that it 
is a moral witness for peace and stability.  
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The press can engender anti-democratic attitudes among citizens through its discursive 
practices that may undermine the entrenchment of a democratic culture. This thesis, foregrounds 
political culture and political communication culture as conceptual frameworks for gaining 
insights on the interaction between actors in the political communication process. This research 
agenda is supported by Pfetsch (2004, 346) who notes that “…the interaction space at the 
interface between politics and the media in which political communication actors move  is 
crucial in understanding the representation of political objects in national public arenas”. 
  The term political culture was introduced by Almond and Verba in 1963 (Pfetsch, 2004, 
347) and referred to the “interplay between subjective orientations of citizens”, meaning the 
ideas and values that impinge of citizens’ political actions and behaviour. Almond and Verba 
(cited in Pfetsch 2004, 347) state that:  
When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalised in the 
cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population…The political culture of a nation is the particular 
distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.  
Due to the fact of political culture being widely shared and distributed within a 
population it is likely to be stable over time and can be passed on from one generation to another. 
On the other hand, political communication is a subset of political culture and evolved in the 
1970s (Pfestch, 2004, Gurevitch and Blumler 2004). Thus, political culture constitutes a 
framework within which different forms of political communication such as the encoding and 
reception of political messages and “vocabularies” of politics take place (Gurevitch and Blumler 
2004, 335-336).  According to Paletz and Lipinsiki (1994, 2) political culture “consists of widely 
shared, fundamental beliefs that have political consequences” and “shapes how individuals and 
society act and react politically”.  According to Paletz and Lipinsiki (1994, 3) “the actual and 
potential role of the media in shaping a political culture is thus self-evident.” The media transmit 
political culture from one generation to another. They diffuse values, attitudes and thoughts, 
through society in ways that render some of them to be “widely shared”.  Since ideas and beliefs 
are of key importance  in political culture the press becomes a critical tool for the dissemination 
and entrenchment of political democratic and anti-democratic cultures.  
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Thus “ideas that go to make up political culture are not innocuous, they have political 
consequences” (Paletz and Lipinsiki (1994, 2). Pfetch (2004, 363) argues that “the concept of 
political communication culture as a component in the overall political culture of a country can 
make an important explanatory contribution to analyzing the interaction between politics and the 
media in modern democracies”. Floss (2008, 4) argues that a nation’s political culture is shaped 
by the character of its institutions and their practices, be it a consensus orientation, 
personalisation orientation or conflict orientation. The way in which news frames issues can also 
determine a country’s political communication culture as well.   
A close examination of press and citizen discourses on election violence enables one to 
gain insights on the way the values and beliefs that underpin the encoding and decoding of 
political messages and the panoply of political vocabularies which permeate political 
communication in Zimbabwe. The chapter argues that the way in which the press frames news 
on election violence accentuates the conflict frames which crystalliseed through anti-democratic 
discursive practices. This conflict orientation engenders negative attitudes in politics which find 
expression through apathy, cynicism and outright disengagement from political processes. Such 
discursive practices play host to anti-democratic practices like intolerance, undermining of a 
positive civic culture are antithetical to the deepening of a democratic culture. 
The differences and similarities between press and citizen discourses on election violence are 
summarized in Table 8.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
326 
 
Table 8.1: Comparing and contrasting press and citizen discourses on election violence 
                                                                DIFFERENCES 
Press Discourses Citizen Discourses 
 Conceive election violence narrowly 
 Privileges covert or physical election violence. 
 Physical violence conceived as disconnected from 
symbolic violence. 
 Election violence viewed through a simplistic lens. 
 Views election violence through a binary lens 
 Attribute election violence to personality traits. 
 Employ episodic frames 
 Employ interpretive frames 
 Pro-involvement in reporting 
 Conceive election violence broadly. 
 Focuses on both physical and covert election 
violence. 
 Conceive election violence as intertwined with 
symbolic violence. 
 Election violence viewed as a complex 
phenomenon. 
 Election violence through multiple lenses. 
 Election violence viewed as embedded in 
culture and every day practices. 
 Employ analytical frames 
 Emphasises detachment in reporting 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                SIMILARITIES 
 Both view election violence as organised 
 Both view perpetrators of election violence  as lacking agency 
 Election violence viewed as an instrument for gaining or retaining power 
 Election violence historicised 
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8.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter compares press and citizen discourses on election violence using three 
themes (conceptions of election violence, framing of election violence and the effects of press 
discourses on citizens) as a lens for gaining insights on the interaction between the press and 
citizens. The chapter argues that, although press and citizen discourses show some overlap they 
also have significant differences.  
Unlike press discourses which narrowly conceive election violence as physical violence, 
citizen discourses conceive election violence through a wider lens encompassing imprints of 
mediated reality, lived experiences and interpersonal experiences, thereby demonstrating the 
intersection of election violence with the broader societal violence. Unlike the press, citizens 
construct election violence as seamless and intersecting with other forms of election violence in 
society. Furthermore, citizen and press framing of election violence demonstrated the currency of 
competing regimes of truth, whereby the press projects election violence in binary terms while 
citizens construct it through its complexities, foregrounding its nexus with history, society, the 
economy and politics. However, both press and citizen discourses framed election violence as 
“orchestrated”, although they differed in their attribution of agency. These competing frames 
also found expression through equally antagonistic discourses actualised through the prism of an 
interpretive journalistic model and an objectivist journalism model.  
These divergent frames recall the competing regimes of truth circulated in the press and 
citizen discourses about the nature, cause and effects of election violence in Zimbabwe during 
presidential and parliamentary elections held between 2000 and 2013. Interactions between press 
and citizen discourses also manifested themselves through contradictory effects of press 
discourses on the citizens.  
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The anti-democratic discursive practices in the press engendered contradictory reflexes 
among the citizens. While exaggerations, suppression of facts, hyperbole, sensationalism and 
other anti-democratic discursive practices in the press engendered negative civic cultures such as 
political disengagement it was also observed that they galvanized citizens to protest against the 
status quo and to expose themselves to alternative (and palatable) sources of information. Thus, 
press discourses engendered both mobilisation and demobilisation behaviour.  
The chapter concludes by pointing out that the data gleaned from analysing the interface 
between press and citizen discourses can be valuable for mapping out the values, beliefs and 
practices which inform how politics is performed in a particular society. Such data can be 
valuable for charting a new paradigmatic path in relation to the role of the press in democracy in 
societies in transition.  
The contention in this thesis is that the ideas circulated by the press have political 
consequences and can shed light on the political culture and political communication culture of a 
society. Political culture can be a powerful explanatory tool for gaining insights into how 
attitudes, values, beliefs and actions can unwittingly lay bare citizens and the press’s 
commitment to democratization. 
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 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
 This study used a Foucauldian discursive analytic approach to map out press and citizen 
discursive constructions of election violence during Zimbabwe’s presidential and parliamentary 
elections held between 2000 and 2013, the ultimate objective being to broaden knowledge on the 
role of the press in election violence. A discursive analytical approach provided a conceptual 
lens to view election violence through a social construction lens.  
The thesis was limited to examining the quality of representation rather than the quantity or 
volume of coverage over a period of thirteen (13) years. The discursive analysis entailed an 
examination of a corpus of archival textual data from five national newspapers, (namely The 
Herald, The Sunday Mail, The Zimbabwe Independent, Daily News, Newsday and The Financial 
Gazette) semi-structured interviews with purposively selected journalists and editors from these 
newspapers as well as semi-structured interviews with 21 purposively sampled Zimbabwean 
citizens who are regular readers of newspapers. Press discourses were compared and contrasted 
with citizen discourses in order to gain insights on the normative values that underpin discursive 
constructions of election violence.  
The study yielded insights that will expand knowledge on the role of the press in political 
conflicts in general and election violence in particular. The competing discursive constructions 
of election violence by the different newspapers bring to the fore the tension between theoretical 
perspectives that contend that reality is constructed by the media through discourse and framing 
and those that suggest that the media simply reflect on reality.  Further, the study explored the 
interface between press and citizen discourses on election violence and demonstrated how citizen 
discourses act as counterpoints to press discourses on election violence. 
This final chapter gives a reflective account of the key observations and findings of the 
thesis highlighting their implications for theory and journalism practice. The limitations of the 
study are discussed and avenues for further research are identified and recommended. 
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The argument advanced in this chapter is that the discursive construction of election 
violence in the state-owned and privately-owned press reflects competing versions of reality 
chalked by equally antagonistic political values. While the state-owned press prioritised ‘national 
interest’ and ‘sovereignty’ the privately-owned press projected election violence through a 
liberal ‘human rights’ framework. In the ensuing contestations, the meaning of election violence 
became a site for political struggles and its meaning became elastic, depending as it was, on who 
is the perpetrator or victim was or which newspaper was reporting and the political interests it 
represented represent. Further, the thesis argues that, although the press had the privilege to set 
the limit on the citizen’s social knowledge, press discourses remained amenable to the 
oppositional readings of politically active members of the public who constructed parallel 
discourses about election violence based on their lived experiences and their interpretations of 
what was published in the newspapers. 
9.2 Competing Regimes of ‘Truth’: Selectivity, Silence and Salience   
 
As pointed out in this thesis, the discursive construction of election violence in the   
period under study (2000 – 2013) was characterised by antagonistic discourses whereby state-
owned and privately-owned press projected competing versions of reality in relation to who the 
perpetrators and the victims or the levels of election violence were. The polarised political 
environment fed into simplistic and dichotomous constructions of election violence, and 
provided fertile ground for the opposing press camps to deploy discursive practices characterised 
by the “Wicked” and the “Saints”, thereby sowing seeds of political intolerance in society. 
However, as demonstrated in Chapter Seven the citizens punctured holes into this binary 
narrative by producing hybrid discourses that bore imprints of mediation and their lived reality. 
The principal discursive tropes through which the press’s binary narrative was pivoted were 
selectivity, silence, and sensationalism, and exaggerations.  
The implication of such discursive practices was that election violence came to denote 
different things depending on who was speaking and the benchmarks of morality were pegged 
differently depending on who was the perpetrator or victim of election violence.  
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As the press had entered into pacts with their political allies to “see no evil, speak no evil 
and hear no evil” the representation of election violence became a terrain of ideological struggle. 
The thesis argues that, although there is no evidence to support the view that the press 
fuel election violence similar to the Rwanda Model mentioned in Chapter Two, nevertheless, 
through its selectivity, conspiracy of silence and sensationalism and other anti-democratic 
framing practices, it promoted a culture of political intolerance which can exacerbate social and 
political tensions in society. Through discursive practices like selectivity, silence, salience, 
hyperbole, and exaggerations the press legitimises election violence. For instance, the persistent 
portrayal of the MDC as the perpetrator of election violence, as the perpetrator of political 
violence or as the “originator of violence” (discussed in Chapter 5) might or could have created 
an excuse for the ruling party to annihilate the opposition party in the sense that such discourses 
legitimise violence against the opposition since the opposition is framed as an enemy and 
eliminating the “enemy” becomes common cause. In the same vein, the “mystification” of 
election violence by the state-owned press, whereby the opposition MDC was constructed, not as 
the “real enemy”, but a front for whites who had been defeated (“the invisible forces”) it meant 
that violence against the MDC was portrayed as “legitimate” since the party was projected as a 
monstrous force, an allusion to Akpabio’s “framing them in order to hang them” technique 
(Akpabio, 2011). Similarly gross exaggerations and hyperbolic representations of election 
violence and the stigmatization of ZANU (PF) by the privately-owned press might also have 
encouraged retaliatory violence by opposition supporters or as one respondent argued (see 
Chapter Seven) made ruling party supporters feel blackmailed and created an incentive to 
perpetrate more violence against political opponents.  
Selectivity reporting of election violence, the conspiracy of silence, selective salience and 
exaggerations are not just unethical, but also anti-democratic news discursive practices which 
hinder the press from promoting accountability and transparency. In addition, the conspiracy of 
silence on violence by the press helps to normalise violence. The fact that the press was 
embedded in political party politics restrained it from reporting fully and objectively on what 
was transpiring on the ground.  
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Voltmer (2010, 137-138) alludes to this when she notes that the media “have been 
criticised for remaining too close to political power holders to be able to act as effective 
watchdogs; political reporting is regarded as too opinionated to provide balanced gate-
keeping…”.  
As a result of their close proximity to political power holders the press in Zimbabwe 
became part and parcel of the architecture of electoral violence. The press became “active 
participants in” shaping public opinion and perceptions and were an integral component of the 
political process rather than “reporting on and about” (emphasis original) election violence 
(Blumler and Gurevitch 1995, 3).  
As a consequence, the reporting of election violence became guided by political, rather 
than professional considerations and stories on election violence were carefully selected, 
“appropriately” placed and inflected, hyped or toned down, depending on who was the alleged 
perpetrator or victim. This gave rise to “activist journalism”, whereby the press became active 
participants in political struggles, doing the bidding for particular political principals.  
As alluded to above “activist journalism” thrives on anti-democratic discursive practices 
(see Table 9.1 below) which are at variance with the normative liberal democratic ideal role of 
the press such as its informative and educative role, because it is driven by a political rather than 
a public interest agenda. As Pippa Norris has observed, the media can only impact positively on 
democratisation and human development only if they are able to play their civic forum role, 
whereby they act as a public sphere, “facilitating informed debate about the major issues of the 
day…in a fair and impartial balance” (Norris 2004, 118) where diverse voices and interests are 
represented. Some scholars contend that, although the media can “help to build peace and 
national consensus”, they can also hinder it if they become proxies for rival political groups, “in 
the process sowing divisiveness rather than consensus” and can “contribute to public cynicism 
and democratic decay” (Coronell n.d., 1).  
To varying degrees, both the state-owned and the privately-owned press employed 
discursive practices that predisposed society to conflict rather than social consensus.  
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Such discursive strategies include “othering”, mystification of the enemy, demonisation, 
the use of emotive language, personalisation and constructions that justified the annihilation of 
the “enemy other”, such as the suggestion that Zanu (PF) was engaged in a perpetual mortal 
combat with invisible forces” and the construction of a false moral equivalence. The 
preponderance of a conflict frame in the representation of election violence in both state-owned 
and privately-owned press speaks volumes about a journalistic and political culture that is more 
oriented towards conflict rather than consensus, and the state of Zimbabwe’s social and political 
fragility created an environment that was conducive for the entrenchment of such a political 
culture.  
The contention in this thesis is that, more than being a constitutional issue, democracy is 
also a culture and a press that does not embody democratic values cannot foster democracy. 
Political culture here denotes, the “widely shared, fundamental beliefs that have political 
consequences…shapes how individuals and the society act and react politically” (Paletz and 
Lipsink (1994, 1). Thus political culture encompasses people’s interactions, political preferences 
subjective orientations (Paletz and Lipsink (1994).  
Floss and Marcinkowski (2008, 4) argue that “a nation’s political culture is very much 
shaped by political institutions, their practices and rationalities”. The press is one of these key 
institutions in society and the way it frames political issues can give an indication on whether it 
can foster consensus or conflict. This, however, is another topic which warrants a separate 
investigation. Suffice it to point out that the deployment of certain discursive tropes, such as 
selectivity could in the long term engender a political culture of intolerance that predisposes 
society towards conflict rather than consensus.  
9.2.1 Interpretive Journalism or Journalistic Activism? 
A key argument that runs throughout the analysis in this thesis and needs to be reiterated 
here is that the way in which Zimbabwean state-owned and privately-owned press discursively 
constructed election violence straddled the thin line between legitimate interpretive journalism 
and activist journalism. The term “activist journalism” used in this thesis was used by two media 
practitioners when they expressed misgivings about the way in which their colleagues had 
become embedded in political party politics (see Chapter Eight).  
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Although others did not use exactly the same term (with one journalist preferring to 
describe journalism of the day as “advocacy” (see Chapter Five) the notion that the press was 
enmeshed in political struggles and ideologies of the day also became a leitmotif in the 
interviews with citizens who mentioned political alignment as one of the major problems with 
the press. As a consequence, press representation of election violence brought to the fore the 
tensions between the normative prescriptions of the state (as educators, informers, public interest 
etc.) activist journalism. The implication of this was that discursive construction of election 
violence became a way of allocating values, thereby spotlighting the potency of the press as a 
distributor of power (Street 2001, 232).  
The discursive power of the press was mobilised through the provision of particular 
interpretive frameworks and discursive practices that shaped public opinion about the reality of 
election violence. The interpretive style ensured that reality was shaped in a particular way 
through selective agenda-setting and fostering certain interpretative frameworks. Nash’s 
contention resonates with one key argument made in this thesis thus: 
Knowledge as discourse is not knowledge of the “real” world as it exists prior to that knowledge. Although 
it presents itself as representing objective reality, in fact, discourses construct and make “real” the objects 
of knowledge they “represent” (cited in Street 2001, 233). 
Although the ideological function is an inherent asset of the press, the way in which the 
press became embedded in political causes during elections that are the focus of this thesis went 
beyond the thresholds of bias expected in society, be they democratic, semi-democratic or 
authoritarian, giving credence to the argument that the press resembled political activists.  
As argued in this thesis such activism manifested itself through their selective reporting, 
distortions, sensationalism, partisan, and dichotomised reporting characterised by the existence 
of “Devils” and “Angels”.  As argued in Chapter 7 such partisanship did not just result in loss of 
public trust towards the press, but also seeded “moods of bitterness”  (Mlambo 2005, 15) among 
bitter rival political party supporters who felt blackmailed by the press. While the immediate 
effect of such acts cannot be quantified, that such actions have the potential to nurture a political 
intolerance and a culture that orients society towards conflict rather than consensus in the long-
run cannot be ruled out. 
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9.2.2 National Interest versus Liberal Human Rights: A Conflict of Values?  
The competing versions of reality about election violence observed in this thesis  were 
pivoted on diametrically opposed ideological values which found expression in the state press’s 
‘national interest’ the privately-owned press’s liberal human rights discourse (vocalised as “the 
watchdog” role). As observed in the thesis the liberal human rights frame was vocalized through 
discursive practices that border on hyperbolic statements and apocalyptic prophecies (such as the 
claim in the Financial Gazette that the situation in Zimbabwe would degenerate into a genocide) 
(discussed in Chapter Five), excessive deployment of humanistic rhetoric in relation to the   
“worthy victims” (Herman and Chomsky 1988) of election violence, who almost always 
happened to be opposition supporters. On the one hand, the ‘watchdog journalism’ concept 
authorised particular discursive practices and behaviour among the privately-owned press such 
as sensationalism in order to attract the international community to intervene through invocation 
of the responsibility to protect doctrine. On the other hand the ‘national interest’ discourse 
legitimised the suppression of incidents of election violence, a culture of denial, sanitization and 
rationalisation of election violence in the state-owned press, meaning that the citizen was 
deprived of adequate information about the situation regarding election violence. At the same it 
became impossible for readers to have an understanding of the level of political violence if they 
relied on the press since it was either portrayed as increasing (in the privately-owned press) or 
decreasing (in the state-owned press).  
The press became indirect accomplices in the election violence through its impartial 
reporting, selective sourcing and selective application of moral standards. It was also 
demonstrated in this thesis how the selective use of sources became a discursive strategy to 
activate either the ‘national interest’ or the ‘watchdog’ argument.  
Whereas the state-owned press relied mainly on the police as sources, the privately-
owned press relied on opposition politicians, human rights organisations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), thus making it very clear that they were pursuing separate ideological 
agendas.  As demonstrated in Chapter Five, two of the reporters that were interviewed (one from 
the state-owned press and the other from the privately-owned press) admitted that these sources 
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were not always reliable since they also were aligned to political parties, and in the case of the 
NGOs, they also wanted to advance their own political agendas.  
In the final analysis, the terms “national interest” and “watchdog journalism” became 
facades to protect partisan political interests rather than protecting the broader interests of the 
citizens as their meanings became infinitely elastic. For instance, “national interest” could be 
interpreted to mean the legitimate state monopoly of violence which was in the public interest, 
but could also mean state directed violence against civilians who did not necessarily threaten 
state security interests. Similarly, the watchdog journalism discourse could be interpreted as 
legitimate surveillance of powerful interests and protection of innocent civilians, but could also 
mean giving a free rein by the privately-owned state to fabricate stories and make false 
allegations against the ruling party (such as the Tadyanemhandu case referred to in Chapter 
Seven) knowing full well that such allegations could gain traction with the ‘international 
community’. Given the elasticity of these concepts the only point of convergence between the 
state-owned press and the privately-owned press was “activist journalism” whereby either side of 
the spectrum became a mouthpiece of their chosen political party. It is this “activist journalism” 
model which defined the discursive construction of election violence in Zimbabwe between 2000 
and 2013, although one must hasten to mention that the degree to which it was practised by 
either side is debatable and fell outside the purview of this thesis.  
9.2.3 The Instrumental Logic of Election Violence: Legitimation and De-legitimation 
Consistent with their diametrically opposed ideological values, discursive constructions 
of election violence were expressed through an instrumental logic whereby the press sought 
either to certify or de-legitimise the electoral verdict. In this vein, and as was demonstrated in the 
thesis, the state-owned press accentuated messages about the “peacefulness” of elections, while 
the privately-owned press condemned every electoral verdict whether the election was peaceful 
or not.  
Against this backdrop both the state-owned and the privately-owned press deployed an 
interpretive news framework through which the press projected a particular political party was 
not electable because it used violence or to trash the verdict in advance on the grounds that 
violence had been used. It was observed in this thesis how the press deployed “memorialisation” 
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(reporting on residual or historical violence in the context of a current election) as a discursive 
strategy to keep memories of a violent past alive so as to influence voting behaviour. The 
implications were that election violence was re-inscribed with a new and wider frame of meaning 
which transcended immediate physical skirmishes to encompass subliminal effects of election 
violence.  
In the privately-owned press, elections became synonymous with remembering the 
“horrendous” events of previous elections, while in the state-owned press the focus was on 
atrocities of the colonial regime and the injustices of the past. The excavation of past electoral 
violence was more associated with the privately-owned press, particularly in relation to the 2013 
harmonised elections, probably because there was negligible physical violence during this 
election. Infusing election violence with a wider frame of meaning that locates violence outside 
its normal conception as well as outside the electoral cycle meant that election violence could not 
be reduced to the counting of dead bodies in a particular electoral context, as it also included 
elements of trauma, pain, and memory. The implication was that physical electoral violence, 
within the immediate electoral cycle was viewed as being synonymous with its residual effects. 
This has methodological and sampling implications for the scholarship on election violence, 
particularly in fragile societies characterised by deep-seated historical tensions.  
The question becomes, what is electoral violence and what is not; where do you draw the 
line; how do you determine an electoral cycle? How do you separate election violence from other 
types of violence? These are hard questions which require hard answers and deserve a separate 
investigation. Be that as it may, it could be argued that, the fact that there is an intrinsic 
relationship between election violence and other political conflicts, the relationship between 
election violence and the press is more complex than previous studies might have assumed.  
What is instructive to note is that, as a discursive strategy, memorialisation of election 
violence is a salutary example of the discretionary powers of the press and its ability to foster 
particular definitions and knowledge or impose hierarchies on phenomena. 
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 Such discretionary power was demonstrated through the selective conscription of 
sources in the condemnation of election violence, with the privately-owned press going for 
institutional voices such as the church and the NGO community and election monitoring groups 
(an expression of its moral and human rights standpoint) to lend moral weight to their political 
agenda.  
As demonstrated in this thesis, the condemnation of election violence was almost always 
followed by blame giving credence to the Foucauldian view that all discourse has consequences. 
It would not have been enough for the press to blame perpetrators of election violence without 
prescribing what or insinuating what action should be taken. 
 In the case of the privately-owned press, condemnation of election violence was always 
followed by the conclusion that the elections would not be free and fair because of the violence, 
thereby opening a debate about what exactly constitutes a free and fair election. For instance, it 
has been observed that in South Africa’s inaugural democratic elections in 1994 more than 1000 
people died in clashes between the African National Congress (ANC) and its arch-rival, Inkatha 
Freedom Party, but were declared free and fair (Chapter Four).  The question that arises is 
whether the freeness and fairness or there lack of elections should be tied to a death toll? Does 
the prevalence of peace (and absence of violence) mean elections are free and fair?  
In this thesis it was demonstrated how the press adopted a simplistic view whereby the 
legitimacy of electoral verdicts was tied to the absence of election violence. The state-owned 
press accentuated the ruling party’s peace message while the privately-owned press ignored it on 
the pre-text ruling party politicians had, in the past been inconsistent in their call for peace. As 
discursive strategies, condemnation, peace advocacy message and endorsement of electoral 
verdicts illustrate the extent to which the state-owned and the privately-owned press pursued 
tangential ideological agendas. This brings to the fore the instrumental logic of election violence, 
whereby election violence became a tool for gaining or retaining power.      
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9.3 Citizen Discourses and their Interface with the Press  
 
9.3.1 Discourses 
In Chapter Seven, it was argued that, although press and citizen discourses differ 
significantly, there are points of convergence. Whereas the press foregrounded physical violence, 
citizens constructed election violence as cross-cutting, encompassing physical, psychological and 
symbolic elements of election violence, meaning their framing went beyond physical or 
observable violence, what Reif (2011, 6) refers to as “noisy” forms of  coercion, to include 
“quiet” covert forms of election violence.  
The wider frame of election violence in citizen discourses is also reflected in the 
characterisation of election violence as irrational, senseless, or a “spirit”, connoting something 
that “suffers from conceptual devaluation or semantic entropy” (Schlesinger 1991, 5). While 
citizen discourses on election violence show conceptual depth and breadth press discourses 
define election violence narrowly, possibly because covert violence lacks the key ingredients of 
newsworthiness, namely visibility, drama, and measurable impact (such as death toll, number of 
injured etc.).  
As noted in Chapter Two, one of the reasons why election violence has been given less 
academic attention is that, unlike wars, and other crises, it generally has a lower death toll.
46
 By 
incorporating citizen discourses about election violence this study is able to broaden knowledge 
on the meaning of election violence, particularly from the point of view of those who experience 
it. Their constructions of election violence bear imprints of their lived reality as well as the 
mediated reality since they interact with the media.  
 
                                                          
46
 This possibly explains the phenomenal attention by both the media and academics to the Kenyan 2007/2008 
post-election violence where about 1300 Kenyans died and about 500 000 displaced (Munyua, n.d.) 
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It was instructive to note that, among the main causes of election violence which 
dominated both press citizen discourses was the issue of unhealthy electoral competition, or “the 
desire for power”, “hunger for power” what Mueller (2011, 99) referred to as “dying to win”, 
which is symptomatic of societies characterised by high levels of patronage (Sisk 2008).  
Mueller (2011, 109) notes that much of the election violence in Kenya emanated from the 
refusal by politicians to lose elections and their “willingness to use violence to win”.  As 
demonstrated in this thesis, citizens do not just attribute election violence to the desire for power, 
but also made reference to residual historical national questions, such as the land issue, the 
liberation struggle and the debilitating and polarising effects of economic sanctions imposed by 
the West (see Chapter Seven). This historicisation of election violence is significant and is 
acknowledged by some Zimbabwean scholars who note how the ruling ZANU (PF) party 
constructed ideologies of violence as an alibi to annihilate its opponents (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2011).  
It could be argued that, apart from engendering a siege mentality based on victimhood, 
colonial violence nurtured a culture of entitlement which found expression in the use of violence 
against opponents, giving way to a cycle of violence whereby the victim became the victimiser. 
Given the cyclical nature of violence, whether the current crop of politicians in the “democratic 
movement”, whose claim for heroism is built on the foundation of “defiance” of autocracy, will 
not replicate similar tendencies of entitlement and violent tendencies in a post-Zanu (PF) era is 
debatable. However, the picture does not look so promising, particularly considering the violent 
fracturing of the opposition MDC, which has been characterised acrimonious intra-party 
skirmishes, some of which are well-documented by Lloyd Sachikonye in his book When a State 
Turns on Its Citizens: Institutionalized Violence and Political Culture (2011) are anything to go 
by. Suffice to reiterate that violence is vicious cycle and a culture acquired through socialization 
and social learning is a key element of the socialization process. 
Both citizens and the press constructed election violence as “organised” or “orchestrated” rather 
than haphazard, and perpetrators of election violence were often constructed as lacking agency in 
the sense they were viewed to be sponsored by their principals who are politicians, an allusion to 
the instrumental logic of election violence in a context of state fragility.  
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However, citizen narratives contradicted the private press’s constructions of election violence as 
widespread, attributing it to a few “Bad Apples” discursive frame underpinned by essentialist 
discourses and positive stereotyping, implying that whatever violence was being committed it 
was the work of very few misguided individuals. 
As was observed in Chapter seven, citizen assessment of how the press reported on 
election violence yielded fruitful insights with all the respondents being in agreement that the 
press was polarised resulting in selective and partial reporting of election violence, thus 
confirming the existence of competing versions of reality about election violence discussed 
above. Citizens mainly attributed the partisan reportage of election violence to the existence of 
different “political agendas” and they pointed explained how theses partisan agendas were an 
impediment in getting a clear picture of what was happening in the country. Among a host of 
accusations against the press were anti-democratic practices such as, exaggerations, cover-ups, 
sensationalism, and selectivity, which motivated citizens to seek alternative means of 
information such as online and social media.  
This chapter argues that anti-democratic journalistic practices exhibited by the press in its 
representation of election violence are anathema to rooting of a civic culture because citizens 
become ignorant of their civic duties (Voltmer 2010). As evidenced by the citizen narratives in 
Chapter Seven, the implications are these anti-democratic practices promote apathy, cynicism, 
fear, mistrust, suspicion and intolerance in society. It was observed in this thesis how, particular 
styles of framing election violence induced fear among the citizens and this militated against 
democratic right to participate in public affairs.   
It is also worth noting, how fear triggered contradictory reflexes such as pain, talking, 
silence, political disengagement, engagement or new modes of communicating about politics. It 
was demonstrated that certain perceptions about the press either fostered passivity or goaded 
people to affirm their political affiliations, meaning that in some instances the press produced 
ambivalent reflexes. Thus contrary to the view that the press can promote political 
disengagement it may promote oppositional tendencies among people who are determined to see 
political change. To this extent findings in this thesis do not show a straightforward relationship 
between press discourses on election violence and citizen political behaviour.  
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In fact, the representation of election violence in the press elicits different forms of 
engagement in politics, some subtle, others not so subtle.  
But it is worth underscoring that the scale tilted more towards a demobilisation effect 
than political engagement. However, these findings challenge the uncritical view associated with 
the Rwanda model whereby the media tend to be blamed for having caused violence during the 
Rwanda-Burundi genocide of 1994 (see also Onyapedi and Ojedeyi 2011). 
9.3.2 Evolving Citizenship  
 
The findings of this study revealed that partisan press discourses on election violence 
spawned new ways of engaging with the press by the news readers, in content in the context of 
intensifying political polarisation. It was observed that, in order to circumvent the problem of 
unbalanced news readers resorted to a form of “news triangulation”, which entailed reading more 
than one newspaper at any one time and consulting “alternative” sources of news (such as social 
media, and other online sources) in order to get a balanced and complete view of what was 
happening in the country. There are several implications arising from this. The first is that the 
polarised political environment and partisan press reporting forced news readers to be vigilant 
against possible propaganda in the newspapers, forcing them to become more critical. This 
process marked the transformation from passive consumers of news to critical citizens, the basis 
upon which the term “citizen” is preferred in this study. The assumption is that readers who 
actively engage in the search for information on political issues are more than  mere news 
readers or audiences who are of academic interest to marketers they have political agency. 
Compared to citizenship which implies active participation in political issues, “readers” and 
“audience” connote passivity and the way in which respondents in this study actively looked for 
information is a demonstration that they had transited from being mere readers to citizens. Their 
scepticism about what they read in the newspapers as illustrated in the discourses is indicative of 
the active citizenship canvassed in this thesis. The second implication relates to citizens’ search 
for alternative news, particularly on social media which speaks to the limits of the normative 
liberal democratic model.  
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Norris alludes to this when she states that: 
Despite liberal ideals, in practice channels of communication can and often do fail to strengthen 
democracy, for many reasons. Limitations on the role of the press include explicit attempts at government 
propaganda; official censorship; legal restrictions on freedom of expression and publication- like stringent 
libel laws and official secrets acts; partisan bias in campaign coverage; oligopolies in commercial 
ownership; and more subtle unfairness in the balance of interests and those whose voices are commonly 
heard in the public sphere… (Norris 2004, 120). 
While the causes of the press’s failure to execute its democratic mandate are debatable, 
and are outside the scope of this study, their impact on citizens portends fascinating dynamics 
about the potency of new communication technologies as possible game-changers in political 
communication in the future, again a topic that warrants a separate investigation. It is, however, 
worth noting that the gap between what the press ought to do and what it actually does during 
elections has spawned “a parallel market of information”  (Moyo 2010, 53) whose full 
manifestations and impact on the democratic polity are yet to be grasped. 
9.3.3 Election Violence: The Ideal Role of the Press 
It was noted in this thesis that citizen discourses on election violence went beyond an 
expression of misgivings about the way the press was reporting on election violence, but 
produced rich insights on what citizens perceived to be the pitfalls of the press in reporting 
election violence. This data could contribute towards crafting a template on reporting political 
conflict in general and election violence in particular (see Table 9.1 below). It was noted in the 
thesis that when talking about the limitations of the press in reporting election violence, they 
accentuated a litany of ethical shortfalls linked to the interpretive journalistic style discussed 
above. It needs to be reiterated here that, citizen suggestions on the ideal role of the press in 
reporting election violence went beyond rehashing normative journalistic ethics such as fairness 
and balance since reporting election violence is considered a “special beat” requiring unique 
skills and sensitivity to context.  
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According to citizens, one of the cardinal requirements in reporting election violence is 
“evidence based” reporting, whereby the press are required to include concrete evidence about 
incidences of election violence, be it audio-visual material or whatever could authenticate a story 
beyond doubt. This is an indication of increasing reader cynicism about interpretative journalism 
whereby journalists tend to infuse their own opinions with information as opposed to objectivist 
journalism whereby facts  which is primarily fact-based (Esser and Umbritch 2014; Fink and 
Schudson 2013). 
 Esser and Umbritch (2014) note that Western newspapers have experienced a substantial 
change from the hard news paradigm to interpretive journalism style which is more geared 
towards answering the WHY question as opposed to the WHAT. Given that citizens perceive 
interpretive journalism as being less credible because of its judgemental and explanatory 
approach they advocated for an “Objectivist” reporting which is based on hard facts. It was clear 
from the findings that citizens are in favour of journalism of detachment and against any form of 
advocacy reporting during elections.  
At the same time they recommended some approaches that could improve the reporting 
of election violence such as follow-ups. These recommendations are manifestations of citizen 
dissatisfaction with existing journalism styles which have made journalism less credible and 
consequently less efficacious in reporting political conflicts. The objectivist journalism approach 
canvassed by the citizens is an antidote to the “activist journalism” model discussed. Table 9.1 
below compares the activist journalism model and the ideal “objectivist” model canvassed by the 
citizens. 
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Table 9.1: The Activist Journalism Model and the Objectivist Model Compared 
Activist Journalism Model Objectivist Journalism Model 
Extreme attachment to political causes 
Selective coverage 
Opinionated reportage 
Journalists embedded in political parties 
Highly interpretive 
Belligerence tone 
Extreme partisanship 
Speculative reporting 
Cover-ups 
No evidence/manufactured evidence 
Episodic 
Exaggerations/sensational 
Party loyalism 
Rumour mongering 
Single source/no source at all 
Inflammatory 
Demonisation 
Personalisation 
 
Detachment from political causes 
Balanced coverage 
Fact-based reporting 
Independent journalism 
Objective 
Peace-building 
Non-partisan 
Factual Reporting 
Highly transparent 
Evidence based reporting 
Follow-ups 
Neutral  
Professionalism 
Shuns rumour 
Multiple-sourcing 
indifference 
 
 
 
346 
 
As shown in Table 9.1 above, the activist journalism and the objectivist journalism 
models are polar opposites. The activist model represents what members of the public felt was 
the obtaining situation during election time, while the objectivist journalism model constitutes 
the normative ideal in reporting election violence. The essential difference between the “activist 
journalism” and ‘objectivist model’ is that the in the former, journalists lack independence while 
in the latter they are independent of political forces.   
It is imperative to emphasize that these models are conceived from the perspective of the 
public rather than the journalists themselves, since the idea was to give agency to citizens as a 
key component of the political communication process.  It is worth noting that the objectivist 
model of journalism contradicts the social constructionist approach adopted in this thesis in the 
sense that it presumes the existence of ‘pure’ reality out there. 
This thesis makes three important contributions to the body of knowledge of media and 
elections. Firstly, the discursive analytic approach canvassed in this thesis provides a solid 
foundation for understanding the myriad of ways in which the media are implicated in the 
distribution of power (Street 2001, 232) and how this power is brought to bear during political 
power contestations. Through their discursive practices the media circulate knowledge and 
meanings about phenomena and those meanings may acquire a hegemonic status by shaping 
perceptions and actions.  
Since a discursive approach to understanding election violence entails scrutinizing text, 
talk and social practices to reveal a particular account of reality, it provides a linkage with 
studies on political culture and political communication culture which have been previously 
studied from a framing perspective. Such an approach brings the study of media and politics into 
the realm of socialization, whereby media practitioners are viewed as products of a particular 
society with shared cultural values. It is these cultural values that should inform the practice of 
journalism. Paying particular attention to journalistic practices as cultural practices enables 
scholars to pay attention to those elements of journalistic practices that can predispose a society 
to conflict.  
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Such practices are not only found in news framing practice, but are also traceable to 
everyday interactions, practices and communication practices.  
Secondly, incorporating the audience/citizens into the political communication equation 
brings one closer to understanding the political communication process as a system comprising 
of different elements (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995). As noted in Chapter One, Blumler and 
Gurevitch (1995, 4) rightly observe that there has been a tendency in political communication to 
“under- or over-emphasize any single element of the political communication system”. The 
consequence of this has been that very little is known about the interactive processes between the 
elements of the political communications. This study makes a modest contribution to a holistic 
understanding of political communication process as a system comprising of different elements. 
  Thirdly, the thesis contributes to the existing body of literature on media and election 
violence, which, as noted in Chapter One is an understudied field of study. As argued in this 
thesis empirical studies on the relationship between the media and election violence remain 
inconclusive and the findings in this thesis could open pathways for more investigation using 
different methodological and theoretical approaches. 
 The modest observations made here could contribute towards building a template on 
political/conflict reporting in contexts best by historical, socio-economic and political cleavages 
so as to promote journalism that is more sensitive to contexts as opposed to the dominant 
journalistic approaches which are based on ‘universalism’. 
9.4 Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
 
The qualitative nature of this study meant that it refrained from making any inferences on 
the connection between the level of political violence and the volume of coverage over the 
period under study. Hence, it remains unknown whether the level of newspaper coverage can 
have an impact on the level of election violence. Only six printed newspapers were selected for 
this study, meaning that online newspapers, which, by virtue of their subterranean environment 
are not constrained by the restrictive press laws in the country and have a much more robust 
journalistic style, were not included in this study.  
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This means that the opportunity for comparing newspapers operating under different 
legal regimes was missed. A further limitation was that some newspapers, notably, the Daily 
News (and to some extent, Newsday) were not consistently published throughout the period 
under consideration (see Chapter One) and this meant that there was not comparable textual data 
from these newspapers since they did not report on some elections. As a result, their discursive 
constructions of certain elections could not be determined. In order to compensate for this gap, 
more privately-owned newspapers were included into the sample. The fact that the primary goal 
of the study was to map out the quality of reportage and not the quantity also meant that the lack 
of consistency in publication by such newspapers did not impact on the overall findings of the 
study that much. Another drawback was that the broadcasting media, which is largely in the 
hands of the government, and has played a crucial role in the country’s political struggles, was 
also not part of the study.  
 Notwithstanding the endeavour to broaden the political communication system by 
factoring in the audience in the system, politicians, who are an integral component of the 
political communication system, were not included as this could have widened the scope of the 
study beyond manageable limits in terms of focus, time and cost.  
Future studies could explore the relationship between media coverage and levels of 
election violence in order to ascertain the relationship between media coverage and election 
violence. There is also scope for a more systematic exploration on whether certain journalistic 
cultural and news framing practices pre-dispose certain societies to election violence. This is 
crucial for mapping out early warning signs for potential political conflict. Such studies may 
include cross-cultural studies exploring the link between journalistic practices and their impact 
on election violence.  
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9.5 Recommendations 
Previous studies on media and politics have tended to over-emphasize the importance of 
political economy and news production imperatives while ignoring cultural practices and values 
that underpin the practice of journalism in different contexts. Ownership and control cannot be 
discounted in the political matrix and media owners will always seek to shape the editorial 
agenda. This thesis recommends that the Zimbabwean press should find shared cultural, 
professional and ethical values so that they are able to hedge themselves against pressures from 
political parties, although, admittedly such pressures cannot be completely eliminated.  
The instrumentalisation of the journalism profession in Zimbabwe partly emanates from 
the lack of an integrative cultural and ethical ethos that could act as a buffer against political 
pressures. In the context of the economic crisis, the impact of economic factors cannot be 
discounted, but then a solid ethical and professional culture could help to alleviate these 
pressures. A unifying ethical code whose values are widely shared by all journalists could help 
foster a common identity among in the journalism profession which in turn would help reduce 
tendencies of ‘othering’ on the basis of the media house that one works for, which is what is 
happening at the moment, as indicated in Chapter Five.  
The reason why politics takes primacy is that politicians put a wedge between journalists 
who are supposed to be united but are divided along political lines as well as along ideological, 
professional values, level of education, and self-perceptions. The lack of common socialization 
background means the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (ZUJ) the body that represents journalists 
lacks a voice, both in terms of labour and professional issues. Its membership is voluntary, 
meaning that journalists can choose to be bound by its ethical code or not and yet they continue 
operating in the same environment. The thesis is however cognisant of the fact that socialization 
is a long term process and does not start in the newsroom but in the lecturer room (if not at 
home). 
 For a very long time the journalism curricula in Zimbabwe have been fragmented and 
not based on any common values that bind the profession. The study recommends that in order to 
bridge differences between journalists, entry into journalism should be based on qualifications, 
so that journalists have a common understanding of their democratic mandate.   
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The lack of a common qualification and professional socialisation has meant that each 
individual journalist is left to their own devices as there is no common code which brings 
journalists under one banner the way lawyers or doctors do. Nyamnjoh proffers a very persuasive 
argument in this regard.  
He posits that: 
To talk of a profession is to talk of people who distinguish themselves through their training and 
competence to practise a given trade. A profession is like a club: with its members, its by-laws, its values, 
its attitudes and ideals. It is going to admit or retain as members only those prepared to respect its vision of 
things, and its approach. Those whose values are different or whose attitudes do not conform will be 
excluded. One cannot talk of a profession where anyone can so what he likes how he likes (Nyamnjoh 
1996, 54-55). 
Although Nyamnjoh was writing in specific reference to the Cameroonian context, his 
statement has got a much wider application.  
The thesis recommends that in order to address the corrosive effects politics manifested 
through activist journalism the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists, the body which represents 
journalists in the country must have more robust programmes that engender a common identity 
among journalists. The argument that ownership constrains journalists from acting ethically is 
only acceptable to a certain degree, because it rests on the assumption that journalists do not 
have integrity to protect. The reason why journalism is encroaching on the border of political 
activism is not necessarily because of pressures from media owners, as was demonstrated in this 
thesis, but because they lack unifying professional and ethical values and a common perception 
as to what their role in society is.  
Yet it is worth sounding a cautionary note here. Journalism is a product of society, 
meaning that journalism and society shape each other in a reciprocal relationship. The attitudes, 
values, beliefs and ideas held by journalists mirror those of society.  
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Given the very low levels of tolerance exhibited in public and private spaces such as 
online user-generated comments where people’s identities are camouflaged it would appear that 
the values and attitudes and culture of reasoned deliberation envisaged in liberal democracy will 
take long to be rooted in fragile societies such as Zimbabwe and the activist journalism model 
exhibited during election time is just a symptom of this malaise. Certainly journalism cannot be 
ahead of its society. 
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9.6 Conclusion 
 
  This thesis has opened the debate on the ideal way in which the press should represent 
election violence and other political conflicts in fragile societies. Press and citizen discursive 
constructions of election violence was analysed from a Foucauldian discursive analytic approach. 
Press and citizen discourses on election violence were analysed from a social construction 
standpoint whereby they constitute regimes of truth or versions of reality that are subject to 
contestation. Thus media messages about election violence were treated as open-ended texts 
which can be interpreted anyhow. Thus the discretionary power of the press was challenged 
through citizen discursive constructions of election violence.  
Although there is no evidence to suggest that the press in Zimbabwe caused election 
violence during elections held between 2000 and 2013, the discursive practices deployed by the 
press engendered social tensions and an intolerant political culture which could predispose 
society to conflict and “moods of bitterness” (Mlambo 2005).  
Two competing journalism models were identified in relation to press discursive 
construction of election violence, namely the state-owned press’ ‘national’ interest journalism 
model and the privately-owned press’s human rights journalism model which found expression 
through the watchdog frame. Both models crystallised into an “activist journalism” model 
whereby the press were embedded in opposing political camps. As a consequence, the press 
exhibited a serious deficit in terms of ethical and professional conduct. The lack of a unifying 
ethical and political ethos among the journalists has created room for political parties to 
instrumentalise the press for political objectives. The thesis argues that the activist journalism 
model practised by sides of the press camp engendered political disengagement among citizens 
which found expression through cynicism and mistrust towards the press. This undermines the 
press’s democratic role of engendering positive civic cultures. 
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